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Summary
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows over the 
next five years will be pushed upwards by buoyant 
growth, competitive pressures and improvements 
in business environments in most countries. But 
macroeconomic, regulatory and geopolitical risks 
will constrain flows. Global FDI recovered strongly 
in 2004-06 after a deep three-year slump. Following 
a further increase in FDI inflows in 2007, albeit at a 
slower rate than annual average growth in 2004-06, 
a modest and temporary decline in global FDI inflows 
is expected in 2008. Global FDI inflows are projected 
to return to steady growth in 2009-11 and to reach 
US$1.6trn by 2011. 
There are a number of reasons to be optimistic 
about the medium-term prospects for FDI. These 
include the ongoing global trend towards better 
business environments, technological change and 
the search for competitively priced skills; and sharper 
global competition pushing companies to seek 
lower-cost destinations. On balance, most host and 
home governments will continue to encourage FDI. 
However, downside risks loom large. These range from 
the risks emanating from global financial turbulence 
to a host of political risks.
Executive summary
Table 1
Foreign direct investment projections 
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World FDI inflows 618.1 563.4 730.2 971.7 1,335.1 1,474.7 1,406.4 1,470.3 1,536.8 1,604.0
 % change, year on year -27.4 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4 10.5 -4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4
 % of GDP 1.9 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4
FDI inflows to developed countries 421.1 354.6 379.5 546.8 824.4 940.2 879.0 925.5 972.6 1017.3
 % change, year on year -25.2 -15.8 7.0 44.1 50.7 14.0 -6.5 5.3 5.1 4.6
 % of GDP 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
 % of world total 68.1 62.9 52.0 56.3 61.7 63.8 62.5 62.9 63.3 63.4
FDI inflows to emerging markets 197.0 208.9 350.7 424.9 510.7 534.6 527.4 544.8 564.2 586.7
 % change, year on year -31.5 6.0 67.9 21.1 20.2 4.7 -1.3 3.3 3.6 4.0
 % of GDP 2.5 2.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4
 % of world total 31.9 37.1 48.0 43.7 38.3 36.2 37.5 37.1 36.7 36.6
World stock of inward FDI 7,185 8,615 9,981 10,455 12,216 13,622 14,955 16,347 17,796 19,307
 % change, year on year 11.4 19.9 15.9 4.7 16.9 11.5 9.8 9.3 8.9 8.5
 % of GDP 22.1 23.6 24.3 23.6 25.6 25.9 26.5 27.4 28.3 29.0
Developed country stock of inward FDI 5,151 6,246 7,189 7,265 8,510 9,441 10,306 11,216 12,171 13,169
 % change, year on year 20.7 21.2 15.1 1.1 17.1 10.9 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.2
 % of GDP 20.6 22.2 23.0 22.3 24.9 25.6 26.4 27.8 29.2 30.4
 % of world total 71.7 72.5 72.0 69.5 69.7 69.3 68.9 68.6 68.4 68.2
Emerging markets stock of inward FDI 2,034 2,369 2,792 3,189 3,706 4,181 4,649 5,130 5,626 6,139
 % change, year on year -6.8 16.5 17.9 14.2 16.2 12.8 11.2 10.4 9.7 9.1
 % of GDP 26.2 27.1 27.2 26.3 26.3 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.3
 % of world total 28.3 27.5 28.0 30.5 30.3 30.7 31.1 31.4 31.6 31.8
Sources: National statistics; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Key trends
Key expected medium-term trends for FDI include the 
following.
● After a brief retrenchment, crossborder mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) will continue to drive 
global FDI. The US and the EU15 (inclusive of 
intra-EU inflows) will continue to dominate as 
recipients of world FDI. 
● Despite growing protectionist sentiment, the US is 
expected easily to retain its position as the world’s 
leading FDI recipient in 2007-11.
●  Among emerging markets, China will remain by far 
the main recipient, with almost 6% of the global 
total and 16% of projected inflows into emerging 
markets. 
● There is likely to be some acceleration of the 
relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing to 
emerging markets, although this is unlikely to be 
as dramatic as many observers hope or fear. 
● The offshoring of services will accelerate—which 
will also feed protectionist sentiment, although 
this form of internationalisation is accompanied 
by relatively modest capital flows. 
● Investment by companies from leading emerging 
markets is likely to continue to gain in importance. 
Benign economic outlook versus heightened 
political risk 
Foreign direct investors are generally a resilient 
breed and security and related risks should not be 
exaggerated. However, the risk of protectionism 
is now appreciable, the global geopolitical climate 
appears more threatening and the outlook for 
securing a stable and co-operative international 
trading and investment environment is worse than in 
the recent past.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are generally 
bullish about the medium-term global investment 
outlook, and appear to be sanguine about 
macroeconomic and financial risks, according to a 
global survey of 602 executives conducted for this 
report. However, these same executives also foresee 
a marked heightening of political risks that could 
undermine the success of their overseas investment 
strategies.
The survey reveals that political risk has jumped 
towards the top of corporate agendas. Political risk 
is seen as posing a considerably greater threat to 
business over the next five years than in the recent 
past. This is especially so for emerging markets, 
where generic political risk is identified as the main 
investment constraint. All four forms of political risk 
(risks of political violence, FDI protectionism, and 
threats associated with geopolitical tensions and 
governmental instability having a material impact on 
business) in emerging markets are seen as increasing 
over the next five years. For developed countries, 
this is true only of FDI protectionism, but there is 
widespread concern about the threat of political 
violence in leading countries such as the US and the 
UK, and apparent sensitivity to a range of geopolitical 
risks. The respondents in the survey expressed high 
rates of agreement with statements pointing to 
disruptions from key sources of global risk such as 
conflict between the West and Iran, Islamic radicalism 
and Russian-Western tensions.
The survey thus reveals an apparent disconnect 
between bullish sentiment on the investment 
outlook and heightened perceptions of political 
risk, especially in emerging markets. Opportunities 
appear to predominate over political risk concerns, 
even though these are seen as posing a considerably 
greater threat to business over the next five years 
than in the recent past. 
Strong growth in 2006
Global FDI inflows climbed to US$1.34trn in 2006, a 
37% increase in US dollar terms on the 2005 total and 
the first time since 2000 that global inflows surpassed 
the US$1trn mark. This was the third consecutive year 
of strong growth in global FDI inflows—by 30% or 
more each year in nominal US dollar terms—although 
the weakening US dollar has boosted the nominal US 
dollar-denominated totals. Global FDI inflows had 
plummeted by a cumulative 60% in US dollar terms in 
2001-03. Despite the recovery in 2004-06, FDI inflows 
as a percentage of the world’s GDP, at 2.8% in 2006, 
were still considerably lower than their peak at the 
end of the previous decade.
The global environment for FDI has been very 
8 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
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favourable in the past few years, and it improved 
further in 2006. Economic growth remained strong 
in the US and accelerated in other OECD countries. 
Most emerging markets performed well, with China’s 
economy continuing to power ahead at exceptionally 
high rates. This also helped to drive up commodity 
prices, which in turn fuelled growth in many other 
emerging markets. Corporate profitability was strong, 
interest rates were low, equity markets performed well 
and real estate prices have generally been high. Ample 
liquidity was available for companies to invest abroad. 
World trade growth was robust and risk-aversion on 
the part of international investors low. 
The growth in global FDI in 2006, as well as in 
2004-05, was in large part the result of very strong 
M&A activity, including in crossborder deals (which 
are the main form of FDI in the developed world). The 
increase in FDI inflows in 2006 was thus especially 
strong to developed economies—by more than 
50%. Growth in FDI flows to emerging markets was 
more modest—by 20% in 2006, similar to the rate 
of expansion in 2005. Thus the share of emerging 
markets in global FDI inflows declined to 38% in 2006 
from a peak of 48% in 2004. Nevertheless, FDI inflows 
to emerging markets reached a record of more than 
US$500bn in 2006. 
FDI inflows increased to record levels in most 
emerging regions. There were, however, two 
exceptions—FDI flows in 2006 declined in Sub-
Saharan Africa and in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Developing Asia received a record 
US$212bn. China was again far and away the main FDI 
recipient among emerging markets, with inflows of 
US$78bn (China’s rank dropped from third to fourth 
globally, behind the US, the UK and France).
Growth in new projects
The list of leading destination countries for FDI 
projects in 2006 differs somewhat from the list of 
leading recipients by FDI values. This is unsurprising, 
since FDI values are heavily influenced by crossborder 
M&As, rather than greenfield investments. China, 
with 1,378 projects in 2006, is ranked first by the 
number of new FDI projects, whereas it was fourth by 
FDI inflows. India jumps to second place—although a 
distant second behind China—with 979 new projects, 
ahead of the US with 725 projects, the UK (668) and 
France (582).
A slowdown and decline before 
renewed growth
FDI inflows in 2007 should be sustained by a 
strong global economy and the continued boom in 
crossborder M&As that occurred in the first half of 
2007. However, growth in 2007 in the global FDI 
total will be modest. Global inflows are projected at 
US$1.5trn, representing 10% growth on 2006. The 
high rates of recovery growth in FDI inflows of recent 
years will thus not be repeated this year, as a result 
of some slowdown in activity and tighter financing 
conditions in the light of volatility in financial 
markets. M&A activity will slow from 2005-06 levels. 
There will also be fewer privatisation opportunities in 
emerging markets compared with recent years.
Completed crossborder global M&As surged by 
more than 50% year on year in the first half of 2007. 
In particular, private equity funds were willing to 
inject capital into all kinds of deals. However, volatile 
financial markets will have a dampening impact on 
M&A activity in the second half of 2007 and into 2008. 
Even before the recent global financial turmoil, it 
was clear that the frenetic activity in global M&As in 
2006, which strengthened further in the first half of 
Table 2
New FDI projects, top recipient countries
 2005  2006  
 No. Share in world   No. Share in world   % change,  
  total (%)  total (%) year on year
China  1,237 11.84 1,378 11.66 11.4
India  590 5.65 979 8.29 65.9
US  563 5.39 725 6.14 28.8
UK  633 6.06 668 5.65 5.5
France  489 4.68 582 4.93 19.0
Russia  511 4.89 386 3.27 -24.5
Romania  261 2.50 362 3.06 38.7
Germany  271 2.59 333 2.82 22.9
Poland  271 2.59 324 2.74 19.6
Bulgaria  140 1.34 286 2.42 104.3
Source: Locomonitor.
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 US$ bn Rank % of world total  US$ bn Rank % of world total 
US 250.9 1 16.75 Finland 5.7 42 0.38
UK 112.9 2 7.54 Czech Republic 5.4 43 0.36
China 86.8 3 5.79 Hungary 5.1 44 0.34
France 78.2 4 5.22 New Zealand 5.0 45 0.34
Belgium 71.6 5 4.78 Ukraine 4.9 46 0.33
Germany 66.0 6 4.41 Algeria 4.7 47 0.32
Canada 63.2 7 4.22 Austria 4.0 48 0.27
Hong Kong 48.0 8 3.20 South Africa 3.2 49 0.21
Spain 44.9 9 2.99 Qatar 3.1 50 0.21
Italy 41.6 10 2.77 Pakistan 2.9 51 0.19
Netherlands 38.5 11 2.57 Serbia 2.8 52 0.19
Australia 37.8 12 2.52 Bulgaria 2.6 53 0.17
Russia 31.4 13 2.10 Croatia 2.6 54 0.17
Brazil 27.5 14 1.84 Philippines 2.4 55 0.16
Singapore 27.1 15 1.81 Slovakia 2.2 56 0.15
Sweden 26.1 16 1.74 Jordan 2.1 57 0.14
Mexico 22.7 17 1.51 Nigeria 2.1 58 0.14
India 20.4 18 1.36 Peru 2.0 59 0.14
Ireland 20.3 19 1.35 Angola 1.9 60 0.12
Turkey 20.0 20 1.33 Tunisia 1.8 61 0.12
Switzerland 18.2 21 1.22 Libya 1.6 62 0.11
Japan 13.3 22 0.89 Azerbaijan 1.6 63 0.11
UAE 12.8 23 0.85 Dominican Republic 1.6 64 0.10
Poland 12.6 24 0.84 Morocco 1.5 65 0.10
Chile 10.9 25 0.73 Greece 1.5 66 0.10
Portugal 9.1 26 0.61 Ecuador 1.5 67 0.10
Thailand 8.9 27 0.59 Estonia 1.4 68 0.09
Denmark 8.2 28 0.55 Cyprus 1.3 69 0.08
Saudi Arabia 7.9 29 0.52 Lithuania 1.2 70 0.08
Romania 7.7 30 0.51 Latvia 1.0 71 0.07
South Korea 7.2 31 0.48 Slovenia 1.0 72 0.07
Taiwan 7.1 32 0.47 Venezuela 1.0 73 0.07
Israel 7.0 33 0.47 Costa Rica 1.0 74 0.07
Malaysia 6.8 34 0.45 Bahrain 1.0 75 0.06
Kazakhstan 6.7 35 0.45 Bangladesh 0.7 76 0.05
Indonesia 6.6 36 0.44 El Salvador 0.6 77 0.04
Argentina 6.5 37 0.44 Cuba 0.5 78 0.04
Vietnam 6.5 38 0.44 Kuwait 0.4 79 0.03
Norway 6.4 39 0.43 Iran 0.4 80 0.02
Colombia 6.3 40 0.42 Sri Lanka 0.3 81 0.02
Egypt 6.0 41 0.40 Kenya 0.1 82 0.01
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
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2007, could not be sustained. The fallout from the 
US sub-prime loan market will reinforce further the 
slowdown in M&As that would have occurred in any 
case. Our global economic forecast assumes that 
the financial turbulence will be contained, in the 
light of the continuing healthy fundamentals of the 
world economy. Much of the M&A activity continues 
to be undertaken by strategic investors with healthy 
balance sheets and strong cash flows. The slowdown 
in M&As, and FDI, is thus likely to be a soft landing, 
rather than a hard crash like the one that occurred in 
2001. 
The increase in global FDI in 2007 is expected to 
be slightly stronger in the developed world (14% 
growth) than in emerging markets, where FDI inflows 
are projected to rise by only 5% in 2007, as strong 
growth in inflows into Latin America (by 20%) is offset 
by weak growth of flows to Asia and a slight decline of 
FDI flows to eastern Europe from their 2006 peak. FDI 
into China is likely to be only slightly up on the 2006 
figure; no growth in inflows to India is expected in 
2007, and further brisk growth in inflows to Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will 
be offset by a decline in flows to other east European 
subregions, including the EU’s new member states.
The deceleration of growth in FDI in 2007 is likely 
to be followed in 2008 by a modest fall (for the first 
time since 2003) in nominal global FDI inflows—by a 
projected 5%. Global inflows are projected to return 
to steady growth in 2009-11, and to reach US$1.6trn 
by 2011. 
Bullish investors
The survey responses on investment intentions are 
broadly consistent with our macroeconomic forecast 
for global FDI flows. We forecast annual average 
global FDI inflows of US$1.5trn in 2007-11, compared 
with an annual average of US$843bn in 2002-06. 
Two-fifths of respondents said that their companies 
would “substantially increase” investments outside 
their home markets over the coming five-year 
period compared with the previous five years, and 
52% said that they would increase their foreign 
investment “moderately”. Thus more than 90% 
expect their investments to increase; fewer than 1% 
of respondents expect to reduce substantially their 
foreign investments in 2007-11. These intentions 
were shared across all major industries we surveyed. 
The US will remain the top destination for FDI
The US will remain the main recipient of FDI, 
accounting for some 17% of the world total in 2007-11. 
However, FDI into the EU as a whole (including intra-
EU flows) will be significantly higher than this. The EU 
will also continue to outstrip the US as a source region 
for direct investment. FDI will remain geographically 
concentrated. The top ten host countries are expected 
to account for almost 60% of the world total; the top 
20 for three-quarters of the world total. Eight of the 
top 20 are emerging-market recipients. 
China will remain the biggest emerging-
market destination—
FDI into China is likely to rise slightly in 2007 to some 
US$80bn and to grow steadily thereafter to surpass 
US$90bn towards the end of the forecast period. 
China is still ranked by most international firms as 
their preferred investment destination, including 
in the survey conducted for this report. China is 
committed to meeting its World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) obligations, which should boost FDI. China’s 
price competitiveness will be maintained over the 
forecast period. However, despite the range of factors 
that underpin the expectation of buoyant FDI into 
China, some factors will keep FDI below potential. 
Although China will remain open to foreign capital—
and in some aspects will liberalise even further—there 
are signs of unease in China about FDI and of the FDI 
protectionism that is occurring elsewhere. 
—but India will disappoint
Despite the country’s dynamism and perceived 
increasing importance, actual FDI inflows to India 
will be relatively modest. India’s potential to attract 
FDI is vast and the government has in recent years 
been adopting measures to encourage FDI. Increased 
acquisitions by foreign companies will lead to higher 
FDI inflows. There will be a steady increase in FDI 
focused on growing domestic market opportunities, 
especially in consumer goods. FDI in manufacturing 
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 11
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will remain limited, although it should increase 
from a low base on the back of improvements in 
infrastructure. 
FDI inflows are set to increase substantially during 
the forecast period, but will still remain well below 
potential because of persistent business environment 
problems. The government’s FDI target of US$25bn 
for fiscal year 2007/08 (April-March) is unlikely to be 
met. Political resistance to privatisation, inflexible 
labour laws and poor infrastructure will also restrict 
FDI inflows.  
Medium-term drivers
Global FDI flows over the forecast period will be 
influenced by a combination of forces—most of them 
positive, pushing FDI flows upwards, but also some 
constraining factors that will keep flows below what 
they might otherwise be. One of the main factors 
underpinning our baseline FDI forecast is that the 
solid world economic recovery is set to continue. 
We forecast that global growth (at purchasing 
power parity—PPP—rates) will remain buoyant; it is 
forecast to average 4.6% a year over 2007-11. The 
strong global performance reflects in large part the 
increasing weight of fast-growing emerging markets, 
especially China and India.
Other reasons to expect continued growth in FDI 
include the ongoing global trend towards better 
business environments; technological change and 
the search for competitively priced skills; and sharper 
global competition that will push companies to grow 
through acquisitions or seek lower-cost destinations. 
The degree of firms’ transnationalisation is also clearly 
linked to their performance, as also illustrated by the 
results of our survey. Firms that had a high degree of 
transnationalisation—those with more than 25% of 
revenue or employees outside their home markets—
were more likely to have above-average financial 
performance than less internationalised firms.
The investment climate
Recent years have brought considerable improvement 
in the global investment climate. The liberalisation 
of economies and of policies towards foreign 
investors has acted as a spur to FDI. Our business 
environment rankings model provides a quantitative 
representation of these trends. The business 
environment rankings paint a relatively optimistic 
picture of the global operating environment over the 
next five years. On baseline assumptions, the global 
trend for liberalisation and deregulation is expected 
to continue. 
A model of FDI determinants shows FDI to be very 
sensitive to the quality of the business environment. 
There is scope in almost all countries for still more 
improvement than we assume will occur over the 
medium term, with striking implications for FDI. For 
example, under the assumption that all countries’ 
business environment scores for 2007-11 were a 
mere 5% higher than we actually assume, our model 
predicts annual average global FDI flows of US$1.7trn 
rather than the actual forecast of US$1.5trn. 
The difference of US$200bn per year, or US$1trn 
cumulatively over the whole 2007-11 period, is a 
measure of the huge opportunity cost, in terms of 
forgone FDI and thus development, of suboptimal 
policies.
Constraining factors
Several factors will work to dampen FDI flows and 
keep them below what they would otherwise be. FDI 
protectionism is one of those factors. Appeals to 
security threats and fears about the consequences of 
globalisation have prompted several governments 
to review and in some cases tighten their FDI 
regulations. Although instances of protectionism are 
expected to remain limited, this will nevertheless have 
some negative impact. At least some large crossborder 
deals are likely to be prevented. Some firms may be 
reluctant to engage in a crossborder deal if they feel 
that opposition from the host government might be 
an issue. Instances of outward FDI protectionism 
as well as regulatory restrictions in some emerging 
markets will also have some adverse impact.
Risks loom large
Our baseline forecast for global FDI flows in 2007-11 
assumes that the effects of a host of positive factors 
for FDI growth will be tempered to an extent by factors 
such as growing opposition to foreign capital in 
12 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
some countries and the negative impact of a host of 
political risks. However, it is possible that negative 
international political and economic developments 
could be worse than assumed, with a much more 
negative impact on global FDI than in our baseline 
assumptions. 
The host of economic risks to our baseline 
range from overleveraged financial institutions to 
the impact of commodity price volatility. Turmoil 
in financial markets could be sharper and more 
prolonged than is assumed; the slowdown in the US 
could be steeper than expected; there could be the 
need for a more aggressive monetary policy stance 
by central banks in response to higher inflationary 
pressures. A sharp, sustained downward turn in global 
equity markets would, for example, put paid to the 
growth in M&As that underpins much FDI.
A rise in FDI protectionism—
Following decades of liberalisation and openness 
to FDI, protectionism is on the rise and there is 
a danger that it will intensify. To the extent that 
there is a backlash against globalisation and the 
economic uncertainty it entails, FDI (like free trade) 
becomes suspect, especially when political and social 
concerns supplement economic motives. There are 
also FDI-specific issues that are fuelling protectionist 
sentiment.
Alongside the continuing dominant trend of 
liberalisation towards FDI, there has also been a 
noticeable trend in recent years—in a number of 
countries and sectors—towards various forms of 
FDI protectionism. These include moves in several 
countries to tighten existing investment rules or to 
enact new rules to regulate foreign investments and 
protect “strategic sectors” from foreign investors. 
Table 4
Business environment ranks and scores
 2007-11 2007-11 2002-06 2002-06 Change in Change
 Total score Rank Total score Rank total score in rank
Denmark 8.76 1 8.69 2 0.06 1
Finland 8.75 2 8.64 3 0.11 1
Singapore 8.72 3 8.71 1 0.01 -2
Switzerland 8.71 4 8.59 7 0.12 3
Canada 8.70 5 8.63 5 0.07 0
Hong Kong 8.68 6 8.57 8 0.11 2
US 8.65 7 8.64 4 0.01 -3
Netherlands 8.64 8 8.53 9 0.11 1
Australia 8.60 9 8.16 12 0.44 3
UK 8.60 10 8.62 6 -0.02 -4
Sweden 8.60 11 8.34 11 0.25 0
Ireland 8.57 12 8.49 10 0.07 -2
Germany 8.46 13 7.97 16 0.48 3
New Zealand 8.31 14 8.15 13 0.16 -1
Belgium 8.30 15 8.07 14 0.23 -1
Austria 8.24 16 7.87 17 0.36 1
Norway 8.14 17 7.99 15 0.15 -2
France 8.12 18 7.87 18 0.25 0
Taiwan 8.11 19 7.66 21 0.45 2
Chile 8.04 20 7.77 19 0.27 -1 
Note. The model covers 82 of the largest economies in the world and scores each of these countries on a range of indicators affecting the business environment—for a five-year historical 
period (currently 2002-06) and a five-year forecast period (2007-11).
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Crossborder M&A deals have become a bone of 
contention in some countries. M&A deals have been 
blocked in both the developing and the developed 
world. In many countries, more rigorous screening 
procedures have been adopted. The growing 
involvement of private equity funds in crossborder 
M&As has generated considerable public criticism 
in some developed countries. The rise of sovereign 
investment agencies has reinforced calls for restrictive 
measures.
Several Latin American countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Argentina, and Venezuela) have been renegotiating 
contracts with MNCs. Although China’s foreign 
investment regime remains open, acquisitions of 
Chinese firms by foreign investors are increasingly 
being questioned. In Russia several oil sector 
contracts with MNCs have been renegotiated, or 
MNCs have been forced to sell parts of their stakes, 
and limits on foreign investment in strategic sectors 
are being introduced. There has been an increase 
in disputes between MNCs and host governments in 
recent years. More than 200 international arbitration 
cases concerning investment projects have been 
initiated in the past few years.
A large proportion of our survey respondents 
reported that they had experienced blocked M&A 
deals. There is concern that FDI protectionism will 
increase significantly in most emerging-market 
regions. There is also concern about FDI protectionism 
in the US, although investors appear more sanguine 
about the threat in other developed countries.
—especially in the energy sector
The biggest investment risks are in the energy sector. 
The political risks of energy investments wax and wane 
with the tightness of global oil supplies. When markets 
are tight and oil prices are high, as they are now, 
existing contracts are renegotiated to the benefit of 
host countries, and some of the hydrocarbon reserves 
are re-nationalised. The absence of internationally 
agreed norms for foreign investment in energy hinders 
economic development in the host countries, foments 
aggressive geopolitical competition that threatens 
global security, and will block the scale of investment 
and co-operation necessary to overhaul a strained 
global energy system.
Political risks facing FDI in energy are likely to 
continue to rise in the coming years. The tensions 
will reflect the large gaps in income between rich 
and poor countries, which easily inspire a backlash 
against foreign investment within poor host countries 
(such as Bolivia); the growing scramble for natural 
resources in a fast-growing world economy, especially 
in view of the rising resource demands of China, and 
the possible peaking of conventional oil supplies in 
the coming decade; and the rising environmental 
threats, which will put many natural-resource-based 
FDI projects under increased scrutiny. 
Outward FDI from emerging markets
Considerable attention is being devoted to increasing 
outward investment by companies from emerging 
markets. Outward FDI flows from emerging markets 
amounted to some US$160bn in 2005. This increased 
to an estimated US$210bn in 2006—at 17% of the 
global total, a slight decline from the share in 2005. 
Rapid economic growth, especially in Asia and oil-
US
Asia












How high is the risk of increased FDI protectionism in 
the following markets during the next five years, in 
your view? 
(% of respondents)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
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exporting countries, high prices for raw materials 
and continuing investment liberalisation in some 
countries have underpinned strong growth in 
outflows. 
Until relatively recently most FDI flows from 
emerging markets took the form mainly of so-called 
South-South investments. But MNCs based in 
emerging economies have also in more recent years 
undertaken some large, high-profile acquisitions in 
developed countries that have attracted considerable 
attention. The rise of multinationals from the South 
is an important phenomenon. It is also feeding rising 
protectionist sentiment in parts of the developed 
world, which makes it all the more important to keep 
the development of emerging-market outward FDI in 
perspective. There are still relatively few companies 
from the South on the list of the worlds’ major MNCs. 
Despite the increase in FDI outflows from emerging 
markets in recent years, these are still dwarfed by 
investments originating in the developed world. 
Although it is set to increase in the future, the present 
degree of penetration of developed countries by 
Southern capital is minuscule. 
The US will set the tone
Developments in the US will be of critical importance 
to overall global trends. Thus, for example, following 
the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
movement of people and goods in and out of the US 
is not as free as it was previously. The US is no longer 
as hospitable to foreign students and migrants. Nor 
will the US operate an open-door policy with respect 
to foreign capital: occasionally it will block foreign 
takeovers of key US companies, which has become 
more likely following recent legislative changes. All 
this will make for a constrained globalisation and for 
less FDI than might otherwise be the case. There is, 
furthermore, a risk of more intensive protectionism 
than we assume in our baseline forecast, which would 
then also spill over to other parts of the world.
The management of political risk
The survey revealed that many firms are not 
addressing adequately their expectations of 
increased political risk. Firms that outperformed 
their competitors paid significantly more attention 
to assessing and taking measures to manage 
political risk. Better-performing companies, with 
better political risk assessment capabilities, also 
experienced fewer cases of expropriation, government 
payment default, import/export licence cancellation, 
or currency transfer restriction than other firms in our 
survey sample.
The virtuous circle of globalisation
Our survey also demonstrated that firms that 
exhibited a high degree of transnationalisation—
those with more than 25% of revenue or employees 
outside their home markets—were significantly 
more bullish in their investment outlook than firms 
that are comparatively more focused on domestic 
operations. Of firms with more than one-quarter 
of their employees working overseas, 45% expect 
foreign investment to increase substantially in 
2007-11, compared with 34% of those with a greater 
home-market focus. Crucially, there also appears to 
be a link between the degree of transnationalisation 
and companies’ performance: those firms in our 
survey with a relatively greater presence in foreign 
markets were more likely to report better than average 
financial performance over the past two years (62% 
compared with 53% for the less internationalised 
firms). 
On most survey questions, the degree of 
transnationalisation did not appear to be related 
to significant differences in perceptions of political 
risk. But there were a few exceptions, suggesting 
that the experience, and confidence, gained from 
operating intensively in foreign destinations led 
to a more sanguine view of some types of political 
risk. Thus, perhaps ironically, more intensive 
internationalisation appeared to be associated with 
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Global foreign direct investment to 2011
By Laza Kekic, Director for Country Forecasting Services, 
Economist Intelligence Unit
Introduction
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
will be pushed upwards by buoyant growth, 
competitive pressures and improvements in business 
environments in most countries. But factors such as 
macroeconomic, regulatory and geopolitical risks 
will constrain flows. Global FDI recovered strongly 
in 2004-06 after a deep three-year slump. Following 
a further increase in FDI inflows in 2007, albeit at a 
slower rate than annual average growth in 2004-06, 
a modest and temporary decline in global FDI inflows 
is expected in 2008. Global FDI inflows are projected 
to return to steady growth in 2009-11, at annual rates 
that are approximately equal to the rate of growth in 
world GDP, and to reach US$1.6trn by 2011. 
There are a number of reasons to be optimistic 
about the medium-term prospects for FDI. These 
include the ongoing global trend towards better 
business environments, technological change and 
the search for competitively priced skills; and sharper 
global competition pushing companies to seek 
lower-cost destinations. However, downside risks 
loom large. These range from global macroeconomic 
imbalances to a range of political risks. 
FDI inflows in 2006
Global FDI inflows climbed to US$1.34trn in 2006, a 
37% increase in US dollar terms on the 2005 total and 
the first time since 2000 that global inflows surpassed 
the US$1trn mark. This was the third consecutive year 
of strong growth in global FDI inflows—by 30% or 
more each year in nominal US dollar terms—although 
it should also be kept in mind that the weakening 
US dollar has boosted the nominal US dollar-
denominated totals.1 The growth in global FDI in 
2006 would have even been even stronger were it not 
for two large accounting transactions that distorted, 
and on a net basis inflated, the 2005 total. Taking out 
these two accounting transactions, global FDI inflows 
would have amounted to US$892bn in 2005 and the 
growth in FDI inflows in 2006 would have been 50%.2
The 2004-06 recovery in global FDI flows followed a 
deep slump. World FDI flows had experienced a sharp 
decline after 2000, in line with the global economic 
slowdown and the end of the previous merger and 
acquisition (M&A) boom, reaching a nadir in 2003. 
Global FDI inflows plummeted by a cumulative 60% in 
US dollar terms in 2001-03 (no previous FDI downturn 
in recent decades had been as severe or had exceeded 
two years). Despite the recovery in 2004-06, FDI 
inflows as a percentage of the world’s GDP, at 2.8% 
in 2006, were still considerably lower than their level 
at the end of the previous decade. The 2006 inflows 
were also still slightly below the peak of US$1.4trn 
recorded in 2000.
The increase in FDI inflows in 2006 was especially 
strong to developed economies—by more than 50%,3 
which followed almost equally strong growth, of 44%, 
in 2005. Growth in FDI flows to emerging markets was 
more modest—by 20% in 2006, similar to the rate 
of expansion in 2005. Thus the share of emerging 
markets in global FDI inflows declined to 38% in 2006 
from a peak of 48% in 2004. Nevertheless, FDI inflows 
to emerging markets reached a record of more than 
US$500bn in 2006. It should also be kept in mind 
that the 2005-06 FDI trend in emerging markets was 
preceded by exceptionally strong growth of 68% in 
2004 and that the FDI slump at the beginning of this 




The picture looks significantly different in some 
respects if we express FDI inflows in terms of constant 
prices, using US dollar-based import price indices, 
rather than in terms of current US dollars.4 The rate 
of decline in world FDI inflows in 2001-03 looks 
1. The 2006 increase 
followed 33% growth in 
global inflows in 2005 
to US$972bn, and 30% 
growth in 2004.
2. The 2005 FDI inflows 
total was pushed in 
an upward direction 
by US$115bn for the 
UK (owing to the 
reorganisation of the 
Shell Transport and 
Trading Company and the 
Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company into Royal Dutch 
Shell, an essentially 
accounting operation 
that was recorded in the 
UK’s balance of payments 
as an FDI inflow), 
and in a downward 
direction for Australia 
(a net disinvestment of 
US$37bn resulting from 
a reorganisation by News 
Corporation). 
3. Or by as much as 76% 
if the 2005 base total 
is adjusted by netting 
out the accounting 
transactions in Australia 
and the UK.
4. The estimates are based 
on deflating nominal US 
dollar totals by US dollar-
based import price indices, 
with base year 2000, for 
more than 80 countries.
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somewhat deeper when measured at constant prices 
and the recovery weaker in 2004-06 than at current 
prices (global FDI inflows in constant prices grew at 
an annual average rate of 26% in 2004-06, compared 
with annual average growth of 33% in nominal US 
dollar terms). At current prices, global FDI inflows in 
2006 were only 5% below the peak level reached in 
2000; in constant prices in 2006 they were still some 
26% below the 2000 level.
The global environment for FDI has been very 
favourable in the past few years, and it improved 
further in 2006. Economic growth remained strong 
in the US and accelerated in other OECD countries. 
Most emerging markets performed well, with China’s 
economy continuing to power ahead at exceptionally 
high rates. This also helped to drive up commodity 
prices, which in turn fuelled growth in many other 
emerging markets. Corporate profitability was strong, 
interest rates were low, equity markets performed well 
and real estate prices have generally been high. Ample 
liquidity was available for companies to invest abroad. 
World trade growth was robust and risk-aversion on 
the part of international investors low. 
Boom in crossborder deals
The growth in global FDI in 2006, as well as in 2004-05, 
was in large part the result of very strong M&A 
activity, including in crossborder deals (which are the 
main form of FDI in the developed world). Many 
companies had accumulated large amounts of cash on 
their balance sheets, and many have engaged in more 
Table 1
FDI inflows
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
World total 491.8 712.9 1,113.8 1,408.3 851.1 618.1 563.4 730.2 971.7 1,335.1
 % change, year on year 23.8 45.0 56.2 26.4 -39.6 -27.4 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4
Developed countries 279.0 493.8 853.0 1,125.0 563.4 421.1 354.6 379.5 546.8 824.4
 % change, year on year 21.4 77.0 72.7 31.9 -49.9 -25.2 -15.8 7.0 44.1 50.7
 % of world total 56.7 69.3 76.6 79.9 66.2 68.1 62.9 52.0 56.3 61.7
Emerging markets 212.8 219.1 260.9 283.3 287.8 197.0 208.9 350.7 424.9 510.7
 % change, year on year 27.2 2.9 19.1 8.6 1.6 -31.5 6.0 67.9 21.1 20.2
 % of world total 43.3 30.7 23.4 20.1 33.8 31.9 37.1 48.0 43.7 38.3
North America 114.9 197.2 308.1 380.8 171.6 96.6 60.6 122.0 128.4 252.7
Western Europe 151.1 285.3 527.6 718.3 373.6 296.7 277.0 212.6 455.5 554.8
 EU15 138.2 269.8 505.9 688.8 357.3 287.4 252.0 202.5 433.6 496.5
Eastern Europe 24.1 26.7 29.1 29.5 30.0 36.0 35.1 66.9 77.1 105.9
Asia-Pacific 111.0 100.8 124.2 165.9 121.8 116.1 110.9 186.0 144.1 238.6
 Developing Asia 98.1 89.4 107.3 142.6 102.6 88.2 93.9 138.6 174.1 212.4
Latin America & the Caribbean 73.6 85.5 108.8 98.3 131.2 54.7 46.9 105.0 106.3 102.5
Middle East 7.1 8.2 4.9 6.6 6.5 5.5 14.2 18.7 30.4 46.2
North Africa 1.5 2.5 2.2 3.2 2.7 3.4 5.2 7.8 14.8 22.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.4 6.7 9.0 5.7 13.6 9.0 13.4 11.3 15.2 12.2
Sources: National statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit; IMF; UNCTAD.
Global FDI inflows
(US$ bn)











20 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
PART 1  GLOBAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO 2011 WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Table 2
FDI inflows in current and constant prices 
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
In current US$ terms        
World total 1,113.8 1,408.3 851.1 618.1 563.4 730.2 971.7 1,335.1
 % change, year on year 56.2 26.4 -39.6 -27.4 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4
Developed countries 853.0 1,125.0 563.4 421.1 354.6 379.5 546.8 824.4
 % change, year on year 72.7 31.9 -49.9 -25.2 -15.8 7.0 44.1 50.7
Emerging markets 260.9 283.3 287.8 197.0 208.9 350.7 424.9 510.7
 % change, year on year 19.1 8.6 1.6 -31.5 6.0 67.9 21.1 20.2
In constant 2000 US$ terms        
World total 1,123.7 1,408.3 877.4 631.7 520.2 642.1 794.5 1,039.8
 % change, year on year 61.1 25.3 -37.7 -28.0 -17.7 23.4 23.7 30.9
Developed countries 855.4 1,125.0 585.7 431.7 319.4 326.3 439.9 633.7
 % change, year on year 77.0 31.5 -47.9 -26.3 -26.0 2.2 34.8 44.1
Emerging markets 268.4 283.3 291.6 200.0 200.8 315.8 354.7 406.1
 % change, year on year 24.8 5.5 2.9 -31.4 0.4 57.3 12.3 14.5
Sources: National statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD; Economist Intelligence Unit estimates for constant price totals.
Table 3 
Completed crossborder M&A deals
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 Developed  Emerging  World % change,   Developed countries,  
 countries markets  year on year % of world total
2000 1,088 88 1,176 49.0 92.5
2001 548 98 646 -45.1 84.8
2002 378 62 440 -31.9 85.9
2003 324 57 381 -13.4 85.0
2004 422 68 490 28.6 86.1
2005 589 137 726 48.2 81.1
2006 768 165 933 28.5 82.3 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit based on data from the following sources: Dealogic, as reported by OECD; Thomson Financial as reported by UNCTAD; Bloomberg.
Index of global FDI inflows
(2000=100)
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restructuring, a trend that has also supported 
crossborder M&As. Another element is the increase in 
transactions being undertaken by private equity 
groups, which raised large funds and concluded a 
series of multi-billion-dollar deals.5
 According to the company Dealogic, global M&As—
both domestic and crossborder—were worth a record 
US$3.9trn in 2006. This was a 30% increase over the 
US$3trn recorded in 2005, which itself represented a 
40% increase over 2004. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit estimates that one-quarter of M&A deals in 2006 
were crossborder transactions.6
The UK in particular was the target country for 
some of the largest crossborder M&As in 2005-06. The 
largest of these was the takeover of the telephone 
operator O2 by Telefonica of Spain for US$31bn 
(announced in 2005 and completed in 2006). In 
all, in the list of top crossborder deals completed in 
2006 (see Table 4), seven out of the top 20 involved 
purchases of UK companies.
Deal-making was spread fairly evenly 
across the major sectors—mining and metals, 
telecommunications, the financial sector, and energy 
and utilities. There was also a sprinkling of major 
deals in some other sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
technology and media (see Table 4).
It is noticeable that no companies based in 
emerging markets were among the targets for the top 
M&A deals in 2006. The share of emerging markets 
in global crossborder M&A sales has been gradually 
increasing in the past few years—to reach almost 20% 
of the total in 2005-06, which is still considerably less 
than their share in global FDI inflows. A higher share 
than in the past of FDI inflows into emerging markets 
is now made up of M&As as opposed to greenfield 
investment. However, the trend of increasing M&A 
sales in emerging markets does not appear to be 
accelerating. Indeed, the growth in crossborder M&As 
in 2006 was somewhat stronger in the developed 
world than in emerging markets. Even if the emerging 
markets’ share in total M&A activity creeps up in the 
coming years, crossborder M&A activity will continue 
to be heavily dominated by the developed countries 
for some time to come. 
This view also appeared to be supported by the 
survey of multinational corporations (MNCs) that was 
conducted for this report. Respondents in the survey 
said that greenfield investments would continue to 
be their primary route for investment into emerging 
markets in the coming five years. M&As lagged 
behind, and the share of those who cited M&As as the 
preferred vehicle for investing into emerging markets 
rose only slightly for 2007-11 plans compared with 
the situation in the previous five-year period (see 
the article on the Economist Intelligence Unit survey 
elsewhere in this volume).
FDI flows to the developed world
FDI inflows to developed countries increased by more 
than 50% in 2006, to US$824bn, although, after three 
years of recovery from the deep slump at the beginning 
of the decade, inflows in 2006 were still well below the 
peak total of US$1.1trn recorded in 2000. 
The growth in global FDI in 2006 was in particular 
boosted by a recovery in FDI to the US, after it had 
dropped to an exceptionally low level in 2005. 
The US was again the world’s top recipient, with 
US$183.6bn in inflows, having been displaced from 
the top spot in 2005 by the UK. Many west European 
firms with improved earnings were drawn to the US, 
where buoyant economic growth and a weaker US 
dollar made US companies attractive acquisition 
propositions. The UK was in second place in 2006, 
with US$137.7bn in inflows. This was a considerable 
decline on the US$196bn total recorded in 2005. 
However, if the Royal Dutch Shell restructuring that 
has been mentioned is netted out of the 2005 figure, 
FDI inflows into the UK in 2006 were higher than in 
the previous year. The UK has been a major beneficiary 
of the global recovery in crossborder M&As. The value 
of overseas companies’ acquisitions in the UK hit an 
all-time high of US$112bn in 2006, up by almost one-
third from the 2005 total, which was already strong.
Strong growth of  inflows into the euro zone
FDI flows into the euro zone surged by 51% in 2006, to 
US$325bn, almost one-quarter of the world total. This 
followed even stronger growth, by 76%, in 2005. The 
2005-06 recovery followed a four-year steep decline 
of FDI flows to the euro zone—to a low of US$122bn 
5. The relationship 
between the movement 
in global FDI flows and 
crossborder M&As has 
been extremely close, 
at least since the early 
1990s, as illustrated by 
the graph on the previous 
page.
6. Economist Intelligence 
Unit estimates based on 
data from the following 
sources: Dealogic, as 
reported by the OECD; 
Thomson Financial as 
reported by UNCTAD; and 
Bloomberg.
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in 2004 from the peak total of US$507bn recorded 
in 2000. The largest host for inward FDI in the euro 
zone in 2006 was France, which attracted inflows of 
US$86.9bn. In the absence of large crossborder deals 
(with the partial exception of foreign investment in 
a privatised toll roads operator), FDI was dominated 
by reinvested earnings and intra-company loans. 
Germany was the second main recipient country in the 
euro zone, with inflows of US$43.4bn. FDI inflows into 
Italy—traditionally a low recipient country—almost 
doubled in 2006, to US$39bn, mainly as a result of 
some major financial sector M&As. 
As the world’s second-largest economy (at market 
exchange rates) and boasting one of the world’s 
largest consumer markets (with a wealthy population 
of nearly 130m), Japan should, in theory, offer inward 
investors ample rewards. The reality is rather 
different. FDI inflows into Japan were more than 
halved in 2005 to US$3.2bn (a mere 0.1% of GDP, one 
of the lowest ratios in the world), from what was a 
modest average of US$7.3bn in 2001-04, and large 
disinvestments meant that inward FDI flows turned 
negative, at US$-6.8bn, in 2006. Officially, the 
Japanese government welcomes inward FDI. In 
practice, however, Japan’s FDI regime remains 
difficult, owing to the complex regulatory 
Table 4
Major completed crossborder M&As, 2006
Investor company Investor country Target company Target country Value of deal  Sector
    (US$ bn)
ARCELOR MITTAL Netherlands ARCELOR Luxembourg 32.0 Metals
TELEFONICA SA Spain O2 PLC UK 30.6 Telecoms
FERROVIAL Spain BAA LTD UK 20.0 Utilities
XSTRATA PLC Switzerland FALCONBRIDGE LTD Canada 18.0 Metals
LINDE AG Germany BOC GROUP PLC UK 16.9 Industrial
MACQUARIE BANK LIMITED Australia THAMES WATER PLC UK 14.9 Utilities
ALCATEL-LUCENT France LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC US 15.3 Telecoms
MULTIPLE ACQUIRERS – SOCIETE DES AUTOROUTES PARIS France 12.1 Utilities
AXA France WINTERTHUR SCHWEIZ VERS-REG Switzerland 10.9 Financial
BNP PARIBAS France BANCA NAZIONALE LAVORO-ORD Italy 11.4 Financial
OSPREY ACQUISITIONS Australia AWG PLC UK 10.8 Utilities
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL IND LTD Israel IVAX CORP US 10.0 Pharma
MULTIPLE ACQUIRERS – NXP BV Netherlands 9.5 Media and entertainment
ABERTIS INFRAESTRUCTURAS SA Spain SANEF France 9.3 Utilities
GOLDCORP INC Canada GLAMIS GOLD LTD US 7.6 Metals
PORTS CUSTOMS & FREE ZONE CO UAE PENINSULAR & ORIENTAL STEAM UK 7.8 Utilities
SWISS RE-REG Switzerland GE GLOBAL INSURANCE HOLDING US 7.7 Financial
COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN France BPB LTD UK 7.6 Building materials
OLD MUTUAL PLC UK SKANDIA FORSAKRINGS AB Sweden 6.6 Financial
NYCOMED HOLDING AS Denmark ALTANA PHARMA AG Germany 5.8 Pharma
HILTON HOTELS CORP US LODGING ASSETS UK 5.7 Media and entertainment
NOVARTIS AG-REG Switzerland CHIRON CORP US 5.7 Pharma
TOSHIBA CORP Japan WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CO LLC US 5.4 Consumer goods
BASF AG Germany BASF CATALYSTS LLC US 5.4 Chemical
ARCELOR Luxembourg DOFASCO INC Canada 5.2 Metals
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES US ATI TECHNOLOGIES INC Canada 5.0 Technology
Source: Bloomberg.
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environment that appears designed to protect 
domestic players. In addition, high labour costs, weak 
growth in recent years and cultural barriers also help 
to explain the low FDI levels.7
 
FDI flows to emerging markets
FDI flows to emerging markets increased by 20% in 
2006, to US$511bn. As noted, the increase of FDI to 
emerging markets in 2005-06 was weaker than that 
to developed countries, in part because there had 
already been a strong emerging-market recovery in 
2004, and the general post-2000 slump in FDI had 
been less severe in emerging markets than in the 
developed world. 
Nevertheless, FDI flows to emerging markets 
surpassed US$500bn for the first time. As in the 
developed world, increased corporate profits 
and favourable financing conditions fuelled FDI 
growth. Emerging markets have performed well in 
recent years, as the global environment has been 
supportive and they have improved their economic 
fundamentals—many have been implementing 
market-friendly reforms and most have consolidated 
macroeconomic stability. Thus, although cyclical 
factors, such as strong external demand and the 
commodity price boom, have predominated in 
explaining recent FDI growth, in some countries 
structural factors have also been at play. 
Services dominate inflows
FDI in emerging markets’ banking, telecoms and real 
estate sectors was particularly strong, as several 
countries relaxed restrictions on foreign ownership 
and undertook major privatisations in services. Most 
of the largest M&As in 2006 in emerging markets 
occurred in the banking and telecoms sectors. FDI in 
real estate was strong in India, Turkey, and several 
countries in eastern Europe and the Middle East 
and North Africa. More than half of the FDI stock in 
emerging markets is now in the services sector.8
FDI inflows increased to record levels in most 
emerging regions. There were, however, two 
exceptions—FDI flows in 2006 declined in Sub-
Saharan Africa and in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Developing Asia received a record 
Table 5
FDI inflows, main recipients
(US$ bn)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
North America     
US 74.5 53.1 122.4 99.4 183.6
Canada 22.2 7.5 -0.4 28.9 69.0
Western Europe     
Belgium 18.1 34.5 44.4 32.0 72.5
France 49.5 43.1 38.7 70.7 86.9
Germany 53.6 30.9 -8.9 35.3 43.4
Ireland 29.5 22.4 -11.0 -29.7 12.8
Italy 14.7 16.5 16.8 19.6 39.0
Netherlands 25.5 20.4 2.0 40.4 3.8
Spain 40.0 25.6 24.8 24.6 20.2
Sweden 12.2 5.0 11.5 10.2 27.2
UK 25.5 27.6 77.9 195.6 137.7
Eastern Europe     
Czech Republic 8.5 2.0 5.0 11.6 6.0
Hungary 3.0 2.2 4.5 7.5 6.1
Kazakhstan 2.6 2.1 4.2 2.0 6.1
Poland 4.1 4.6 12.9 9.6 14.5
Romania 1.1 1.8 6.4 6.5 11.4
Russia 3.5 8.0 15.4 12.8 28.7
Asia & Australasia     
Australia 17.0 8.1 36.6 -35.1 24.7
China 49.3 47.1 54.9 79.1 78.1
Hong Kong 9.7 13.6 34.0 33.6 42.9
India 5.6 4.3 5.8 6.7 17.5
Japan 9.1 6.2 7.8 3.2 -6.8
Malaysia 3.2 2.5 4.6 4.0 6.1
Singapore 7.2 10.4 14.8 20.1 25.7
South Korea 2.4 3.5 9.2 6.3 3.6
Latin America     
Argentina 2.1 1.7 4.6 5.0 4.8
Brazil 16.6 10.1 18.2 15.2 18.8
Chile 2.6 4.3 7.2 7.0 8.1
Colombia 2.1 1.8 3.1 10.3 6.3
Mexico 19.4 15.3 22.4 19.7 19.0
Sources: National statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD.
7. See also box later in this 
article on FDI into Japan
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US$212bn—an increase by 22% on 2005, just above 
the average rate of increase for emerging markets. 
This followed growth by 26% in 2005 and 48% in 
2004. China was again far and away the main FDI 
recipient among emerging markets, with inflows of 
US$78bn (China’s rank dropped from third to fourth 
globally, behind the US, the UK and France). 
FDI inflows into India grew strongly to US$17.5bn 
in 2006, two and half times the US$6.7bn recorded in 
2005. The increase in FDI flows into India was owing 
to increased M&A activity, a booming property market 
and the increased ability of some investors to find ways 
around remaining entry restrictions. However, some 
US$4.6bn of the 2006 recorded inflow was owing to 
two accounting transactions by the UK-based Cairn 
Energy and its Indian arm’s initial public offering 
(IPO). These transactions resulted in an FDI inflow 
and outflow of the same amounts. Nevertheless, even 
if these are deducted from the 2006 inflow, growth 
was still strong. Inflows into India are, however, still 
dwarfed by the amounts that China receives.
FDI inflows into the transition economies of 
eastern Europe reached a record total of US$106bn 
in 2006, up by more than one-third on the US$78bn 
received in 2005. This region thus displaced for the 
first time Latin America and the Caribbean as the 
second most important emerging-market destination 
for FDI. The 2006 increase affected most economies 
in the area. The growth was the result of large-scale 
privatisation sales in some countries; growth in 
reinvested earnings, as well as a real estate boom in 
many new EU member states; ongoing strong growth 
in FDI into previous laggards such as the Balkans; and 
commodity investments into some members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There 
was a very strong increase in FDI flows into Russia, 
which more than doubled in 2006, to US$28.7bn, 
and made up more than one-quarter of the regional 
FDI inflows in developed countries and emerging markets
(US$ bn)










8. World Bank, Global 
Development Finance 
2007.
Top emerging-market FDI recipients, 2006
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total. The lure of ample market opportunities and very 
strong consumer spending growth in Russia more 
than offset the impact of some deterioration in the 
business environment—especially as far as investment 
in natural resources is concerned.
In Turkey large-scale M&As in the banking sector 
and foreign purchases of real estate underpinned a 
surge of FDI inflows to a record US$20bn in 2006, 
double the 2005 total—which was itself far above the 
paltry amounts of US$1bn-2bn that had been invested 
in previous years.
A small decline in inflows to Latin America
Inflows of US$102.5bn to Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 2006 represented a decline on the 2005 
total of US$106.3bn. Nevertheless, inflows into the 
region had already more than doubled in 2004-05, 
after being reduced to a low of US$47bn in 2003. 
The performance in 2006 and the maintenance of 
inflows of over US$100bn was still respectable and 
was sustained by the region’s economic recovery, 
improved macroeconomic environment and strong 
demand for commodities. However, the inflows in 
2004-06 were still far below the record highs seen in 
2001.
As usual, FDI inflows into Brazil and Mexico 
dominated regional FDI (comprising more than one-
third of total inflows, although the 2006 Mexico 
total was slightly down on 2005). A sizeable share 
was, as usual, also owing to inflows into Caribbean 
tax havens (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the 
British Virgin Islands). FDI inflows to Chile increased 
to an estimated US$8.1bn as a result of strong 
growth in reinvested earnings in the mining sector. 
By contrast, FDI inflows to Colombia declined sharply 
from one-off, privatisation-related record inflows 
of US$10.3bn in 2005. In the Andean countries, a 
trend towards greater state control of the natural 
resources sector and less favourable fiscal regimes for 
investors in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela dampened 
investment. 
FDI grew strongly in 2006 in both North Africa 
(by 51%, to an estimated US$22.3bn, with Egypt 
accounting for some 45% of the total) and the 
developing Middle East9 (by 25%, to some US$32bn—
a record total for the region, despite the high political 
and security risks). A surge in FDI is being driven by a 
boom in privatisation and strong regional liquidity. 
Inflows increased to just about every economy in both 
North Africa and the Middle East.
FDI inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa dropped to an 
estimated US$12.2bn in 2006—a 20% drop on the 
2005 record inflow of US$15.2bn, mainly because of 
developments in South Africa. In 2005 a large part 
of the regional inflow was owing to several M&As in 
South Africa. In 2006, in turn, large disinvestments 
meant that inward FDI was slightly negative for 
South Africa. High prices and strong global demand 
for commodities were the main drivers of FDI flows 
in other countries. Angola, Equatorial Guinea 
and Nigeria were the region’s only significant FDI 
recipients and this was almost exclusively in the form 
of oil sector investments.
9. The Middle East 
excluding Israel.
FDI inflows into emerging markets, 2004-06
(US$ bn)
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Concentration of FDI
Despite the increase in FDI into some previously 
poorly performing emerging-market regions, the 
concentration of FDI flows into emerging markets 
remains relatively high. The top ten recipient 
countries accounted for 55% of all inflows to emerging 
markets in 2006. The concentration is nevertheless 
down on the 70%-plus recorded in the late 1990s. 
Among the top ten in 2006 were the main traditional 
FDI recipients in the emerging-market world—China, 
Brazil, Mexico and Poland, as well Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Russia (ranked third), Turkey (fifth) and 
India (eighth) are relative newcomers to the top ten.
 
Inward FDI stocks
The value of the global inward FDI stock climbed to 
more than US$12trn by the end of 2006, more than 
double the 2000 total in nominal terms. As a share of 
world GDP, the inward FDI stock increased from 19% to 
an estimated 26% over the same period. The US inward 
FDI stock was by far the highest in the world—almost 
twice the stock in the UK, but was still only equal to 
some 15% of US GDP. France was in third place, with a 
stock estimated at US$783bn (35% of GDP), ahead of 
Germany in fourth place (US$761bn; 26% of GDP) and 
China in fifth (US$699bn; 26% of GDP).
There is considerable variation across countries 
in the degree of FDI penetration (as measured by the 
ratio of the stock of inward FDI to GDP) around the 
global average ratio of about 25%. Reflecting the 
differential experience in recent decades of countries 
around the world in attracting FDI, it ranges from 
extremely high ratios in excess of 100% for Hong 
Kong, Ireland and Singapore to extremely low ratios 
for Japan, Iran and Kuwait (less than 3%).
Leading outward investors
(Outward FDI stock, end-2006; US$ bn)
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Inward FDI projects
Looking at FDI trends by the number of projects, 
irrespective of their size, or values, also confirms that 
2006 was a strong year for global FDI performance. 
According to data from Locomonitor, there were 
11,814 new FDI projects worldwide in 2006. This 
represented growth of 13% on the 2005 total, a 
considerable acceleration on growth rates for new 
projects of 8% in 2004 and 2% in 2005.
The list of leading destination countries for FDI 
projects in 2006 differs somewhat from the list of 
leading recipients by FDI values. This is unsurprising, 
since FDI values are heavily influenced by crossborder 
M&As, rather than greenfield investments. China, 
with 1,378 projects in 2006, is ranked first by the 
number of new FDI projects, whereas it was fourth by 
FDI inflows. India jumps to second place—although a 
distant second behind China—with 979 new projects, 
ahead of the US with 725 projects, the UK (668) and 
France (582).
Whereas the list of the top recipients by FDI values 
is dominated by developed countries, for projects 
emerging markets are better-represented. Among the 
top ten in 2006 are six emerging markets—including 
four from eastern Europe (Russia, Romania, Poland 
and Bulgaria). The ranking by project numbers 
thus also corresponds more closely to the list of 
most attractive FDI destinations from our survey of 
investors (see the article by Matthew Shinkman in this 
volume).
Trends in outward FDI
In 2006 the US regained its traditional role as the 
world’s main outward investor, as its outward FDI 
flows reached US$249bn, 20% of the world total.10 
Reinvested earnings accounted for about half of 
US outward investment in 2006, in contrast to the 
massive repatriation of funds by US investors in 2005 
(driven by changes in US corporate tax laws). Despite 
the upsurge in global M&As, the weak US dollar 
contributed to the fact that US companies were not 
especially active in acquiring new corporate assets 
abroad. Foreign equity investment by US companies of 
some US$40bn in 2006 was similar to the total for US 
crossborder acquisitions in 2005.11
The other main investing countries in 2006 were 
France (US$136.3bn), which had also recorded 
a high total in 2005 (US$133.6bn); Switzerland 
(US$81.6bn); and the UK (US$79.8bn), although 
outflows from the latter declined from the levels in 
2004-05. French outward investment reflected a 
high level of foreign acquisitions. About 30% of the 
outflows were accounted for by the five largest foreign 
M&As by French companies, including, notably, 
Table 6 
New FDI projects, top recipient countries
 2005  2006  
 No. Share in world   No. Share in world   % change,  
  total (%)  total (%) year on year
China  1,237 11.84 1,378 11.66 11.4
India  590 5.65 979 8.29 65.9
US  563 5.39 725 6.14 28.8
UK  633 6.06 668 5.65 5.5
France  489 4.68 582 4.93 19.0
Russia  511 4.89 386 3.27 -24.5
Romania  261 2.50 362 3.06 38.7
Germany  271 2.59 333 2.82 22.9
Poland  271 2.59 324 2.74 19.6
Bulgaria  140 1.34 286 2.42 104.3
UAE  226 2.16 282 2.39 24.8
Spain  152 1.46 242 2.05 59.2
Hungary  206 1.97 235 1.99 14.1
Vietnam  169 1.62 196 1.66 16.0
Singapore  159 1.52 189 1.60 18.9
Canada  206 1.97 177 1.50 -14.1
Czech Republic  149 1.43 174 1.47 16.8
Mexico  137 1.31 170 1.44 24.1
Hong Kong  125 1.20 151 1.28 20.8
Japan  121 1.16 145 1.23 19.8
Brazil  170 1.63 145 1.23 -14.7
Ireland  193 1.85 140 1.19 -27.5
Italy  140 1.34 138 1.17 -1.4
Netherlands  109 1.04 129 1.09 18.3
Australia  110 1.05 126 1.07 14.5
Ukraine  125 1.20 124 1.05 -0.8
Malaysia  93 0.89 123 1.04 32.3
Sweden  105 1.01 120 1.02 14.3
Slovakia  118 1.13 115 0.97 -2.5
Thailand  117 1.12 111 0.94 -5.1
Source: Locomonitor.
10. Many problems in 
statistical coverage (which 
for many countries tend 
to affect the recording 
of outward investment 
even more than of inward 
investment) mean that 
at the global level inward 
and outward flows never 
match and the discrepancy 
can in some years be 
considerable.
11. See OECD, Trends and 
Recent Developments in 
Foreign Direct Investment, 
June 2007, p. 4.
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Alcatel’s acquisition of US-based Lucent and AXA’s 
takeover of the Swiss insurer Wintherthur.12
German firms’ FDI outflows amounted to US$79bn 
in 2006—the second year of recovery from unusually 
low levels in 2002-04, which had in part been affected 
by corporate tax reforms. Germany’s investment was 
concentrated in the EU15 and the US, whereas central 
and eastern Europe received relatively little—despite 
ongoing concerns in Germany about a supposed 
threat of a major relocation of German capital and 
jobs to the east.
FDI outflows from Japan in 2006 increased to 
US$50.2bn, from US$45bn in 2005—the 2005 figure 
was the highest for Japan since 1990. Japanese 
outward investors have benefited from the high 
profitability of their overseas assets in recent years, 
and they have increased their reinvestments in host 
economies.
Outward flows from emerging markets
Considerable attention has lately been devoted 
to increasing outward investment by companies 
from emerging markets.13 Significant outward FDI 
flows from emerging markets are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Although almost all developing 
countries remain net importers of FDI, several of 
them have nevertheless emerged in recent years as 
important outward investors. Unsurprisingly, it is 
the relatively more advanced economies—certain 
countries in the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), some east-central European 
economies, South Africa, Russia, and a few within 
South America—as well as China, that have taken the 
lead. 
We estimate that outward FDI flows from emerging 
markets, including from offshore financial centres, 
amounted to some US$160bn in 2005. This was the 
highest level ever recorded and represented 18% of 
world outflows—still far below the share of emerging 
markets in inward flows of 44% in that year, but a 
sharper rise on their share in global outward flows of 
12% in 2004. This rose to an estimated US$210bn in 
2006—at 17% of the global total, a slight decline from 
the share in 2005. Rapid economic growth, especially 
Table 7
Global FDI outflows
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
World 1,076.7 1,267.0 768.2 541.0 546.0 817.6 891.5 1,260.7
 % change, year on year 52.3 17.7 -39.4 -29.6 0.9 49.7 9.0 41.4
Developed countries 1,004.0 1,104.2 687.0 477.2 505.2 723.2 731.2 1,050.5
 % of total 93.2 87.2 89.4 88.2 92.5 88.4 82.0 83.3
Emerging markets 72.7 162.8 81.2 63.8 40.8 94.4 160.3 210.2
 % of total 6.8 12.8 10.6 11.8 7.5 11.6 18.0 16.7 
Sources: National statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD.
12. Ibid, p. 5.
13. UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2006; 
OECD, Trends and Recent 
Developments in Foreign 
Direct Investment, June 
2007; World Bank, Global 
Development Finance 
2007; UNCTAD, “The 
emerging landscape of 
foreign direct investment: 
some salient issues”, 
TD/B/COM.2/77, February 
1st 2007.
FDI outflows from emerging markets, 2006
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in Asia and oil-exporting countries, high prices for raw 
materials and continuing investment liberalisation in 
some countries have underpinned strong growth in 
outflows. 
Until relatively recently most FDI flows from 
emerging markets took the form mainly of so-called 
South-South investments. These are still significant. 
South-South investment has and will continue to 
be driven by comparative advantages such as local 
knowledge and geographic and cultural proximity. 
Investors from emerging economies play an important 
role especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, with South 
Africa emerging in recent years as one of the largest 
source countries. China and, to a lesser extent, 
Brazil, India, Malaysia and Russia have been active 
in natural resources. In the Middle East and North 
Africa, investment from the Gulf countries has been 
important. 
FDI between Asian countries accounts for almost 
half of all FDI inflows to the region and there is 
evidence of increasing intra-ASEAN flows. In China, 
the four largest emerging Asia investors (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) accounted for 
some 40% of the FDI amount invested in 2006, with 
Hong Kong alone representing 30%.14 In eastern 
Europe, too, intra-regional flows are on the rise. FDI 
by so-called Translatinas accounts for an increasing 
share of total FDI in Latin America.15
However, MNCs based in emerging economies have 
also in more recent years undertaken some large, high-
profile acquisitions in developed countries. A few large 
M&As that have involved companies from emerging 
markets have attracted considerable attention. Recent 
examples (see Table 9) include: the US$17bn purchase 
by Brazil’s CVRD of Inco of Canada, making CVRD the 
world’s second-largest mining company; and two 
US$14bn deals—Mexico-based Cemex’s purchase of 
Rinker of Australia and the acquisition by India’s Tata 
Steel of the Anglo-Dutch Corus. 
The rise of multinationals from the South is an 
important phenomenon. As discussed elsewhere in 
this volume, it is also feeding rising protectionist 
sentiment in parts of the developed world, which 
makes it all the more important to keep the 
development of emerging-market outward FDI in 
perspective. There are still relatively few companies 
from the South on the list of the world’s major MNCs. 
Despite the increase in FDI outflows from emerging 
markets in recent years, these are still dwarfed by 
investments originating in the developed world. 
Although it is set to increase in the future, the present 
degree of penetration of developed countries by 
Southern capital is minuscule. 
14. OECD, Trends and 
Recent Developments in 
Foreign Direct Investment, 
June 2007, p. 15.
15. UN Economic 
Commission for Latin 
American and the 
Caribbean, Foreign 
Investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 
2007. Thierry Ogier, 
“Latin America’s emerging 
multinational companies”, 
Latin America Regional 
Overview, June 2007, 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit.
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The forecast: a slowdown 
and decline before renewed 
growth
The outlook for 2007
FDI inflows in 2007 should be sustained by a 
strong global economy and the continued boom in 
crossborder M&As that occurred in the first half of 
2007. However, growth in 2007 in the global FDI 
total will be modest, especially compared with the 
growth rates in 2004-06. Global inflows are projected 
at US$1.5trn, representing 10% growth on 2006, 
and the first time this decade that the nominal US 
dollar total will have exceeded the peak achieved 
in 2000. The high rates of recovery growth in FDI 
inflows of recent years will thus not be repeated this 
year, as a result of some slowdown in activity and 
tighter financing conditions in the light of volatility 
in financial markets. M&A activity will slow from 
2005-06 levels. There will also be fewer privatisation 
opportunities in emerging markets compared with 
recent years.
According to data from Dealogic, announced global 
M&As in the first half of 2007 increased by 51% to 
US$2.8trn, from US$1.9trn in the first half of 2006. 
On the basis of data from Bloomberg, we estimate 
that completed crossborder M&As surged by more 
than 50% in the first half of 2007, to some US$650bn. 
Industry consolidation fuelled the continued surge 
in M&As in the first half of 2007, despite signs that 
the benign lending environment that underpinned 
the boom was coming to an end. In particular, private 
equity funds were willing to inject capital into all 
kinds of deals. Private equity transactions represented 
about 20% of all M&A activity worldwide in the 
Table 8
FDI projections
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
World FDI inflows 618.1 563.4 730.2 971.7 1,335.1 1,474.7 1,406.4 1,470.3 1,536.8 1,604.0
 % change, year on year -27.4 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4 10.5 -4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4
 % of GDP 1.9 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4
FDI inflows to developed countries 421.1 354.6 379.5 546.8 824.4 940.2 879.0 925.5 972.6 1,017.3
 % change, year on year -25.2 -15.8 7.0 44.1 50.7 14.0 -6.5 5.3 5.1 4.6
 % of GDP 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4
 % of world total 68.1 62.9 52.0 56.3 61.7 63.8 62.5 62.9 63.3 63.4
FDI inflows to emerging markets 197.0 208.9 350.7 424.9 510.7 534.6 527.4 544.8 564.2 586.7
 % change, year on year -31.5 6.0 67.9 21.1 20.2 4.7 -1.3 3.3 3.6 4.0
 % of GDP 2.5 2.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4
 % of world total 31.9 37.1 48.0 43.7 38.3 36.2 37.5 37.1 36.7 36.6
World stock of inward FDI 7,185 8,615 9,981 10,455 12,216 13,622 14,955 16,347 17,796 19,307
 % change, year on year 11.4 19.9 15.9 4.7 16.9 11.5 9.8 9.3 8.9 8.5
 % of GDP 22.1 23.6 24.3 23.6 25.6 25.9 26.5 27.4 28.3 29.0
Developed country stock of inward FDI 5,151 6,246 7,189 7,265 8,510 9,441 10,306 11,216 12,171 13,169
 % change, year on year 20.7 21.2 15.1 1.1 17.1 10.9 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.2
 % of GDP 20.6 22.2 23.0 22.3 24.9 25.6 26.4 27.8 29.2 30.4
 % of world total 71.7 72.5 72.0 69.5 69.7 69.3 68.9 68.6 68.4 68.2
Emerging markets stock of inward FDI 2,034 2,369 2,792 3,189 3,706 4,181 4,649 5,130 5,626 6,139
 % change, year on year -6.8 16.5 17.9 14.2 16.2 12.8 11.2 10.4 9.7 9.1
 % of GDP 26.2 27.1 27.2 26.3 26.3 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.3
 % of world total 28.3 27.5 28.0 30.5 30.3 30.7 31.1 31.4 31.6 31.8
Sources: National statistics; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Table 9
Major completed crossborder M&As, Jan-Jun 2007
Investor company Investor country Target company Target Value of deal  Sector
   coutry (US$ bn)
IBERDROLA SA Spain SCOTTISH POWER PLC UK 28.9 Energy
KKR & CO LP US ALLIANCE BOOTS PLC UK 24.2 Consumer goods
JAPAN TOBACCO INC Japan GALLAHER GROUP PLC UK 19.5 Consumer goods
CEMENTOS MEXICANOS Mexico RINKER GROUP Australia 14.0 Building materials
CIA VALE DO RIO DOCE-PREF A Brazil INCO LTD Canada 16.7 Metals
ASTRAZENECA PLC UK MEDIMMUNE INC US 14.7 Pharma
VODAFONE GROUP PLC UK HUTCHISON ESSAR LTD India 13.1 Telecoms
TATA STEEL LIMITED India CORUS GROUP PLC UK 13.5 Metals
ALLIANZ SE-REG Germany AGF - ASSUR GEN DE FRANCE France 12.7 Financial
NYSE EURONEXT US EURONEXT NV Netherlands 12.1 Financial
ENEL SPA Italy ENDESA SA Spain 11.0 Energy
CITIGROUP INC US NIKKO CORDIAL CORP Japan 7.8 Financial
CREDIT AGRICOLE SA France CASSA RISPARMIO PARMA E PIAC Italy 7.5 Financial
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-A SHS Netherlands SHELL CANADA LTD Canada 7.3 Energy
MULTIPLE ACQUIRERS – US FOODSERVICE US 7.1 Consumer goods
MULTIPLE ACQUIRERS – TELEDIFFUSION DE FRANCE FR 6.5 Media
HINDALCO INDUSTRIES LIMITED India NOVELIS INC US 5.7 Metals
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC SA France AMERICAN POWER CONVERSION US 5.5 Energy
ARCELOR MITTAL Netherlands ARCELOR BRASIL SA Brazil 5.4 Metals
CENTRO PROPERTIES GROUP Australia NEW PLAN EXCEL REALTY TRUST US 5.2 Real estate
TERRA FIRMA CAPITAL PARTNERS UK PEGASUS AVIATION FINANCE CO US 5.2 Financial
DANSKE BANK A/S Denmark SAMPO BANK PLC Finland 5.2 Financial
SWISSCOM AG-REG Switzerland FASTWEB Italy 5.2 Telecoms
Source: Bloomberg.
first half of 2007, in line with a trend that has been 
building since the end of 2003. However, volatile 
financial markets will have a dampening impact on 
M&A activity in the second half of 2007 and into 2008.
Even before the recent global financial turmoil, it was 
clear that the frenetic activity in global M&As in 2006, 
which strengthened further in the first half of 2007, 
could not be sustained. The fallout from the US sub-
prime loan market will reinforce further the slowdown in 
M&As that would have occurred in any case. 
Our global economic forecast assumes that the 
financial turbulence will be contained, in the light 
of the continuing healthy fundamentals of the world 
economy. Global growth is still strong, and profit 
growth remains robust. Much of the M&A activity 
continues to be undertaken by strategic investors 
with healthy balance sheets and strong cash flows. 
European activity in particular remains more 
corporate-driven than based on activity by private 
equity funds—in the first half of 2007 leveraged 
buyouts represented 13% of European deal volume, 
compared with 35% in the US.
The slowdown in M&As, and FDI, is thus likely to be 
a soft landing, rather than a hard crash like the one 
that occurred in 2001. Diverse and expanded funding 
sources for M&A will provide a cushion. Deals by 
private equity funds will be hit most, possibly severely 
for a period of time. Even here, however, activity 
might continue by some large funds, which are more 
diversified than they were at the start of the decade. 
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Although buyouts will be at a virtual standstill, other 
private equity transactions such as distressed debt 
deals and workouts could increase.
The increase in global FDI in 2007 is expected to 
be slightly stronger in the developed world (14% 
growth) than in emerging markets, where FDI inflows 
are projected to rise by only 5% in 2007. The US is 
expected again to be the world’s leading FDI recipient 
in 2007, with some US$240bn in inflows. FDI inflows 
into the EU15 are forecast to rise only by about 5%, 
as further increases in FDI flows to major euro zone 
economies offset an expected decline of flows into 
the UK. M&A activity in the UK has slowed from the 
heights achieved in 2005-06.
FDI inflows to emerging markets in 2007 are 
forecast to rise by only 5% in US dollar terms, as 
strong growth in inflows into Latin America (by 20%) 
is offset by weak growth of flows to Asia and a slight 
decline of FDI flows to eastern Europe from their 
2006 peak. FDI into China is likely to be only slightly 
up on the 2006 figure; no growth in inflows to India 
is expected in 2007,16 and further brisk growth in 
inflows to Russia and the CIS will be offset by a decline 
in flows to other east European subregions, including 
the EU’s new member states.
Heading for a temporary fall in 2008
The deceleration of growth in FDI in 2007 is likely 
to be followed in 2008 by a modest fall (for the first 
time since 2003) in nominal global FDI inflows—by a 
projected 5%. Global inflows are projected to return 
to steady growth in 2009-11, at annual rates that are 
approximately equal to the rate of growth in world 
GDP, and to reach US$1.6trn by 2011. 
The value of global FDI is expected to remain high 
in historical terms. Annual average global FDI inflows 
of US$1.5trn are forecast for 2007-11, compared with 
an annual average of US$843bn in 2002-06. At the 
end of the forecast period global FDI inflows will be 
US$1.6trn, 14% above their peak in 2000 in US dollar 
terms. However, in terms of constant price estimates 
(when current values are deflated by US dollar-
based import price indices), global FDI inflows will 
in 2011 still be more than 10% below the 2000 peak. 
The overall trend in FDI flows in 2007-11, although 
buoyant, will fall well short of the dynamism in the 
boom period of the 1990s.17
The expected buoyancy of global FDI becomes 
most apparent when it is measured in relation to 
GDP. Until the late 1990s world FDI inflows scarcely 
averaged more than 1% of GDP. Until then the IMF 
Table 10
FDI inflows in current and constant prices
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
In current US$ terms     
World total 1,335.1 1,474.7 1,406.4 1,470.3 1,536.8 1,604.0
 % change, year on year 37.4 10.5 -4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4
Developed countries 824.4 940.2 879.0 925.5 972.6 1,017.3
 % change, year on year 50.7 14.0 -6.5 5.3 5.1 4.6
Emerging markets 510.7 534.6 527.4 544.8 564.2 586.7
 % change, year on year 20.2 4.7 -1.3 3.3 3.6 4.0 
In constant 2000 US$ terms     
World total 1,039.8 1,097.3 1,038.0 1,109.6 1,184.8 1,231.2
 % change, year on year 30.9 5.5 -5.4 6.9 6.8 3.9
Developed countries 633.7 686.6 641.2 700.8 761.6 796.4
 % change, year on year 44.1 8.3 -6.6 9.3 8.7 4.6
Emerging markets 406.1 410.7 396.8 408.8 423.2 434.8
 % change, year on year 14.5 1.1 -3.4 3.0 3.5 2.7 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
16. See the discussion 
later in this article.
17. Between 1990 and 
2000 global FDI increased 
by a factor of 6.5. Global 
FDI inflows almost tripled 
between 1997 and 2000, 
growing at an average 
annual rate of over 40% 
in 1998-2000. The growth 
in global FDI in the 
1990s far outstripped the 
growth in world output 
and trade over the same 
period, and earned FDI 
the title of the “cutting 
edge of globalisation”. In 
2000 FDI inflows were a 
staggering 20 times higher 
than they had been 20 
years previously.
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would classify as “high FDI recipients” those countries 
in which FDI inflows exceeded 1% of GDP. It was only 
from the mid-1990s that the share of FDI flows in GDP 
began to grow significantly. The projected average 
FDI/GDP ratio in 2007-11 of 2.5% for the world as a 
whole would be high by historical standards. 
The US will remain the main recipient of FDI, 
accounting for some 17% of the world total in 2007-11. 
However, FDI into the EU as a whole (including intra-
EU flows) will be significantly higher than this. The EU 
will also continue to outstrip the US as a source region 
for direct investment. FDI will remain geographically 
concentrated. The top ten host countries are expected 
to account for almost 60% of the world total; the top 
20 for three-quarters of the world total. Eight of the 
top 20 are emerging-market recipients. 
The league table of FDI recipients looks 
significantly different if we “normalise” FDI inflows 
by GDP, gross fixed investment or population. As 
could be expected, the rankings on the basis of these 
measures differ greatly from the rankings based 
on absolute FDI numbers. Unsurprisingly, natural-
resource-rich countries rank highly, attracting 
considerably more FDI than their market size would 
warrant. A mix of mainly small countries from different 
regions are represented in the top ten. Notably among 
larger, more developed economies, Japan has the 
second-lowest ratio of FDI inflows to GDP and ratio of 
FDI inflows to gross fixed investment among these 82 
countries.
FDI in the developed world
Contrary to widespread expectations about the 
concentration of new FDI in the emerging world, a 
larger share of the increase in global FDI in 2007-11 
will go to the developed world, in large part because 
of the pattern of crossborder M&As. Indeed, the share 
of emerging markets in global FDI inflows is projected 
FDI inflows to EU15
(US$ bn)
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 US$ bn Rank % of world total  US$ bn Rank % of world total 
US 250.9 1 16.75 Finland 5.7 42 0.38
UK 112.9 2 7.54 Czech Republic 5.4 43 0.36
China 86.8 3 5.79 Hungary 5.1 44 0.34
France 78.2 4 5.22 New Zealand 5.0 45 0.34
Belgium 71.6 5 4.78 Ukraine 4.9 46 0.33
Germany 66.0 6 4.41 Algeria 4.7 47 0.32
Canada 63.2 7 4.22 Austria 4.0 48 0.27
Hong Kong 48.0 8 3.20 South Africa 3.2 49 0.21
Spain 44.9 9 2.99 Qatar 3.1 50 0.21
Italy 41.6 10 2.77 Pakistan 2.9 51 0.19
Netherlands 38.5 11 2.57 Serbia 2.8 52 0.19
Australia 37.8 12 2.52 Bulgaria 2.6 53 0.17
Russia 31.4 13 2.10 Croatia 2.6 54 0.17
Brazil 27.5 14 1.84 Philippines 2.4 55 0.16
Singapore 27.1 15 1.81 Slovakia 2.2 56 0.15
Sweden 26.1 16 1.74 Jordan 2.1 57 0.14
Mexico 22.7 17 1.51 Nigeria 2.1 58 0.14
India 20.4 18 1.36 Peru 2.0 59 0.14
Ireland 20.3 19 1.35 Angola 1.9 60 0.12
Turkey 20.0 20 1.33 Tunisia 1.8 61 0.12
Switzerland 18.2 21 1.22 Libya 1.6 62 0.11
Japan 13.3 22 0.89 Azerbaijan 1.6 63 0.11
UAE 12.8 23 0.85 Dominican Republic 1.6 64 0.10
Poland 12.6 24 0.84 Morocco 1.5 65 0.10
Chile 10.9 25 0.73 Greece 1.5 66 0.10
Portugal 9.1 26 0.61 Ecuador 1.5 67 0.10
Thailand 8.9 27 0.59 Estonia 1.4 68 0.09
Denmark 8.2 28 0.55 Cyprus 1.3 69 0.08
Saudi Arabia 7.9 29 0.52 Lithuania 1.2 70 0.08
Romania 7.7 30 0.51 Latvia 1.0 71 0.07
South Korea 7.2 31 0.48 Slovenia 1.0 72 0.07
Taiwan 7.1 32 0.47 Venezuela 1.0 73 0.07
Israel 7.0 33 0.47 Costa Rica 1.0 74 0.07
Malaysia 6.8 34 0.45 Bahrain 1.0 75 0.06
Kazakhstan 6.7 35 0.45 Bangladesh 0.7 76 0.05
Indonesia 6.6 36 0.44 El Salvador 0.6 77 0.04
Argentina 6.5 37 0.44 Cuba 0.5 78 0.04
Vietnam 6.5 38 0.44 Kuwait 0.4 79 0.03
Norway 6.4 39 0.43 Iran 0.4 80 0.02
Colombia 6.3 40 0.42 Sri Lanka 0.3 81 0.02
Egypt 6.0 41 0.40 Kenya 0.1 82 0.01
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Belgium 6,883 1 16.09 3 72.86 2
Hong Kong 6,843 2 20.42 1 97.69 1
Singapore 5,938 3 16.15 2 68.61 3
Ireland 4,729 4 7.26 5 28.15 8
Qatar 3,233 5 5.10 14 20.00 19
Sweden 2,831 6 5.55 12 28.99 6
Switzerland 2,400 7 4.29 22 19.74 20
UAE 2,337 8 5.07 15 21.67 13
Netherlands 2,319 9 4.70 19 22.00 11
Canada 1,907 10 4.59 20 20.37 17
UK 1,860 11 3.97 25 21.38 14
Australia 1,835 12 4.57 21 17.16 25
Cyprus 1,591 13 5.88 10 28.49 7
Denmark 1,500 14 2.44 50 10.58 48
Norway 1,362 15 1.62 65 7.84 65
Bahrain 1,278 16 5.34 13 20.22 18
France 1,274 17 2.93 45 14.27 36
New Zealand 1,188 18 4.28 23 18.73 23
Finland 1,078 19 2.40 51 10.65 47
Estonia 1,034 20 5.78 11 16.91 27
Spain 978 21 2.93 43 9.82 56
Israel 963 22 3.99 24 20.94 15
Portugal 856 23 3.95 27 19.13 22
USA 823 24 1.61 66 10.41 54
Germany 798 25 2.01 57 10.41 53
Italy 715 26 1.90 60 8.93 60
Chile 650 27 6.31 8 28.04 9
Croatia 565 28 5.00 17 15.07 33
Czech Republic 528 29 2.95 42 11.25 46
Hungary 517 30 3.59 33 16.05 31
Slovenia 509 31 2.04 55 7.99 64
Austria 483 32 1.05 73 4.60 71
Latvia 460 33 3.38 36 9.30 58
Kazakhstan 432 34 4.78 18 15.12 32
Slovakia 406 35 2.70 49 10.35 55
Serbia 378 36 6.36 7 30.41 5
Lithuania 363 37 2.85 46 11.31 45
Romania 356 38 3.93 28 14.03 37
Bulgaria 343 39 6.15 9 18.21 24
Jordan 341 40 11.46 4 39.23 4
Poland 331 41 2.75 47 11.71 43
Taiwan 310 42 1.67 64 8.04 63
Saudi Arabia 293 43 1.86 61 9.82 57
Libya 265 44 3.38 37 12.20 42
Turkey 263 45 3.65 31 17.13 26
Malaysia 245 46 3.17 40 16.06 30
Russia 223 47 2.12 53 10.53 51
Costa Rica 219 48 3.61 32 16.59 29
Mexico 206 49 2.37 52 10.56 49
Azerbaijan 185 50 3.70 30 13.74 38
Tunisia 169 51 5.07 16 20.67 16
Dominican Republic 165 52 3.57 35 23.10 10
Argentina 164 53 2.11 54 8.89 61
South Korea 146 54 0.59 76 2.02 76
Brazil 144 55 1.98 58 10.44 52
Greece 138 56 0.40 78 1.59 78
Algeria 138 57 3.59 34 13.29 40
Colombia 133 58 3.73 29 13.38 39
Thailand 133 59 3.34 38 11.34 44
Kuwait 109 60 0.34 79 1.46 79
Ecuador 108 61 3.33 39 14.79 34
Ukraine 107 62 2.93 44 13.12 41
Angola 107 63 3.10 41 21.77 12
Japan 104 64 0.24 81 1.04 81
El Salvador 85 65 2.75 48 14.75 35
Egypt 77 66 3.96 26 16.80 28
Vietnam 75 67 6.86 6 19.17 21
Peru 70 68 1.77 62 7.52 66
South Africa 66 69 1.18 71 6.29 68
China 65 70 1.97 59 4.38 72
Cuba 49 71 1.07 72 7.46 67
Morocco 47 72 2.03 56 8.49 62
Venezuela 35 73 0.48 77 1.80 77
Indonesia 26 74 1.26 70 5.17 70
Philippines 25 75 1.45 67 10.55 50
India 18 76 1.35 69 4.09 73
Pakistan 18 77 1.71 63 9.03 59
Sri Lanka 15 78 0.86 75 2.77 75
Nigeria 14 79 1.40 68 5.59 69
Iran 5 80 0.12 82 0.37 82
Bangladesh 5 81 0.90 74 3.28 74
Kenya 2 82 0.27 80 1.32 80
Table 12
FDI inflows in relation to population, GDP and fixed investment 
(2007-11 average)
 FDI  Rank FDI   Rank FDI inflows/  Rank
 inflows   inflows/  fixed 
 per head   GDP     investment   
 (US$)  (%)   (%) 
 FDI  Rank FDI   Rank FDI inflows/  Rank
 inflows   inflows/  fixed 
 per head   GDP     investment   
 (US$)  (%)   (%) 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
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to remain broadly stable (there is a slight decline from 
38% in 2006 to 37% in 2011). During 2007-11 as a 
whole compared with the previous five-year period 
of 2002-06, FDI inflows into the developed world are 
projected to be 87% higher, compared with a 63% 
increase in flows to emerging markets.
In the developed world the main part of FDI will 
continue to originate from M&A activity. This will 
be underpinned by relatively low interest rates; 
the competitive pressures for restructuring and 
consolidation; and the increasing sophistication of 
financial markets. In Europe, M&As and the creation of 
pan-European companies will be spurred as companies 
strive to make sure that their businesses are large 
and productive enough to compete around the world. 
Although some countries are close to exhausting their 
opportunities for large-scale privatisations, overall 
there is still scope for the worldwide trend to continue 
into the medium term, in response to fiscal pressures 
and the desire to improve efficiency. 
Many firms with improved earnings are likely to 
be drawn to the US, where fairly buoyant economic 
growth and a weaker US dollar will make US companies 
attractive acquisition propositions.18 The strength 
of productivity growth in the US also makes it an 
appealing location for investors (European investors 
already account for about 60% of FDI in the US).19
FDI in emerging markets
MNCs will look to expand operations in select 
emerging economies to increase sales and rationalise 
production activities in order to benefit from 
economies of scale and lower production costs. High 
prices for many commodities will also stimulate 
direct investment in countries that are rich in natural 
resources. As a result, FDI flows to the emerging 
markets are expected to remain buoyant, averaging 
more than US$550bn per year in 2007-11, although 
overall there will be relatively modest annual growth 
in inflows from the record highs achieved in 2004-06. 
Despite the range of factors that will tend to push 
up FDI inflows to the emerging-market world, there 
are a number of reasons to be cautious about their 
FDI prospects. The fact that privatisation revenue is 
expected to tail off in many leading emerging markets 
will dampen inflows, as will increased risk perceptions 
about some emerging markets among many investors. 
Economic growth in the emerging world is expected 
to slow somewhat compared with recent years, and 
the international environment will gradually become 
less supportive. In a few countries populism and 
nationalism are on the rise, culminating in some cases 
in the repudiation of existing contracts with foreign 
firms, and this will act to slow the pace of investment 
in affected markets. External imbalances and the 
possibility of sharp exchange-rate fluctuations, as 
well as volatile commodity prices, pose risks that 
could also hamper investment activity.
Key trends
Key medium-term trends in global FDI will include the 
following.
● After a brief retrenchment, crossborder M&As will 
continue to drive global FDI. The US and the EU15 
(inclusive of intra-EU inflows) will continue to 
dominate as recipients of world FDI. 
● Among emerging markets, China will remain by far 
the main recipient, with almost 6% of the global 
total and 16% of projected inflows into emerging 
markets. 
● There is likely to be some acceleration of the 
relocation of labour-intensive manufacturing to 
emerging markets, although this is unlikely to be 
as dramatic as many observers hope or fear. 
● Compared with earlier years, the outsourcing 
of services will accelerate. This form of 
internationalisation is accompanied by relatively 
modest capital flows. Nevertheless, although 
development of information and communications 
technology (ICT) may have lagged behind some 
expectations, the explosion in bandwidth 
potentially brings a widening number of services 
into the offshoring realm. In addition, it is likely 
that outsourcing will increasingly shift to captive 
providers, so that a higher share of outsourcing is 
conducted through FDI than in the past.
● Investment by companies from leading emerging 
markets is likely to continue to gain in importance. 
● Foreign investors are generally a resilient breed 
and security and related risks should not be 
18. Various business 
surveys also confirm the 
appeal of the US as a 




Unit’s 2006 Global M&A 
Survey, the US was rated 
the most promising M&A 
target market, well ahead 
of other countries.
19. On the expected 
significant medium-
term increase in EU15 
investment into the US, 
see the article in the 2006 
issue of World Investment 
Prospects by Dan O’Brien, 
“Transatlantic foreign 
direct investment: the 
backbone of the global 
economy”.
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exaggerated. However, the risk of protectionism 
is now greater, the global geopolitical climate 
appears more threatening and the outlook for 
securing a stable and co-operative international 
trading and investment environment is worse than 
in the recent past (see discussion below).
Medium-term drivers of FDI
Global FDI flows over the forecast period will be 
influenced by a combination of forces—most of them 
positive, pushing FDI flows upwards, but there are 
also some constraining factors that will keep flows 
below what they might otherwise be. 
One of the main factors underpinning our baseline 
FDI forecast is that the solid world economic recovery 
is set to continue. We forecast that global growth (at 
purchasing power parity—PPP—rates) will remain 
buoyant; it is forecast to average 4.6% a year over 
2007-11. The strong global performance reflects 
in large part the increasing weight of fast-growing 
emerging markets, especially China and India.
Other reasons to expect continued growth in 
FDI include the ongoing global trend towards 
better business environments (as measured by our 
cross-country business environment rankings); 
technological change and the search for competitively 
priced skills; and sharper global competition that 
will push companies to grow through acquisitions 
or seek lower-cost destinations. The degree of firms’ 
transnationalisation is also clearly linked to their 
performance, as also illustrated by the results of our 
survey of more than 600 MNCs. Firms that had a high 
degree of transnationalisation—those with more than 
25% of revenue or employees outside their home 
markets—were more likely to have above-average 
financial performance than less internationalised 
firms.
The global investment climate 
Recent years have brought considerable improvement 
in the global investment climate. Policies have 
been liberalised in many countries across the globe. 
The liberalisation of economies and of policies 
towards foreign investors has acted as a spur to 
FDI. Our business environment rankings model 
provides a quantitative representation of these 
trends. The business environment rankings paint a 
relatively optimistic picture of the global operating 
environment over the next five years. The average 
country business environment score in 2007-11 is 
expected to be 0.46 points higher than in 2002-06. 
The global trend for liberalisation and deregulation 
of domestic markets is expected to continue. Despite 
instances of reversals, most countries have not 
retreated from liberalisation. Further measures to 
liberalise international trade flows now look unlikely, 
with the Doha round of World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) negotiations in deep trouble. However, we do 
not expect a reversal of the liberalisation seen over 
the past few decades.
The expected trend of improvement in the global 
operational environment augurs well for FDI prospects. 
Our FDI model (see Annex A to this article) shows 
FDI to be very sensitive to the quality of the business 
Business environment average scores  
(out of 10)
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environment. The trend of further improvement in 
business environments across the globe that we 
expect, and the consequent beneficial impact on 
FDI, however, masks one important consideration: 
there is scope in almost all countries for still more 
improvement than we assume will occur over the 
medium term, with striking implications for FDI.
For example, under the assumption that all 
countries’ business environment scores for 2007-11 
were a mere 5% higher than we actually assume, 
our model predicts annual average global FDI flows 
of US$1.7trn rather than the actual forecast of 
US$1.5trn. The difference of US$200bn per year, or 
US$1trn cumulatively over the whole 2007-11 period, 
is a measure of the huge opportunity cost, in terms 
of forgone FDI and thus development, of suboptimal 
policies.
However, several factors will work to dampen FDI 
flows and keep them below what they would otherwise 
be. FDI protectionism is one of those factors. Appeals 
to security threats and fears about the consequences 
of globalisation have prompted several governments 
to review and in some cases tighten their FDI 
regulations.20
The trend towards FDI protectionism is being 
reinforced by rising concern in a number of countries 
about investments by state-owned sovereign 
investment agencies. The latter invest official 
currency reserves in foreign assets and control an 
estimated US$2.5trn, more than all the world’s hedge 
funds combined.21
Although instances of protectionism—on security 
grounds or otherwise—are expected to remain limited, 
this will nevertheless have some negative impact. 
At least some large crossborder deals are likely to be 
prevented. Some firms may be reluctant to engage in 
a crossborder deal if they feel that opposition from 
the host government might be an issue. Instances 
of outward FDI protectionism as well as regulatory 
restrictions in some emerging markets will also have 
some adverse impact.
20. See the in-depth 
discussion in the article 
in this volume by Karl P 
Sauvant, and the review, 
also in this volume, by 
Matthew Shinkman of the 
views on political risk that 
emerge from our survey 





The framework covers 82 of the world’s 
leading economies that are analysed 
regularly in the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Country Forecasts. The model seeks 
to measure the quality or attractiveness 
of the business environment and its key 
components. The quantitative assessment 
of the business environment—the 
opportunities for and obstacles to business—
enables a country to be ranked on its overall 
position and in each of ten categories, on 
both a global and regional basis. The model 
uses quantitative data, business surveys 
and expert assessments to measure the 
attractiveness of the business environment 
across the 82 countries. Individual country 
scores are compiled by a large team of in-
house economists and country experts, 
assisted by a global network of associated 
contributors and analysts. The framework 
is designed to reflect the principal criteria 
used by companies to formulate their global 
business strategies and investment location 
decisions. The overall scores (on a scale of 
1-10) and rankings are based on scores for 
91 indicators, grouped into ten categories 
of the business environment. Scores and 
rankings are produced for both a five-year 
historical period (currently 2002-06) and 
a five-year forecast period (2007-11). The 
full methodology appears at the end of this 
report.
The enabling framework for foreign 
direct investment (FDI), captured by 
the policy towards foreign investment 
in the model, consists of the rules and 
regulations governing entry and operation 
of FDI, and overall standards of treatment. 
Although open FDI policies are a necessary 
condition, a wide range of other policies 
can influence FDI decisions. These are 
captured in the other categories of our 
business environment rankings model, and 
include government measures that influence 
institutional effectiveness, infrastructure 
and skill endowments, macroeconomic and 
political stability. They also involve policies 
towards private enterprise in general: tax, 
labour market, financial sector, and foreign 
trade and exchange-rate policies.
Business surveys conducted by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit have confirmed 
that our ten categories are all highly rated 
as important for business. This means that 
countries need to satisfy across the full range 
of business environment issues. This is also 
the reason why developed countries have 
the best business environments—taking into 
account their performance across the board.
Specific policies towards foreign 
investment have a moderately high 
influence on executive decisions, but again 
less so than the broad business climate 
in a country. Pro-FDI policies can have a 
significant but rarely decisive influence on 
companies’ decisions to invest in a country. 
Special tax incentives are considered much 
less important than other features of the 
investment climate.
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Denmark 8.76 1 8.69 2 0.06 1
Finland 8.75 2 8.64 3 0.11 1
Singapore 8.72 3 8.71 1 0.01 -2
Switzerland 8.71 4 8.59 7 0.12 3
Canada 8.70 5 8.63 5 0.07 0
Hong Kong 8.68 6 8.57 8 0.11 2
US 8.65 7 8.64 4 0.01 -3
Netherlands 8.64 8 8.53 9 0.11 1
Australia 8.60 9 8.16 12 0.44 3
UK 8.60 10 8.62 6 -0.02 -4
Sweden 8.60 11 8.34 11 0.25 0
Ireland 8.57 12 8.49 10 0.07 -2
Germany 8.46 13 7.97 16 0.48 3
New Zealand 8.31 14 8.15 13 0.16 -1
Belgium 8.30 15 8.07 14 0.23 -1
Austria 8.24 16 7.87 17 0.36 1
Norway 8.14 17 7.99 15 0.15 -2
France 8.12 18 7.87 18 0.25 0
Taiwan 8.11 19 7.66 21 0.45 2
Chile 8.04 20 7.77 19 0.27 -1
Estonia 7.87 21 7.72 20 0.15 -1
Spain 7.82 22 7.40 22 0.41 0
Israel 7.67 23 6.95 29 0.72 6
Qatar 7.60 24 6.93 30 0.66 6
South Korea 7.56 25 7.12 25 0.44 0
Czech Republic 7.55 26 7.03 28 0.52 2
Japan 7.54 27 7.08 27 0.46 0
UAE 7.48 28 7.27 24 0.22 -4
Slovakia 7.44 29 6.81 31 0.63 2
Bahrain 7.43 30 7.10 26 0.33 -4
Malaysia 7.43 31 7.29 23 0.14 -8
Slovenia 7.41 32 6.75 34 0.66 2
Portugal 7.39 33 6.73 36 0.67 3
Poland 7.17 34 6.73 35 0.44 1
Hungary 7.12 35 6.79 32 0.32 -3
Cyprus 7.10 36 6.77 33 0.33 -3
Latvia 7.06 37 6.63 39 0.43 2
Lithuania 7.03 38 6.62 40 0.41 2
Mexico 7.02 39 6.65 38 0.37 -1
Italy 7.02 40 6.48 42 0.54 2
South Africa 6.97 41 6.09 46 0.88 5
Thailand 6.81 42 6.71 37 0.10 -5
Greece 6.81 43 6.34 44 0.47 1
Bulgaria 6.77 44 5.89 49 0.88 5
Costa Rica 6.72 45 6.31 45 0.40 0
Brazil 6.69 46 6.53 41 0.16 -5
Croatia 6.67 47 5.84 50 0.83 3
Romania 6.58 48 5.79 51 0.79 3
Saudi Arabia 6.57 49 5.78 52 0.79 3
Jordan 6.46 50 5.72 54 0.74 4
El Salvador 6.44 51 5.98 47 0.46 -4
Turkey 6.42 52 5.66 57 0.76 5
China 6.38 53 5.61 58 0.77 5
India 6.37 54 5.27 62 1.10 8
Kuwait 6.34 55 6.37 43 -0.03 -12
Philippines 6.34 56 5.90 48 0.44 -8
Argentina 6.33 57 5.70 55 0.63 -2
Peru 6.27 58 5.68 56 0.58 -2
Colombia 6.26 59 5.74 53 0.53 -6
Egypt 6.23 60 5.11 65 1.12 5
Indonesia 6.21 61 5.39 60 0.83 -1
Serbia 6.10 62 4.98 68 1.12 6
Russia 6.07 63 5.44 59 0.63 -4
Tunisia 6.01 64 5.22 63 0.78 -1
Vietnam 5.95 65 4.83 70 1.12 5
Sri Lanka 5.80 66 5.32 61 0.49 -5
Dominican Rep. 5.77 67 5.21 64 0.56 -3
Morocco 5.64 68 4.66 72 0.98 4
Kazakhstan 5.60 69 5.10 66 0.50 -3
Ukraine 5.45 70 4.44 76 1.01 6
Pakistan 5.34 71 4.94 69 0.40 -2
Azerbaijan 5.30 72 4.53 73 0.78 1
Algeria 5.25 73 4.31 77 0.94 4
Bangladesh 5.10 74 4.44 75 0.66 1
Nigeria 4.88 75 4.46 74 0.41 -1
Ecuador 4.85 76 5.05 67 -0.19 -9
Kenya 4.83 77 4.24 79 0.59 2
Cuba 4.48 78 4.08 80 0.40 2
Iran 4.35 79 3.59 81 0.76 2
Libya 4.33 80 4.30 78 0.03 -2
Venezuela 4.30 81 4.81 71 -0.50 -10
Angola 3.92 82 3.19 82 0.73 0
Average 6.87 – 6.41 – 0.46 
Median 6.89 – 6.50 – 0.39   
Table 13
Business environment ranks and scores
 2007-11 2007-11 2002-06 2002-06 Change in Change 
 Total score Rank Total score Rank total score in rank 
 2007-11 2007-11 2002-06 2002-06 Change in Change 
 Total score Rank Total score Rank total score in rank
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Risks loom large
Our baseline forecast for global FDI flows in 2007-11 
assumes that the effects of a host of positive factors 
for FDI growth will be tempered to an extent by factors 
such as growing opposition to foreign capital in 
some countries and the negative impact of a host of 
political risks. However, it is possible that negative 
international political and economic developments 
could be worse than assumed, with a much more 
negative impact on global FDI than in our baseline 
assumptions. 
The host of economic risks to our baseline 
range from overleveraged financial institutions to 
the impact of commodity price volatility. Turmoil 
The return of political risk
Contrary to popular belief, businesspeople 
and investors have traditionally paid little 
attention in their decision-making to most 
forms of political risk, compared with most 
other important drivers of investment 
decisions. Macroeconomic conditions, 
labour availability and costs, and the overall 
business and policy environment in a country 
have been far more important issues.
Nor did the terrorist attacks in the US 
on September 11th 2001 change things 
much in this respect. This event may have 
transformed the political landscape but it 
has had surprisingly little impact on the 
global economy or even businesspeople’s 
perceptions. Even though September 11th 
spawned a growth industry of writing on 
risk and doom-laden warnings about the 
end of globalisation, the actual impact on 
international business, and businesspeople’s 
decision-making and perceptions, has been 
minimal.
The low corporate profile of political risk 
was reinforced by the drastic decline since 
the end of the cold war of the capacity of 
geopolitical tensions seriously to undermine 
business. Furthermore, the increasing 
sophistication of corporate strategies 
and the availability of insurance schemes 
mitigated the potential impact from 
“classical political and security risks”—of 
disruption to business from governmental 
instability or civil unrest. Indeed, most 
multinational corporations (MNCs)—and 
not only oil companies—have traditionally 
been a very hardy breed operating in the 
seemingly most inhospitable climates.
However, there are signs that things may 
be changing. Various forms of political risk 
have jumped towards the top of corporate 
agendas. This trend was also very much 
confirmed by the results of the survey 
conducted for this report. Political risk was 
generally seen as posing a considerably 
greater threat to business over the next 
five years than in the recent past. This was 
especially so for emerging markets, where 
generic political risk was identified as the 
main investment constraint. All forms of 
political risk in emerging markets were 
expected to increase over the next five years. 
For developed countries, this was the case 
for the risk of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) protectionism. There was widespread 
concern about the threat of political violence 
and apparent sensitivity to a range of 
geopolitical risks.
On the threat of political violence, 
the survey findings mirrored in large part 
the results of other recent Economist 
Intelligence Unit surveys. For example, 
a Lloyds-Economist Intelligence Unit 
survey from early 2007 (“Under attack? 
Global business and the threat of political 
violence”) found that business leaders 
believe that political violence risk is real and 
rising. More than 50% of the executives that 
were surveyed believe that business is now 
as much a target for attack as government, 
and think political violence will increase 
worldwide over the next five years, with 
terrorism and conflict set to become bigger 
problems than ordinary crime. Concerns 
about political violence were seen as a 
significant barrier to foreign investment. 
Business leaders clearly believe that they 
are operating in an increasingly dangerous 
world.
At the same time, in the survey conducted 
for this report the majority of executives 
were bullish about the investment outlook 
over the next five years, and when asked 
what forces would have the greatest 
influence on global FDI trends in the 
coming five years, respondents largely cited 
economic, rather than political, trends—out 
of 14 factors, six of the top seven were 
economic issues (geopolitical tensions were 
fifth).
Opportunities versus risks 
There thus appears to be a clear disconnect 
between a benign economic outlook and 
significantly heightened political risk 
perceptions. How can this be explained? In 
large part, the increased risk perceptions are 
related to real developments. As discussed in 
various parts of this report, there is certainly 
a threat of increased FDI protectionism and 
geopolitical tensions are high in various 
parts of the world. Arguably, the incidence of 
terrorist attacks, the possibility of the export 
of terrorists from Iraq to other parts of the 
world and expectations that business could 
be targeted directly more than in the past 
may also justify heightened concern about 
threats to business from political violence. 
Yet these concerns do not appear to have 
a significant impact on decision-making. 
Most likely, the heightened political risk 
perceptions are trumped by the perceived 
good opportunities for investment and the 
very positive overall economic outlook. 
Were the latter to deteriorate—disturbing 
the present balance between perceived 
opportunities and risks—then there would 
most likely also be a greater readiness to act 
on the heightened sensitivity to a wide range 
of political risks.
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in financial markets could be sharper and more 
prolonged than is assumed; the slowdown in the US 
could be steeper than expected; there could be the 
need for a more aggressive monetary policy stance 
by central banks in response to higher inflationary 
pressures. A sharp, sustained downward turn in global 
equity markets would, for example, put paid to the 
growth in M&As that underpins much FDI.
In addition to macroeconomic risks, the possible 
adverse impact of political risks, over and above 
what is already assumed in our baseline forecast, 
looms large. After the collapse of Soviet communism, 
international political co-operation helped to fuel a 
decade of intensified globalisation, including stellar 
growth in foreign investment. The co-operative 
spirit has wilted in recent years. The deepening of 
globalisation, with FDI to the fore, could be at risk if 
the tensions over the Middle East and other disputes 
sour further the international climate. 
Three types of, in part inter-related, political risks 
pose a threat to our baseline FDI scenario: disruptions 
and costs to business associated with terrorist attacks 
and the threat to personal security; the potential 
adverse impact on global business of the unsettled 
international political climate; and the threat to 
globalisation from strengthened protectionist 
sentiment (the survey of more than 600 MNCs that 
was conducted for this report revealed heightened 
perceptions of political risk among investors, 
especially for investment into emerging markets).
Developments in the US are of critical importance 
to overall global trends. Thus, for example, following 
the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
movement of people and goods in and out of the US 
is not as free as it was previously. The US is no longer 
as hospitable to foreign students and migrants. Nor 
will the US operate an open-door policy with respect 
to foreign capital: occasionally it will block foreign 
takeovers of key US companies. All this will make for a 
constrained globalisation and for less FDI than might 
otherwise be the case.
However, there are several reasons not to expect 
a descent into serious protectionism or a backlash 
against globalisation and FDI. Powerful business 
interests in the US and Europe will continue to lobby 
and push for FDI openness, including to companies 
from the South. Their efforts are already bearing 
fruit in at least partly defusing some proposed 
measures for FDI protectionism. Technology and 
communications developments will continue to be 
strong countervailing forces undermining moves 
toward protectionism of all kinds. The fast-growing 
emerging markets, such as China and India, will be a 
powerful engine sustaining international integration. 
Regional trends
North America
FDI inflows into the US slumped in the early part 
of the decade, reaching a low of US$53bn in 2003. 
Inflows recovered in 2004-05 to an annual average 
of US$111bn (equal to 1% of GDP). In 2006 the 
US regained its position as the world’s leading 
destination for FDI inflows, as a pick-up in growth 
and the weakening of the US dollar made the US 
attractive to investors. The US will remain the world’s 
leading destination for FDI over the medium term. 
The key attraction to investing in the US will be the 
size of the market. With GDP valued at US$13.3trn in 
2006, the US economy at current exchange rates was 
approximately three times the size of Japan’s and 
one-quarter larger than that of the euro zone. The 
US also has a very good business environment, with 
a liberal policy towards private enterprise, a well-
functioning labour market, deep capital markets and 
good infrastructure. At the federal level, little is done 
to encourage foreign investment, but many states and 
local governments offer tax breaks or grants.
In addition to the appeal of the vast size of the 
domestic market and the business-friendly policy 
environment, the US remains the unquestioned global 
technology leader. Foreign companies will continue to 
view having operations in the US as a way of gaining 
access to cutting-edge technology. The stock of FDI in 
the US is still relatively low, which suggests that there 
is potential for continued substantial inflows. Strong 
global economic growth and buoyant profits have 
left many firms globally in a good position to seek 
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acquisitions, and the depreciation of the US dollar has 
made prices of US firms particularly attractive. These 
factors underpin a bullish forecast for FDI inflows into 
the US, even for 2007, a year in which the economy 
will register weak GDP growth. A cooling of the boom 
in leveraged buyouts is likely to lead to a temporary 
decline of FDI inflows in 2008, before a resumption in 
steady growth in FDI inflows in 2009-11.22
Risks to the forecast stem from the threat to 
macroeconomic stability and protectionist sentiment. 
On our baseline assumptions, rising protectionist 
sentiment will have only a limited effect on FDI flows. 
However, there is a risk of a stronger negative impact. 
Political opposition by some to foreign involvement 
in so-called strategic sectors, such as energy and 
infrastructure, has already affected a few high-profile 
deals. The US recently amended legislation dealing 
with scrutiny of FDI deals.23 This will lengthen the 
time it takes to win approval for proposed crossborder 
M&As in sensitive sectors.
US business environment rank declines
The US’s rank in our business environment rankings 
for 2007-11 falls to seventh, down from fourth 
in 2002-06. Although the business environment 
will remain generally very good, there are serious 
concerns about macroeconomic stability (arising 
from the current-account deficit and high levels of 
personal debt), security risks, strained international 
relations and long-standing problems with political 
lobbying. However, we still expect the US economy 
to outperform most major developed economies over 
the coming five years. Medium-term growth, although 
slower than during the second half of the 1990s, will 
still be robust by historical standards. 
Canada experienced a sharp drop in FDI inflows 
22. Our survey also 
confirmed that a majority 
of MNCs rate the US very 
highly as a location for 
investment in 2007-11.
23. See the detailed 
discussion in the article 
by Karl P Sauvant in this 
volume.
Table 14
FDI inflows into North America
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
US        
Inflows (US$ bn) 84.5 103.4 174.4 283.4 314.0 144.0 74.5 53.1
 % of world total 21.3 21.0 24.5 25.4 22.3 16.9 12.0 9.4
 % change, year on year 43.7 22.4 68.7 62.5 10.8 -54.1 -48.3 -28.6
 % of GDP 1.1 1.2 2.0 3.1 3.2 1.4 0.7 0.5 
Canada        
Inflows (US$ bn) 9.6 11.5 22.8 24.7 66.8 27.7 22.2 7.5
 % of world total 2.4 2.3 3.2 2.2 4.7 3.3 3.6 1.3
 % change, year on year 4.1 19.6 97.9 8.5 169.9 -58.6 -19.9 -66.2
 % of GDP 1.6 1.8 3.7 3.7 9.2 3.9 3.0 0.9 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
US        
Inflows (US$ bn) 122.4 99.4 183.6 237.7 235.0 252.0 260.0 270.0
 % of world total 16.8 10.2 13.8 16.1 16.7 17.1 16.9 16.8
 % change, year on year 130.3 -18.7 84.7 29.4 -1.1 7.2 3.2 3.8
 % of GDP 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Canada        
Inflows (US$ bn) -0.4 28.9 69.0 84.8 59.1 56.0 57.0 59.0
 % of world total 0.0 3.0 5.2 5.8 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.7
 % change, year on year -104.9 – 138.7 22.9 -30.3 -5.3 1.8 3.5
 % of GDP 0.0 2.6 5.4 6.3 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; OECD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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in 2003-04. However, inflows recovered strongly in 
2005 and especially 2006. Canada will provide good 
opportunities for foreign investors over the medium 
term. Close physical proximity to and economic 
integration with the US will continue to be the 
driving force behind foreign investment in Canada. 
Canada has been reducing some of the remaining 
barriers to FDI, while also introducing measures 
to promote inward investment, including low-cost 
financing and reductions in business taxes. However, 
a liberalisation of foreign ownership curbs in telecoms 
and broadcasting will continue to be obstructed by 
strong opposition. High oil prices will underpin strong 
investment inflows into exploration and extraction 
activities. Nevertheless, the surge in 2006 and 2007 
will not be sustained, as financing conditions for 
acquisitions deteriorate globally. 
Canada ranks as the fifth-best place in the world 
in which to conduct business in 2007-11, according 
to our business environment model, equal to its 
rank for 2002-06. Canada’s position is the result of 
a strong macroeconomic environment and market 
opportunities, an increasingly liberalised policy 
framework (compared with the past) and excellent 
infrastructure.
Western Europe
After falling sharply in 2001-04, FDI inflows into 
western Europe recovered strongly in 2005 and 2006. 
Western Europe will continue to be the world’s largest 
recipient of FDI. The main motive for the majority 
of foreign companies investing in the region will 
continue to be better access to one of the world’s 
largest and wealthiest markets. The presence of dense 
industry clusters will also continue to make the region 
attractive as an investment location. Projected annual 
average FDI inflows into the region in 2007-11 will be 
above 3% of GDP—a historically high level and above 
the world average.
As in 2005, the UK was the EU’s top FDI recipient 
in 2006, with US$138bn in inflows. This represented 
more than one-quarter of all FDI inflows into the 
EU15. On a crude measure of FDI activity—the number 
of projects irrespective of their size and value—the 
UK also held the top position in Europe in 2006, 
ahead of France (see Table 6). The leading locations 
for investment across Europe have not changed 
significantly over the past ten years. Every year the 
UK, France and Germany have consistently held their 
position as the favourite European destinations for 
FDI.
The US is the single largest generator of company 
investment projects; it has generated more than 
double the next-largest provider, Germany, which in 
turn accounted for double the number of projects as 
third-placed Japan. Leading west European nations 
benefit to a large extent from US investment–English-
speaking Ireland and the UK notably so. The UK is 
a significant investor for France. French companies 
make up a large proportion of investment into Spain 
and Germany.24
The UK and France will remain the main 
destinations for FDI into western Europe. The UK’s 
attractiveness as a location for FDI has rested on a 
policy of openness to foreign investors, a flexible 
labour market and a highly developed financial sector. 
A less tangible but still important reason is the status 
of English as the world’s leading business language. 
 
The UK’s FDI appeal could weaken
However, a number of factors could weaken the 
UK’s appeal over the next few years. High levels 
of consumer debt pose a threat to the stability of 
the macroeconomic environment. The tax regime 
is becoming more burdensome and complex. 
Improvements to the congested road and rail 
transport infrastructure will be slow to materialise. 
And despite concerted government efforts, the UK will 
struggle to close its productivity gap with the US and 
the best performers in western Europe. In our business 
environment rankings, the UK falls to tenth place for 
2007-11 (compared with sixth in 2002-06), as a result 
of some deterioration in the labour market, increasing 
government regulation and a rise in the tax burden. 
The risk of terrorism has also increased uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, the size of the UK market and the 
existence of industry clusters, centres of scientific 
excellence and skilled human capital will continue 
to be important magnets for FDI in sectors such as 
financial services, software, pharmaceuticals and 
24. Ernst & Young, 
European Investment 
Monitor 2007.
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biotechnology.
France’s business environment has been 
transformed since the mid-1980s, and it now has 
many strengths as an investment location that offset 
some of its long-standing weaknesses, such as an 
onerous tax burden and a highly regulated labour 
market. 
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president in May 
2007 has improved the chances of structural reforms 
in France, but these are likely to be less far-reaching 
than many observers assume. Despite a number of 
important microeconomic reforms in the pipeline, 
some of France’s long-standing weaknesses are 
likely to persist. The tax burden will remain high and 
the labour market will continue to be burdened by 
excessive regulation. 
Table 15
FDI inflows into western Europe
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Western Europe        
Inflows (US$ bn) 125.3 151.1 285.3 527.6 718.3 373.6 296.7 277.0
 % of world total 31.6 30.7 40.0 47.4 51.0 43.9 48.0 49.2
 % change, year on year -0.7 20.6 88.8 84.9 36.1 -48.0 -20.6 -6.6
 % of GDP 1.3 1.7 3.0 5.7 8.3 4.3 3.1 2.4 
 EU15        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 116.5 138.2 269.8 505.9 688.8 357.3 287.4 252.0
  % of world total 29.3 28.1 37.8 45.4 48.9 42.0 46.5 44.7
  % change, year on year -1.6 18.7 95.2 87.5 36.2 -48.1 -19.6 -12.3
  % of GDP 1.3 1.6 3.1 5.8 8.5 4.4 3.2 2.3 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Western Europe        
Inflows (US$ bn) 212.6 455.5 554.8 572.3 550.4 581.9 613.9 644.1
 % of world total 29.1 46.9 41.6 38.8 39.1 39.6 39.9 40.2
 % change, year on year -23.3 114.3 21.8 3.1 -3.8 5.7 5.5 4.9
 % of GDP 1.6 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 
 EU15        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 202.5 433.6 496.5 520.1 500.4 529.7 561.8 590.0
  % of world total 27.7 44.6 37.2 35.3 35.6 36.0 36.6 36.8
  % change, year on year -19.6 114.1 14.5 4.8 -3.8 5.9 6.1 5.0
  % of GDP 1.6 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; OECD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
FDI inflows to leading European destinations, 2006-11
(US$ bn)
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France in two minds on FDI
The government is also likely to continue a policy of 
promoting “national champions” and obstructing 
foreign takeovers of French companies in sectors that 
are considered to be “strategic”. French policymakers 
appear often to be in two minds—they want to attract 
FDI and take pride in France’s high position in the 
international FDI league tables, and at the same time 
they seek to foster “national champions”, limiting 
FDI in some sectors. Although France has been at the 
forefront of espousing protectionist sentiment, we do 
not expect that this will have a significant effect on 
crossborder M&As and FDI into France. Offsetting to a 
large extent some expected deterioration in specific 
policies and attitudes to FDI are France’s attractions 
as an investment location. These include the country’s 
central geographical location in the EU, one of the 
world’s most highly educated and productive labour 
forces, and its outstanding transport and telecoms 
infrastructure. In all, France retains many advantages 
that will help it to remain one of the largest 
destinations for FDI in the EU.
Germany’s highly skilled workforce and excellent 
infrastructure will continue to make it a good 
location for specialised manufacturing. The structure 
of German industry is still relatively fragmented, 
providing foreign investors with the opportunity 
to participate in sectoral consolidation and to reap 
economies of scale through acquisitions. The still low 
level of real estate prices by west European standards 
may also attract investors in this sector.
Asia and Australasia
Asia will remain the world’s most dynamic region, with 
growth rates comparable to those in the mid-1990s. 
The region’s economies are being lifted by intra-
regional trade, particularly as the Chinese economy 
continues to boom. FDI flows to the region will remain 
buoyant, despite some negative trends such as rising 
protectionism in several Asian countries.25
FDI inflows into Asia and Australasia increased in 
2006 to almost US$240bn, after inflows had fallen 
back sharply to US$144bn in 2005. The latter was 
in large part the result of a large negative inward 
investment figure for Australia (stemming from a 
reorganisation by News Corporation). Developing 
Asia, by contrast, had attracted a record high of 
US$174bn in inflows in 2005 (a 26% increase 
compared with 2004), and this climbed to a new 
record total of US$212bn in 2006, by far the highest 
emerging-market regional total. 
China will retain its leading position
As in recent years, China was far and away the main 
FDI recipient among emerging markets. Although FDI 
inflows actually fell slightly in 2006, to US$78.1bn, 
from US$79.1bn in 2005, this was still one of the 
highest totals in the world. Despite concerns about 
rising cost pressures, because of the size of the 
domestic market and strong growth prospects, and 
for reasons of cost competitiveness, China remains a 
favoured base for foreign companies. Many foreign 
companies are now starting to make good profits 
(even if there are significant variations across 
sectors). Nevertheless, companies wishing to sell into 
the domestic market still find the country’s business 
environment a difficult one in which to operate. 
Despite improvements in recent years, the Chinese 
market is characterised by bureaucratic hurdles and 
an opaque legal system. 
FDI into China is likely to rise slightly in 2007 to 
some US$80bn and to grow steadily thereafter to 
surpass US$90bn towards the end of the forecast 
period. China is still ranked by most international 
firms as their preferred investment destination, 
including in the survey conducted for this report. 
China is committed to meeting its WTO obligations, 
which should boost FDI. The gradual opening up 
of sectors such as domestic commerce, financial 
services, insurance and tourism is under way. 
Geographical restrictions on where foreign 
companies are allowed to set up operations will also 
be relaxed in the coming years. 
China’s price competitiveness will be maintained 
over the forecast period. On baseline assumptions, 
there seems little risk of a massive relocation of FDI 
from China to cheaper locations. However, despite 
the range of factors that underpin the expectation 
of buoyant FDI into China, there are also some 
considerations that will keep FDI below potential, 
25. The most recent 
examples are in ASEAN 
countries. In early 2007 
Thailand’s government 
approved measures that 
limit foreign investors to 
holding no more than 50% 
of the shares or the voting 
rights in companies. 
In July 2007 Indonesia 
greatly expanded its 
“negative investment list” 
of local industries in which 
foreign investment is 
partly or wholly restricted. 
The new list will affect at 
least 338 business sectors, 
up substantially from 83 
previously.
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as well as downside risks to the baseline forecast. 
Although China will remain open to foreign capital—
and in some aspects will liberalise even further—there 
are signs of unease in China with what some are 
beginning to see as excessive dependence on FDI, 
similar to the increasing FDI protectionism that is 
occurring elsewhere. Another dampening effect will 
come from the alignment of corporate tax rates levied 
on domestic and foreign firms (towards the higher 
domestic rate). Furthermore, if the upward pressure 
on the renminbi leads to appreciation that is much 
stronger than anticipated, that might also hold back 
inward FDI flows. 
Although China has been the top investment 
destination in Asia for some years, investor interest 
in India is a more recent development. Whereas 
China’s FDI is concentrated in capital-intensive 
manufacturing, FDI flows into India are mostly in 
information technology (IT) and communications 
centres, which are not accompanied by sizeable FDI 
flows. Despite India’s successful positioning as a 
business processing and IT outsourcing hub, these 
activities often translate into Indian services sector 
exports via third-party transactions—not FDI. Despite 
strong growth in FDI inflows in 2005-06, India has yet 
to build a critical mass in FDI.
The services sector continues to be the main target 
for FDI in India. FDI in the services sector increased 
to US$5.3bn in 2006, compared with US$1.8bn 
in 2006—in part owing to two large transactions 
by Oracle and Merrill Lynch (both US). There were 
also a number of small investments in IT services, 
as well as a pick-up of FDI in real estate (to about 
US$1.5bn, from only US$0.1bn in 2005), following a 
relaxation of regulations related to FDI in the sector 
in February 2006. By contrast, FDI in manufacturing 
actually declined in 2006 to US$1.5bn, compared with 
US$1.8bn in 2005. The largest single investment in 
the manufacturing sector was only US$79m, reflecting 
the fact that the overall business environment for 
manufacturing FDI is not yet attractive enough.26
India’s potential to attract FDI is vast and the 
government has in recent years been adopting 
measures to encourage FDI. Increased acquisitions 
by foreign companies will lead to higher FDI inflows. 
There will be a steady increase in FDI focused on 
growing domestic market opportunities, especially 
in consumer goods. FDI in manufacturing will remain 
limited, although it should increase from a low base 
on the back of improvements in infrastructure. 
There could also be a foreign investment boom in 
retailing, if the government eventually opens up this 
sector. Telecoms and energy are other high-potential 
industries for FDI.
FDI inflows into India will remain below potential
FDI inflows are set to increase substantially during 
the forecast period, but will still remain well below 
potential because of persistent business environment 
problems. The government’s FDI target of US$25bn 
for fiscal year 2007/08 (April-March) is unlikely to 
be met. The Congress-led coalition government has 
Main outward investors from developing Asia
(FDI outflows; 2007-11 annual av; US$ bn)
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FDI Story: Changing Gears, 
May 21st 2007.
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made significant progress in opening the economy to 
foreign investment, but further progress before the 
next election, due by May 2009, will be constrained 
by opposition from the government’s leftist political 
allies. India’s privatisation programme has stalled 
owing to opposition from the Left Front, on the 
support of which the government relies. Inflexible 
labour laws and poor infrastructure will also restrict 
FDI inflows.
FDI into India will grow but will remain very low 
in relation to the size and potential of its economy. 
India will also continue to lag far behind China as a 
FDI inflows to developing Asia
(US$ bn)
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FDI inflows into Japan
Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Japan is very low; the rate of FDI penetration 
as measured by the share of the stock of 
inward FDI in GDP, at 2.5%, is one of the 
lowest in the world. FDI inflows into Japan 
were more than halved in 2005 to US$3.2bn 
(a mere 0.1% of GDP, one of the lowest 
ratios in the world), from what was a modest 
average of US$7.3bn in 2001-04, and large 
disinvestments meant that inward FDI flows 
turned negative, at US$-6.8bn, in 2006. 
Although some pick-up is expected during 
the forecast period, FDI inflows will remain 
very low as a share of GDP and the ratio of the 
stock of inward FDI to GDP is projected to rise 
to only 2.8% by the end of the period. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s FDI 
model of FDI determinants captures the 
main reasons why FDI into Japan has been so 
low, although even the low total for average 
annual FDI inflows predicted by the model 
(US$5.8bn for 2002-06) exceeded the actual 
(US$4bn)—suggesting that some factors 
not fully captured by the model were also at 
work. High labour costs, various problems of 
the operating environment (as measured in 
our business environment score for Japan), 
weak growth and poor knowledge of foreign 
languages all offset the attractions of a large 
market.
Japan’s attractiveness is further 
diminished by the fact that consumer 
spending is weak, prices are falling and 
the population is shrinking. Japan cannot 
compete as a regional export hub with 
countries such as Singapore. Many domestic 
companies resist foreign takeovers. 
The government has been trying to 
attract FDI. It has reformed the commercial 
code and made it easier for foreign firms 
to buy Japanese ones. Japan hopes that 
foreign capital can reform companies and 
increase competition. In manufacturing, 
labour productivity at the Japanese affiliates 
of foreign firms is as much as 60% higher 
than it is at domestic firms; in services firms 
it is 80% higher, according to the OECD. 
Acquisitions by foreign buyers have tended 
to increase the overall value of Japanese 
firms. Three years after an international 
takeover, profits have increased by 35% 
on average and the overall value of firms 
acquired by foreigners has increased nearly 
twice as much as those bought by domestic 
competitors (see “Gaijin at the gates”, The 
Economist, August 16th 2007).
The Japanese government has a goal 
of increasing the stock of inward FDI to 
5% of GDP by 2010. Since the government 
began its “Invest Japan” campaign in 2003, 
the country has implemented some policy 
measures to encourage FDI. A takeover 
technique known as “triangular merger” 
allows acquirers to use equity stakes instead 
of only cash to buy targeted firms. 
Even with an inward FDI stock at 5% of 
GDP, Japan would still lag far behind other 
advanced economies in attracting foreign 
investment. In fact, Japan is expected to fall 
well short of this target. Despite having one 
of the largest markets in the world, Japan 
will remain a difficult country in which to 
invest. Change is likely to be incremental at 
best. A complicated regulatory environment, 
high costs and residual hostility to foreign 
ownership of important Japanese companies 
will militate against a rapid increase in 
inward FDI.
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preferred destination for investment. For example, in 
the survey conducted for this report, China was rated 
far ahead of India as a location that was considered 
important to investors in 2007-11.
ASEAN prospects
There has been concern among members of ASEAN 
that China is divert FDI from their countries, and that 
India too will increasingly do so. However, FDI is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game. If countries continue to 
improve their business environments, they will also 
remain attractive locations for FDI. China will continue 
drawing FDI to its expanding higher-value-added 
production base. At the top end, however, it will remain 
in direct competition with other economies, and some 
of China’s advantages in low-level production during 
the 1990s will gradually pass to others. 
Indeed, we forecast that the gap between FDI 
inflows into China and the ASEAN countries will 
narrow. Whereas inflows into China were in 2002-06 
80% higher than the size of inflows into the ASEAN 
ten, in 2007-11 FDI into China is projected to be 45% 
Table 16
FDI inflows into Asia & Australasia
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Asia & Australasia        
Inflows (US$ bn) 97.6 111.0 100.8 124.2 165.9 121.8 116.1 110.9
 % of world total 25.5 23.4 14.8 12.8 12.6 16.9 18.9 19.8
 % change, year on year 10.1 13.8 -9.2 23.2 33.6 -26.6 -4.7 -4.4
 % of GDP 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.3 
 Developing Asia        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 87.1 98.1 89.4 107.3 142.6 102.6 88.2 93.9
  % of world total 21.9 20.0 12.5 9.6 10.1 12.1 14.3 16.7
  % change, year on year 19.2 12.6 -8.9 20.1 32.8 -28.0 -14.1 6.5
  % of GDP 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.2 3.0 2.4 2.3 
  China        
  Inflows (US$ bn) 40.2 44.2 43.8 38.8 38.4 44.2 49.3 47.1
   % of regional total 41.2 39.9 43.4 31.2 23.2 36.3 42.5 25.3
   % change, year on year 12.1 10.1 -1.1 -11.4 -0.9 15.2 11.5 -4.5
   % of GDP 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.4 2.9 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia        
Inflows (US$ bn) 186.0 144.1 238.6 276.5 275.0 287.9 302.7 315.6
 % of world total 25.6 14.9 18.3 18.9 19.7 19.7 19.9 19.9
 % change, year on year 67.7 -22.5 65.6 15.9 -0.6 4.7 5.2 4.3
 % of GDP 2.0 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 
 Developing Asia        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 138.6 174.1 212.4 218.2 224.0 234.8 244.5 254.2
  % of world total 19.1 18.0 16.3 14.9 16.0 16.1 16.1 16.0
  % change, year on year 47.5 25.6 22.0 2.7 2.7 4.8 4.1 4.0
  % of GDP 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1 
  China        
  Inflows (US$ bn) 54.9 79.1 78.1 79.5 84.1 86.5 90.9 92.9
   % of regional total 29.5 54.9 32.7 28.8 30.6 30.0 30.0 29.4
   % change, year on year 16.7 44.0 -1.3 1.8 5.8 2.8 5.1 2.2
   % of GDP 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 49
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS   GLOBAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO 2011  PART 1
higher than inflows into the ASEAN countries.
The ASEAN economies are expected to perform 
well over the forecast period, growing by an annual 
average of around 5% in 2007-11. Despite increased 
competition in Asia for FDI flows, Singapore will 
remain an attractive destination for foreign investors 
during 2007-11, with its business environment 
remaining one of the most attractive in the world. FDI 
inflows will be enhanced by the increasing number 
of bilateral free-trade agreements that Singapore is 
negotiating, and the island state’s pivotal position 
within South-east Asia. Nevertheless, it has become 
an increasingly high-cost location. Accordingly, 
the government is now building on its high-quality 
physical and social infrastructure.
Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007, which should 
reinforce the positive impact of high growth rates on 
FDI. As a result, in 2007-11 FDI inflows into Vietnam 
are projected to rise steadily and to reach almost 
US$8bn by 2011. Annual FDI inflows in 2007-11 are 
forecast to average almost 7% of GDP. In Indonesia, 
FDI inflows are expected to pick up from the very low 
levels of recent years, despite the recent adoption 
of some restrictive measures. Thailand is currently 
in the midst of political turmoil. Aside from political 
concerns, Thailand has been losing its attractiveness 
as a location for investment owing to a rising cost 
base and uncertainty about the commitment to 
liberalisation—particularly in key sectors such 
as telecoms and utilities. The country’s poor 
infrastructure has also deterred investors.
FDI inflows into South Korea will remain well below 
the country’s potential. Despite having a domestic 
market of nearly 50m (increasingly wealthy) people 
and one of the most advanced manufacturing bases in 
Asia, South Korea is likely to remain a difficult place 
to do business. This reflects residual hostility towards 
foreign ownership, continued lack of corporate 
transparency and persistent labour militancy. 
Latin America and the Caribbean
FDI into Latin America and the Caribbean declined 
slightly in 2006, but as in 2005 exceeded US$100bn. 
Strong growth in the US and resource-seeking 
investors were the principal forces behind the high 
level.27 The regional economic recovery, an improved 
macroeconomic environment and strong demand 
for commodities underpinned the opening of new 
business opportunities for foreign investors. 
As usual, Brazil and Mexico were the main FDI 
recipients in 2006, together accounting for 37% of the 
regional total. Although Mexico’s inflows of US$19bn 
represented a slight decline on 2005, these were 
marginally higher than inflows into Brazil. Mexico 
thus beat Brazil again for the sixth consecutive year 
as the top FDI destination in the region. Mexico’s 
manufacturing sector received the majority of FDI, 
much of which flowed via the maquila free economic 
zones. High inflows reflect the continued strength of 
the US economy. 
FDI inflows to Chile increased to an estimated 
US$8.1bn as a result of strong growth in reinvested 
earnings in the mining sector. FDI inflows to Colombia 
declined sharply from one-off, privatisation-related 
27. See UN Economic 
Commission for Latin 
American and the 
Caribbean, Foreign 
Investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 
2007.
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Table 17
FDI inflows into Latin America & the Caribbean 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Latin America & the Caribbean       
Inflows (US$ bn) 52.9 73.6 85.5 108.8 98.3 131.2 54.7 46.9
 % of world total 13.3 15.0 12.0 9.8 7.0 15.4 8.9 8.3
 % of emerging markets total 31.6 34.6 39.0 41.7 34.7 45.6 27.8 22.5
 % change, year on year 64.3 39.1 16.0 27.3 -9.7 33.5 -58.3 -14.3
 % of GDP 2.8 3.5 4.1 5.9 4.8 6.6 3.1 2.6
 Brazil        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 11.2 19.7 31.9 28.6 32.8 22.5 16.6 10.1
  % of regional total 21.2 26.7 37.3 26.3 33.3 17.1 30.3 21.6
  % of GDP 1.3 2.3 3.8 4.9 5.1 4.1 3.3 1.8
 Mexico        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 9.2 12.8 12.4 13.7 17.8 27.4 19.4 15.3
  % of regional total 17.4 17.4 14.5 12.6 18.1 20.9 35.4 32.7
  % of GDP 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.8 3.1 4.4 3.0 2.4
 Chile        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 4.8 5.3 4.6 8.8 4.9 4.2 2.6 4.3
  % of regional total 9.1 7.2 5.4 8.1 4.9 3.2 4.7 9.2
  % of GDP 6.4 6.4 5.8 12.0 6.4 6.1 3.8 5.8
 Argentina        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 6.9 9.2 7.3 24.0 10.4 2.2 2.1 1.7
  % of regional total 13.1 12.4 8.5 22.0 10.6 1.7 3.9 3.5
  % of GDP 2.6 3.1 2.4 8.5 3.7 0.8 2.1 1.3 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Latin America & the Caribbean       
Inflows (US$ bn) 105.0 106.3 102.5 123.0 121.2 125.8 131.9 138.1
 % of world total 14.4 10.9 7.7 8.3 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
 % of emerging markets total 29.9 25.0 20.1 23.0 23.0 23.1 23.4 23.5
 % change, year on year 123.8 1.2 -3.6 20.1 -1.5 3.8 4.8 4.8
 % of GDP 5.0 4.1 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
 Brazil        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 18.2 15.2 18.8 34.5 27.0 25.0 25.0 26.0
  % of regional total 17.3 14.3 18.3 28.0 22.3 19.9 19.0 18.8
  % of GDP 2.7 1.7 1.8 2.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
 Mexico        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 22.4 19.7 19.0 21.3 21.5 22.5 23.7 24.5
  % of regional total 21.3 18.6 18.6 17.3 17.7 17.9 18.0 17.7
  % of GDP 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3
 Chile        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 7.2 7.0 8.1 10.0 9.8 10.9 11.8 12.0
  % of regional total 6.8 6.5 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.6 8.9 8.7
  % of GDP 7.5 5.9 5.5 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.7 6.5
 Argentina        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.9
  % of regional total 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.2 4.8 5.2 5.5 5.7
  % of GDP 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Sources: National statistics; IMF; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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record inflows of US$10.3bn in 2005. In the Andean 
countries, a trend towards greater state control 
of the natural resource sector and less favourable 
fiscal regimes for investors in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela dampened investment.
 
Robust growth in 2007
The region is expected to record significant growth of 
FDI this year, by a projected 20%, led by very strong 
inflows into Brazil. FDI inflows into Brazil surged in 
the first half of 2007, owing to a combination of a 
liquid global market, favourable financing conditions, 
and increased investment in export-oriented 
manufacturing and extractive sectors. Several large 
deals were concluded, including the acquisition of 
Arcelor Brasil by Arcelor Mittal (Netherlands) for 
US$5.4bn, and the purchase of Serasa by Experian 
(UK) for US$1.2bn.
Over the medium term, further growth in FDI 
inflows into the region is expected, although the peak 
of the late 1990s is not expected to be repeated by 
2011. Real GDP growth in the Latin America region 
is forecast to slow from 5.3% in 2006 to 4.6% in 
2007 and 4.1% in 2008. Economies in the region 
will continue to be among the leading beneficiaries 
of strong Asian demand for non-oil commodities, 
although prices are likely to decline from their recent 
exceptionally high levels, particularly in 2008. The 
slowdown in the US will depress growth in 2007, 
particularly among countries with strong trade ties 
to North America. Some domestic factors behind 
recent strong growth will also weaken. International 
financing conditions are likely to tighten. 
Given its reasonable growth prospects and the 
attractions of its large domestic market, Brazil will 
receive sizeable inflows of FDI. We expect Mexico to 
remain a desirable destination for FDI. Rising incomes 
will make Mexico more attractive to firms selling 
consumer goods and services. Manufacturing will 
continue to receive investment, as foreign companies 
locate plants geared to the US market in Mexico 
in order to take advantage of lower labour costs. 
However, Mexican manufacturers will be exposed to 
the threat of competition from lower-cost destinations 
in the emerging-market world, especially China. 
However, FDI inflows will continue to be hindered 
by costs to business deriving from bureaucracy, 
deficiencies in infrastructure and underinvestment 
in human capital. Many Latin American countries slip 
down the business environment rankings in 2007-11, 
as the pace of improvement is slow compared with 
other regions. Latin America also received a modest 
rating as a preferred destination for investors in the 
survey that was conducted for this report, although 
the results were somewhat better than average among 
respondents from US companies. Further instances of 
protectionism are likely in some countries, although 
these are very unlikely to translate into a full-scale 
regional backlash against foreign investors.
Structural weaknesses will continue to depress 
Latin American performance, especially in comparison 
with other emerging regions. Although the share 
of gross fixed investment in GDP has risen in Latin 
America, it remains low, and this will continue to 
depress the region’s long-term growth potential. 
Weak investment reflects low domestic saving rates, 
high real interest rates, an inefficient tax system and a 
high level of red tape. 
The left-wing nationalist tone adopted by some 
Latin American governments, such as in Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, may also deter foreign 
investment inflows. Populist leaders in the region 
are seeking greater revenue from national energy 
resources to finance redistributive economic policies. 
The situation in Venezuela is a particular concern. 
The president, Hugo Chávez, has long threatened to 
take control of “key sectors”, but nationalisation even 
outside the energy sector is moving beyond rhetoric. 
Eastern Europe
FDI inflows into the transition economies of eastern 
Europe reached a record total of US$106bn in 
2006, compared with US$77bn in 2005—the rate of 
increase, 37%, was exactly equal to the growth rate 
in global FDI in 2006. This meant that the transition 
economies’ share in global FDI inflows in 2006 
remained unchanged compared with 2005, at 7.9%. 
In 2006 the region displaced Latin America and the 
Caribbean as the second most important emerging-
market destination for FDI after developing Asia. 
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Three economies in the region were among the top 
emerging-market FDI recipients in 2006—Russia 
(third), Poland (tenth) and Romania (11th). The 
US$106bn total inflows represented almost 5% of the 
transition region’s GDP, the highest ratio achieved so 
far. For the Balkans the FDI inflows/GDP ratio exceeded 
10% in 2006, and it was almost 8% for the Baltic states.
The 2006 increase in FDI inflows affected all 
transition subregions—except east-central Europe, 
where inflows equalled the 2005 total—and most 
economies in the area. For a large number of 
countries, the 2006 inflows represented a record 
total (Russia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Kazakhstan). The growth in FDI inflows was the result 
of large-scale privatisation sales in some countries; 
growth in reinvested earnings, as well as a real estate 
boom in many new EU member states; ongoing strong 
growth in FDI into previous laggards such as the 
Balkans; and commodity investments into some CIS 
states. There was a very strong increase in FDI flows 
into Russia, which more than doubled in 2006 to 
US$28.7bn. The lure of ample market opportunities 
and very strong consumer spending growth in Russia 
more than offset the impact of some deterioration 
in the business environment—especially as far as 
investment in natural resources is concerned.
FDI inflows into Poland reached US$14.5bn 
in 2006, a 51% increase on 2005. Unlike in most 
other high-FDI recipient countries in the region, 
Poland’s total owed little to privatisations in 2006. 
The ongoing real estate boom underpinned much of 
the increase in FDI, as did an increase in reinvested 
earnings, indicating growing confidence in the Polish 
economy. The inflow into Hungary was boosted by the 
US$1.3bn acquisition of MOL’s natural gas storage 
EU membership and FDI
A key question is whether EU membership 
boosts foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. 
The conventional wisdom has been that 
membership will lead to a new surge of FDI 
into the EU’s new member states and that it 
will spark a massive intra-EU relocation of 
production from the west to the east. This 
conventional wisdom is now fraying a bit at 
the edges, although the dominant view is still 
that membership has and will boost FDI 
inflows to the new members. In 2003 there 
was a sharp dip in FDI flows to the eight east 
European countries that joined the EU in 
2004. A good recovery followed from 2004. 
But it is difficult to ascribe this to the effect of 
EU membership as such, as flows in 2004-06 
were influenced by a number of large 
privatisations. The recovery in FDI inflows has 
also been cyclical in the sense that the new 
members benefited from the economic 
recovery in the euro area following very weak 
activity in the beginning of the decade.
EU membership has been accompanied 
by some FDI-enhancing aspects. There were 
some further reductions in risk ratings; many 
small investors in particular were reassured. 
Although the bulk of trade liberalisation 
(which was an important driving force 
for FDI) occurred long before, some 
residual trade barriers were removed after 
membership. Further improvement occurred 
in some areas of the business environment, 
as practices became further aligned with EU 
norms. Access to EU structural funding is a 
point of attraction for some FDI. Ultimately, 
the adoption of the euro is likely to have 
a positive impact on FDI flows—although 
for most of the new EU members in eastern 
Europe this is still some years away.
The caveats
However, there are also some significant 
caveats and the net impact of EU membership 
on FDI is by no means self-evident. The 
attainment of membership removed a reform 
anchor and the discipline of the accession 
process; this has been very evident in many 
countries of the region. The well-known 
World Bank ease of doing business indicators 
show that, on average, the regulatory 
framework for business in the EU new 
member states is far from ideal—there is 
a lot of room for improvement. Although 
the Baltic states and, to a lesser extent, 
Slovakia rank highly, the others perform 
quite poorly. EU membership also appears to 
have been associated with upward pressure 
on currencies and on labour costs. Some EU 
regulations reduce flexibility and impose 
costs on business. The elimination of special 
FDI incentives, required by EU membership, 
may be positive from an overall economic 
welfare point of view, but from the point of 
view of attracting FDI it is a negative. The 
experience of previous enlargements, the 
Nordic or the southern ones, also suggests 
that the link between FDI and enlargement is 
much weaker than often supposed. 
Economist Intelligence Unit surveys of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) tend 
to show that East Asia features far more 
prominently than the east European EU 
members as a preferred destination for 
future investment. It is worth mentioning 
that labour costs are not the only issue 
for investors. The new member states lose 
out also on the criteria of a skilled labour 
force and as a location for research and 
development (R&D) activities. 
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and wholesale trading businesses by Germany’s E.ON. 
Large privatisation deals accounted for a 
significant portion of the region’s FDI inflows in 2006. 
Fast-growing Romania attracted inflows of US$11.4bn 
in 2006. Some US$2.8bn of the total was based on 
the purchase by Austria’s Erste Bank of a stake in the 
country’s largest bank, Banca Comerciala Romana. 
Slovakia’s FDI inflow of over US$4bn in 2006 partly 
reflected privatisation inflows from the sale of the 
power generator Slovenske elektrarne (SE) to Enel 
(Italy). Croatia’s US$3.6bn FDI inflow was based on 
the sale of pharmaceuticals giant Pliva to Barr (US) 
for US$2.5bn, and, to a lesser extent, another round 
of privatisation of oil and gas company INA (for some 
US$500m). In Lithuania the US$1.8bn inflow in 2006 
was boosted by the sale of the government’s stake in 
the oil complex Mazeikiu Nafta to Poland’s PKN Orlen 
for US$852m. 
Nevertheless, despite the high 2006 inflow into 
the region, it is noticeable that despite widespread 
fears in western Europe about dislocation of economic 
activity to the east, the share of the eight new east 
European EU member states that joined in 2004 in 
total FDI flows to the EU25 was a mere 7% in 2006, 
down on the 8% share recorded in 2005.
FDI flows have peaked
There are a number of reasons to believe, however, 
that FDI inflows into the region may have peaked 
in 2006. A modest decline is forecast for 2007, to a 
still very high US$104bn. Total FDI inflows are likely 
to continue to trend downwards after that over the 
medium term, both in absolute US dollar terms and 
in terms of the percentage of the region’s GDP. The 
main reason for this is the near-exhaustion of major 
privatisation opportunities in much of the region. But 
sharply increasing labour costs in many countries, 
continuing business environment problems and 
competition from other destinations will contribute 
to a tailing-off of FDI inflows into many of the new EU 
member states. Although FDI inflows have increased 
significantly into many CIS states, political risk and 
business environment problems will keep flows 
below potential. FDI inflows into each subregion are 
expected to taper off in 2007, with the exception of 
the CIS, as a result of declining competitiveness and 
the absence of large privatisation sales, as well the 
effect of an uncertain macroeconomic environment in 
some countries. 
Medium-term trends
Russia, a notable FDI laggard so far, is expected to 
become the main destination country in the region 
over the medium term (although as a share of GDP and 
in per-capita terms inflows will still remain relatively 
modest). Implementation of reforms will remain a 
serious problem, but Russia is nevertheless expected 
to record an improvement in its business environment 
in the medium term. WTO membership, expected in 
the next couple of years, will have a positive impact. 
Annual average FDI inflows into Russia are projected 
at above US$30bn during the next five years. 
Although this will represent a notable improvement 
on Russia’s past performance, it is still short of the 
FDI inflows to east European EU member states
(US$ bn)
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Russia’s outward foreign 
direct investment
Russia’s booming domestic market and 
natural resource endowments mean that 
the country has become a major destination 
for inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Attention has recently also turned 
to Russia’s increasingly prominent role 
as an outward investor. Russian outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) is part of 
a new global phenomenon of investment by 
some emerging markets. Although Russian 
companies are relative latecomers, their 
recent expansion, facilitated by oil liquidity, 
has been rapid. Russian FDI outflows 
averaged only about US$3bn per year up 
to 2002 (similar to the low levels of inward 
flows). But they shot up to US$9.7bn in 
2003, an average of more than US$13bn 
in 2004-05, and reached a record total of 
US$18bn in 2006. 
OFDI data are problematic for most 
emerging markets, but appear to be 
especially so in the case of Russia. Official 
figures overstate OFDI as they also include 
some portfolio investment. Round-tripping 
(outward investment that then makes its 
way back into Russia as inward investment) 
plays a role. Official data understate OFDI 
to the extent that some unrecorded capital 
flight may have the characteristics of FDI, 
although the majority of capital flight has 
been channelled into non-FDI financial 
assets. Investments by Russian-controlled 
entities registered abroad do not appear 
in Russian OFDI statistics. In so far as this 
is a secondary movement of resources that 
originated in Russia, the cumulative stock 
of Russian FDI is not affected. But some 
growth in offshore assets and the investment 
of that increase of assets would have the 
character of Russian outward investment. 
FDI registration procedures seem to have 
improved in recent years. Part of the OFDI in 
2006 would probably have previously been 
unrecorded and appeared as capital flight. In 
2006 capital flight declined, mainly because 
of the introduction of full capital-account 
convertibility in July 2006. 
Comparable FDI stock data can be crudely 
estimated on the basis of cumulative flows. 
In 1992-2006 cumulative outflows for 
Russia of US$75bn are higher than for most 
emerging markets (including Brazil, China 
and India), although the differences are 
far smaller than if reported stock data are 
used. Overall, although Russian OFDI has 
been fast-growing, its extent can be easily 
exaggerated. Russian multinationals appear 
to be still less globalised than the leading 
companies from some other emerging 
markets. Boston Consulting Group’s 2006 
list of the top 100 “global challengers” from 
rapidly developing economies includes just 
seven Russian companies, compared with 
12 from Brazil and 44 from China. In the 
Financial Times’s recent ranking, according 
to market capitalisation, of the world’s 
top companies, only three Russian firms 
appeared in the top 100—Gazprom at sixth, 
Rosneft at 68th and Lukoil at 96th. In a 
recent survey of 51 chief executive officers 
(CEOs) of leading companies in Russia, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that about 
three in four did not wish to acquire assets 
abroad, and only 10% had acquired foreign 
assets in the past year—a lower proportion 
than was found in similar surveys of leading 
Chinese and Brazilian firms. 
A statistical regression analysis of OFDI 
for 74 countries in 2006 shows that just two 
variables—the size of the country (measured 
by GDP in US dollars) and income per head 
levels (in US dollars) explain almost 80% of 
the inter-country variation in OFDI flows. 
Russia’s OFDI is about what one would expect 
on the basis of its size and wealth—that 
is, the level predicted by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s equation is exactly equal 
to the actual OFDI flow in 2006 of US$18bn.
Distribution of Russian OFDI
OFDI from Russia is largely limited to a few 
sectors, where companies have specific 
competitive advantages and where global 
consolidation pressure is intense—in energy, 
metallurgy and telecommunications. Only a 
few Russian companies have so far emerged 
as global players; most others remain at 
best regional players. While Gazprom and 
Lukoil have been active in the oil and gas 
sector for several years, outward investment 
has been more recent in the metals sector, 
with Severstal, Norilsk Nickel, Rusal and 
Evraz becoming significant investors. Within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), Russian telecoms companies have also 
become dominant players. Until recently, the 
bulk of Russia’s OFDI went to the CIS, where 
Russian companies are the dominant foreign 
investors. Russian OFDI is also flowing into 
central and south-eastern Europe. Russian 
metals companies are becoming major 
investors in Africa.
Drivers of Russian OFDI
Russian OFDI is driven by a number of 
motives, including gaining critical mass to 
survive consolidation; and to gain access to 
new markets, raw materials, and technology 
and management know-how. Russian OFDI 
has sometimes been also driven by a desire to 
flee the country’s difficult domestic business 
environment. The improved financial position 
of Russian natural resource firms—as a 
result of high world prices and several years 
of strong growth—has been a major factor. 
Despite the increasing role of the state in 
the Russian economy, commercial motives 
appear to predominate in Russian OFDI. This 
is especially true of the metals companies 
and of the mobile operators. The case of 
the oil and gas companies is less clear-
cut—especially of the state-owned gas giant 
Gazprom. The latter fuses commercial and 
geopolitical agendas into one. 
Russian companies suffer from a poor 
image. A 2006 survey by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit of 332 international 
executives showed that a majority of 
respondents had negative perceptions 
of Russian business in all aspects, from 
management skills and reliability to issues 
of transparency and political independence. 
Over 60% of respondents expected political 
opposition to be the major obstacle to 
Russia’s corporate expansion in their home 
countries. In part the image is undeserved, 
in so far as it is based on prejudices. 
However, the negative reputation is 
also in part based on reality and Russian 
companies’ substantial weaknesses, such as 
weak governance.
Outlook
Leading Russian investors, such as Lukoil, 
Gazprom, Rusal, Severstal and Evraz, have 
announced very ambitious investment plans. 
However, it is possible that the increasing 
role of the Russian state in the economy, 
as well as poor Russian-Western political 
relations, will constrain Russian OFDI. State 
control of energy companies will make these 
more sluggish and complacent in general, 
and less able to expand. Resistance in 
developed countries to Russian takeover 
bids is likely to feed off the uncertainties 
about the relationship between the state 
and Russia’s companies. As of 2008, Russia 
will have a Fund for Future Generations, part 
of which will be invested in riskier assets, 
including in the form of FDI. It will be worth 
more than US$30bn in 2008. The likelihood 
that the state will seek to invest a significant 
part of such large sums in Western businesses 
is bound to magnify further the risk of a 
protectionist reaction in the West.
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Table 18
FDI inflows into eastern Europe 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  
Eastern Europe  
Inflows (US$ bn) 16.8 24.1 26.7 29.1 29.5 30.0 36.0 35.1
 % of world total 4.2 4.9 3.7 2.6 2.1 3.5 5.8 6.2
 % change, year on year 1.2 43.1 10.8 5.6 1.5 1.5 20.3 -2.7
 % of GDP 1.8 2.6 3.2 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.6 2.9
 East-central Europe        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 9.7 10.9 14.2 17.4 19.3 17.4 21.4 9.8
  % of regional total 57.9 45.1 53.2 59.7 65.4 58.0 59.5 27.8
  % change, year on year -14.7 11.4 30.6 24.3 11.2 -9.9 23.3 -54.5
  % of GDP 3.2 3.6 4.4 5.5 6.1 5.0 5.5 2.2
 Balkans        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 1.1 3.1 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.2 4.2 8.0
  % of regional total 6.5 12.7 14.4 12.7 12.2 14.2 11.7 23.0
  % change, year on year 45.2 181.4 26.1 -4.5 -1.8 17.5 -0.8 91.1
  % of GDP 1.2 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.4 4.3 3.7 5.4
 Baltics        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 0.7 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4
  % of regional total 4.1 4.7 7.0 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.5 4.0
  % change, year on year 50.8 66.8 63.1 -38.8 3.4 -5.0 11.7 12.1
  % of GDP 3.7 5.4 7.9 4.8 4.7 4.2 4.1 3.6
 CIS        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 5.3 9.0 6.8 6.9 5.4 7.2 9.1 15.8
  % of regional total 31.6 37.5 25.4 23.7 18.4 24.1 25.3 45.2
  % change, year on year 32.4 69.9 -24.9 -2.7 -21.3 32.9 26.6 73.5
  % of GDP 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.4 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.8
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
Eastern Europe 
Inflows (US$ bn) 66.9 77.1 105.9 104.0 94.3 94.1 94.8 96.9
 % of world total 9.2 7.9 7.9 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.2 6.0
 % change, year on year 90.8 15.4 37.2 -1.8 -9.3 -0.3 0.8 2.3
 % of GDP 4.4 4.1 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4
 East-central Europe        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 24.3 31.2 31.2 26.6 26.3 26.0 26.3 26.7
  % of regional total 36.4 40.4 29.4 25.5 27.9 27.7 27.8 27.5
  % change, year on year 149.4 28.2 -0.1 -14.8 -1.1 -1.0 1.1 1.5
  % of GDP 4.5 5.0 4.5 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6
 Balkans        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 13.3 15.1 27.4 22.0 18.5 16.5 16.7 17.1
  % of regional total 19.9 19.6 25.9 21.2 19.6 17.5 17.6 17.6
  % change, year on year 65.6 13.7 81.0 -19.7 -16.0 -10.8 0.9 2.5
  % of GDP 7.4 7.2 10.9 7.0 5.2 4.4 4.1 3.9
 Baltics        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 2.4 4.8 5.0 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.1
  % of regional total 3.6 6.2 4.8 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.2
  % change, year on year 70.0 99.7 6.0 -32.6 -2.9 8.5 7.5 6.2
  % of GDP 5.0 8.6 7.6 4.1 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
 CIS        
 Inflows (US$ bn) 26.8 26.1 42.2 52.0 46.3 48.0 48.0 49.1
  % of regional total 40.1 33.8 39.9 50.0 49.0 51.0 50.6 50.6
  % change, year on year 69.4 -2.9 62.1 23.1 -11.0 3.7 0.0 2.3
  % of GDP 3.5 2.6 3.3 3.4 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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country’s potential. Even by 2011, Russia’s total stock 
of inward FDI (projected at US$251bn) will amount to 
only 13% of GDP.
Other CIS energy producers will continue to attract 
significant FDI over the medium term. The investment 
plans of a group of large and well-established 
investors in the oil and gas sector mean steady 
inflows into Kazakhstan of some US$7bn per year 
in 2007-11. In Azerbaijan the completion of several 
major hydrocarbons projects in 2005-06 means that 
FDI inflows in the coming years will be lower than in 
the recent past—annual FDI inflows into Azerbaijan 
in 2001-05 averaged over 25% of GDP (one of the 
highest ratios in the world). Investment in non-oil 
sectors will continue to be hindered by a poor overall 
business environment. 
FDI flows into the new EU member states
FDI inflows into the ten new EU member states from 
eastern Europe (including Bulgaria and Romania, 
which joined in January 2007)—the “EU10”—peaked 
in 2006 at US$53bn. They are forecast to decline to 
US$43bn in 2007 and to fall further, stabilising at just 
under US$40bn per year, in 2008-11. Although well 
below the 2006 peak, this will still amount to a good 
performance in terms of FDI inflows as a share of GDP. 
Certain sectors, such as services outsourcing, will be 
very attractive. However, services outsourcing does 
not tend to be associated with large capital flows. 
Overall, given rising wage costs in the region, the 
danger of a diversion of cost-sensitive forms of FDI to 
even cheaper destinations may loom larger than any 
promise of much more relocation to these countries of 
investment from the West.
 
The Middle East and North Africa
This is a very disparate region. It includes countries, 
such as Israel, with a good business environment, 
as well as countries with extremely poor conditions 
for business, such as Iran. Globalisation trends had 
traditionally tended to bypass much of the region, 
which has been afflicted by political instability and 
state-directed economies. However, more investor-
friendly attitudes and policies are now on the agenda 
throughout much of the area. The latter include 
liberalisation measures, the sale of state enterprises, 
and the reduction of trade barriers and deregulation. 
Some of these countries have in the past been among 
the most hostile countries to FDI in the world, but, 
as governments look to relieve fiscal pressures by 
promoting private-sector growth, the worldwide wave 
of liberalisation of policy towards foreign investment 
is affecting these countries as well.
High oil prices and strong oil demand have 
underpinned recent GDP growth in the Middle East and 
North Africa. FDI flows increased strongly in 2006, and 
this affected almost all countries in the region. Egypt 
in particular received significant levels of FDI in 2006, 
of US$10bn—which was almost double the previous 
record inflow attracted in 2005. FDI inflows into Israel 
almost tripled in 2006, to US$14.2bn, having also 
grown strongly in 2005. This was mainly the result 
Share of Russia in FDI inflows to eastern Europe
(% of total)
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of several large-scale privatisations. Israel is also 
becoming an active outward investor, especially in 
technology-intensive sectors.
Robust growth prospects
Growth prospects in the Middle East and North Africa 
remain robust, with overall GDP growth for the region 
forecast to average around 5% per year in 2007-11. 
Buoyant energy markets have helped to support 
strong economic expansion since 2003. Oil revenue 
remains buoyant. This extra liquidity is still boosting 
growth in the region, as strong receipts are tempting 
even the more prudent governments to lift public 
spending and investment. The benefit of high oil 
receipts is spreading to non-oil-exporting countries, 
as oil-rich Gulf states seek investment opportunities 
in the region. 
The massive reserves and generally low extraction 
costs for oil in the region are reason enough for 
most foreign companies to maintain or increase 
hydrocarbons investments in the area, despite the 
difficult political and business environment. However, 
the attractions of the Middle East and North Africa for 
other forms of FDI will remain fairly limited. Despite 
the recent extensive moves towards liberalisation 
in the region, progress is likely to be slow. In some 
countries economic liberalisation will remain difficult, 
given a volatile political atmosphere. Entrenched 
vested interests are liable to delay the restructuring 
and liberalisation of certain sectors. Business 
environments should generally improve compared 
with the past, but change will generally not keep pace 
with that in other regions.
Foreign investors will be discouraged by poor 
business environments and regional political 
tensions. Investor sentiment and tourism could be 
adversely affected by a deterioration of the security 
environment. Apart from the possibility of a general 
rise in terrorist attacks against local and Western 
targets across the region, there are specific risks 
associated with the security situation in Iraq, political 
turmoil in Lebanon and concerns about Iran’s nuclear 
programme. 
In North Africa, privatisations, increased 
investment into tourism and access to EU markets 
should encourage FDI. Tunisia and Morocco may be 
attractive locations for offshore services to French- 
and Spanish-speaking countries. FDI in tourism 
has historically been modest, despite the sector’s 
economic importance, but it seems set to grow more 
rapidly in future. Algeria has substantial FDI potential 
owing to its proximity to markets and its large pool 
of cheap labour. The country’s investment climate 
is improving, albeit from a low base. Medium-term 
gas demand from Europe should ensure that the 
hydrocarbons sector continues to attract strong 
inflows of FDI. 
Direct investment is projected to remain robust 
in Algeria and Egypt, although in the case of Egypt 
some slowdown is likely as the pace of privatisation 
decelerates. Egypt regards the encouragement of FDI 
as a policy priority and has undertaken a number of 
legislative reforms to help to improve the investment 
environment. These include a more flexible labour 
Leading FDI recipients in Middle East and North Africa
(FDI inflows; 2007-11 annual av; US$ bn)
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law and laws allowing majority foreign ownership 
of banks, insurance companies and real estate. 
Despite moving ahead only slowly, the privatisation 
programme should attract more FDI. Egypt’s large 
pool of cheap labour, relative political stability and 
a prime geographical location should help to attract 
investors.
Sub-Saharan Africa
FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa fell to US$12.2bn 
in 2006, after having reached a record total of more 
than US$15bn in 2005. The trend in both 2005 and 
2006 was dominated by developments in South 
Africa. In 2005 a large part of the regional inflow was 
attributable to several M&As in South Africa, especially 
the purchase of South African bank ABSA by Barclays 
(UK). In 2006, in turn, the main reason for the decline 
in the regional total was large disinvestments in 
South Africa, which meant that inward FDI was slightly 
negative for South Africa in 2006.
We forecast that real GDP growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa will remain buoyant, at over 5% per year 
over the medium term. These aggregate figures 
are dominated by South Africa and Nigeria, which 
together with many smaller countries are benefiting 
from the still high level of commodity prices. The 
increased global demand for commodities will attract 
FDI into Africa.
The bulk of African FDI remains concentrated in 
resource-based industries. FDI flows and corporate 
investor interest have so far been limited to just a few 
key markets. Over the medium term growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa is expected to moderate. Oil prices 
will remain high, but other commodity prices are 
expected to slip back, especially from 2007, hurting 
export revenue and slowing FDI into the extraction 
industries. Nevertheless, Africa’s growth performance 
will remain robust in comparison with that of most of 
the 1990s. 
Table 19
FDI inflows into the Middle East & North Africa 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Middle East        
Inflows (US$ bn) 4.8 7.1 8.2 4.9 6.6 6.5 5.5 14.2
 % of world total 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 2.5
 % change, year on year 298.6 47.6 16.0 -40.4 33.6 -0.3 -15.7 158.2
 % of GDP 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.9 
North Africa        
Inflows (US$ bn) 1.1 1.5 2.5 2.2 3.2 2.7 3.4 5.2
 % of world total 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9
 % change, year on year 27.3 37.5 62.9 -12.6 46.7 -13.6 25.3 51.4
 % of GDP 0.5 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.4 2.1 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Middle East        
Inflows (US$ bn) 18.7 30.4 46.2 41.8 36.8 37.4 39.7 42.0
 % of world total 2.6 3.1 3.5 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.6
 % change, year on year 31.5 62.3 52.2 -9.4 -12.2 1.7 6.2 5.7
 % of GDP 2.2 2.9 3.9 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 
North Africa        
Inflows (US$ bn) 7.8 14.8 22.3 21.1 20.8 19.1 19.7 20.2
 % of world total 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
 % change, year on year 49.3 89.9 50.9 -5.4 -1.8 -7.8 2.8 2.6
 % of GDP 2.6 4.3 5.6 4.7 4.3 3.7 3.6 3.5 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; UNCTAD; Economist Intelligence Unit estimates and forecasts.
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Disincentives to investment
The disincentives to investment in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are many. The main barriers are poor infrastructure 
and poor education. Other important deterrents are 
war and social unrest; the impact of HIV/AIDS; the 
lack of transparency; government instability and 
policy uncertainty; and vulnerability to shifts in world 
commodity prices.28 The small size of many African 
markets and the lack of integration between them 
is another drawback. Many MNCs still prefer to tap 
African markets by trading rather than investing. 
 Over the medium term, the region’s share in global 
FDI will remain very low (at only 1% in 2007-11). 
Three countries are likely to continue to dominate 
FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: South Africa and Nigeria 
(the two largest economies in terms of GDP), followed 
by Angola. In the case of Nigeria and Angola, 
development of the oil and gas sector has been the 
driving force. The attraction of South Africa is more 
diverse: in addition to mineral wealth, there is also 
the appeal of relative financial sophistication and 
closer integration with the global economy. Nigeria 
has enormous opportunities, but risks remain very 
high. Corruption and security are major problems, as 
well as the very poor infrastructure.
 
FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa
(US$ bn)














FDI inflows into Sub-Saharan Africa
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sub-Saharan Africa        
Inflows (US$ bn) 4.5 8.4 6.7 9.0 5.7 13.6 9.0 13.4
 % of world total 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.8 0.4 1.6 1.5 2.4
 % change, year on year -0.9 87.2 -20.6 34.0 -35.9 137.7 -34.1 49.3
 % of GDP 1.5 2.6 2.2 3.0 1.9 4.6 3.0 3.4 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Sub-Saharan Africa        
Inflows (US$ bn) 11.3 15.2 12.2 13.4 13.9 16.1 17.1 18.1
 % of world total 1.5 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
 % change, year on year -15.9 34.3 -19.6 10.3 3.0 16.3 6.3 5.7
 % of GDP 2.3 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Sources: National statistics; IMF; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
28. For example, see 
UNCTAD, Economic 
Development in Africa, 
Rethinking the Role of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 
2005.
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Annex A: FDI determinants 
and forecasts
Cross-section model
In our cross-section empirical investigation of the 
determinants of FDI, average FDI inflows into 77 
countries (missing data reduced the size of the 
sample from 82 to 77) were related to a number of 
variables that influence FDI. The estimation was 
very satisfactory. Market size (income) and the 
business environment scores alone explained more 
than two-thirds of the variation in FDI inflows across 
countries. The full model, containing other significant 
explanatory variables, gave a high coefficient of 
determination (R2) for cross-section estimation. The 
model results suggested that FDI inflows are sensitive 
to the policy framework.
The estimated equation has been used to make 
projections for 2007-11, or rather serve as a check on 
individual country forecasts that are generated, in the 
first instance, by time-series methods. The equation 
has also been used to conduct sensitivity analysis and 
alternative projections of global FDI flows. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit produces regular 
medium-term forecasts for 82 countries, which 
account for almost all of global FDI. For an additional 
68 countries, FDI is forecast over a two-year time 
horizon. For the purposes of this study, in addition to 
the five-year forecasts for the 82 countries, the two-
year forecasts for the 68 countries were extended to 
2011. Simple extrapolation procedures were used for 
the remaining other countries to derive regional and 
world totals.
The individual country projections are based on an 
error correction equation, which assumes a long-term 
relationship between FDI and GDP and other variables, 
with the share of FDI in GDP rising over time. The 
specification of the equation varies across countries, 
but in general the long-term elasticity of FDI with 
respect to GDP is quite high, with large changes in GDP 
taking several years fully to affect FDI flows. 
Determinants of foreign direct investment
(dependent variable Ln FDI)
 Coefficients t Stat













n 77  
R2 0.91 
Constant is not reported 
Ln is the natural logarithm 
Dependent variable: 
FDI: average FDI inflows; 2002-06; US$ m
Independent variables:
GDP in 2004; at PPP, US$ bn, 
GDPGROWTH: annual average real GDP growth, 2002-06 
BERADJ: the business environment score, 2002-06, for all  
categories except for market opportunities 
NATRES: percentage share of fuels and minerals in total 
merchandise exports, 2000 
ULC: Unit labour costs,2004. Index, US=100. Index (US=100) of 
wages (the average monthly US dollar wage for the whole 
economy; in some cases manufacturing sector only) 
divided by index (US=100) of GDP per head, at PPP US$. 
AIRDIST: air distance in km between the country and the closest 
of one of three metropolitan areas (US, EU15 (as represented by 
Frankfurt), Japan). 
FDISTOCK: share of the inward FDI stock in GDP, 2001. 
ENGLISH: dummy variable taking value of 1 for English-speaking 
countries, 0 otherwise.  
WEUDUM: dummy variable for West European countries  
EEDUM: dummy variable for East European countries 
LATAM: dummy variable for Latina American countries 
MENA: dummy variable for North African and Middle 
Eastern countries 
Sources for the data are IMF; Economist Intelligence Unit; UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report, World Bank, World Development Indicators; ILO; UNIDO; CIA World Factbook. 
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Indicator scores in the business rankings model, 2007-11
 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
Political environment
 1. Risk of armed conflict 3.9 4.6 4.7 4.3 3.5 4.1 3.1
 2. Risk of social unrest 3.5 4.1 4.4 3.6 3.2 3.1 2.8
 3. Constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power 3.5 5.0 4.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 2.5
 4. Government and opposition 3.7 4.7 4.4 3.5 3.8 2.9 3.4
 5. Threat of politically motivated violence 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.7 2.4
 6. International disputes or tensions 3.4 3.9 4.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.5
 7. Government policy towards business 3.6 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.3
 8. Effectiveness of political system in policy formulation and execution 3.1 3.7 3.8 2.8 3.1 2.7 2.8
 9. Quality of the bureaucracy 3.0 3.9 3.8 2.4 3.2 2.8 2.4
 10. Transparency and fairness of legal system 3.0 4.1 4.2 2.8 3.2 2.6 2.1
 11. Efficiency of legal system 3.3 4.1 4.3 3.2 3.6 2.4 2.8
 12. Corruption 2.9 3.7 4.1 2.3 2.8 2.3 2.4
 13. Impact of crime 3.5 4.0 4.2 3.4 3.5 2.6 3.5
Macroeconomic environment
 *1. Inflation 4.5 5.0 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.3
 *2. Budget balance as % of GDP 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.3 3.9 4.3 4.1
 *3. Government debt as % of GDP 4.3 3.0 3.8 4.8 4.0 4.5 4.4
 *4. Exchange-rate volatility 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0
 *5. Current-account balance as % of GDP 3.7 4.1 3.8 2.3 4.0 4.2 4.4
 6. Quality of policymaking 3.7 4.3 4.3 3.8 3.9 3.2 3.1
 7. Institutional underpinnings 3.8 4.9 4.8 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.1
 8. Asset prices 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2
Market opportunities
 *1. GDP, US$ bn at PPP 3.2 5.0 3.6 2.5 3.9 3.0 2.6
 *2. GDP per head, US$ at PPP 3.2 5.0 4.7 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.6
 *3. Real GDP growth 3.8 2.7 3.0 4.3 4.1 3.5 4.2
 *4. Share of world merchandise trade 2.8 5.0 3.8 2.3 3.4 2.0 1.9
 *5. Average annual rate of growth of exports 3.1 2.6 2.7 3.8 3.2 2.6 3.1
 *6. Average annual rate of growth of imports 3.5 3.0 2.8 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.8
 *7. The natural resource endowment 3.0 4.1 3.2 2.3 2.5 3.2 3.9
 *8. Profitability 3.9 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.4
 9. Regional integration 3.8 4.4 4.9 4.4 3.0 3.3 3.1
 10. Proximity to markets 3.0 4.9 4.2 3.6 2.4 2.1 2.2
Annex B: Business environment rankings: Regional scores
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 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
Policy towards private enterprise and competition
 1. Degree to which private property rights are protected 3.9 4.9 4.9 3.8 4.1 2.9 3.4
 2. Government regulation on setting up new private businesses 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.0
 3. Freedom of existing businesses to compete 3.4 4.3 4.1 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.9
 4. Promotion of competition 3.3 4.4 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.0 2.6
 5. Protection of intellectual property 3.4 4.7 4.6 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.6
 6. Price controls 3.7 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.3 3.1
 7. Distortions arising from lobbying by special interest groups 2.9 3.4 3.6 2.6 3.2 2.7 2.3
 8. Distortions arising from state ownership/control 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.7
 9. Minority shareholders 3.4 4.4 4.4 3.0 3.6 2.7 2.9
Policy towards foreign investment
 1. Government policy towards foreign capital 3.8 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.5
 2. Openness of national culture to foreign influences 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.2
 3. Risk of expropriation of foreign assets 4.1 5.0 4.9 4.1 4.1 3.5 3.6
 4. Availability of investment protection schemes 3.8 4.6 4.6 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3
 5. Government favouritism 3.4 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.1
Foreign trade and exchange controls
 1. Capital-account liberalisation 4.2 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.9 4.2 3.5
 **2. Tariff and non-tariff protection 3.7 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.2
 3. Ease of trading 3.9 4.7 4.4 3.9 4.1 3.4 3.2
 *4. Openness of trade 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.8 3.6
 5. Restrictions on the current account 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.3 4.0
Taxes
 **1. The corporate tax burden 3.8 2.9 3.7 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.8
 *2. The top marginal personal income tax 4.2 3.4 3.2 4.8 4.2 4.8 4.2
 *3. Value-added tax 3.5 3.9 2.6 3.1 4.2 3.2 4.0
 4. Employers’ social security contributions 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.1 4.0 3.2 3.9
 5. Degree to which fiscal regime encourages new investment 3.1 3.3 3.7 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.9
 6. Consistency and fairness of the tax system 3.2 4.1 4.2 2.9 3.5 2.4 2.5
 7. Tax complexity 3.3 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.6 2.5 3.4
Financing
 1. Openness of banking sector 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.4
 2. Stockmarket capitalisation 3.4 4.9 4.5 2.7 3.5 2.4 3.1
 **3. Distortions in financial markets 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.7
 4. Quality of the financial regulatory system 3.6 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.2
 5. Access of foreigners to local capital market 3.8 4.7 4.8 3.7 3.8 3.3 3.1
 6. Access to medium-term finance for investment 3.5 4.6 4.4 3.0 3.8 2.9 3.1
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 63
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS   GLOBAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO 2011  PART 1
 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
The labour market
 *1. Labour costs adjusted for productivity 3.9 2.3 2.3 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.3
 *2. Availability of skilled labour 3.3 4.9 4.3 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5
 3. Quality of workforce 3.3 4.1 4.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.8
 4. Quality of local managers 3.5 4.6 4.3 3.3 3.7 3.5 2.6
 5. Language skills 3.5 4.3 4.3 3.1 3.6 3.3 3.0
 6. Health of the workforce 3.6 5.0 4.9 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.1
 7. Level of technical skills 3.6 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.0
 *8. Cost of living 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.9 3.5 2.9
 **9. Incidence of strikes 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.2 3.8
 10. Restrictiveness of labour laws 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3 2.8 3.0
 11. Extent of wage regulation 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.9 3.3 3.0
 12. Hiring of foreign nationals 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.3 3.8 2.8
Infrastructure
 *1. Telephone density 3.6 4.9 4.7 3.4 3.4 3.0 3.2
 **2. Reliability of telecoms network 3.7 4.7 4.7 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.1
 *3. Telecoms costs 4.0 4.9 4.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.4
 *4. Mobiles 4.1 4.7 4.9 4.8 3.8 3.4 3.4
 *5. Stock of personal computers 3.8 4.9 4.7 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.1
 *6. Internet use 3.8 5.0 4.8 4.2 3.4 3.3 2.8
 *7. Broadband penetration 3.7 5.0 4.8 4.2 3.4 3.3 2.8
 *8. R&D expenditure as % of GDP 3.1 4.7 4.3 3.1 3.2 2.3 2.3
 9. Research infrastructure 3.5 4.7 4.4 3.4 3.8 3.0 2.6
 **10. The infrastructure for retail and wholesale distribution 3.4 4.6 4.5 3.1 3.3 2.5 2.8
 **11. Extent and quality of the road network 3.2 4.6 4.4 3.0 2.9 2.4 2.5
 **12. Extent and quality of the rail network 3.0 4.4 4.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.0
 13. Quality of ports infrastructure 3.7 4.6 4.4 3.5 3.8 3.1 3.4
 14. Quality of air transport infrastructure 3.8 4.7 4.5 3.5 3.8 3.6 3.4
 *15. Production of electricity per head 3.4 4.6 4.3 3.8 3.0 2.3 3.0
 *16. Rents of office space 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 3.1 3.7 3.6
Note. A single asterisk (*) denotes scores based on quantitative indicators. Indicators with a double asterisk (**) are partly based on data. All other indicators are qualitative in nature.
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Indicator scores in the business rankings model, 2002-06
 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
Political environment
 1. Risk of armed conflict 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.3 3.6 3.9 3.1
 2. Risk of social unrest 3.4 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.5 2.8 2.7
 3. Constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power 3.5 5.0 4.9 3.4 3.0 3.4 2.2
 4. Government and opposition 3.7 4.7 4.5 3.5 3.9 3.0 3.2
 5. Threat of politically motivated violence 3.5 3.7 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.6 2.5
 6. International disputes or tensions 3.3 4.0 4.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.4
 7. Government policy towards business 3.5 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.1
 8. Effectiveness of political system in policy formulation and execution 3.0 3.7 3.8 2.6 3.2 2.6 2.6
 9. Quality of the bureaucracy 2.9 3.9 3.7 2.3 3.2 2.6 2.2
 10. Transparency and fairness of legal system 2.8 4.1 4.1 2.4 2.9 2.4 1.8
 11. Efficiency of legal system 3.2 4.1 4.3 2.8 3.6 2.4 2.6
 12. Corruption 2.7 3.7 4.1 2.2 2.6 1.9 2.3
 13. Impact of crime 3.4 3.9 4.2 3.1 3.5 2.6 3.2
Macroeconomic environment
 *1. Inflation 4.3 5.0 4.7 4.1 4.6 3.8 4.1
 *2. Budget balance as % of GDP 3.9 3.4 3.9 4.0 3.6 4.2 3.8
 *3. Government debt as % of GDP 3.9 3.0 3.5 4.6 3.6 4.1 3.9
 *4. Exchange-rate volatility 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.6
 *5. Current-account balance as % of GDP 3.8 4.1 3.8 2.1 4.4 4.3 4.6
 6. Quality of policymaking 3.6 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.2 2.9
 7. Institutional underpinnings 3.8 4.9 4.8 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.1
 8. Asset prices 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.1 3.3
Market opportunities
 *1. GDP, US$ bn at PPP 2.9 5.0 3.4 2.2 3.6 2.8 2.2
 *2. GDP per head, US$ at PPP 3.0 4.4 4.3 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.5
 *3. Real GDP growth 3.8 2.1 2.6 4.4 4.1 3.7 4.3
 *4. Share of world merchandise trade 2.7 5.0 3.9 1.8 3.4 1.8 1.9
 *5. Average annual rate of growth of exports 3.3 2.3 2.3 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.4
 *6. Average annual rate of growth of imports 3.6 2.7 2.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.8
 *7. The natural resource endowment 3.1 4.4 3.3 2.3 2.5 3.2 3.9
 *8. Profitability 4.2 2.7 3.0 4.6 4.5 4.3 4.6
 9. Regional integration 3.5 4.4 4.8 3.6 2.9 3.0 2.8
 10. Proximity to markets 3.0 4.9 4.2 3.6 2.4 2.1 2.2
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 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
Policy towards private enterprise and competition
 1. Degree to which private property rights are protected 3.7 4.9 4.8 3.2 3.9 3.0 3.0
 2. Government regulation on setting up new private businesses 3.2 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.6
 3. Freedom of existing businesses to compete 3.3 4.3 4.1 3.0 3.4 3.3 2.5
 4. Promotion of competition 2.9 4.1 3.8 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.2
 5. Protection of intellectual property 3.1 4.7 4.5 2.6 3.0 2.5 2.3
 6. Price controls 3.5 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.7
 7. Distortions arising from lobbying by special interest groups 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.4
 8. Distortions arising from state ownership/control 3.1 4.1 3.8 3.1 2.9 3.3 2.2
 9. Minority shareholders 3.3 4.4 4.4 2.6 3.8 2.4 2.7
Policy towards foreign investment
 1. Government policy towards foreign capital 3.6 3.9 4.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 2.9
 2. Openness of national culture to foreign influences 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.0
 3. Risk of expropriation of foreign assets 4.1 5.0 4.9 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.4
 4. Availability of investment protection schemes 3.6 4.4 4.6 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.1
 5. Government favouritism 3.4 3.7 4.0 2.9 3.6 3.0 3.0
Foreign trade and exchange controls
 1. Capital-account liberalisation 3.8 4.9 4.9 3.6 3.5 4.0 2.9
 **2. Tariff and non-tariff protection 3.4 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.3 2.5
 3. Ease of trading 3.5 4.6 4.4 3.3 3.6 3.3 2.8
 *4. Openness of trade 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.0 2.8
 5. Restrictions on the current account 4.3 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.3 3.5
Taxes
 **1. The corporate tax burden 3.5 2.6 3.4 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.2
 *2. The top marginal personal income tax 3.8 2.9 2.9 4.1 4.1 4.6 3.7
 *3. Value-added tax 3.4 3.9 2.7 2.8 4.2 3.2 3.9
 4. Employers’ social security contributions 3.2 3.0 2.8 1.9 4.1 3.6 3.7
 5. Degree to which fiscal regime encourages new investment 2.8 3.0 3.4 2.4 3.1 2.4 2.4
 6. Consistency and fairness of the tax system 3.0 4.1 4.0 2.4 3.2 2.3 2.4
 7. Tax complexity 3.1 2.9 3.4 2.9 3.5 2.3 3.1
Financing
 1. Openness of banking sector 3.5 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.5 2.8
 2. Stockmarket capitalisation 3.0 4.7 4.3 2.3 3.1 2.3 2.8
 **3. Distortions in financial markets 3.8 5.0 4.8 3.7 3.9 3.3 3.2
 4. Quality of the financial regulatory system 3.1 4.1 4.1 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.5
 5. Access of foreigners to local capital market 3.4 4.4 4.4 3.3 3.1 3.3 2.6
 6. Access to medium-term finance for investment 3.2 4.6 4.3 2.6 3.4 2.3 2.7
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 World G7 Western  Eastern  Asia Latin  Middle East  
   Europe Europe  America & Africa
The labour market
 *1. Labour costs adjusted for productivity 3.9 2.3 2.3 4.8 4.2 4.2 4.3
 *2. Availability of skilled labour 3.1 4.9 4.3 3.4 2.9 2.4 2.1
 3. Quality of workforce 3.1 4.0 3.7 2.7 3.1 3.1 2.5
 4. Quality of local managers 3.5 4.6 4.4 2.9 3.7 3.5 2.5
 5. Language skills 3.5 4.3 4.3 3.0 3.8 3.2 3.0
 6. Health of the workforce 3.4 4.9 4.7 2.8 3.2 3.3 2.9
 7. Level of technical skills 3.5 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.9
 *8. Cost of living 2.8 1.3 1.4 3.1 3.0 3.8 3.2
 **9. Incidence of strikes 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.4
 10. Restrictiveness of labour laws 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.9
 11. Extent of wage regulation 3.3 3.6 3.5 2.9 3.8 3.3 2.8
 12. Hiring of foreign nationals 3.4 3.9 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.8 2.8
Infrastructure
 *1. Telephone density 3.3 4.7 4.5 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6
 **2. Reliability of telecoms network 3.3 4.7 4.6 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.6
 *3. Telecoms costs 3.6 4.7 4.7 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.0
 *4. Mobiles 3.3 4.3 4.8 3.5 3.0 2.3 2.5
 *5. Stock of personal computers 3.4 4.7 4.5 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.4
 *6. Internet use 2.9 4.6 4.1 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.1
 *7. Broadband penetration 2.9 4.7 4.2 2.8 3.1 2.5 1.6
 *8. R&D expenditure as % of GDP 3.0 4.6 4.2 2.9 3.2 2.3 2.1
 9. Research infrastructure 3.5 4.7 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.1 2.5
 **10. The infrastructure for retail and wholesale distribution 3.0 4.6 4.3 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.4
 **11. Extent and quality of the road network 3.0 4.4 4.3 3.0 2.8 2.1 2.2
 **12. Extent and quality of the rail network 3.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.2
 13. Quality of ports infrastructure 3.5 4.3 4.3 3.4 3.4 2.8 3.2
 14. Quality of air transport infrastructure 3.6 4.7 4.4 3.0 3.7 3.3 3.3
 *15. Production of electricity per head 3.2 4.6 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.1 2.9
 *16. Rents of office space 3.4 2.0 2.2 2.8 3.4 4.4 4.4
Note. A single asterisk (*) denotes scores based on quantitative indicators. Indicators with a double asterisk (**) are partly based on data. All other indicators are qualitative in nature.
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Regulatory risk and the growth of FDI
Karl P Sauvant, Executive Director, Colombia Program 
on International Investment* 
Introduction
Almost every week, if not every few days, one can 
read that the laws and regulations governing foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in some country have been 
changed to make them more welcoming, that another 
investment promotion agency (IPA) has been set up, 
and that FDI into some country has broken another 
record. World FDI inflows were US$1.3trn in 2006 
and are expected to reach US$1.5trn in 2007 (just 
above, in current US dollar terms, the all-time high 
of US$1.4trn in 2000). They are predicted to increase 
further over the next five years, albeit at slower 
annual rates than during the recent recovery in 
global FDI (see the article by Laza Kekic elsewhere in 
this volume). As discussed below, the economic and 
other forces driving FDI upwards continue to be very 
strong.
At the same time, however, one can also read 
that a crossborder merger and acquisition (M&A) is 
being questioned or blocked, a contract between a 
multinational corporation (MNC) and a host country 
is being renegotiated or cancelled, or laws and 
regulations are being introduced that make the 
business environment less hospitable for FDI.1 
Are these restrictions straws in the wind or do they 
indicate a storm in the making? Will the forces that 
drive the expansion of FDI continue to trump the risks, 
especially the political and regulatory risks that may 
slow down drastically or even stop the growth of FDI 
flows?
The pressure of competition
The growth of FDI is driven by the interests of MNCS 
and those of host- and home-country governments. 
All firms are subject to the pressures of globalisation. 
As a result of the liberalisation of international 
economic transactions in recent decades and improved 
communication technologies, global competition has 
intensified. This puts considerable pressure on firms 
to internationalise, including through FDI. MNCs are 
motivated to establish a portfolio of locational assets 
to secure competitive advantage. They are driven 
to invest abroad to have better access to resources 
(including skills and technology) and to be close to 
their markets. No wonder, then, that the number 
of MNCs has multiplied in recent decades (the total 
number of MNCs in the world is about 80,000). The 
pressures of globalisation will continue to drive firms 
to invest abroad to develop their own portfolios of 
locational assets, driving up global FDI.
Host countries still seek FDI
Host countries are interested in the tangible and 
intangible assets that FDI represents, outweighing 
whatever negative effects are associated with it. These 
assets include capital and, even more important, 
skills, technological know-how and access to markets 
(often in combination with brand names). The latter 
is particularly important for countries that pursue 
an export-oriented development strategy, as it is 
extremely difficult to break into highly competitive 
markets, especially in the developed world.
Today, almost all countries in the world seek to 
attract FDI and they pursue increasingly similar 
strategies in this respect. The most basic strategy has 
been, and continues to be, to make the regulatory 
framework for FDI more welcoming. This includes, first 
of all, opening more sectors to foreign investment. 
Out of 2,349 changes in national FDI laws between 
1991 and 2005, 92% were in the direction of creating 
a more favourable climate for foreign investors.2
The bulk of manufacturing in an overwhelming 
number of countries is now open to FDI. Natural 
resources are less so, but MNCs have access through 
various non-equity forms. Even the services 
sector—which, traditionally, has contained many 
activities that are off-limits for foreign investors—has 
* E-mail: karl.sauvant@
law.columbia.edu. I 
wish to acknowledge 
with gratitude helpful 
comments by John H 
Dunning, Laza Kekic, 
Stephen Jen, Alexander 
Mansilya-Kruz and 
Hamed El-Kady, and the 
assistance of Michael 
O’Sullivan, Matthew Quint, 
Maria Estenssoro and 
Geebin Oyang.
1. Even the G8 leaders, at 
their June 2007 summit, 
warned of an increased 
tendency towards FDI 
protectionism.
2. UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2006: 
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increasingly been opened, although (compared 
especially with manufacturing) many restrictions still 
apply.3 Nevertheless, the liberalisation trend has been 
clear, indeed overwhelming. 
To strengthen and make more credible the 
improvements of the national regulatory framework, 
174 countries had concluded 2,572 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) by the end of 2006.4 They 
enshrine key protection standards in legally binding 
international agreements. Increasingly, moreover, 
preferential free-trade and investment agreements 
also include various investment protection standards 
and sometimes prescribe further liberalisation of the 
investment framework; as of the end of 2006, 241 
such agreements had been signed.5
Economic determinants
A country’s regulatory framework needs to be enabling 
and investment promotion can help. However, 
whether FDI will be undertaken will in the end depend 
mainly on economic factors such as market size and 
growth; the quality of infrastructure, skills and the 
3. An indication of the 
uneven liberalisation 
process and the room 
that still exists in this 
respect as regards 
services is the distribution 
of reservations in 
international investment 
agreements (IIAs) across 
sectors: out of 4,806 
non-conforming measures 
scheduled in eight IIAs, 
close to three-quarters 
(71%) of them relate to 
services; that number is 
almost six times higher 
than the number of 
reservations for primary 
sector industries and 
70 times higher than 
that for manufacturing 
industries (see chart). 
UNCTAD, Preserving 
Flexibility in IIAs: The Use 
of Reservations, Geneva, 
2006, pp. 39-40.




22nd 2007), mimeo, p. 3. 
Relevant are also double-
taxation treaties (DTTs) 
not discussed here; 2,651 
such treaties existed at the 
end of 2006; see ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 4.
Reservations on investment, by economic sector, selected international investment agreements (a)




(a) The agreements are: the Andean Pact (Decision 510); the Canada-Chile and US-Chile Free-Trade Agreements; the Agreement between Columbia, Mexico and 
Venezuela; the Mercosur Colonia Protocol; NAFTA; the OECD National Treatment Instrument; and the draft OECD MAI.
Source: UNCTAD, Preserving Flexibility in IIAs: The Use of Reservations, Geneva, 2006, p. 40.
Attracting FDI: beyond
mere liberalisation
The great majority of countries have gone 
beyond liberalisation by protecting and 
actively seeking to encourage foreign 
investors to enter their markets. The 
instruments of choice of this second 
generation of investment promotion 
strategies are investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs); investment guides and 
websites; and especially incentives. IPAs of 
one kind or another have been established 
in the great majority of countries during 
the past decade. Although highly 
uneven in terms of size, competence and 
effectiveness, they all try actively to attract 
foreign investors within the context of a 
liberalised foreign direct investment (FDI) 
framework. They do this by, among other 
things, building a positive image of their 
countries in the investment community, 
undertaking “road shows”, providing after-
investment services to existing investors 
and, increasingly, engaging in policy 
advocacy. 
The role of incentives
Most IPAs also make use of financial, 
fiscal or other (including regulatory) 
incentives. In fact, all indications are 
that incentive competition is becoming 
stronger, especially as far as taxes are 
concerned. How effective incentives are in 
swaying investors is very much debated, 
but unless the key economic determinants 
are favourable, they may frequently be only 
icing on the cake. This may be particularly 
the case for natural resource and market-
seeking investors, as for them the major 
attractions are clear. It may be less the case 
for efficiency-seeking investors, especially 
when they produce goods or services for 
the world market for which alternative, 
equally attractive, investment locations are 
available. Incentives that bring in flagship 
investors (the attraction of which could 
entice other investors to follow suit) may 
be useful; this is particularly the case for 
locations that are not yet prominently on 
the radar screen of investors. Regardless of 
what the overall effectiveness of incentives 
is, unless a multinational agreement is 
reached to tame incentives competition 
(and such an agreement is not even in 
sight in the foreseeable future), the use of 
incentives will increase and, at least at the 
margins, help to attract FDI.
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technology base; and the availability of natural 
resources in host countries (see the FDI determinants 
model elsewhere in this volume). 
Home countries encourage outward FDI
What about home-country governments and their 
interests? Developed-country governments support 
outward FDI in the interest of the international 
competitiveness of their firms. They provide, 
for example, information about investment 
opportunities, finance feasibility studies, conclude 
bilateral treaties for the protection and promotion of 
FDI (as well as the avoidance of double taxation), and 
offer insurance for outward FDI projects. 
Some emerging markets have begun to follow 
suit, be they small countries such as Singapore 
(which wants to create, through outward FDI, an 
“external wing” of its economy), or large ones such 
as China (with its “Go Global” policy). For example, 
most recently the vice-minister of the National 
Development and Reform Commission of China, 
Zhang Xizoqiang, indicated that Chinese government 
entities will provide diplomatic, foreign-exchange, 
tax, customs, credit, insurance and other support to 
Chinese firms investing abroad in target industries.6 
Most emerging markets, however, do not yet have 
a coherent set of policies in place on outward FDI. 
Yet, where their firms are successful in international 
acquisitions, there are visible expressions of national 
pride. Many countries are likely to continue to support 
their firms’ expansion abroad, thus increasing the 
likelihood that investment flows will grow.
Potential sources of FDI 
What are the main sources of future FDI? There are, 
first of all, the traditional MNCs, that is, the firms 
that are already established abroad. Quite a number 
of them already have a high share of their assets 
abroad, but most can be expected to continue to 
expand. That is even more the case for firms that 
have only a moderate share of their assets abroad, 
the low-level transnationalisers, and firms that are 
not yet transnational at all (including most small and 
medium-sized enterprises—SMEs). 
The services sector
Firms in the services sector are a particularly 
important source of future FDI, as these firms are 
considerably less transnational (in terms of the 
share of their assets abroad) than industrial firms. 
Moreover, since most services are still not tradeable, 
if services firms want to expand abroad, they need to 
do that via FDI. In fact, services firms have dominated 
outward FDI flows in recent years, indicating that the 
catch-up process with industrial firms is in full swing—
and the chances are that it will continue. The growth 
of offshoring services functions will be particularly 
important here.
Emerging market MNCs
Another key pool of potential FDI consists of firms 
headquartered in emerging markets. FDI outflows 
from these economies have risen considerably over 
the past 25 years, from negligible amounts at the 
beginning of the 1980s to, according to Economist 
Intelligence Unit estimates, US$160bn in 2005 and 
US$210bn in 2006 (see p. 28). An estimated 20,000 
MNCs are now headquartered in emerging markets. 
Most of them have the potential to become much more 
transnational. There are many more firms that have 
not yet taken the first steps abroad, but are likely 
to do so in the future. As emerging markets grow, 
therefore, they will not only become more attractive 
for inward FDI, but increasingly also become sources 
of more outward FDI.7 
Sovereign investment agencies
The sovereign investment agencies (SIAs) of a 
number of countries—that is, investment vehicles of 
governments (see Table 1)—could potentially have a 
considerable impact on FDI flows. Such entities are 
not new. Perhaps the oldest is the Kuwait Investment 
Authority; it has substantial holdings in a number of 
companies, including Germany’s DaimlerChrysler. 
Another well-known example is Singapore’s Temasek 
Holdings; it bought, for example, Shin Corp. 
(Thailand) for US$3.8bn. The biggest one is the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, which has some 
US$875bn at its disposal. 
It is difficult to determine the number of these 
6. At the Chinese 
Enterprises Outbound 
Investment Conference, 
Beijing, May 15th 2007; 
see China Daily, June 15th 
2007, p. 11.
7. For a discussion of the 
range of issues related 
to the rise of emerging 
market MNCs, see Karl 
P Sauvant with Kristin 
Mendoza and Irmak 
Ince (eds), The Rise of 
Transnational Corporations 
from Emerging Markets: 
Threat or Opportunity?, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
forthcoming; UNCTAD, 
World Investment 
Report 2006: FDI from 
Developing and Transition 
Economies. Implications 
for Development, Geneva, 
2006; and Andrea 
Goldstein, Multinational 
Companies from Emerging 
Economies: Composition, 
Conceptualization and 
Direction in the Global 
Economy, Palgrave 
McMillan, Hampshire and 
New York, 2007.
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state-owned entities, as the boundary line between 
public funds in general and SIAs is difficult to 
draw. For example, many pension funds of public 
institutions could technically be included, but many 
of them are passive investors that control only 
small stakes and do not seek active involvement in 
the management of the assets they have acquired. 
However, a growing number of these entities are 
becoming active shareholders and are acquiring 
controlling stakes. 
Add to that the resources SIAs have at their 
disposal. Morgan Stanley estimates these to be 
around US$2.5trn in mid-2007, projected to rise to 
US$12trn in 2015 (based largely on the assumption 
that oil prices will remain at current levels).8 These 
figures compare with a forecast US$1.5trn of world 
FDI flows in 2007 and a world stock of inward FDI of 
about US$12trn at the end of 2006. 
These SIAs draw on the official reserves 
accumulated by their governments, typically in the 
context of commodity-price booms (especially for oil) 
or surpluses generated by the export of other goods 
Table 1
Estimated assets of sovereign investment agencies, Jul 2007
(US$ bn unless otherwise indicated)
Economy Sovereign investment agency Estimated  Year of  Country’s  Source of funds
  assetsa establishment foreign-exchange
    reservesb
Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 875.0 1976 34.8c Oil
Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabian funds of various types 300.0 n/a 23.2 Oil
Singapore GIC 330.0 1981 143.6 Export surplus
Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 300.0 1996 56.0 Oil
China China Investment Corporationd 300.0 2007 1,332.6 Export surplus
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 167.0 1953 20.6 Oil
Singapore Temasek Holdings 100.0 1974 143.6 Export surplus
Australia Australian Future Fund 40.0 2004 64.9 Other
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 40.0 n/a 5.2 Gas
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 30.0 1983 0.5 Oil
US (Alaska) Alaska Permanent Fund 39.4 1976 41.5 Oil
Russia Fund for Future Generationse 32.0 2008 397.0 Oil
Republic of Korea KIC 20.0 2005 250.3 Export surplus
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional Berhad 18.3 1993 90.8 Export surplus
Taiwan National Stabilisation Fund 15.0 n/a 268.0 Export surplus
Canada Alberta Heritage TF 15.4 1976 39.4 Oil
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund 12.0 1999 58.2 Oil
Kazakhstan National Fund 17.0 2000 20.9 Oil, gas
Botswana Pula Fund 6.2 1966 8.0 Diamonds
Chile Copper SF 3.9 1981 16.7 Copper
Oman State General RF 2.0 1980 6.9 Oil, gas
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 1.5 1999 2.8 Oil
Venezuela FIEM 0.8 1998 16.3 Oil
Trinidad & Tobago Revenue Stabilisation Fund 0.5 2000 5.5 Oil
Kiribati Revenue Equalisation Fund 0.4 1956 n/a Phosphates
Uganda Poverty Action Fund 0.4 1998 1.9 Aid
a It is not know what portion of these funds will be used for FDI purposes. b Most recent 2007 figures. c Reserves for the United Arab Emirates. d Still formally to be established. Includes Huijin Co. e Still formally to be 
established.  Source: Columbia Program on International Investment, based on estimates by Morgan Stanley, Economist Intelligence Unit and the IMF.
8. Stephen Jen, “How Big 
Could Sovereign Wealth 
Funds Be by 2015?”, 
Morgan Stanley Research: 
Economics, May 3rd 2007, 
p. 2. Note that, apart 
from SIAs, state-owned 
enterprises will invest 
more abroad. The China 
Development Bank, for 
example, may invest as 
much as US$13.5bn in 
Barclays (Financial Times, 
July 25th 2007).
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and services. Originally, the funds involved were 
primarily meant to protect a country against volatile 
commodity price fluctuations or to cushion it against 
exchange-rate risks. However, some of these have 
evolved, to quote Stephen Jen, “from ‘stabilization 
funds’ to ‘wealth accumulation’ or ‘wealth 
preservation’ funds”.9 In that new function, they 
are diversifying their assets into equities—they are 
becoming SIAs. As public institutions, their ultimate 
responsibility is, at least in principle, to increase the 
welfare of their countries, with the general public 
being the ultimate stakeholders. It is not known what 
share of their funds SIAs have used for FDI purposes 
or, for that matter, how much they would use (and how 
much of their reserves countries will allocate to these 
agencies).  However, if they were to use substantial 
funds for FDI purposes and were not hindered from 
doing so, emerging markets would come to account for 
a large share of growing world FDI flows. 
In summary, there is considerable potential for 
more FDI, both from the demand and the supply side. 
The dominant trend for the main FDI determinants 
will remain favourable. In particular, the trend 
medium- and long-term economic conditions for FDI 
are likely to remain benign, despite inevitable cyclical 
fluctuations. These are powerful forces pushing the 
growth of FDI. So what could disturb this rosy picture 
and slow down or even stop the growth of FDI?
Countervailing factors
Although the economic determinants of FDI are 
crucial, they can only come into play if and when 
the regulatory framework is enabling. The risk of 
adverse changes in regulatory frameworks represents 
the single most important threat to the future of 
FDI flows. Various other risks also loom, including 
geopolitical risks and the risk of political violence or 
government instability (see the article elsewhere in 
this volume on a survey of more than 600 investors on 
attitudes to political risk). 
The regulatory framework for FDI is the concrete 
expression, via the political process, of the attitudes 
towards FDI of governments in home and host 
countries. The latter are, in turn, embedded in 
attitudes towards globalisation, of which FDI is one of 
the most important components. To the extent that 
there is a backlash against globalisation (although 
most of the discussion so far has focused on trade 
and its effects on jobs), attitudes towards FDI will be 
affected as well. 
The regulatory framework for FDI reflects the 
balance of the economic and other costs and benefits 
that countries associate with FDI. Countries seek to 
attract FDI because it is judged to help them advance 
their economic development without jeopardising 
other national objectives, such as national security, 
control over strategic industries and firms, preserving 
cultural identity, or a reluctance to allow firms from 
particular countries to play a key role in one’s own 
economy. There are indications that regulatory risk 
(including FDI protectionism) is becoming more 
salient in many host and home countries, especially 
when it comes to M&As and offshoring.
The risk of host-country FDI protectionism
As mentioned, the regulatory framework for FDI has 
been characterised, in recent decades, by a strong 
trend of liberalisation. Although this overall trend 
continues, there has in recent years been a marked 
rise in the number of regulatory changes unfavourable 
to foreign investors: compared with a total of 90 such 
changes over the 12-year period 1991-2002, the 
number rose to 101 in 2003-05.10
A number of these changes signal a more cautious 
approach to crossborder M&As. Crossborder M&As 
are by far the most important mode of entry for MNCs 
in developed countries, and they account for an 
increasing share of FDI flows to emerging markets. 
(For a discussion of M&A trends, see the article by 
Laza Kekic elsewhere in this volume.)
From a firm’s perspective, M&As have certain 
advantages, including the speed with which new 
tangible and intangible assets can be acquired and 
the corporate network expanded. From a host-country 
perspective, crossborder M&As do not add to its 
productive capacity (at least immediately), but merely 
represent a transfer of ownership from domestic to 
foreign firms. Moreover, such transactions are often 
accompanied by restructuring, typically implying 
job losses or the closing down of activities, in order 
9. Stephen Jen, 
“Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and Official FX Reserves”, 
Morgan Stanley Research: 
Economics, September 
14th 2006, p. 2.
10. See UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2006, 
p. 24.
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to increase the efficiency of the assets involved, 
integrate them profitably into the new parent 
company or simply ensure their survival. 
A more cautious attitude towards crossborder 
M&As can therefore have a major impact on FDI flows. 
Caution can be heightened if the acquirer is a private 
equity group, is from an emerging market or is a state-
owned entity; or if the targeted firm involves national 
security, is in a strategic industry or is regarded as a 
national champion.
The role of private equity groups
The increasingly prominent role of private equity 
groups in FDI has affected attitudes. In 2006 private 
equity investments accounted for an estimated 
one-fifth of the value of all crossborder M&A flows. 
Although their acquisitions may make perfect sense 
from an economic efficiency point of view, they 
are at times surrounded by controversy. Private 
equity groups are often seen as taking advantage 
of a company in distress. Resistance may only be 
magnified if the foreign investor succeeds in rescuing 
the firm, turning it into a successful venture and then 
selling it for a considerably higher price.11   
Discussions of the role of private equity groups 
have been particularly heated in Germany; not so 
long ago, a leading politician compared them with 
the biblical plague of locusts. Underlying these 
hostile reactions is that private equity groups are 
not regarded as strategic investors interested in, 
and bound to, the long-term economic development 
of a host country. Rather, they are seen as firms out 
to make a “quick buck”, to maximise as rapidly as 
possible their own returns on investment, including 
by breaking up, if need be, the firms acquired and 
selling individual pieces to the highest bidder. It may 
well be that sceptical attitudes towards private equity 
groups will lead to more restrictions in host countries 
on these types of investors.
National security or just protectionism?
The needs of national security, tightly linked 
to strategic sectors and national champions, 
are often explicitly invoked when it comes to 
stymying crossborder M&As. National security is a 
vague concept; it easily lends itself to misuse for 
protectionist purposes.12 For the US, preoccupied 
with terrorism, this concept has primarily military and 
strategic political connotations—witness the Dubai 
Ports World and CNOOC cases. For the EU, Japan and a 
number of developing countries, “national security” is 
also economic in nature and easily blends with talk of 
strategic industries and national champions. French 
policymakers, for example, speak about “economic 
patriotism” and include casinos among the country’s 
strategic industries.13 The issue of national champions 
came into play when there was a rumour that Pepsi 
(US) might want to acquire France’s Danone, one of 
the world’s leading yogurt producers. 
A number of crossborder M&As in Europe have 
invoked considerations of strategic industries or 
national champions and hence triggered government 
resistance. Examples are the attempt by Enel (Italy) 
to buy Suez (France); German E.ON’s bid to acquire 
Endesa (Spain); Italy’s blocking the Albertis (Spain) 
bid for Autostrade; and the reported failed takeover 
attempts by Russia’s Gazprom of Centrica (UK) in 
2005-06. As it happens, Gazprom itself benefits 
from its government’s determined strategy to re-
establish state control over Russia’s natural resources, 
considered to be of strategic importance. As part 
of that strategy, some MNCs have had to relinquish 
controlling stakes in a number of projects. Russia is 
in fact considering declaring a number of activities 
as being “strategic”, with implications for the 
participation of foreign firms.14
Most of the difficulties that crossborder M&As have 
faced so far seem to have taken place in developed 
countries. But the change in attitude is catching 
on in developing countries. An earlier Economist 
Intelligence Unit survey of 258 senior executives 
across Asia, for example, found that the US (24%), 
China (23%) and France (13%) are regarded as 
the countries most likely to block M&As because of 
strategic and political concerns.15 
In the survey conducted for this report, 
respondents expressed considerable concern about 
possible protectionism in a number of emerging-
market regions. Among developed countries, France 
and the US were the two that stood out in terms of 
11. The acquisition of 
the Korea Exchange Bank 
by Lone Star (US) had 
elements of this reaction 
when Lone Star sought to 
sell the firm for a much 
higher price than for the 
one it had paid when it 
made its acquisition.
12. In its 2007 Summit 
Declaration the G8 noted: 
“we remain committed 
to minimize any national 
restrictions on foreign 
investment. Such 
restrictions should apply 
to very limited cases which 
primarily concern national 
security”.
13. In a December 
31st 2005 decree, the 
French government 
announced that it would 
protect eleven priority 
industries from foreign 
takeovers: casinos; 
private security; research, 
development and 
production of products 
with potential illicit or 








with access to defence 
secrets; arms and 
munitions; and defence 
subcontracting (Financial 
Times, January 4th 2006).
14. Most of the activities 
mentioned in the current 
(August 2007) bill 
before the State Duma 
(the lower house of the 
Russian parliament) 
relate to arms, nuclear 
facilities, cryptography, 
espionage, aerospace 
and natural monopolies 
(including pipelines, 
power transmission, rail 
transport, ports, airports, 
mail). The bill also 
foresees that no foreign 
state-controlled entity 
can control over 25% of a 
Russian firm that engages 
in a strategic activity.
15. Norton Rose, “Cross-
border M&A: the Asian 
perspective”, Economist 
Intelligence Unit and 
Norton Rose, London, 
2007, p. 4.
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concern about attitudes of officials to FDI. 
In China, the leading FDI recipient among 
emerging markets, questions have been posed about 
the desirability of certain M&As. The reaction in the 
US to the Dubai Ports World acquisition played a 
role in this respect: if the US, as the world’s leading 
economy, has concerns regarding FDI, should not 
China, as a developing country, be also concerned 
about the role of FDI in its economy? As a result, the 
concept of “economic security” has gained currency. 
Thus, the demonstration effect of blocking M&As 
in developed countries may well ripple through an 
increasing number of emerging markets.
Emerging-market and state-owned investors receive 
special attention
There seems to be special scepticism towards large 
M&As by emerging-market firms. Such M&As have 
increased from 5% to 17% in terms of number of deals 
and from 4% to 13% in terms of value between 1987 
and 2005, representing 1,072 deals worth US$90bn in 
2005.16 Some prominent examples include:
● the US$1.25bn acquisition by Lenovo (China) of 
the personal computer (PC) division of IBM (US) in 
2005; 
● the takeover by CVRD (Brazil) of INCO (Canada) in 
2007, for US$16.7bn; and
● the successful bid by Tata (India) for Corus (UK/
Netherlands) for US$13.5bn in 2007. 
One certainly cannot say that M&As are typically 
resisted (all of the ones just mentioned were 
successful). However, it appears that especially high-
profile ones are receiving increasing attention and 
may encounter resistance. The 2006 acquisition of 
Arcelor (Luxembourg) for US$32bn by Mittal Steel, a 
company registered in the Netherlands and managed 
out of London, is an example. 
Scepticism, at times bordering on hostility, 
becomes stronger if the emerging-market entity is 
state-owned. Acquisitions by a developed-country 
state-owned entity such as Deutsche Bahn AG 
(Germany—it acquired the US’s DHL, a logistics firm) 
do not seem to present problems, even if they take 
place in sensitive sectors. However, UAE-based Dubai 
Ports World’s acquisition of P&O Steam Navigation 
Company (UK), with assets in the US, was only 
approved in 2006 once Dubai Ports World agreed to 
divest itself of its US assets. In the case of CNOOC 
(China), and its 2005 attempt to purchase Unocal 
(US), the fact that it is a state-owned enterprise 
played a role. 
There is, however, a special breed of state-owned 
entities that has entered the spotlight and created 
considerable anxiety in a number of countries: SIAs. 
As these entities are not new (see above), the obvious 
question is: why do they (apart from state-owned 
firms) suddenly get so much attention? A confluence 
of reasons is responsible, first and foremost among 
them the growing number and size of such agencies. 
The key, however, is that most of them are controlled 
by emerging-market governments. 
The size of the resources available to SIAs combines 
with the fear that emerging-market SIAs are basically 
instruments of government policy, meant to advance 
not only the public good in general but to support 
political goals. This was not much of an issue, at least 
in the past, with regard to the SIAs of small countries 
such as Singapore and Norway. (In fact, entities of 
this type from developed countries—such as Norway’s 
Government Pension Fund, which has some 3,500 
investments and is an activist investor—have so far 
not drawn much attention; the focus of the public and 
policy debate is on emerging-market agencies.) But it 
becomes an issue when large countries and especially 
strategic competitors are involved. Hence the foray of 
Russian state-owned enterprises into western Europe, 
and the expected investments by Russia’s SIA (to be 
formed in 2008), are regarded with trepidation in 
much of the developed world. This applies even more 
so to China’s SIA, to be set up later in 2007. (Fear of 
China’s and Russia’s government-controlled entities—
and to a certain extent also those controlled by Gulf 
states—fuels a good part of the discussions and 
concerns on this issue.) China’s prospective agency 
may well have US$200bn-300bn at its disposal, 
including for FDI.17 If China’s investment arm embarks 
on a major acquisition spree, this is bound to lead to 
strong reactions in a number of countries. 
16. UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2006, 
p. 108.
17. An early transaction of 
this still-to-be-established 
agency was the 
acquisition, in June 2007, 
of 9.9% of the Blackstone 
Group, a leading US 
private equity firm. China’s 
new investment agency 
was careful to remain, in 
this acquisition, below 
the 10% threshold at 
which it would have 
been considered a direct 
investment, and it took 
its share in non-voting 
stock, in this manner not 
triggering a review by the 
Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United 
States. But even then 
this move was front-page 
news when the plan was 
announced on May 19th 
2007.
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To cope with the reaction to SIAs, China (as well 
as other countries) may need to learn from the 
experience of Japan. When that country’s (private) 
firms began to make large-scale foreign investments 
in the 1980s, there was widespread fear that they 
would come to dominate the world economy, and 
attitudes in some countries (such as the US) were 
quite defensive. These fears only calmed down when 
Japan entered a period of stagnation in the 1990s 
and, perhaps even more important, when Japanese 
firms moved to much more acceptable foreign 
investments, namely by establishing assembly 
facilities and eventually full greenfield production 
units in the US. (Additional effects were that, in this 
manner, they not only circumvented “voluntary” 
export restraints but also reduced the bilateral trade 
deficit, thereby neutralising other sources of friction 
between Japan and the US.) State-owned entities may 
need to have a similar trajectory in order to allay a 
good part of the fears associated with their emergence 
as significant outward investors and, in the case of 
China, the rise of that country as an economic power.
So far there is little, if any, systematic evidence 
that SIAs are instruments of specific government 
policies; their actions would most likely also have 
been taken if they had been purely commercial 
enterprises. Nevertheless, the suspicion is there. 
It is fuelled by a lack of transparency as to what the 
strategic objectives of SIAs are and, in particular, 
what investments they have undertaken (a notable 
exception is Norway’s SIA). This is part of a broader 
concern, namely the quality of corporate governance 
of these entities, a concern that is also voiced 
with respect to state-owned enterprises.18 Part of 
that is the fear that such state entities also enjoy 
certain advantages (such as cheap financing), as 
this could put private-sector firms at a competitive 
disadvantage. The financing advantage acquires a 
particular edge for countries that are seen to have an 
undervalued currency.
Finally, one cannot avoid the impression that 
the very rise of emerging-market MNCs as new 
and powerful competitors, the need to accept 
that they are here to stay and the challenge of 
integrating the newcomers into the world economy 
all play a role. And, as we know from other contexts 
(such as international relations among states), 
accommodating rising newcomers is not easy.  
Points to watch
The various instances of crossborder M&As that have 
encountered difficulties so far represent only a very 
small share of all M&As that take place each year. 
Nevertheless, they are becoming more frequent. 
Moreover, the greater prominence of SIAs will almost 
certainly lead to defensive reactions in a number of 
countries, thus reducing FDI flows below what they 
otherwise might be. What we will need to watch are 
three things:
● the frequency and nature of instances of 
opposition to M&As;
● how much pressure there will be for reciprocity 
between governments in their treatment of FDI 
deals; and
● whether governments create new mechanisms that 
allow them to block crossborder M&As.
It is likely that an increasing number of crossborder 
M&As will encounter resistance. The only question 
is how many? The answer is probably only a limited 
number. The reason is that the bulk of M&As are 
normal commercial transactions (with the only 
principal constraining consideration being anti-
competitive M&As) that receive little attention. The 
key will be how active state-owned entities (and 
especially SIAs) will be in the M&A market.
With respect to reciprocity, the argument is being 
made that, if state-owned entities from one country 
are allowed to invest in another country, the latter 
country’s firms should have equal access to the former 
country.19 As most developed countries are much 
more open to FDI than emerging markets, reciprocity 
becomes a tool to open other countries to FDI—or to 
protect oneself from undesirable inward FDI. Where 
reciprocity is not forthcoming, FDI flows may be 
dampened; where it is, they may go up. To quote US 
deputy Treasury secretary Robert Kimmitt, speaking 
in the context of the discussions to strengthen the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
18. See, for example, 
Rainer Geiger, “Corporate 
Governance of Emerging 
Market TNCs: Why Does 
it Matter?”, in Sauvant 
with Mendoza and 
Ince (eds), The Rise of 
Transnational Corporations 
from Emerging Markets. 
For a broader discussion 
of developed countries’ 
concerns as regards 
M&As by state-owned 
enterprises, see Andrea 
Goldstein, “Who’s Afraid of 
Emerging Market TNCs? Or: 
Are Developing Countries 
Missing Something in the 
Globalisation Debate?”, in 
the same volume.
19. See, for example, 
Jeffrey Garten, “We need 
rules for sovereign funds”, 
Financial Times, August 
8th 2007.
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States (CFIUS): “Reciprocity is not a factor that CFIUS 
considers. However, investments that take place 
inside a broader political context, and the degree to 
which American companies are afforded access to 
their investment opportunities in countries abroad 
will be related to the opportunities available to their 
companies in the US.”20
CFIUS is the best-known example of a mechanism 
to monitor, and potentially block, crossborder 
M&As; it is an inter-agency committee chaired by 
the secretary of the US Treasury. It implements the 
Exon-Florio provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act, which gives authority 
to the country’s president “to suspend or prohibit 
any foreign acquisition, merger or takeover of a 
US corporation that is determined to threaten the 
national security of the United States”.21 On July 26th 
2007, CFIUS was strengthened with the signing into 
law of the “Foreign Investment and National Security 
Act of 2007”.22
Other countries are also considering establishing 
CFIUS-type defence mechanisms. Countries such as 
Germany and Hungary are considering the creation 
of review mechanisms, especially for investments by 
SIAs, perhaps at the EU level (which France would 
support). German Chancellor Angela Merkel is quoted 
as saying: “With those sovereign funds we now have a 
new and completely unknown element in circulation 
… One cannot simply react as if these are completely 
normal funds of privately pooled capital.”23 A bill may 
still be considered this year by the Bundestag. The 
UK, on the other hand, is more cautious, although the 
need for reciprocity is also emphasised. As in the case 
of the US, the intention is to install the equivalent 
20. Quoted in Deborah 
Solomon, “Foreign 
investors face new hurdles 
across the globe”, Wall 
Street Journal, July 6th 
2007. This is perhaps 
also what is behind the 
following observation 
in the 2007 G8 Summit 
Declaration: “Companies 
from G8 countries 
investing in emerging 
economies expect to find 
the same open investment 
environment as companies 
from such countries 
investing in G8 countries.”





22. US Senate, 110th 
Congress, S. 1610, 
“Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act of 
2007”.
23. International Herald 
Tribune, July 14th-15th 
2007.
The Committee on 
Foreign Investment in 
the United States
CFIUS reviews must be completed 
within 30 days. A review of a 
covered transaction leads to an 
investigation (which needs to 
be concluded within 45 days) if 
any of the following conditions 
apply: (1) a transaction threatens 
to impair the national security of 
the US, and this threat has not 
been mitigated during or prior to 
the review of the transaction; (2) 
a transaction involves a foreign 
government-controlled entity; (3) a 
transaction would result in control 
of any critical infrastructure and 
could impair national security; or 
(4) the lead agency and CFIUS agree 
that an investigation should take 
place. Crucially, the law creates a 
presumption that an investigation 
must take place if a state-owned 
entity is the acquirer, unless the 
secretary of the Treasury and the 
head of the lead agency jointly 
determine that the transaction will 
not impair national security. Factors 
that CFIUS needs to consider when 
determining the national security 
impact of a transaction include 
the risk of technology transfer to a 
country that is a threat to the US; the 
impact on critical infrastructure and 
critical technologies; and foreign 
government ownership.  
During its first years of existence, 
CFIUS reviewed relatively few cases. 
That number has increased, however, 
in recent years, as has the number 
of mitigation agreements. To quote 
from the testimony on February 7th 
2007 of Todd M Malan, president 
and chief executive officer (CEO) of 
the Organization for International 
Investment, Washington, to the 
House Financial Services Committee: 
“A recent study published by the 
National Foundation for American 
Policy showed that, in the last year, 
the number of CFIUS filings increased 
by 73%, the number of investigations 
jumped by 350% and the number of 
companies withdrawing their filings 
with CFIUS grew by 250%. There were 
more second-stage investigations 
last year than during the previous five 
years of the Bush administration and 
more than during 1991-2000. The 
number of mitigation agreements, or 
conditions imposed on companies, 
more than tripled last year. More 
specifically, the Department of 
Homeland Security required an 
average of 4.5 mitigation agreements 
per year between 2003 and 2005. 
Last year, DHS required mitigation 
agreements in fifteen transactions.”1
Although the percentages quoted 
are based on low absolute numbers, 
they do reflect a changing attitude 
in the US towards crossborder 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
CFIUS reviews are likely to become 
more frequent and stringent, if only 
because the number of M&As in 
which the acquirer is a state-owned 
enterprise or a sovereign investment 
agency (SIA) is likely to go up. 
1. Testimony of Todd M Malan before the House Financial 
Services Committee, February 7th 2007.
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of an emergency brake, to put the government into 
a position to block undesirable crossborder M&As. 
As in the case of the US, it is of course difficult to 
draw the line between “desirable” and “undesirable” 
transactions, to determine which industries are 
“strategic” and to avoid an outcome whereby the 
institutions created become overly restrictive, be it in 
response to public concerns or protectionist pressures.
Outside Europe, China has already established (in 
2006) a defence mechanism, in the form of a “National 
Economic Security Review Mechanism”. Under 
this system, approval is required for the following 
categories of acquisitions: important industries, 
elements that may affect national economic security, 
and famous trademarks and long-established Chinese 
trade names/companies. None of these categories is 
defined.24
It would not be surprising if other countries 
were to follow suit, creating in this manner new 
screening mechanisms for FDI. This is reminiscent of 
a time some 20-30 years ago when various countries 
(such as Canada) had review mechanisms in place 
to screen out undesirable FDI. Most of these (along 
with the laws that restricted inward FDI) were 
eventually dismantled, became less stringent in 
terms of enforcement or were replaced by investment 
promotion agencies (IPAs).
In addition, crossborder M&As can also be 
discouraged or stymied informally, for example by 
the very knowledge that they have to go through a 
formal review process, through statements by leading 
politicians that rumoured or proposed M&As are frowned 
upon and through resistance in legislative bodies or 
among the public at large. These informal barriers are 
difficult to quantify, but they have been rising.
MNC-host country conflicts
Concrete cost/benefit considerations, combined with 
strategic industry concerns, are also at the heart of 
conflicts between host developing countries and 
MNCs in natural resource industries. Many assets in 
these industries were nationalised in the 1960s and 
1970s, with nationalisations of this kind reaching 
a peak during the early 1970s. The rationale at that 
time was that governments needed to exercise direct 
control over their natural resources, as these, as 
strategic industries, were central to their economic 
development and because the distribution of rents 
from their exploitation was considered to be lopsided 
in favour of MNCs. At that time, heated discussion 
took place on the right of “permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources”, with developing countries 
reaffirming this right in various UN resolutions. 
This discussion subsequently died down, but the 
problematique is re-emerging. Reference was already 
made to Russia. A number of governments in Africa 
(Congo, Liberia) and Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela) have re-visited the contracts concluded 
between MNCs and host-country entities in order 
to see whether the host country did get the best 
possible deal for the exploitation of what are often 
the only significant assets a country has (although 
ideological considerations also play a role in some of 
these countries). The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that many of the deals in national resource 
industries are subject to the “obsolescing bargain”. 
Prospecting for natural resources is a risky 
business in that a firm typically does not know 
whether it will be successful; in order to entice firms 
to undertake prospecting, countries often offer very 
generous terms. Once prospecting is successful and 
a firm has invested heavily, it becomes, in a sense, 
a captive of the country, which, in turn (and not 
surprisingly), will seek to increase its share of the 
rents derived from its natural resources. (For the 
firm, the benefits of successful prospecting in one 
country need to be offset by the costs of unsuccessful 
prospecting in another country.) If differences 
cannot be resolved through renegotiations of the 
underlying contract, they may well result in unilateral 
action by the governments. Where this takes the 
form of nationalisation or similar action, FDI is 
reduced. Equally important, such action can have 
a chilling effect on future FDI flows, including to 
other countries, if firms see this type of political risk 
increasing. More countries may well become more 
assertive in this area (especially if the commodities 
boom lasts), with the risk of conflicts between them 
and MNCs increasing and FDI flows in the natural 
resource sector declining.
24. Robert D Lewis, “Cross-
border M&A in China: a 
comparative analysis”, 
Lovells, Beijing, 2007, 
mimeo. However, China 
had been screening 
inbound FDI before that.
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Increased litigation
The relationship between MNCs and host countries 
is becoming more confrontational, judging from the 
number of international arbitration cases. There were 
few such cases during the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
By the end of 2006, however, 258 international 
treaty-based arbitration cases had been initiated, 
some two-thirds before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).25 Some 
47% have arisen in the past three years, and 73% 
during the past five years; 70 countries in all parts of 
the world are (or were) respondents in cases initiated 
by MNCs (see Table 2). Bolivia’s denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention in May 2007 may be an indication 
of the growing scepticism towards FDI and the 
international arbitration of investment disputes. 
There is considerable potential for a substantial 
further increase in the number of investment 
disputes, if one considers that (1) there are some 
3,000 international investment agreements, most 
of which contain dispute-settlement provisions; and 
(2) there are more than 80,000 MNCs, over 800,000 
foreign affiliates and even more shareholders, most 
of which, depending on the treaty language, could 
in principle initiate a case if they felt aggrieved. The 
growth of investment disputes reflects the confidence 
of international investors to stand up for what they 
consider to be their rights and for the rule of law,26 
but it comes at a time when the role of FDI is under 
reassessment in some countries.
Home-country protectionism
As discussed earlier, most home countries are 
supportive of “their” MNCs and their outward FDI. 
There are, however, two imponderables that may 
change this situation, one relating to developed 
countries, the other to emerging markets. Developed 
countries are faced with a profound transformation 
affecting more than two-thirds of their economies—the 
services sector. A similar transformation some 40 years 
ago as regards the manufacturing sector triggered a 
broad discussion as to what this meant for employment 
and how this could lead to a hollowing-out of the 
economies involved—and, ultimately, whether or not 
FDI was desirable. At that time, part of the answer was 
presented by trade adjustment programmes and the 
prospects of moving into the services sector. Outward 
FDI in manufacturing gathered speed, contributing 
significantly to the growth of FDI flows and the 
emergence of an integrated international production 
system in manufacturing.
Resistance to offshoring
We are now at the threshold of a similar development 
in the services sector. In particular, the process of 
offshoring the production of services, and efforts by 
largely white-collar workers to protect their jobs are 
likely to spark debates on the desirability of outward 
FDI. Such a discussion has already flared up in the 
US (which led to a series of bills seeking to introduce 
restrictions on offshoring) and, under the heading of 
“délocalisation”, in France. Given the magnitude of 
the transformation we are facing, it may well be that, 
as the offshoring of services gathers speed, the call 
for restrictions on outward FDI will become louder and 
may be heeded. A key consideration will be the overall 
performance of the economies of the developed 
countries and hence their ability to absorb the shock 
of this transformation.
Similar considerations apply also to emerging 





May 2007), mimeo, p. 5. 
For a discussion of the 
reasons for this explosion 
of investment disputes, 
see Jeswald W Salacuse, 
“Explanations for the 
Increased Recourse to 
Treaty-based Investment 
Dispute Settlement: 
Resolving the Struggle of 
Life against Form?”, in Karl 
P Sauvant with Michael 
Chiswick-Patterson (eds), 
Coherence and Consistency 
in International 
Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 
forthcoming.
26. For comparison: 
during the entire existence 
of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT; 
1948-94), a total of 101 
disputes were brought; 
another 366 disputes have 
been brought under the 
World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) from its inception 
up to July 12th 2007. It 
must be noted, however, 
that only states can 
use the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism.
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Leading respondents in international investment 
disputes, end-2006
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however, is that emerging markets, by definition, 
are economies that do not have sufficient productive 
capacity. Hence, outward FDI may begin to be 
questioned, and may affect the regulatory framework 
for (outward) FDI.
There is another reason why the outcome is 
uncertain, and it cuts across developed countries 
and emerging markets: as firms transnationalise, 
their interests are no longer necessarily identical 
with those of their home countries; they become, as 
their name implies, “multinational”, with their own 
interests being paramount and no longer attached 
to any particular country. It used to be said that 
what is good for General Motors is good for the US. 
Globalisation, and especially outward FDI, has put this 
dictum in question, as reflected in the famous debate 
between Robert Reich and Laura Tyson on “Who is 
us?”: a corporation that is headquartered in the US 
but has a substantial part of its activities abroad, or 
a foreign company that has a substantial share of 
its activities in the US?27 For Mr Reich, the answer 
was “the American worker”, and he was prepared, 
therefore, not to give preferential treatment to 
US-headquartered firms. For Ms Tyson it was the 
US company—although she conceded that this may 
become less clear in the future as firms become more 
transnationalised (which is what happened). 
This debate took place some 15 years ago. Since 
then, firms have become more transnational. But 
virtually all countries continue to believe that firms 
headquartered in their territories are “their” firms, 
and some indeed are considered national champions; 
hence, what is good for them is good for the 
country. Once it sinks in that MNCs seek to maximise 
their global competitiveness, as opposed to the 
performance of any particular economy, the support 
for outward FDI may wane, with implications for the 
regulatory framework and FDI flows.
The bottom line
The driving forces for a further expansion of FDI 
are strong. Over the medium and long term, the 
economic drivers of FDI should remain favourable. 
For firms, a portfolio of locational assets is crucial for 
their competitiveness, and there are still substantial 
potential sources of FDI. Host countries continue to 
attract investment to promote their development, 
and home countries promote outward FDI in the 
interest of the competitiveness of their firms and the 
performance of their own economies. 
Expectations are therefore that MNCs will continue 
to invest abroad at historically high levels—if they 
are allowed to do so, that is, by host and home 
countries. However, there is an appreciable risk that 
the FDI regulatory framework—which has in the past 
two decades overwhelmingly moved in a liberalising 
direction—will become more protectionist, in both 
host and home countries.
Ambivalent attitudes
Attitudes to FDI do not depend on an assessment 
of its economic costs and benefits alone. Openness 
to FDI can be perceived to conflict with other 
national objectives. And attitudes towards FDI are 
ambivalent in most countries, precisely because of 
the “foreignness” of the investment. As a result, 
supportive and sceptical attitudes towards FDI often 
battle for supremacy when it comes to policymaking. 
Today, sceptical attitudes are in the ascendancy 
in a growing number of countries, especially 
towards crossborder M&As, emerging-market MNCs 
(particularly state-owned enterprises and SIAs) 
and private equity groups, and with regard to the 
distribution of benefits related to FDI (primarily in the 
natural resource sector). 
Attitudes to outward FDI may become less 
favourable in developed countries if the offshoring 
of services accelerates. In emerging markets, where 
capital is scarce, attitudes towards outward FDI may 
also change. In both cases, such a change in attitudes 
would increase regulatory risk and have implications 
for investment flows.
In countries that are high FDI recipients, attitudes 
and policy towards FDI may also be affected by a 
feeling that a country has attracted “enough” FDI (a 
consideration that seems to play a role in China), or if 
there is a perception that a country needs to be more 
selective in attracting FDI by focusing on attracting 
“good” FDI and discouraging “bad” FDI. In such 
circumstances, FDI can become a victim of its own 
27. See Robert Reich, 
“Who is us?”, Harvard 
Business Review, 1990, 
pp. 53-64; Laura D’Andrea 
Tyson, “They are not us: 
why American ownership 
still matters”, The 
American Prospect, 1991, 
pp. 37-48; and Robert 
Reich, “Who do we think 
they are?”, The American 
Prospect, 1991, pp. 49-53.
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 79
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS REGULATORY RISK AND THE GROWTH OF FDI  PART 1
success, and M&As are then particularly vulnerable. 
On the other hand, most countries (or regions within 
countries) that have been less successful in attracting 
FDI are more likely to eschew restrictive measures.
What is the bottom line? In particular, could a 
protectionist backlash trump the forces driving 
FDI in an upward direction? Until now, the overall 
interests of the three key players in world FDI were 
largely aligned: host countries sought inward FDI to 
further their economic development; home countries 
supported outward FDI to further the competitiveness 
of their firms; and firms undertook such investment 
to further their international competitiveness. 
This alignment found its expression in the 
liberalisation of national FDI regulatory frameworks, 
the strengthening of international standards of 
protection for FDI and the efforts of IPAs to attract 
such investment. The result was the dramatic growth 
of FDI flows in recent decades. Overall, the driving 
forces of FDI continue to be strong, grounded in 
economic considerations. 
But forces sceptical towards FDI are on the rise, 
and the interests of the three key players are no 
longer as aligned as in the past. The regulatory risk is 
increasing, and the climate for at least some types of 
FDI is becoming less welcoming. One cannot exclude 
the possibility that increased scepticism may presage 
a storm in the making that could overwhelm the forces 
driving FDI in an upward direction. 
On balance, no major backlash is likely to take 
place given the continuing strength of globalisation 
and the forces that propel FDI (and this underlies the 
forecasts made elsewhere in this volume). Rather, we 
are more likely to see a certain re-balancing in the 
attitudes towards, and regulatory frameworks for, FDI, 
tempering the dominant liberalisation trend of the 
past two decades and restraining the growth of future 
investment flows.
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By Jeffrey D Sachs, Quetelet Professor of Sustainable 
Development and Director of the Earth Institute at 
Columbia University*
Introduction
We have entered a new cycle of increased political 
risk regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
general and in the energy sector in particular (see 
the contributions elsewhere in this volume by Karl 
P Sauvant on FDI protectionism and by Matthew 
Shinkman on a survey of foreign investors’ attitudes 
to political risk). Nationalisations are on the rise in 
Latin America. Russia is confiscating foreign assets 
and cancelling foreign oil and gas concessions. The US 
is rejecting FDI inflows from some emerging markets 
in the name of national security. Foreign equity 
ownership through sovereign investment agencies 
(SIAs)—many of them from energy-exporting 
countries—is moving to the top of the policy and 
political debate. 
One is tempted to sigh “plus ça change, plus 
c’est la même chose”. We have, of course, seen 
nationalisations before, most notably in the 1970s 
when oil-producing states wrested control of their 
oil reserves away from the “Seven Sisters”. Today’s 
upheavals in Venezuela, Bolivia, Russia and other 
hydrocarbon economies show similar muscle-flexing 
by producing states in a rapidly tightening global 
energy market. One is also tempted to cry “hypocrite” 
at US politicians who attack proposed investments 
by Dubai or China, when they have favoured similar 
US investments abroad for decades. And of course we 
have good reason to cringe when UK investigators 
stop their enquiries into British corruption regarding 
projects in Saudi Arabia in the name of national 
security. 
Yet there are serious matters afoot that deserve 
our attention. The nationalisations and turmoil in 
the energy sector are more than muscle-flexing or 
the result merely of a tightening oil market. They 
represent much more than the anti-US antics of 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, the populism of 
Bolivia’s Evo Morales or the neo-authoritarianism 
of Russian president Vladimir Putin. They in fact 
represent a serious lack of basic investment standards 
in the global energy sector. The costs of this turmoil 
are much more than broken contracts and reduced 
or delayed investment flows. The absence of 
internationally agreed norms for foreign investment, 
especially in energy, hinders economic development 
in the host countries, foments aggressive geopolitical 
competition that threatens global security, and 
will block the scale of investment and co-operation 
necessary to overhaul a strained and environmentally 
dangerous global energy system.
Resource investments without legitimacy
The biggest investment risks today are in the natural 
resource sectors, and especially the energy sector. 
And it is in the energy sector where global investment 
standards are the most lacking. For a century, FDI 
in hydrocarbons has been part of the geopolitical 
great game. The international oil giants, the world’s 
largest companies, have long operated in a ruthlessly 
politicised environment. The US and Europe have long 
pursued foreign policies, up to and including coups and 
war, to win concessions for their energy giants, and to 
try (usually ineffectually) to secure cheap and reliable 
energy supplies for their home nations. The stakes are 
even higher today as big new competitors, notably 
China and India, have joined these great games. And 
the oil exporting states themselves, many in the low-
income world, find themselves riding the proverbial 
tiger. They seem to be in control right now, when oil 
markets are very tight, but these same countries are 
easily devoured when oil prices decline. The implosion 
of the Soviet Union was precipitated, at least in part, 
by the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s. 
Addressing political risk in the energy sector
* For further discussion, 
see Escaping the Resource 
Curse, edited by Jeffrey 
D Sachs, Macartan 
Humphreys and Joseph 
E Stiglitz, Columbia 
University Press, 
June 2007.
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The political risks of energy investments, judged 
from the perspective of the US and Europe, wax and 
wane with the tightness of global oil supplies. When 
markets are tight and oil prices are high, as in the 
1970s and now, existing contracts are renegotiated 
to the benefit of host countries, and some of the 
hydrocarbon reserves are re-nationalised. Oil rents 
are thereby reallocated to the advantage of the host 
countries. When oil prices are low, the host countries 
are weak and unable to renegotiate the terms of 
existing agreements. 
Judged by the financial press of the US and 
Europe, the renegotiations of contractual terms are 
a sign of perfidious host-country behaviour. But 
there is of course much more than meets the eye. The 
contracts that are being cancelled or restructured in 
Russia, Bolivia and elsewhere cannot pass minimal 
standards of honesty, transparency and due process. 
Neither side can claim the high ground. The FDI 
and concessions have such little staying power 
because they lack true legitimacy. All parties—the 
host government, the source governments (acting 
on behalf of the oil companies) and the companies 
themselves—behave opportunistically, seizing short-
term advantages at the expense of long-term trust. 
When short-term bargaining power changes, so too do 
the contracts. 
The Russian government’s nationalisation of 
Yukos and other oil assets, as well as the cancellation 
of various drilling concessions, exemplify brazen 
behaviour on both sides. Yukos gained its vast oil 
and gas assets in the flagrantly corrupt shares-for-
loans deals of the mid-1990s, which pillaged the 
Russian state of tens of billions of dollars of natural 
resource wealth. It is certainly not surprising that 
wealth so flagrantly won was so easily lost in a re-
nationalisation of the same assets. Who truly could cry 
for Yukos?
The Bolivian nationalisations of the gas sector 
occurred in a different context, but as in Russia, a 
context with far too little transparency and legitimacy 
in the relationship between foreign investors and the 
state. When companies such as Petrobrás (Brazil) and 
Repsol (Spain) acquired their interests in Bolivian 
natural gas in the 1990s, the declared natural gas 
reserves were less than 10trn cu feet. A few years 
later, the reserves were declared to be vastly greater, 
perhaps between 50trn and 100trn cu feet. Were the 
original estimates understated? Is the entire increase 
in reserves truly the result of unexpected discoveries? 
Even if that is the case, which is far from clear, the 
original contracts surely required restructuring 
to prevent a massive transfer of wealth to foreign 
investors from an impoverished country. 
The companies should have agreed to renegotiate 
the terms of their original agreements with the 
Bolivian government, but for many years they 
resisted. Finally, after coups, failed governments, 
public unrest and growing political turmoil, a new 
and more assertive government headed by Mr Morales 
simply imposed new contractual terms, which the 
foreign investors accepted. Without knowing the 
precise terms, I would bet that the companies will still 
do very well on their investments over the long haul.  
The ultimate source of contractual instability 
in Russia, Bolivia and many other countries, is not 
arbitrary host-country behaviour but rather the lack of 
legitimacy of the contractual process in the first place. 
The negotiations between investors and the state are 
habitually secret, and the resulting terms are almost 
always secret as well. An air of corruption hangs 
heavily over most deals. The public has no confidence 
in the legitimacy of the investor-state relationship. 
Western countries fuel the doubts. Their foreign 
policies are directed to winning favourable energy 
concessions, rather than establishing a sense of 
fairness and a framework for long-term development 
of the host countries. Even when “official” money 
is involved in these deals, as with the World Bank’s 
co-financing of the Chad-Cameroon oil project, the 
terms of the oil agreements are still kept secret. That 
deal too, not surprisingly, has exploded in acrimony 
and yet another failure to convert oil earnings into 
economic development in a low-income country. 
Stabilising host-investor relations
In the international sphere, effective long-term 
relations are maintained not mainly through 
international law, which is inherently weak, but 
through the desire of parties to maintain trust 
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and thereby to reap the benefits of long-term 
co-operation. Game theorists have given us the 
conceptual model of a “repeated prisoner’s dilemma”, 
in which two parties to an ongoing bilateral 
relationship must decide in one period after the next 
whether to co-operate with their counterpart, or 
instead to cheat. One possible outcome is that the 
parties act opportunistically in each period, cheating 
on each occasion, and not worrying how today’s poor 
behaviour will imperil the future of the relationship. 
Another possible outcome is that each party co-
operates today, not only to repeat the benefits of 
co-operation today, but also to preserve trust and co-
operation in the future. Each of these outcomes is a 
game-theoretic equilibrium, but only the co-operative 
outcome leads to the best payoffs for the parties.
Today’s political risk in hydrocarbons reflects 
a basic lack of co-operation and norms between 
investors and host governments. Opportunism 
dominates and cynicism is confused with true wisdom. 
The idea that the relationship between hosts and 
foreign investors should be one of long-term trust 
is widely judged to be naive and beyond reach. The 
idea that the foreign energy policies of the US, 
Europe, China and India can be co-operative among 
themselves as well as with the host countries is viewed 
as hopelessly utopian. 
Yet the costs of this failure of trust will be more 
than lost contracts or arbitrary swings in wealth. We 
have entered a period in which rapid global growth 
is coming up against the constraint of a lack of spare 
capacity in primary energy production, and when the 
world also needs a fundamental overhaul of its energy 
technologies to head off these supply constraints—as 
well as the growing danger of human-induced 
climate change. Only massive flows of FDI, guided 
by appropriate environmental policies, will be able 
to provide the trillions of dollars needed to ensure 
reliable and environmentally safe power for a rapidly 
growing world economy in the coming decades. 
Dealing with political risk
The growing political risks around hydrocarbon 
investments will undermine these goals, unless we 
take a radically new direction. We will need to build 
institutional structures for long-term co-operation 
between businesses, importing countries (the G8, 
China, India and others) and the host countries. I 
suggest three core steps. 
First, FDI in the energy sector should be based 
on a foundation of full disclosure, including the 
publication of all contractual terms and all payments 
between host country and the investing companies. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, a 
growing partnership of key stakeholders in business, 
government and civil society, has begun to formulate 
such global standards. A library of contracts could be 
maintained at the UN and be available online for all 
interested parties and the general public. 
Second, the relationship between host country 
and foreign direct investors should recognise the 
long-term mutual interests of investors and host 
countries. Foreign direct investors need to be able to 
earn profits at rates that compensate adequately for 
risk, and the host countries should be able to benefit 
in terms of long-term sustainable development, 
meaning economic growth in an environmentally 
sound manner. Projects that fail either the 
developmental or environmental imperatives are 
bound to fail politically in the long term. The violence 
in the Niger Delta and the cutbacks in production by 
the international producers epitomise the disasters 
that befall both the companies and the host regions 
when investments are taken without regard for the 
longer-term development context. The UN Global 
Compact is an ideal place to hammer out a set of 
common principles for the sector. 
Third, home-country governments, which wield 
foreign policy instruments for the benefit of their 
national companies, will have to practice a new 
kind of restrained global politics. The current US 
administration has been the quintessential “great 
game” operator. The administration’s machinations 
in Iraq and throughout the Middle East have left the 
region, and US foreign policy, in tatters. Explicit 
codes of conduct are needed among governments to 
reduce as much as possible the use of foreign policy 
tools (foreign aid, promises of military sales and other 
military support, threats of sanctions, and so forth) 
to promote specific commercial opportunities of their 
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major companies. This is, of course, the very stuff 
of traditional international politics, but it is no less 
destructive for that being the case. 
New investment co-operation is required 
Political risks facing FDI are likely to continue to 
rise in the coming years, at least until a new global 
framework for such investment is established. The 
tensions will reflect three basic facts: the startling 
gaps in income between rich and poor countries, 
which easily inspire a backlash against foreign 
investment within poor host countries (such as 
Bolivia); the growing scramble for natural resources 
in a fast-growing world economy, especially in view 
of the rising resource demands of China, and the 
possible peaking of conventional oil supplies in the 
coming decade; and the rising environmental threats 
in most regions, and at the global scale, which will 
put many natural-resource-based FDI projects under 
increased scrutiny and much greater controversy. 
All of these trends have been exacerbated in 
recent years by US foreign policy and a wavering of 
support for globalisation within the US. Just when co-
operation has been most needed to work out suitable 
frameworks for combining economic growth with 
poverty reduction and environmental sustainability, 
the US embarked on a path of aggressive unilateralism 
and a sense of grievance about the world economy. 
And this has paralleled a growing opposition 
within the US to FDI inflows, not unlike the kinds 
of opposition long seen (and long ignored by the 
US) abroad. The rise of China, and the increasing 
security fears of the US after the September 11th 
2001 terrorist attacks, are both fuelling the new anti-
investment sentiment. 
If the US and other countries, including China, 
simply step up their competition for natural resources, 
and push for short-term commercial opportunities 
(for example, in demands for the opening of foreign 
markets), the hostile politics over FDI will surely heat 
up further. The chances to mobilise such investment 
to revamp the global energy sector, to achieve 
sustainable growth rather than a resource-curse in 
oil-rich countries, and to invigorate the economic 
development of the poorest countries, could be 
squandered. If, instead, we recognise that the recent 
skirmishes over FDI reflect deeper needs for trust and 
co-operation, there will still be time to address the 
growing political risks for such investment in a more 
fundamental and therefore sustainable manner. The 
latter course is our only sensible approach, and the 
stakes are high and rising. 
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Companies are generally bullish about the medium-
term global investment outlook, according to 
a global survey of 602 executives conducted by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit for this report. 
However, these same executives also foresee a 
marked heightening of political risks that could 
undermine the success of their overseas investment 
strategies.
For the purposes of our survey, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit defines political risk to include:
Risk of political violence: terrorism and civil 
unrest that can cause material loss 
FDI protectionism: impact on existing operations 
(expropriation, negative impact of changes in FDI 
regulations); and on new investments, including 
mergers and acquisitions—M&As (formal or informal 
barriers)
Geopolitical risk: impact of international tensions 
and threat of organised conflict
Government instability: government collapse 
or prolonged instability having a material impact on 
business
Questions addressed by the survey include:
● What are companies’ plans for FDI?
● What weight does political risk assessment have, 
compared with other features of the business 
environment, in explaining companies’ investment 
location decisions?
● How heavily do global geopolitical threats weigh 
on multinational corporation (MNC) strategies?
● Is there an intensifying protectionist backlash 
against FDI?
● How sensitive are firms to the threat of political 
violence?
● What measures have MNCs put in place to manage 
political risk?
● Do investors see a trade-off-between political 
stability and political democratisation?
● What are companies’ coping strategies and 
what are the key factors to minimise the impact 
of political instability on overseas operations, 
particularly in emerging markets?
We surveyed 602 senior executives from MNCs around 
the world in June 2007 in order to try to answer 
these and other questions. Survey responses were 
roughly evenly split between executives in western 
Europe, North America and Asia, and came from a 
range of industries. The survey also attracted a highly 
internationalised sample—about one-third of the 
companies represented in the survey reported at 
least half of their revenue coming from operations or 
affiliates outside their home countries. Roughly half 
of respondents are either at senior vice-president 
level or above in their organisations. 
Benign economic outlook versus heightened 
political risk 
The main overall finding of the survey on business 
sentiment is that executives are bullish about the 
investment outlook over the next five years, and 
are apparently sanguine about macroeconomic and 
financial risks and the impact of tightened credit 
conditions. The vast majority of respondents plan to 
increase FDI “substantially” or “moderately” over the 
next five years compared with the previous five years. 
The survey results suggest that economic factors 
trump risks and other considerations in the list of 
forces that will have the greatest influence on global 
FDI. Opportunities appear to predominate over risk 
concerns.
However, at the same time there are signs of 
significantly heightened political risk perceptions. 
Political risk is seen as posing a considerably greater 
threat to business over the next five years than in the 
The investors’ view: economic opportunities 
versus political risks in 2007-11
By Matthew Shinkman, Manager, Industry and Management Research CEEMEA, Economist Intelligence Unit
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recent past. This is especially so for emerging markets, 
where generic political risk is identified as the main 
investment constraint. All four forms of political risk 
in emerging markets are seen as increasing over the 
next five years. For developed countries, this is true 
only of FDI protectionism, but there is widespread 
concern about the threat of political violence in 
leading countries such as the US and the UK, and 
apparent sensitivity to a range of geopolitical risks. 
The respondents in the survey expressed high rates of 
agreement with statements pointing to disruptions 
from key sources of global risk such as conflict 
between the West and Iran, Islamic radicalism and 
Russian-Western tensions.
Investors remain optimistic
The survey results show that despite the perception 
of greater political risk in coming years, businesses 
are bullish about their investment intentions. Two-
fifths of respondents said that their companies 
would “substantially increase” investments outside 
their home markets over the coming five-year 
period compared with the previous five years, and 
52% said that they would increase their foreign 
investment “moderately”. Thus more than 90% 
expect their investments to increase; fewer than 1% 
of respondents expect to reduce substantially their 
foreign investments in 2007-11. These intentions 
were shared across all major industries we surveyed. 
Manufacturing and energy firms are even more bullish 
than the sample as a whole—almost half of these 
companies expect investment to rise substantially 
in coming years. Respondents based in the US were 
less bullish than their counterparts in Europe and 
Asia—only 32% of US-based firms expect investment 
to rise substantially in 2007-11, compared with 40% 
and 44% in Asia and Europe, respectively.
The survey responses on investment intentions 
are thus broadly consistent with our macroeconomic 
forecast for global FDI flows (see the article by Laza 
Kekic elsewhere in this volume). We forecast annual 
average global FDI inflows of US$1.5trn in 2007-11, 
compared with an annual average of US$843bn in 
2002-06.
The most important markets
The survey respondents rated China as the most 
important market for businesses in 2007-11: 52% 
expect the market to be of “critical importance” to 
their investment strategies over the coming five 
years, and over 85% expect it to be either critically 
important or to be at least of some importance in their 
investment plans. The US came out as the second most 
important market, with 76% of firms expecting it to 
play an important role in their investment portfolios 
in 2007-11. 
India and the rest of emerging Asia are also of 
great interest to our respondents (in particular those 
in the professional services sector), with the UK not 
far behind. The rest of western and eastern Europe are 
rated about equally. Most other emerging regions are 
far behind Asia, as well as emerging Europe. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the rating for Latin America is rather 
modest. The Middle East and North Africa and Sub-
Saharan Africa are by some distance least important 
to investors in the coming five-year period—with 
the exception of the energy and natural resource 
industries, which see Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
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Firms with a more developed international 
presence (as measured by the share of their revenue 
and employment accounted for by their foreign 
affiliates) gave a significantly higher rating to 
Brazil, Russia, India and China—the so-called BRICs 
markets—than the sample as a whole. 
 
Regionalisation versus globalisation
Despite ongoing globalisation, our survey responses 
reflect the well-known proposition that location and 
geography remain key determinants of FDI (see p. 60) 
and that much of FDI remains regional in nature. Thus 
firms from North America were significantly more 
likely to rate Mexico and Latin America as markets of 
“critical importance” in their investment planning 
(20% and 15% of North American respondents, 
respectively—in both cases about twice the level of 
the sample as a whole), whereas European 
respondents expect the UK, France, and the emerging 
economies of eastern Europe to feature more 
prominently than do respondents from other regions. 
Asian firms, equally, expect China, India and the rest 
of Asia to be of greater importance than does the 
sample as a whole.
Forms of investment
Respondents suggested that greenfield investments 
would be their primary route into emerging markets 
in the coming five years (35% said it would be their 
most important form of investment in these markets), 
although relative to the previous five-year period 
the importance of follow-on investment is expected 
to rise slightly. Despite the trend in recent years 
of an increasing share of global crossborder M&As 
taking place in emerging markets, in our survey the 
share of M&As as the preferred vehicle for investing 
into emerging markets rises only slightly in 2007-11 
compared with the previous five-year period (from 
28% to 29%). The implied caution about undertaking 
M&As in emerging markets may also help explain why 
the expected increase of FDI into emerging markets 
during the next five years (as reflected in our forecast) 
is not stronger, despite the growing importance of 
these markets for global business. 
In developed markets, competitive pressures will 
continue to drive consolidation, with M&As expected 
to be by far the most important form of investment for 
our respondents (about 40% of respondents for both 
periods). 
Economic factors override other issues 
When asked what forces will have the greatest 
influence on global FDI trends in the coming five 
years, respondents largely cited economic, rather 
than political, trends—out of 14 factors, six of the 
top seven are economic issues. Almost three-quarters 
of respondents feel that rising demand in emerging 
markets will be the most important factor driving 
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investment flows in 2007-12, with the state of the US 
economy, global outsourcing trends and increased 
outward investment from emerging markets the 
next most-cited factors. Geopolitical tensions were 
the fifth most important, while only around 14% of 
respondents expect the threat of terrorism to be a key 
driver of investment trends in the coming five years.  
Here, too, geography plays a role—Asian firms 
were more likely to cite emerging-market demand 
as a key factor (84% compared with 74% in the full 
sample), whereas North American and European firms 
were more likely to expect the performance of the US 
and the euro zone to be a factor in global investment 
trends. 
Constraints on investment
Unsurprisingly, investments in developed and 
emerging markets face differing constraints. Costs are 
clearly the main concern for investors into developed 
markets, whereas political risk and governance issues 
are the most prominent barriers to investment into 
emerging markets. For the developed economies, 
respondents were most likely to cite labour costs 
(42%), exchange-rate strength (38%) and taxation 
rates (32%) as key limitations on their investment 
plans.  
In emerging markets, almost half cited political 
risk as a key constraint, followed by corruption (43%) 
and then by infrastructure weaknesses and contract 
enforcement problems (North American firms were 
substantially more likely to cite contract enforcement 
as an investment constraint—47% compared to 37% 
in the sample as a whole). 
Political risk is seen to be on the rise
Survey responses suggest that political risk is 
expected to become a much more significant issue 








Which forms of investment in developed and 
emerging markets are most important now and in  
five years? 
(% of respondents)








0 10 20 30 40 50
Now
In five years
Developed markets  Emerging markets
Developed markets  Emerging markets
Rising demand in 
emerging markets
The state of the US 
economy
Global outsourcing of 
service functions
Increased investment 





The state of the euro 
area economy












In your opinion, which of the following forces will 
have the greatest influence on global foreign direct 
investment over the next five years?  
Select up to four.   
(% of respondents)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
88 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
PART 1  SURVEY RESULTS WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
in 2007-11, especially for emerging markets. In 
developed markets, investors remain relatively 
sanguine about most forms of political risk: one-third 
even expect the risk of political violence to recede in 
these markets in the coming five years compared with 
the previous five years, relative to 13% who expect 
this risk to increase. Government instability and 
geopolitical risks to developed-market investments 
are also expected to ease.  
The only exception here—unsurprising given recent 
trends (see the article by Karl Sauvant elsewhere in 
this volume)—concerns the risk of FDI protectionism 
in developed countries; a higher proportion of 
respondents expect this risk to increase than those who 
see it as diminishing over the next five years.
However, for emerging markets there is a strong 
trend of heightened risk perceptions for all types of 
political risk. An astonishingly high proportion of 
respondents—around half—expect political violence, 
geopolitical risk and government instability to 
increase in these markets in the coming five years 
(compared with only around 10% of respondents who 
think these risks will be lower in 2007-11). Around 
40% expect the same for the risk of FDI protectionism. 
These views were shared broadly across geographies 
and sectors. 
When asked which specific countries exhibit 
the highest levels of political risk, respondents 
unsurprisingly rated Iraq as the riskiest. More 
surprisingly, the second-riskiest country was Russia, 
ahead of Afghanistan and Iran. China, Venezuela, 
Pakistan, Zimbabwe, North Korea and Nigeria rounded 
out the top ten riskiest markets. 
At the same time, opportunities appear to offset 
risk perceptions (or at least illustrate the disconnect 
between the economic outlook and political risk 
perceptions) for several of these economies. China 
and Russia are high FDI recipients (China was also 
rated the most important market in our survey and 
over half of the survey respondents considered Russia 
important to their investment plans). Pakistan and 
Nigeria are also likely to attract significant FDI flows 
in 2007-11, despite the political risks. 
Geopolitical hotspots 
Several geopolitical hot-spots also feature highly on 
investors’ radar screens.  The majority of respondents 
expect a crisis in Iran to disrupt the global economy 
at some point in the next five years, and over 70% 
believe that Islamic radicalism will pose an increasing 
threat to business. Well over half of the respondents 
agreed that rising Western-Russian political tensions 
will have a significant negative impact on business 
(unsurprisingly, this share rose to 70% in the case of 
energy sector firms).  
Respondents are somewhat less worried about 
political instability in Asia, although more than 40% 
thought that the region could experience a major 
political crisis in the next five years that would disrupt 
business. Around 40% agreed with the statement 
that renewed instability in the Balkans will dampen 
the FDI recovery in that region. However, perhaps 
it is fortunate for the FDI recipient countries of this 
Developed markets
Emerging markets
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
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subregion that this portion declined significantly, to 
29%, for respondents from west European firms—the 
most significant investors in the Balkans.
Respondents based in North America proved more 
worried about the potential for a crisis over Iran than 
were their European and Asian colleagues—almost 
one-third strongly agreed that “A crisis over Iran 
will disrupt the global economy during the next five 
years”, compared with 18% of the entire sample. 
Investors are concerned about the risk of terrorism, 
not only in many emerging markets, but also in some 
leading developed states. Unsurprisingly, 70% of 
respondents expect terrorism to be a “high risk” in the 
Middle East in 2007-11, but this region is followed by 
the US and the UK as markets considered most likely 
to be at high risk of terrorist activity. 
For most markets the risk of increased FDI 
protectionism features much less prominently among 
investors’ concerns than the risk of terrorism. For 
developed markets as a whole, on balance survey 
participants actually expect protectionism to be less 
of an issue in 2007-11 than in the previous five-year 
period—although there appeared to be particular 
concern about rising protectionism in the US. 
The threat of protectionism was less of a concern, 
compared with other risks, to investors in emerging 
markets.  
When asked about specific markets, significant 
differences emerged.  When correcting for those 
who either do not know or do not invest in individual 
regions, Russia came out as by far the most high-risk 
market for protectionism (42% of respondents). The 
Middle East and Latin America followed with 28% and 
26% of respondents, respectively. Almost one in five 
respondents expect FDI protectionism to be a high 
risk in the US in 2007-11, well ahead of the proportion 
who expect the same in western Europe.
The US and France were the only two developed 
markets for which a higher share of respondents 
thought that officials were today less receptive to 
foreign investors than they were five years ago. For 
most regions, both developed and emerging markets, 
the proportion of survey respondents who thought 
that officials were today more receptive to investors 
than five years ago far outstripped those who believed 
that officials had become less receptive. In part, 
this is a reflection of the fact that over the past five 
years as a whole, the global trend of liberalisation 
and opening to FDI has continued (reversals in some 
areas, as described elsewhere in this volume, are a 
recent phenomenon and pose risks for the future). 
This was particularly the case for China and India. For 
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of officials had become more receptive to investors 
and only 7% said that they had become less receptive; 
for India the corresponding proportions were 49% 
and 6%. These responses may also to a certain extent 
illustrate the fact that attitudes towards officialdom 
and bureaucracy can be influenced by a country’s 
economic attractiveness and market dynamism.
Political risk is a reality
The concept of political risk covers a wide range 
of issues, from the threat of political violence and 
geopolitical tensions to shifting legal and regulatory 
frameworks and collapsing governments. When we 
asked participants to identify instances in which 
their firms had been subject to specific political 
risk events—things such as problems with currency 
convertibility and transfer, government payment 
default or expropriation of assets—the responses were 
striking.  
When adjusting for respondents who do not 
operate in the regions in question, the survey found 
that 16% of companies had experienced problems 
with converting or transferring currency in Latin 
America, and 14% had had similar issues in Asia. 
One in seven had suffered a unilateral contract 
cancellation or request for renegotiation by a 
government counter-party in Russia (the same ratio 
had faced this issue in Asia). And almost one in ten 
had suffered some form of expropriation of assets 
in Russia and Latin America. Payment defaults by 
government buyers in Latin America were suffered by 
12% of respondents operating in those markets, and 
9% of respondents working in the MENA region and 
Asia.
The problem is largely—but not solely—an 
emerging-market phenomenon: 17% of respondents 
operating in North America said that they had had 
an M&A deal blocked by authorities in the past five 
years. For western Europe and Asia the corresponding 
proportion was 10%.
Managing political risk
It is unclear whether firms are addressing adequately 
their expectations of increased political risk. Firms 
appear unlikely to seek external help in managing 
their relationships with political actors: 43% of 
respondents said their firms do not have any contact 
with investment promotion agencies (IPAs), and only 
18% suggested that their interactions with IPAs are 
helpful in their investment decisions. At the same 
time, only 20% of respondents suggested that the 
existence of an international investment agreement 
(IIA) between their home country and other markets 
strongly affects their decisions to invest crossborder.  
Internally, within firms, survey responses suggest 
that things are a bit better, although room for 
improvement remains: 32% of respondents said 
that their firms’ internal political risk assessment 
capabilities are “excellent” or “very good”, but 
almost one-quarter said their firms are either weak at 
assessing political risk or that they do not do it at all.  
Of responding firms, 22% generate formal political 
Political risk events
Which of the following has your company experienced? 
% of respondents operating in each region 
 North  Latin  Western  Eastern  Russia/ Middle East &   Sub-Saharan  Asia
 America America Europe Europe CIS North Africa Africa 
Unilateral contract cancellation or   11.5% 13.7% 11.0% 10.3% 13.6% 12.3% 6.6% 14.2%
request for renegotiation by
a government counterparty        
Cancellation of import or export licences 10.2% 6.6% 7.8% 6.4% 8.7% 7.1% 6.6% 6.8%
Payment default by a government buyer 3.8% 11.9% 6.5% 7.8% 8.2% 9.1% 6.6% 9.0%
Inability to convert or transfer currency 6.9% 16.0% 3.2% 10.8% 8.7% 10.0% 9.6% 14.0%
Expropriation of assets 3.6% 8.0% 3.5% 5.0% 8.4% 3.4% 5.6% 5.4%
Blocked M&A deal 16.5% 7.1% 9.9% 5.3% 6.9% 3.4% 2.3% 10.2%
Litigation based on an event of political violence 3.6% 4.3% 2.2% 3.3% 3.3% 5.4% 5.3% 3.8%
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
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risk ratings internally, and about 30% rely on rating 
agencies for help in assessing political risk. However, 
35% said they do not use formal ratings in their 
investment decisions. Only 16% of respondents said 
their firms purchase political risk insurance.
Does all of this matter? A closer look at the survey 
results suggests that it does. We asked respondents to 
rate the financial performance of their firms relative 
to their peers over the past two years, and those 
whose firms outperformed their competitors were 
significantly more likely to rate their firms’ political 
risk assessment capability highly. One-tenth of 
high-performers said their firms were “excellent” at 
assessing political risk, twice the 5% of the remainder 
of our sample who said the same, and 28% rated their 
political risk assessment as “very good”, compared to 
15% of average or low-performing companies. High-
performing companies are also more likely to make 
use of IPAs (20% compared with 15%). 
Perhaps most crucially, these high-performing 
companies—with better political risk assessment 
capabilities—have also experienced fewer cases of 
expropriation, government payment default, import/
export licence cancellation or currency transfer 
restriction than underperforming firms in our sample.  
Foreign direct investment 
and democracy 
The impact of forms of political regime on 
investment, and in particular the relationship 
between FDI and democracy, has been the 
subject of much attention. Traditionally, 
there has been an assumption that most 
foreign investors tend to be indifferent to 
the form of government in host countries, 
as long as the main economic drivers of 
investment are favourable and the overall 
business environment is at least tolerable. 
Indeed, although democracies are associated 
with greater transparency, there was even 
a presumption that many foreign investors 
may even prefer the predictability that 
authoritarian regimes are sometimes 
perceived to confer. However, various 
empirical studies have also revealed a 
significant positive link between FDI flows 
and the existence of political democracy in 
host countries, once other FDI drivers are 
controlled for.
We asked our survey respondents a range 
of questions to ascertain their views on this 
issue. The responses were mixed and, in some 
cases, surprising. The respondents were split 
in their answers to the question of whether a 
country being a democracy had a significant 
impact on their investment decisions in 
emerging markets. Just over half said yes and 
45% said no. With respect to the proposition 
that in emerging markets authoritarian 
regimes may make for a more stable and 
predictable environment for business, 
perhaps surprisingly only 38% disagreed, 
31% neither agreed nor disagreed and almost 
30% agreed. 
It is often said that energy sector firms 
in particular tend to have to operate in 
authoritarian countries, that they are used 
to this and may indeed even prefer such a 
situation. Our survey provides some limited 
support for this proposition. A significantly 
lower share of energy sector firms (44%) 
than the survey average stated that whether 
a country was a democracy was important to 
their investment decisions. A significantly 
higher share than the average (39%) agreed 
with the statement that authoritarian 
regimes in emerging markets make for a more 
stable and predictable environment.
The responses to other questions 
suggested a greater sensitivity to the 
importance of types of political regimes and 
a possible positive link between democracy 
in host countries and MNC operations. A clear 
majority disagreed with the statement that 
“a country’s political system is of marginal 
importance to my company’s investment 
decisions”. Only some 20% agreed with 
the statement that the fact that China is 
an autocracy and India a democracy helps 
explain why China attracts so much more FDI 
than India; the vast majority of respondents 
disagreed.






How would you rate your company’s political risk 
assessment capability?  
(% of respondents)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Low-performers          High-performers
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Bulls and bears 
We found no clear difference in the political risk 
outlook between those firms who plan to invest 
heavily in 2007-11 and those who have more 
moderate investment plans—in line with the overall 
finding of the survey of an apparent disconnect 
between expectations of heightened political risk and 
a general investment bullishness.  
However, respondents whose firms anticipate a 
substantial increase in foreign investment in the 
coming five years exhibited a number of important 
differences in outlook relative to those who expect 
foreign investment to remain unchanged or decrease.  
Aggressive investors are more sanguine about 
macroeconomic risks—just 16% cite macroeconomic 
instability as a likely factor in future global investment 
trends, compared with almost one-third of those who 
are less likely to invest themselves.  
More optimistic investors also appear to view the 
institutional aspects of globalisation differently from 
their more cautious peers. Those with more bullish 
crossborder investment plans—and thus more likely 
to benefit from freer trade and investment patterns—
place a higher value on regional integration and 
multilateralism. Almost one-third of high-investors 
expect regional integration to be a key investment 
driver in 2007-11, whereas only 20% of low-investors 
agree. Equally, when asked whether “multilateral co-
operation on key international problems is essential”, 
56% of high-investors strongly agreed, compared with 
36% of low-investors.  
Those with more modest plans for crossborder 
investment place a heavier emphasis on democracy 
and the quality of governance in their target markets. 
This may indicate that problems in these areas 
are a key deterrent to investment by this group 
of companies—75% of low-investors agreed that 
“whether a country is a democracy has a significant 
impact on our investment decisions in emerging 
markets”, and just 8% disagreed. Fewer than half of 
high-investors agreed, and 20% disagreed.  
These differences in outlook also appear to drive 
different approaches to the investment process. 
One-quarter of high-investors consider IIAs to be 
“very important” to their investment decisions, 
compared with 14% of low-investors, and high-
investors put more stock in political risk assessment 
than their peers. Just over one-tenth consider their 
firms’ political risk assessment capabilities to be 
“excellent”, compared with just 2% of low-investors, 
and 24% call it “very good”, compared with 16% of 
those with cautious investment plans. High-investors 
are also significantly more likely to purchase political 
risk insurance.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
Rising demand in 
emerging markets
The state of the 
US economy
Increased investment 
flows originating from 
emerging market 
countries











In your opinion, which of the following forces will 
have the greatest influence on global foreign direct 
investment over the next five years?  
Select up to four.   
(% of respondents)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
High-investors          Low-investors
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The virtuous circle of globalisation
Firms that exhibited a high degree of 
transnationalisation—those with more than 
25% of revenue or employees outside their home 
markets—were significantly more bullish in their 
investment outlook than firms that are comparatively 
more focused on domestic operations. Of firms 
with more than one-quarter of their employees 
working overseas, 45% expect foreign investment 
to increase substantially in 2007-11, compared with 
34% of those with a greater home-market focus. (As 
mentioned above, more internationalised firms show 
a greater interest in emerging markets as investment 
destinations as well.) This suggests a further 
widening in the future of the gap between the most 
transnationalised MNCs and the rest—rather than a 
narrowing as is sometimes expected.
Crucially, there also appears to be a link 
between the degree of transnationalisation and 
firm performance: those firms in our survey with a 
relatively greater presence in foreign markets were 
more likely to report better than average financial 
performance over the past two years (62% compared 
with 53% for the less internationalised firms). 
Internationalisation and risk perceptions
On most questions, the degree of transnationalisation 
did not appear to account for large or significant 
differences in perceptions of political risk. But 
there were a few exceptions, suggesting that 
the experience, and confidence, gained from 
operating intensively in foreign destinations led 
to a more sanguine view of some types of political 
risk. Thus, perhaps ironically, more intensive 
internationalisation appeared to be associated with 
less fear of some of the consequences of greater 
exposure to globalisation. 
The highly transnationalised firms seemed 
somewhat less sensitive to the threats from 
geopolitical tensions and terrorism—27% of the more 
internationalised firms cited geopolitical tensions as 
a key factor for investment in 2007-11, compared with 
35% of the other firms; the corresponding proportions 
for the risk from terrorism were 10% and 18%, 
respectively. With respect to the risk of terrorism in 
emerging markets, 39% of the more internationalised 
companies saw this as an increasing threat over the 
next five years, compared with 49% for the others.  
a More than 25% of employees working in operations outside 
home market.  Source: Economist Intelligence Unit survey, June 2007.
Rising demand in 
emerging markets
Increased investment 




The threat of terrorism
Investment drivers 2007-11
Which of the following forces will have the greatest 
influence on global foreign direct investment over the 
next five years?  
(% of respondents)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Less transnational
Highly transnationala
a More than 25% of employees working in operations outside 





Outlook for emerging market political risk 2007-11
Which of the following types of political risk is likely to 
be more of an issue over the next five years? 
(% of respondents)
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Less transnational
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Conclusion
Our survey has helped to cast considerable light on 
the questions we posed:
● Political risk and companies’ investment 
location decisions. The main finding of the survey 
was the apparent disconnect between bullish 
sentiment on the investment outlook over the next 
five years, and heightened perceptions of political 
risk, especially in emerging markets. Opportunities 
appear to predominate over political risk concerns, 
even though these are seen as posing a considerably 
greater threat to business over the next five years 
than in the recent past. 
● Geopolitical threats and MNCs. Firms exhibit 
sensitivity to a range of geopolitical risks. The survey 
respondents expressed high rates of agreement with 
statements pointing to disruptions from key sources 
of global risk such as conflict between the West 
and Iran, Islamic radicalism and Russian-Western 
tensions.
● On a protectionist backlash against FDI. A large 
proportion of the sample reported that they had 
experienced blocked M&A deals. There is concern 
that FDI protectionism will increase significantly in 
most emerging-market regions. There is also concern 
about FDI protectionism in the US, although investors 
appear more sanguine about the threat in other 
developed countries. Investors were, however, less 
worried about FDI protectionism than about other 
forms of political risk in emerging markets.
● The sensitivity of firms to the threat of political 
violence. Terrorism did not feature highly on the list 
of factors that will shape future FDI trends. However, 
investors appear very concerned about the risk of 
terrorism, not only in many emerging markets, but 
also in some leading developed states such as the US 
and the UK. 
● FDI, political stability and political 
democratisation. The respondents were split in 
their answers to the question of whether a country’s 
being a democracy had a significant impact on their 
investment decisions in emerging markets. The 
responses to some questions suggested a greater 
sensitivity to the importance of types of political 
regimes and a possible positive link between 
democracy in host countries and MNC operations.
● The management of political risk. Many firms 
are not addressing adequately their expectations 
of increased political risk. Firms that outperformed 
their competitors paid significantly more attention 
to assessing and taking measures to manage 
political risk. Better-performing companies, with 
better political risk assessment capabilities, also 
experienced fewer cases of expropriation, government 
payment default, import/export licence cancellation, 
or currency transfer restriction than other firms in our 
sample.  
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Survey results
Screener question. Does your company invest, or
plan to invest, in markets outside its home country?
(% of respondents)
Note. Results shown here include all respondents who completed the survey





Increase substantially  40
Increase moderately  52
Stay unchanged  6
Decrease moderately  2
Decrease substantially  1
Don’t know 1
How do you expect your company’s investment 
outside its home market to change over the next  










Which forms of investment in developed and 
emerging markets are most important now and in  
five years? 
(% of respondents)
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Greenfield  Mergers and Follow-on investment
investment acquisitions in existing operations
Rising demand in 
emerging markets
The state of the US 
economy
Global outsourcing of 
service functions
Increased investment 





The state of the euro 
area economy












In your opinion, which of the following forces will 
have the greatest influence on global foreign direct 
investment over the next five years?  
Select up to four.   
(% of respondents)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
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(% of respondents)













EU members in east-central Europe
Russia
Other Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Of critical importance Somewhat important Not important Don’t know
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How does your company use investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs)?   
(% of respondents)
We do not have contact 
with IPAs  43 
We contact IPAs, but do 
not ﬁnd them very 
helpful to our business 
and investment 
decisions  18 
We contact IPAs and ﬁnd 
them helpful to our 
business and investment 
decisions  13 
Don’t know  26 
To what extent does the existence of an 
international investment agreement (for example, a 
bilateral investment treaty) influence your 
company’s decision on which markets to invest in?  
(% of respondents)
To a very great extent  19
To a limited extent  48 
Not at all  23
Don’t know  9
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 97
























Not applicable—we do 
not invest in developed 
markets
Don’t know
Which of the following represent the most 
significant constraints on your company’s plans to 
invest in developed markets? Select up to four.   
(% of respondents)






or judicial system 
weaknesses













Lack of access to 
financing
Labour costs
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in emerging 
markets
Don’t know
Which of the following represent the most 
significant constraints on your company’s plans to 
invest in emerging markets?  Select up to four.   
(% of respondents)
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US
Asia









Risk of terrorism in the coming five years   
(% of respondents)
Risk of increased FDI protectionism in the 
coming five years 
(% of respondents)
High               Medium               Low               Don’t knowHigh               Medium               Low               Don’t know
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Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
(% of respondents)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Strongly agree           Agree           Neither agree nor disagree           Disagree           Strongly disagree           Don’t know
A crisis over Iran will 
disrupt the global economy 
during the next five years
Islamic radicalism will pose 
an increasing threat to 
business
Rising Russian-Western 
political tensions will have 
a significant negative 
impact on business
Multilateral co-operation 
on key international 
problems is essential
Asia will experience a 
major political crisis during 
the next five years that will 
disrupt business
Improved US-European 
relations will provide a big 
additional boost to 
transatlantic business ties
Renewed instability in the 
Balkans will dampen the 
FDI recovery in that region
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
(% of respondents)
0 20 40 60 80 100
A high degree of democratic 
development and transparency is 
important for our investment location 
decisions in the developed world
Whether a country is a democracy 
has a significant impact on our 
investment decisions in emerging 
markets
In emerging markets, authoritarian 
regimes make for a more stable and 
predictable environment for business 
operations
A country's political system is of 
marginal importance to my company's 
investment decisions
The fact that China is an autocracy 
and India a democracy helps explain 
why China attracts so much more FDI 
than India
Strongly agree           Agree           Neither agree nor disagree           Disagree           Strongly disagree           Don’t know
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Afghanistan 10.7 11.2 3.8
Albania 0.3 0.5 0.2
Algeria 0.7 0.4 0.2
American Samoa 0.0 0.2 0.0
Angola 0.7 0.5 0.6
Antigua 0.2 0.0 0.0
Argentina 0.5 0.2 0.8
Armenia 0.2 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan 0.9 0.9 0.4
Bahrain 0.0 0.0 0.2
Bangladesh 0.5 0.9 1.2
Barbuda 0.2 0.0 0.0
Belarus 0.3 0.2 1.0
Belgium 0.0 0.2 0.0
Benin 0.0 0.0 0.2
Bhutan 0.3 0.2 0.0
Bolivia 0.3 0.9 1.0
Bonaire 0.0 0.2 0.0
Bosnia & Hercegovina 0.2 0.5 0.4
Botswana 0.0 0.4 0.4
Brazil 0.3 1.4 0.8
Bulgaria 0.0 0.2 0.4
Burkina 0.0 0.0 0.2
Cambodia 0.3 0.2 0.2
Central African Republic 0.3 0.4 0.2
Chad 0.3 0.4 0.2
Chile 0.0 0.2 0.0
China 8.8 6.2 5.4
Colombia 0.3 1.3 0.2
Congo 0.5 0.5 1.8
Cook Islands 0.0 0.0 0.2
Cote d’Ivoire 0.5 0.2 0.6
Cuba 0.3 1.1 0.4
Cyprus 0.2 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.4
Ecuador 0.0 0.7 0.4
Egypt 0.7 0.5 0.4
El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.2
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.2
Eritrea 0.0 0.0 0.2
Ethiopia 0.0 0.4 0.6
Fiji 0.0 0.0 0.4
France 0.2 0.2 0.4
Georgia 0.0 0.0 0.2
Ghana 0.3 0.2 0.0
Gibraltar 0.0 0.0 0.2
Greece 0.2 0.0 0.0
Grenada 0.0 0.2 0.0
Guatemala 0.0 0.2 0.0
Guinea 0.2 0.0 0.0
Guyana 0.2 0.0 0.0
Haiti 0.0 0.7 0.8
Honduras 0.0 0.2 0.0
Hong Kong 0.0 0.4 0.0
India 0.3 0.9 2.4
Indonesia 2.1 2.4 2.0
Iran 7.2 7.2 10.2
Iraq 17.2 9.8 6.6
Israel 1.4 2.0 2.0
Jamaica 0.0 0.2 0.0
Kazakhstan 0.2 0.4 0.6
Kenya 0.0 0.2 0.0
Kyrgyz Republic 0.2 0.0 0.0
Korea (North) 2.1 2.4 5.2
Korea (South) 0.0 0.4 0.2
Kuwait 0.0 0.2 0.0
Laos 0.3 0.0 0.2
Lebanon 0.5 1.1 1.6
Liberia 0.3 0.0 0.2
Libya 0.0 0.4 0.2
Malaysia 0.2 0.4 0.4
Mexico 0.2 0.2 0.6
Moldova 0.0 0.0 0.2
Mozambique 0.2 0.0 0.0
Myanmar 1.0 0.5 0.4
Nauru 0.0 0.0 0.2
Nepal 0.0 0.0 0.6
Nicaragua 0.2 0.0 0.0
Nigeria 2.4 3.1 2.8
Oman 0.2 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 3.3 4.2 3.6
Panama 0.2 0.0 0.0
Papua New Guinea 0.0 0.4 0.0
Peru 0.0 0.2 0.0
Philippines 0.3 0.4 0.8
Poland 0.0 0.2 0.0
Puerto Rico 0.0 0.2 0.0
Russia 12.6 8.0 6.8
Rwanda 0.0 0.4 0.8
Saudi Arabia 1.0 2.4 2.0
Sierra Leone 0.2 0.0 0.2
Somalia 0.7 0.5 1.0
South Africa 0.0 0.4 0.4
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.2
Sri Lanka 0.2 0.0 1.0
Sudan 0.7 1.3 1.6
Syria 0.2 0.4 1.6
Taiwan 0.5 0.7 1.2
Tajikistan 0.0 0.0 0.4
Thailand 1.9 2.2 1.6
Togo 0.0 0.0 0.2
Turkey 0.0 0.7 1.4
Turkmenistan 0.0 0.0 0.4
Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.2
Ukraine 1.0 2.0 1.2
United Arab Emirates 0.0 0.2 0.4
United Kingdom 0.0 0.0 0.2
United States of America 1.7 0.7 1.2
Uruguay 0.0 0.0 0.2
Uzbekistan 0.0 0.2 0.2
Venezuela 5.3 6.0 5.2
Vietnam 0.2 0.2 0.2
Virgin Islands (UK) 0.0 0.0 0.2
Yemen 0.0 0.2 0.0
Yugoslavia 0.2 0.2 0.2
Zaire 0.2 0.4 0.0
Zambia 0.0 0.2 0.2
Zimbabwe 3.6 3.1 3.0
In your opinion, which countries have the highest political risk? Name up to three countries.
(% respondents)
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3  Country 1 Country 2 Country 3  Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
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Is the attitude of officials your company deals with in the following emerging and developed markets more or 
less receptive to foreign investment than five years ago?     
(% of respondents)













EU members in 
east-central Europe
Russia
Other eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
0 20 40 60 80 100
Developed markets
Risk of political 
violence






Risk of political 
violence





Thinking about your company’s plans to invest in 
both developed and emerging markets, are the 
following types of political risk likely to be more of 
an issue over the next ﬁve years compared with the 
previous ﬁve years?
(% of respondents)
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
More of  About the Less of an Don’t know/
an issue   same  issue  Not applicable
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we do not 
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Blocked M&A deal
Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Payment default by a 
government buyer
Expropriation of assets
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in North America in the past five years?   
(% of respondents)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty




Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in Latin America in the past five years?     
(% of respondents)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 




Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Payment default by a 
government buyer
Expropriation of assets
Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in western Europe in the past five 
years?      
(% of respondents)
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Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Payment default by a 
government buyer




Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in eastern Europe in the past five years?  
(% of respondents)
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cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Expropriation of assets
Payment default by a 
government buyer
Blocked M&A deal
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in Russia/CIS in the past five years?   
(% of respondents)
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Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Inability to convert or 
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Payment default by a 
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Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Litigation based on an 




Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in the Middle East & North Africa in the 
past five years?    
(% of respondents)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Payment default by a 
government buyer
Expropriation of assets
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Blocked M&A deal
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past five 
years?    
(% of respondents)
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Unilateral contract 
cancellation or request 
for renegotiation by a 
government 
counterparty
Inability to convert or 
transfer currency
Blocked M&A deal
Payment default by a 
government buyer
Cancellation of import 
or export licences
Expropriation of assets
Litigation based on an 
event of political 
violence
Not applicable—we do 
not invest in this 
market
Don’t know
Which of the following has your company 
experienced in Asia in the past five years?    
(% of respondents)












Does your company use formal ratings for political 
risk?  
(% of respondents)
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Yes  16
No  60
Don’t know  24
Does your company purchase political risk 








How would you rate your company’s political risk 
assessment capability?  
(% of respondents)
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Middle East & 
North Africa
EU members in east-
central Europe
Other Latin America 
and Caribbean
Russia






If your company has political risk insurance, in 
which regions are your operations covered?     
(% of respondents)









In which region are you personally located?  
(% of respondents)












Entertainment, media  
and publishing









What is your primary industry?   
(% of respondents)




Don’t know  2
How would you assess your company’s financial 
performance relative to its peers over the past two 
years?   
(% of respondents)
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More than 75%  15
Don’t know  4
Roughly what percentage of your company’s workers 
and revenue are accounted for by operations or 







More than 75%  10













Which of the following best describes your title?    
(% of respondents)
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United States of America
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82) 
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.64 8.65 4 7
Political environment 7.9 7.9 18 17
 Political stability 7.4 7.4 32 33
 Political effectiveness 8.4 8.4 10 10
Macroeconomic environment 7.8 7.5 33 44
Market opportunities 8.2 8.3 3 3
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 9.5 9.5 1 1
Policy towards foreign investment 8.7 8.7 10 12
Foreign trade & exchange controls 10.0 9.6 1 3
Taxes 7.0 7.2 19 21
Financing 9.6 9.6 6 8
Labour market 8.3 8.8 1 1
Infrastructure 9.4 9.4 3 3
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 293.7 296.4 299.4 302.1 304.8 307.6 310.3 313.1
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 11,734.3 12,487.2 13,272.1 14,019.5 14,909.4 15,812.8 16,739.2 16,739.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 11,712.5 12,455.8 13,246.6 13,832.8 14,574.8 15,373.7 16,204.4 17,067.0
GDP (% real change) 3.9 3.2 3.3 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 122.4 99.4 183.6 237.7 235.0 252.0 260.0 270.0
 % of GDP 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
 % of gross fixed investment 6.7 4.9 8.5 11.1 10.4 10.5 10.1 9.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 1,727.1 1,874.3 2,057.9 2,295.6 2,530.6 2,782.6 3,042.6 3,312.6
 % of GDP 14.7 15.0 15.5 16.4 17.0 17.6 18.2 19.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 222.4 -12.7 248.9 225.0 220.0 239.0 245.0 265.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 2,399.2 2,453.9 2,702.8 2,927.8 3,147.8 3,386.8 3,631.8 3,896.8
 % of GDP 20.4 19.7 20.4 20.9 21.1 21.4 21.7 23.3
Key issues
The US remains one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in the 
developed world. Investors are drawn to its wealth of market opportunities 
and its investor-friendly entrepreneurial culture, trading environment and 
infrastructure. These strengths underpin a bullish forecast for FDI, even for 
2007, a year in which the economy will register the weakest GDP growth since 
2002. Strong global economic growth and buoyant profits have left many 
firms globally in a good position to seek acquisitions, and the depreciation 
of the US dollar has made prices of US firms particularly attractive. However, 
the current spending spree is clearly fuelled in part by excess global liquidity, 
often channelled through private equity funds, and a tightening of financial 
conditions may lead to substantial correction. Another concern is rising 
protectionist sentiment in Congress, which has amended legislation dealing 
with checks on foreign investment inflows. This threatens to lengthen the 
time it takes to win approval for proposed mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in 
sensitive sectors. Political opposition by some to foreign involvement in so-
called strategic sectors, such as energy and infrastructure, has already derailed 
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Foreign direct investment 
in the United States of America
Stocks and flows
In absolute terms, the US is the largest 
host of FDI in the world. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit estimates that the 
book value of the stock of FDI in the US 
reached US$2.1trn by the end of 2006, or 
more than one-third of the stock of FDI 
hosted by the G7 group of industrialised 
countries. However, this was equivalent 
to only around 16% of GDP, compared 
with an average of 25% of GDP in the 
other G7 countries. FDI inflows surged 
at the end of the 1990s and in 2000, but 
then slumped to a low of US$53bn in 
2003. Since then inflows have picked up 
and according to national figures (which 
can differ from international statistics 
used for our series) reached US$183.6bn 
(equivalent to 1.4% of GDP) in 2006. 
Foreign memories of the US recession 
of 2001 and the scandals relating to US 
corporate accounting have faded, and 
the weakening of the US dollar makes 
US dollar assets cheaper to foreign 
investors. FDI inflows amounted to 
about 8.5% of total fixed investment in 
2006. Although annual fluctuations have 
been large, acquisition of equity capital 
has been by far the most important 
component of inward FDI flows in recent 
years. Over one-half of the acquisitions 
are made by foreign-owned firms already 
operating in the US, rather than new 
entrants to the US market.
Origin and distribution
The most important single owner 
of FDI in the US is the UK, which in 
2005 accounted for about 17% of the 
US inward direct investment stock 
(measured at historic cost). The next 
most significant investor, Japan, owns 
12%, with Germany owning 11% and the 
Netherlands owning 10%. As a region, 
Europe is by far the largest investor in 
the US, accounting for about 70% of 
the entire stock of FDI. FDI inflows from 
Europe have fluctuated considerably, 
reaching a recent low point of 43% of 
total inflows in 2003, when European 
companies were financially stretched by 
the impact of the economic downturn, 
but they recovered to 66% in 2005. 
Manufacturing accounted for 33% of 
the stock of inward FDI in 2005. Among 
manufacturing industries, chemicals 
(9% of the total FDI stock) and transport 
(mainly cars, 5% of the total) are the 
most important. Banks and other 
financial institutions account for 21% 
of the total. All petroleum-related 
industries (including extraction, related 
services, refining, transport and re-
selling) account for 8%. 
Determinants
Unsurprisingly, the key attraction to 
investing in the US is the size of the 
market. With GDP valued at US$13.3trn 
in 2006, the US economy at current 
exchange rates was approximately 
three times the size of Japan’s and 
one-quarter larger than that of the 
euro zone. The US also has an excellent 
business environment, with a liberal 
policy towards private enterprise, a well-
functioning labour market, deep capital 
markets and good infrastructure. The 
country is particularly attractive for high 
value-added industries and functions 
in which a highly qualified workforce is 
particularly important. At the federal 
level, little is done to encourage foreign 
investment, but many states and local 
governments offer tax breaks or grants.
Impact
Inward direct investment to the US 
economy is not that important as a 
source of new fixed investment, since 
almost all of the inflow of FDI in recent 
years has been associated with merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity rather 
than direct increases in the US capital 
stock. Indeed, the drop-off in FDI 
inflows seen in 2001-03 was almost 
entirely attributable to the slump in 
global M&A activity. Although inflows 
related to M&As may boost productivity, 
the effect, at least in the short term, is 
much less visible than that of greenfield 
investments. In so far as knowledge 
transfer plays a role in the FDI activity, it 
is often the foreign acquirer that does the 
learning, not the US target. 
Potential
The stock of FDI in the US is relatively 
low, which suggests that there is 
potential for continued substantial 
inflows. In addition to the appeal of the 
vast size of the domestic market and the 
business-friendly policy environment, 
the US remains the unquestioned global 
technology leader. Foreign companies 
increasingly view having operations 
in the US as a way of gaining access to 
cutting-edge technology. Consequently, 
we believe that FDI inflows will remain 
strong, although a cooling of the current 
boom in leveraged buyouts may lead to a 
temporary stagnation or even decline. 
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Canada
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82) 
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.63 8.70 5 5
Political environment 8.4 8.4 13 13
 Political stability 8.9 8.9 13 13
 Political effectiveness 8.1 8.1 13 13
Macroeconomic environment 8.9 8.9 6 8
Market opportunities 7.8 8.0 6 4
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.8 9.0 6 4
Policy towards foreign investment 8.7 8.7 10 12
Foreign trade & exchange controls 10.0 10.0 1 1
Taxes 7.2 7.2 16 21
Financing 9.6 9.6 6 8
Labour market 7.6 7.8 9 6
Infrastructure 9.3 9.3 6 9
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 32.0 32.3 32.6 32.9 33.2 33.5 33.8 34.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 992.1 1,131.8 1,268.8 1,351.0 1,341.7 1,349.4 1,399.9 1,465.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,036.8 1,098.9 1,170.2 1,229.8 1,281.0 1,353.0 1,426.1 1,499.1
GDP (% real change) 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) -0.4 28.9 69.0 84.8 59.1 56.0 57.0 59.0
 % of GDP 0.0 2.6 5.4 6.3 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0
 % of gross fixed investment -0.2 12.3 25.3 29.1 19.8 18.3 17.6 17.1
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 318.6 350.0 385.2 470.0 529.1 585.1 642.1 701.1
 % of GDP 32.1 30.9 30.4 34.8 39.4 43.4 45.9 47.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 43.7 33.5 45.2 51.0 48.0 43.0 45.0 47.5
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 369.8 392.7 449.0 500.0 548.0 591.0 636.0 683.5
 % of GDP 37.3 34.7 35.4 37.0 40.8 43.8 45.4 46.6
Key issues
Canada has one of the healthiest economies of the main industrialised 
countries. It runs surpluses on both the federal budget and the current 
account, and its strong growth performance and high living standards provide 
ample opportunities for foreign investors. The country’s comparatively small 
population and consumer base will always place it at a disadvantage in a direct 
comparison with the US, but heavy public investment in infrastructure and the 
country’s wealth in natural resources, allied to productivity-enhancing private 
investment, should prevent any further rise in the income gap between the two 
countries. The strong macroeconomic environment will allow governments, 
current and future, to continue the ongoing reduction in the tax burden while 
also implementing new spending measures to improve Canada’s already good 
infrastructure. Investment in security is critical to meet US requirements and 
thereby keep trade flowing across the US border. A shift to tighter US border 
controls would threaten to curb crossborder commerce, reducing Canada’s 
attractiveness. Meanwhile, the risks posed by the separatist movement 
in Quebec are much less prominent than in the recent past, but cannot be 
dismissed altogether.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Canada
Stocks and flows
FDI plays a major role in the Canadian 
economy. The stock of inward FDI totalled 
an estimated US$350bn at the end of 
2005 (on a historic-cost book-value 
basis), equivalent to 31% of GDP. This 
compares with 38% of GDP for the UK, 
24% for Germany and 15% for the US. 
FDI inflows into Canada fell sharply in 
2001-04 after peaking at US$67bn in 
2000. The bursting of the technology 
bubble, the economic downturn in the US 
and the absence of foreign acquisitions 
of large Canadian companies reduced 
FDI inflows into Canada to an average 
of just US$15bn in 2001-04. FDI inflows 
recovered strongly in 2005, to US$29bn, 
and surged to almost US$70bn in 2006 
on the back of a boom in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As).
Origin and distribution
The US accounts for the main share of 
FDI inflows into Canada, owning nearly 
two-thirds of the inward FDI stock 
in 2005 on a current-cost basis. The 
EU is the only other important direct 
investor, owning around one-quarter 
of the FDI stock, with the UK the largest 
single EU source, accounting for around 
7%. Japan is relatively unimportant, 
accounting for less than 3% of the 
inward stock. There are high levels of 
foreign ownership in many sectors of 
the Canadian economy, particularly 
in natural resources, manufacturing 
and financial services. Finance and 
insurance and energy each account for 
about one-fifth of the FDI stock. Other 
important sectors include machinery 
and transport equipment (dominated 
by US car manufacturers), services and 
retailing, and wood and paper.
Determinants
Physical proximity has been a key driving 
force behind US foreign investment 
in Canada and has encouraged the 
integration of the two economies. 
Canada’s attraction as a destination for 
US investment was enhanced when the 
Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) between the 
two countries came into effect in 1989. 
Under the FTA, almost all tariffs on trade 
in goods have been abolished, and many 
US companies have restructured their 
operations to treat the US and Canada 
as a single market. Large FDI projects 
in Canada (the approval threshold 
is lower for certain sectors, such as 
finance, transportation and culture) 
have to be approved by a federal agency, 
Investment Canada, but few are rejected. 
Under the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which superseded 
the FTA in 1994, less restrictive 
conditions exist for investments by US 
and Mexican companies, and these will 
gradually be extended to firms from other 
countries that belong to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Canada is pursuing 
separate free-trade agreements with 
other countries and regions. Canada has 
an attractive business environment for 
foreign investors and scores highly in all 
categories of the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s business environment rankings. 
Canada’s ranks for foreign trade and 
exchange controls, infrastructure, 
market opportunities and policy towards 
private enterprise and competition are 
particularly high. 
Impact
FDI inflows into Canada accounted for 
25% of total gross fixed capital formation 
in 2006. This was a marked increase on 
recent years, but still well down on the 
high of 48.1% in 2000. FDI inflows have 
been a catalyst for improving efficiency, 
raising productivity and promoting 
diversification of the Canadian economy. 
They have also helped to generate 
enormous trade flows between the US 
and Canada, creating new jobs and 
raising living standards.
Potential
Although the stock of inward FDI as a 
percentage of GDP in Canada is fairly 
high in comparison with other developed 
countries, there is still considerable 
potential for large-scale inflows in 
the medium term, and FDI inflows are 
expected to remain high. Nevertheless, 
the surge in 2006 and 2007 will not 
be sustained as financing conditions 
for acquisitions deteriorate globally. 
Governments, past and present, have 
been reducing some of the remaining 
barriers to FDI, while also introducing 
measures to promote inward investment, 
including low-cost financing and 
reductions in business taxes. However, a 
liberalisation of foreign ownership curbs 
in telecommunications and broadcasting 
will continue to be obstructed by strong 
opposition from the left. High oil prices 
will underpin strong investment inflows 
into exploration and extraction activities 
in Alberta’s oilsands.
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Belgium
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82) 
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.07 8.30 14 15
Political environment 8.3 8.1 15 15
 Political stability 8.9 8.9 13 13
 Political effectiveness 7.8 7.4 17 20
Macroeconomic environment 8.3 8.3 20 19
Market opportunities 6.3 7.0 37 20
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.5 9.0 10 4
Policy towards foreign investment 9.1 9.1 6 8
Foreign trade & exchange controls 9.6 9.6 3 3
Taxes 5.6 5.8 41 60
Financing 9.3 10.0 11 1
Labour market 6.8 6.7 27 41
Infrastructure 9.0 9.4 10 3
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 359.3 372.6 394.5 442.4 461.5 446.3 437.2 439.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 328.0 342.0 354.8 365.4 375.1 393.1 410.6 428.1
GDP (% real change) 2.8 1.4 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 44.4 32.0 72.5 71.0 68.0 71.0 73.0 75.0
 % of GDP 12.4 8.6 18.4 16.0 14.7 15.9 16.7 17.0
 % of gross fixed investment 63.5 43.3 90.1 76.0 67.6 72.0 74.0 74.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 471.1 474.7 547.2 618.2 686.2 757.2 830.2 905.2
 % of GDP 131.1 127.4 138.7 139.7 148.7 169.7 189.9 205.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 34.7 30.1 63.2 70.9 71.3 80.0 78.8 84.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 369.2 374.6 437.7 508.6 579.9 659.9 738.8 823.1
 % of GDP 102.8 100.5 111.0 115.0 125.7 147.9 169.0 187.1
Key issues
Belgium is an attractive business location overall, with an open economy, a relatively 
benign environment for free enterprise, and a generally reliable transport and 
communications infrastructure. Set against this, Belgium is saddled with a high ratio 
of public debt to GDP (although this has been declining in recent years), an onerous 
tax burden and an excessively regulated labour market. The general government 
budget has been kept in balance in recent years and should remain at or close to 
balance, but the need for fiscal stringency will make it hard to reduce the tax wedge 
(the difference between labour costs and take-home pay), which remains one of the 
highest in the world. Fiscal stringency will become more difficult as the devolution of 
power to the regions reduces the effectiveness of spending controls. The corporate 
tax rate in Belgium is high, although it is mitigated by tax deductions on notional 
interest when firms invest from own resources, and a “ruling” system to allow long-
term tax planning. Port and road infrastructure in Belgium is good, and the rail 
infrastructure is being improved by a €13bn (US$16.6bn) investment programme. 
However, congestion will remain a concern.
Business environment scores, 2007-11
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Foreign direct investment 
in Belgium
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows into Belgium have recovered 
since bottoming out at US$18.1bn in 
2002. Annual FDI inflows have been 
consistently strong in 2004-06, reaching 
US$73bn in 2006. The stock of inward 
FDI is estimated by the IMF to have 
increased from US$471bn at end-2004 to 
US$474.7bn at end-2005. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit estimates that the 
stock of inward FDI reached US$547bn at 
end-2006 (139% of GDP). However, FDI 
statistics for Belgium tend to be inflated 
because they include the large number 
of corporate “co-ordination centres” in 
Belgium, which are often intermediaries 
for FDI in other countries. This caveat 
notwithstanding, Belgium is a significant 
host of FDI, ranking fourth in Europe 
for the number of projects in 2005, 
according to a study by accountancy firm 
Ernst & Young.
Origin and distribution
The main foreign investors into Belgium 
have historically been the US, France 
and the Netherlands. According to the 
Ernst & Young study, the US accounted 
for 35% of the number of investment 
projects in 2005. It continues to be 
the main investor in Flanders, which 
attracts the largest share of FDI in 
Belgium. Both Flanders and Wallonia 
are increasingly successful in attracting 
warehousing and distribution centres 
for a significant part of Europe. FDI in 
Belgium as a whole is concentrated 
mainly in the real estate and general 
business services (excluding financial 
services), which comprised 22.2% of 
incoming FDI in 2005. In manufacturing, 
Belgium receives FDI inflows to its 
automotive industry from long-standing 
investors such as Ford, General Motors 
(both US), Volkswagen (Germany) and 
Volvo (Sweden). Greenfield investments 
are largely concentrated in the general 
chemicals (particularly plastic and 
rubber), pharmaceuticals and life 
sciences sectors. The major electricity 
companies, Electrabel and SPE, are now 
foreign-owned, so much new investment 
is coming from the parent companies, 
currently based in France. 
Determinants
Belgium’s central geographical position 
in the EU, strong infrastructure and 
access to ports, close links with its 
immediate neighbours, and multilingual 
and highly productive labour force all 
contribute to the country’s high stock of 
FDI. The EU provides some incentives for 
companies in less-advantaged regions 
(namely, Wallonia) and for sectors that 
are in industrial decline or suffering 
from high unemployment (specifically 
high-technology sectors). Previously, 
Belgium attracted FDI because of its 
attractive tax regime for company co-
ordination centres, but these were 
removed after being declared unfair 
competition by the EU and the OECD. The 
government hopes that new favourable 
provisions for the investment of own 
capital, which came into effect in 2005, 
will continue to attract co-ordination 
centres, but the new provisions must be 
put in the context of the still-high rate of 
corporation tax. One deterrent to FDI in 
Belgium is its poor ranking for research 
and development (R&D), spending on 
which has declined as a share of GDP in 
recent years. However, Belgium has some 
strong research initiatives, such as the 
Inter-University Micro-Electronics Centre 
(IMEC) in Leuven and the headquarters of 
GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals in Rixensart. 
Another deterrent to FDI in Belgium is 
its high labour costs, although discounts 
on the generally high level of social 
insurance contributions are provided 
for certain groups, including younger 
workers, older workers and researchers.
Impact
Belgium has long benefited from the 
presence of foreign-controlled companies, 
as they make a significant positive 
contribution to the spread of technology, 
employment and exports. Most recent 
investments have been acquisitions of 
existing companies, including financial 
services companies. The resultant highly 
internationalised financial sector ensures 
that financing conditions are competitive 
and of a high standard.
Potential
A stable macroeconomic environment 
and a central location, which offers easy 
access to the UK, French, Dutch and 
German markets, will remain important 
points of attraction for inward FDI flows. 
Flanders has acquired a reputation as a 
centre for a range of high-technology 
activities and Brussels is well situated 
and serviced to manage EU-wide 
operations. Wallonia, which is trying 
to enhance its status and its marketing 
efforts and wants to build special centres 
of excellence, has the highest growth 
potential of the three regions. 
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France
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82) 
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.87 8.12 18 18
Political environment 8.1 7.9 16 17
 Political stability 8.1 7.8 19 27
 Political effectiveness 8.1 8.1 13 13
Macroeconomic environment 8.0 8.0 25 25
Market opportunities 7.5 8.0 12 5
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.0 8.0 17 21
Policy towards foreign investment 8.2 8.2 17 20
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.2 8.7 28 24
Taxes 5.1 6.0 63 54
Financing 9.6 9.6 6 8
Labour market 6.9 7.4 26 18
Infrastructure 9.2 9.4 8 3
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 60.4 60.6 60.9 61.1 61.4 61.6 61.9 62.1
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 2,061.2 2,137.4 2,252.0 2,540.1 2,693.6 2,667.5 2,699.5 2,780.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,813.8 1,902.2 1,995.0 2,074.6 2,162.4 2,267.2 2,373.8 2,488.1
GDP (% real change) 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 38.7 70.7 86.9 84.4 71.1 72.6 79.8 83.1
 % of GDP 1.9 3.3 3.9 3.3 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.0
 % of gross fixed investment 9.7 16.7 18.9 16.1 12.8 13.3 14.5 14.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 641.8 627.9 783.0 867.5 938.5 1,011.2 1,091.0 1,174.1
 % of GDP 31.1 29.4 34.8 34.2 34.8 37.9 40.4 42.2
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 76.7 133.6 136.3 135.5 92.1 91.3 94.8 102.8
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 845.5 882.3 1,075.9 1,211.4 1,303.6 1,394.9 1,489.7 1,592.4
 % of GDP 41.0 41.3 47.8 47.7 48.4 52.3 55.2 57.3
Key issues
France’s business environment benefits from outstanding infrastructure, a 
highly productive labour force and a central geographical position in western 
Europe. However, the country’s attractiveness as a business location is vitiated 
by a high tax burden, an onerous regulatory environment and by capricious state 
intervention in product markets. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as president in 
May 2007 has improved the chances of structural reforms, but these are likely to 
be less far-reaching than many observers assume. The government’s priority will 
be to push through reforms designed to reduce the country’s high unemployment 
rate. This will entail cutting direct taxes and relaxing France’s restrictive labour 
laws. However, the government’s room for manoeuvre will be limited by the 
weakness of the public finances and by possible resistance to change from labour 
market insiders. In addition, the government will continue to interfere in product 
markets—notably by promoting “national champions” and obstructing foreign 
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Foreign direct investment 
in France
Stocks and flows
Although they dipped in 2004, FDI 
inflows into France held up well during 
the global downturn in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity in 2001-03. 
Since 2005, FDI inflows have surged on 
the back of a strong recovery in global 
M&A activity. In 2006 FDI inflows into 
France totalled US$86.9bn—a record 
both in absolute terms and as a share 
of GDP. With 582 new projects in 2006, 
France was traditionally highly placed 
in terms of the number of FDI projects, 
second only to the UK in Europe. Sizeable 
cumulative FDI flows over the past decade 
have pushed up France’s stock of inward 
FDI (measured at book value) from 12% 
of GDP in 1995 to 35% in 2006. France’s 
ratio of FDI stock to GDP remains slightly 
below the EU average. This reflects the 
low base from which France started in the 
early 1990s, when governments’ embrace 
of foreign investment was lukewarm, as 
well as a history of obstruction to foreign 
takeovers of leading domestic firms.
Origin and distribution
Most FDI into France originates from 
other EU countries, although there 
has been a sharp rise in the number 
of investment projects from the US 
since 1997. As in other EU countries, 
investment from Asia still accounts for 
only a small share of the total. Firms 
from the US, the UK, the Netherlands and 
Germany account for the largest share of 
the inward FDI stock in France. Although 
most investment projects still originate 
from other EU countries, US firms created 
more jobs (8,756) in France in 2005 than 
the next two largest investing countries, 
Germany (6,055) and the UK (2,598), 
combined. The sectoral composition of 
FDI into France has changed markedly 
over the past decade, with the share of 
services in the inward FDI stock rising 
from 46% in 1991 to over 70% at present. 
FDI in the industrial sector is now 
concentrated in high-skill sectors such 
as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and 
aerospace equipment.
Determinants
Despite a high tax burden, a long 
tradition of state interventionism and 
an excessively regulated labour market, 
France has many attractions as an 
investment location. These include the 
country’s central geographical location 
in the EU, one of the world’s most 
highly educated and productive labour 
forces, the quality of its research and 
development (R&D) and its outstanding 
transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure. France has a number of 
important clusters in sectors such as 
healthcare, biotechnology, software, 
electrical engineering, and commercial 
and financial services, which act as 
magnets for FDI.
Impact
Foreign companies with presences in 
France employ some 2.3m workers. 
However, the pattern of inward 
investment is geographically uneven, 
with four regions—Ile de France, 
Rhône-Alpes, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and Midi-
Pyrénées—capturing the bulk of inward 
investment projects, and other parts 
of the country, particularly the north-
west, attracting little. The impact of FDI 
on employment, working practices and 
productivity has been equally uneven. In 
2005 just three regions—Ile de France, 
Rhône-Alpes and Nord-Pas-de-Calais—
accounted for over 50% of all the jobs 
created or saved by new FDI projects.
Potential
France’s exaggerated concern about 
délocalisation—the belief that firms 
are set to migrate en masse to new EU 
member states and emerging economies 
outside the EU to take advantage of 
their lower labour costs and taxes—is 
misplaced. France retains many 
advantages that will help it to remain 
one of the main destinations for FDI in 
the EU. However, despite a number of 
important microeconomic reforms in the 
pipeline, some of France’s long-standing 
weaknesses are likely to persist. The 
tax burden will remain high; the labour 
market will continue to be burdened by 
excessive regulation; competition policy 
will be unevenly enforced; and corporate 
consolidation will remain susceptible 
to capricious intervention by the state, 
which will continue to promote “national 
champions” and discourage foreign 
takeovers of leading domestic firms.
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Germany
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.97 8.46 16 13
Political environment 8.8 8.8 9 10
 Political stability 9.3 9.3 10 9
 Political effectiveness 8.4 8.4 10 10
Macroeconomic environment 8.0 8.9 25 8
Market opportunities 7.2 8.0 15 5
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.5 8.5 10 14
Policy towards foreign investment 8.7 8.7 10 12
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.6 15 3
Taxes 5.1 6.2 60 48
Financing 8.9 9.3 14 14
Labour market 6.9 7.3 24 22
Infrastructure 9.0 9.4 10 3
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 82.5 82.5 82.6 82.6 82.7 82.8 83.0 82.9
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 2,744.2 2,791.7 2,899.5 3,235.4 3,398.4 3,296.9 3,244.4 3,294.6
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 2,368.2 2,454.5 2,469.6 2,519.8 2,604.0 2,734.4 2,858.6 2,980.7
GDP (% real change) 1.3 0.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) -8.9 35.3 43.4 60.4 62.2 65.2 69.7 72.5
 % of GDP -0.3 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2
 % of gross fixed investment -1.9 7.3 8.4 10.2 9.8 10.3 10.8 10.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 709.4 660.4 761.1 821.5 883.7 948.9 1,018.7 1,091.2
 % of GDP 25.9 23.7 26.2 25.4 26.0 28.8 31.4 33.1
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 14.1 56.9 79.0 83.8 85.0 89.0 95.6 96.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 810.6 801.4 940.4 1,024.1 1,109.1 1,198.1 1,293.7 1,389.7
 % of GDP 29.5 28.7 32.4 31.7 32.6 36.3 39.9 42.2
Key issues
Germany’s rate of GDP growth over the past decade has been one of the lowest 
in the developed world, a reflection of structural problems and of a protracted 
adjustment after excessive wage growth and a construction overhang following 
reunification. A period of sustained low wage growth has restored German firms’ 
trade competitiveness, and strong export growth has started to feed through to 
domestic demand. Since late 2005 GDP growth has been robust, but structural 
problems remain a concern and the “grand coalition” government is making only 
moderate progress. Reforms are being driven by fears that domestic firms will 
shift their production to eastern Europe and other emerging markets, where the 
tax burden and labour costs are lower than in Germany. A reduction in the overall 
corporate tax rate (including local trading taxes) from around 39% to below 30% 
will take effect from the start of 2008. After significant reforms of unemployment 
benefits in 2002 and 2003, some moderate further improvements are likely. 
Transport, pensions and healthcare financing are all likely to remain firmly on the 
policy agenda.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Germany
Stocks and flows
Relative to GDP, FDI into Germany has 
been lower than in most other large 
economies in western Europe. During the 
late 1990s Germany participated in the 
global boom in merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity, with FDI inflows shooting 
up to US$210bn in 2000. However, the 
scale of the inflows in 2000 reflected 
the hostile takeover of a German mobile 
telephone company, Mannesmann, 
by Vodafone of the UK—the world’s 
largest ever crossborder acquisition. 
FDI inflows subsequently fell back as 
the global M&A boom came to an end. 
In 2004 FDI inflows turned negative, 
reflecting substantial disinvestments 
by foreign investors in reaction to 
changes in the tax code mainly affecting 
holding companies. However, FDI inflows 
have since recovered, in parallel with 
the broader recovery in international 
flows. The Economist Intelligence Unit 
estimates that the stock of inward FDI 
reached US$761bn at the end of 2006, 
or 26.2% of GDP. Outflows of FDI usually 
exceed inflows. As a result, the stock of 
outward investment, at 32.4% of GDP in 
2006, exceeds the inward stock.
Origin and distribution
As is the case in other developed 
countries, the FDI stock in Germany 
is increasingly dominated by services 
providers rather than manufacturers, 
although the latter remain important. 
Most of Germany’s inward FDI stock 
originates from other EU countries—
although this sometimes includes 
investments from outside the EU that are 
transferred through countries such as 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the 
largest and fifth-largest foreign direct 
investors in Germany, respectively). The 
most important investor from outside the 
EU is the US. Most outward investment 
is to other west European countries, 
but outflows to the lower-cost, former 
communist countries to the east are 
also significant, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector.
Determinants
German labour costs are among the 
highest in the world, despite a period 
of low wage growth in recent years, 
so that Germany cannot compete 
for investment in labour-intensive 
production. Rigid labour laws have 
also deterred foreign investors. The tax 
environment also remains a downside, 
although an improvement is expected 
in 2008. Foreign investors, including a 
rising number of private equity firms, are 
attracted by the large number of highly 
sophisticated mid-sized companies 
specialising in profitable niche markets. 
Additional strengths are the country’s 
good infrastructure, relatively strong 
innovation activity and highly skilled 
labour force. 
Impact
Foreign-owned companies employed 
2.2m people in Germany in 2004. 
Most FDI inflows takes the form of 
acquisitions (initially often associated 
with a payroll reduction) rather than 
greenfield investments, so that the 
immediate impact on employment is 
not clear (and in some cases has been 
negative initially). Nevertheless, FDI into 
Germany has often helped to prevent 
company closures. Since FDI inflows 
are often motivated by attempts to 
benefit from superior technology and 
skills in Germany, the positive effect on 
human capital and innovation is limited. 
However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that FDI inflows have led to an 
improvement in management practices. 
Potential
Germany’s generally highly skilled 
workforce and excellent infrastructure 
make it a good location for specialised 
manufacturing. More generally, the 
structure of German industry is still 
relatively fragmented, providing 
foreign investors with the opportunity 
to participate in sectoral consolidation 
and to reap economies of scale through 
acquisitions. The still low level of real 
estate prices by west European standards 
may also attract investors in this 
sector. The generational changeover at 
the helm of many small and medium-
sized companies provides increased 
opportunities for foreign investors. 
Annual average FDI inflows in 2007-11 
are forecast to average about 2% of GDP, 
which will be considerably higher than 
the historical average.
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Italy
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.48 7.02 42 40
Political environment 6.7 6.9 33 33
 Political stability 8.9 8.9 13 13
 Political effectiveness 4.9 5.2 45 46
Macroeconomic environment 6.9 7.2 56 54
Market opportunities 5.6 7.0 53 19
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.3 6.8 33 37
Policy towards foreign investment 6.9 7.3 41 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.8 8.7 32 24
Taxes 4.1 4.1 78 82
Financing 7.8 8.5 20 24
Labour market 5.5 6.1 65 59
Infrastructure 7.3 7.8 25 29
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 1,726.8 1,773.2 1,854.3 2,109.7 2,222.2 2,182.8 2,192.3 2,239.0
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,632.1 1,674.6 1,755.9 1,843.8 1,909.0 1,990.8 2,077.5 2,164.0
GDP (% real change) 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 16.8 19.6 39.0 38.8 40.7 42.8 42.8 42.8
 % of GDP 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9
 % of gross fixed investment 4.7 5.4 10.1 8.9 8.7 9.2 9.1 8.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 220.7 224.1 294.8 333.6 374.3 417.0 459.8 502.5
 % of GDP 12.8 12.6 15.9 15.8 16.8 19.1 21.0 22.4
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 19.1 40.7 41.8 52.7 55.4 58.1 61.0 64.1
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 280.5 293.5 375.8 428.5 483.8 542.0 603.0 667.1
 % of GDP 16.2 16.6 20.3 20.3 21.8 24.8 27.5 29.8
Key issues
A major improvement in the business environment is unlikely under the left-of-
centre government led by Romano Prodi. Its main challenge will be to continue the 
process of fiscal consolidation without stifling economic growth. But resistance 
to long overdue spending cuts meant that the 2007 budget focused on higher 
taxation to lower the budget deficit. Some tax cuts are likely in 2008, as revenue 
has exceeded projections, partly as a result of a clampdown on tax evasion. The tax 
wedge on labour has been reduced and social security contributions on overtime 
have been lowered. Measures have been introduced to increase competition in 
protected services sectors such as professional services, taxis and pharmacies, but 
the government made concessions in the face of protests and implementation is 
proving a problem. Mr Prodi has resisted pressure from the left to dismantle the 
2003 labour market reform, but social security contributions on some temporary 
contracts have been raised. Changes to the 2004 pension reform will result in a 
more gradual increase in the minimum retirement age from 2008. The government’s 
latest infrastructure investment plan appears more realistic, but few projects will be 
completed before 2011.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Italy
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows into Italy are modest 
compared with most other EU countries. 
Nevertheless, in 2001-03, when global 
FDI flows fell sharply, inflows into Italy 
rose. In 2006 they amounted to almost 
US$39bn, or 2.1% of GDP, compared 
with 1.1% of GDP in 2005 and 0.2% of 
GDP in 1998. The stock of FDI in Italy was 
an estimated US$294.8bn at the end 
of 2006, just over one-quarter of the 
level in the UK and just over one-half of 
that in the Netherlands. In relation to 
GDP the stock of FDI was estimated at 
about 15.9% in 2006, lower than in any 
other EU country apart from Greece. FDI 
outflows have also generally been small 
(partly because of the large number of 
small and medium-sized family-owned 
companies in Italy, which lack the 
financial resources for rapid expansion 
abroad). However, there was a sharp 
increase in 2005-06 as a result of large 
investments abroad in the banking 
sector. Italy has generally been a net 
exporter of FDI.
Origin and distribution
According to data from the Italian 
Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano 
dei Cambi, UIC), the Italian inward FDI 
stock is regionally diversified, with just 
over 50% of the total originating from 
four European countries (France, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland with about 
13.5% each and the UK with just over 
12%). The US also accounts for about 
13%. The EU accounts for over 60% of 
the inward stock. The services sector 
accounts for almost 60% of the inward 
FDI stock, of which finance accounts 
for about 30%. The share accounted for 
by the financial sector is likely to have 
risen following crossborder mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) such as the BNL and 
Antoveneta bank takeovers by two foreign 
banks, BBVA (Spain) and ABN Amro 
(Netherlands), in 2005. Machinery and 
equipment accounts for just over 10% of 
the inward FDI stock, and chemicals and 
chemical products for 6.5%. Almost all 
of the inward FDI stock is located in the 
north and centre of the country.
Determinants
The factors deterring FDI inflows are 
the complexity of Italy’s legal system, 
inefficiencies in public administration, 
inadequate infrastructure (particularly in 
the south of the country), and continued 
political instability, which has led to 
frequent changes in laws affecting FDI 
decisions. In addition, studies of the 
determinants of FDI in southern Italy 
have highlighted classical deterrents 
to investing in the south, such as poor 
infrastructure, distance from major 
European markets, low presence of 
other foreign firms, and a high level of 
organised crime. Such studies seem to 
indicate that fiscal incentives and the 
presence of specialised producer service 
providers have a low impact on foreign 
entrants’ decisions, but that human 
capital is an important positive variable. 
Italy has an abundant workforce in the 
south, which has attracted a few high-
technology investments to areas such as 
Catania in Sicily. The abundance of skilled 
labour in the south, combined with 
limited job opportunities in high valued-
added sectors, has helped to keep wage 
costs down for high-tech start-ups there.
Impact
Because of the comparatively low level of 
inflows, the impact of FDI on the Italian 
economy has been limited. The depressed 
areas of the south, which attract little 
FDI, would benefit substantially in 
terms of employment and through the 
spillover effect of advanced technology, 
management practices and production 
processes. However, the debate often 
overstates the benefits that FDI would 
have, given the ease with which Italian 
firms can tap the financial markets and 
the existence of an abundance of domestic 
capital, as highlighted by the country’s 
high savings ratio, which in the past was 
mainly channelled into high-yielding 
Treasury bills, but is now becoming more 
available for equity investment. 
Potential
Most of the factors that have deterred FDI 
in the past will remain in place for some 
time. A slight improvement is expected in 
the efficiency of the public administration, 
as a result of past reforms. However, the 
investment agency, Sviluppo Italia, has 
been largely ineffective and may be shut 
down. Inefficient work practices in the 
public sector will be slow to change. Italy 
is starting to catch up with other European 
countries in terms of computer usage 
and broadband penetration. Extensive 
privatisations since 1992 have attracted 
some foreign investors and the process 
is now almost complete. Opposition to 
the sale of assets in so-called strategic 
sectors to foreign investors is likely to 
continue. Nevertheless, foreign takeovers 
in the banking sector used to face major 
obstacles in the past, but most of these 
appear to have been removed by reforms 
introduced at the end of 2005.
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Netherlands
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.53 8.64 9 8
Political environment 9.1 9.0 7 8
 Political stability 9.6 9.3 4 9
 Political effectiveness 8.7 8.7 9 9
Macroeconomic environment 8.6 9.2 11 2
Market opportunities 6.3 7.0 34 20
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 9.0 9.0 4 4
Policy towards foreign investment 9.6 9.6 2 1
Foreign trade & exchange controls 9.6 9.6 3 3
Taxes 6.2 6.5 31 35
Financing 10.0 10.0 1 1
Labour market 7.8 7.5 6 15
Infrastructure 9.2 9.2 8 12
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.6 16.7 16.8
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 609.0 629.9 662.9 762.3 814.8 812.5 827.7 854.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 546.4 573.0 608.9 647.0 679.8 713.7 747.8 782.3
GDP (% real change) 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 2.0 40.4 3.8 29.9 27.4 36.8 45.1 53.1
 % of GDP 0.3 6.4 0.6 3.9 3.4 4.5 5.5 6.2
 % of gross fixed investment 1.8 33.2 2.8 19.2 16.0 21.1 25.2 28.4
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 469.9 447.1 487.5 517.4 544.8 581.6 626.7 679.8
 % of GDP 77.2 71.0 73.5 67.9 66.9 71.6 75.7 79.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 26.4 140.5 22.3 63.6 79.2 80.4 79.9 84.6
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 597.9 629.9 729.7 793.3 872.4 952.9 1,032.7 1,117.3
 % of GDP 98.2 100.0 110.1 104.1 107.1 117.3 124.8 130.7
Key issues
After a weak performance in 2005, real GDP growth accelerated to 2.9% in 2006. 
Stronger GDP growth has been accompanied by a fall in unemployment and an 
improvement in the public finances. The Netherlands ranks as one of the world’s 
most attractive business locations, with an efficient financial sector, a highly 
skilled and multilingual labour force, product markets that are now mostly open 
to competition and a high-quality transport and communication infrastructure. 
Given the negative impact of the ageing population on the sustainability of the 
public finances, one of the government’s principal long-term challenges will be 
to increase the rate of participation in the labour force. The political complexion 
of the new coalition government is likely to rule out substantial tax reductions. 
As a result, the relative attractiveness of the country’s tax environment is likely to 
deteriorate slightly over the next five years. Set against this, the country’s already 
favourable climate for free enterprise should be bolstered by the liberalisation of 
previously uncontested product markets and by the establishment of new domestic 
watchdogs.
Business environment scores, 2007-11
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Foreign direct investment 
in the Netherlands
Stocks and flows
Annual FDI inflows averaged US$52bn in 
1999-2000 at the peak of the previous 
global merger and acquisition (M&A) 
boom, compared with an annual average 
of US$6.9bn in 1985-95, but, like most 
other EU countries, the Netherlands 
suffered from the sharp fall in global 
crossborder investment flows in 2001-04. 
After a resurgence in 2005, FDI inflows 
fell back again in 2006 to just US$3.8bn. 
In general, the country has been 
relatively successful in attracting inward 
FDI, as attested by inward FDI stock 
figures. With an estimated stock of 
US$487.5bn at the end of 2006, the 
Netherlands is one of the largest hosts of 
inward FDI in the EU. The Netherlands’ 
success in attracting FDI is even more 
apparent when measured as a share of 
GDP. In 2006 the Netherlands’ inward FDI 
stock amounted to 73.5% of GDP. Despite 
its success as an FDI host, the 
Netherlands, like many developed 
economies, is still a net exporter of direct 
investment capital. In 2006 the stock of 
outward FDI reached US$729.7bn.
Origin and distribution
The largest inward investor in the 
Netherlands is the US, followed by 
other large EU economies (mainly the 
UK, Germany and Belgium). At the 
end of 2005 companies from other EU 
countries accounted for 61% of the total 
stock of FDI in the Netherlands, with 
a further 18% taken up by companies 
from the US. Services—particularly 
transport, information technology (IT), 
telecommunications, media, banking 
and insurance—account for much of 
the recent surge in inward FDI. In 2005 
services accounted for 65% of the total 
stock of FDI in the country. Breakdowns 
are not yet available for the end of 2006, 
but figures for flows during the course 
of the year suggest that EU countries 
continued to invest in the Netherlands, 
but that US direct investments fell quite 
significantly.
Determinants
The Netherlands’ success in attracting 
inward FDI can be linked to its 
strong international orientation, its 
membership of the EU, its participation in 
European economic and monetary union 
(EMU), and the government’s liberal 
policy stance towards foreign investment 
and private enterprise. Additional 
attractions are a highly skilled and 
multilingual labour force, well-developed 
capital markets, and the Netherlands’ 
favourable geographical location at the 
centre of the EU (the country’s modern 
and reliable telecoms network makes it 
a particularly good base for distribution 
centres serving the entire EU single 
market). Although the tax burden 
remains quite high by international 
standards, foreign companies 
wishing to set up in the country can 
negotiate tax rulings in advance. The 
Netherlands has bilateral tax treaties 
with around 100 countries, and there 
are no withholding taxes on outgoing 
royalties and interest payments. The 
government, through the Netherlands 
Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA), 
is actively involved in promoting the 
country as a location for FDI. Incentives 
are made available to encourage 
investment in the less-developed areas 
of the country (particularly the north-
east and the south), as well as in new 
technologies. Rules on the taxation of 
staff share options, extensively used by 
“new economy” companies, have been 
changed to encourage further investment 
in this field.
Impact
The scale of inward direct investment in 
the Netherlands has been sufficient to 
have a number of positive effects on the 
economy. As in other EU countries where 
inward direct investment has reached a 
certain level, the Netherlands now has 
a critical mass of firms in a number of 
sectors (notably telecoms, media and 
IT), resulting in the creation of “positive 
externalities” that are likely to continue 
to attract more investment in the sectors 
concerned. FDI makes a significant 
contribution to employment growth and 
to gross fixed capital formation.
Potential
The Netherlands has set out to 
reinforce its position as the undisputed 
international gateway to the EU. Its 
political, social and economic stability, 
highly qualified and multilingual 
workforce, pro-business policies and 
privileged geographical location should 
ensure that the country continues to 
receive a large share of intra-regional 
FDI flows, as well as investments from 
outside the EU seeking to exploit the 
Netherlands’ position as a gateway.
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Spain
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.40 7.82 22 22
Political environment 7.8 7.8 19 21
 Political stability 8.5 8.1 16 16
 Political effectiveness 7.1 7.4 20 20
Macroeconomic environment 7.5 7.2 39 54
Market opportunities 7.1 7.7 17 11
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 7.5 7.8 21 24
Policy towards foreign investment 8.2 8.2 17 20
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.1 15 14
Taxes 5.6 6.3 42 42
Financing 7.8 8.9 20 18
Labour market 6.5 7.2 38 28
Infrastructure 7.5 8.2 24 22
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 42.7 44.1 45.1 45.4 45.8 46.2 46.6 46.9
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 1,044.5 1,128.0 1,225.8 1,430.1 1,529.4 1,521.4 1,551.0 1,608.1
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,108.3 1,183.6 1,267.8 1,365.5 1,436.7 1,509.2 1,586.3 1,664.9
GDP (% real change) 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 24.8 24.6 20.2 40.3 42.4 44.0 47.1 50.4
 % of GDP 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
 % of gross fixed investment 8.5 7.4 5.4 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.6
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 395.2 371.5 443.3 483.6 526.0 570.0 617.1 667.6
 % of GDP 37.8 32.9 36.2 33.8 34.4 37.5 39.8 41.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 61.5 41.9 88.7 95.8 86.2 86.2 87.1 88.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 371.2 372.6 508.0 603.8 690.0 776.3 863.4 951.4
 % of GDP 35.5 33.0 41.4 42.2 45.1 51.0 55.7 59.2
Key issues
Rising wage and non-wage costs, insufficient reforms in key areas and the 
growing attractiveness of alternative locations (particularly in central and 
eastern Europe) pose a threat to Spain’s attractiveness as a business location. 
Hourly wage costs remain lower than in France or Germany, but they are far 
higher than in a wide range of countries in eastern Europe, the Far East and 
elsewhere that have become attractive destinations for FDI. With labour market 
regulations also less flexible than in a number of other EU countries, Spain is not 
an obvious location for greenfield investments except in a few niche fields. Spain 
is a major market and many Spanish companies are profitable, making them 
potentially attractive targets for takeovers, but the Spanish government may 
lean on the regulatory authorities to impede such takeovers in what it considers 
important sectors, as it did in 2006 and early 2007, when it obstructed the 
attempt by a German energy company, E.ON, to acquire the Spanish electricity 
company Endesa. This has raised questions about the Spanish government’s 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Spain
Stocks and flows
Spain has a reasonable track-record in 
attracting greenfield industrial projects 
over the past three decades, but FDI 
inflows have been low compared with 
other EU countries. As the country’s 
relative appeal has declined, so too 
have FDI inflows. FDI inflows into 
Spain amounted to just US$20.2bn in 
2006, down from a peak of US$40bn in 
2002. The total stock of inward FDI was 
estimated at US$443.3bn at the end 
of 2006, which was up on US$371.5bn 
a year earlier, largely owing to the 
weakening US dollar. Outflows of FDI, 
driven initially by a surge in investment 
by Spanish companies buying companies 
in Latin America and subsequently in 
Europe, have exceeded inward FDI since 
1997 (with the exception of 2002) and 
reached US$88.7bn in 2006. The stock of 
Spanish FDI abroad stood at US$508bn at 
end-2006, substantially higher than the 
US$373bn recorded at end-2005.
Origin and distribution
In common with other developed 
economies, FDI inflows into Spain have 
been shifting from manufacturing to 
services, although the country has had 
limited success in attracting inward 
direct investment in the information 
communications and technology (ICT) 
sector. This reflects shortcomings in its 
educational system and the lack of a 
strong domestic industry in these areas. 
Other EU countries account for most FDI 
inflows into Spain.
Determinants
Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986 
generated foreign interest in what was 
a large and growing domestic market 
with an established low-cost industrial 
base. Foreign multinationals quickly 
purchased and restructured much of 
the country’s heavy manufacturing 
industry, encountering little political 
or social opposition and enjoying 
considerable business success. Spain 
has well-established political and 
financial mechanisms in place for 
foreign investors, as well as a workforce 
accustomed to multinational work 
practices and a younger generation of 
managers, who have adopted a more 
flexible business culture. Spanish 
labour costs remain a little below 
those in most other west European 
countries, but are far higher than in 
eastern Europe or in other parts of the 
world where manufactured activity has 
recently developed. A case in point is 
the automotive sector, where Spain 
hosts some of Europe’s most efficient car 
assembly plants, from which firms are 
beginning to relocate in the face of rising 
labour costs. Foreign investors can, 
however, still be attracted to invest in 
some other sectors by the ease of access 
to the EU market, a favourable quality 
of life, and a dynamic consumer market. 
The government has in the past offered 
a range of financial and tax incentives 
to foreign investors, as have regional 
governments, which enjoy considerable 
autonomy and compete with each other 
to attract inward FDI. However, these 
incentives have been curtailed by EU 
state aid regulations that strictly limit 
aid to regions other than the least 
developed. The Spanish government 
has shown itself resistant to foreign 
takeovers of major Spanish companies, as 
was vividly illustrated in 2006-07, when it 
tried to block the bid by a German energy 
company, E.ON, for the Spanish energy 
company Endesa.
Impact
Inward direct investment was important 
to Spain’s economic development in 
the 1980s and early 1990s in terms of 
job creation, labour productivity and 
the spillover benefits to the larger 
economy. More recently the scale of 
FDI, and therefore the impact for the 
broader economy, has been more limited, 
although even a modest level of FDI 
in high-technology sectors helps to 
boost the country’s limited capacity for 
research and development (R&D) and 
technological innovation.
Potential
Although many of the factors that used 
to attract foreign investors to Spain 
remain in place, its former advantage as a 
relatively low-wage economy has in effect 
disappeared. The government will need 
to introduce labour market and other 
economic reforms, improve education 
and vocational training, encourage 
research and be more vigorous in the 
implementation of competition policy to 
compete more effectively to attract FDI 
into high-tech and innovative sectors, 
which could help to stimulate indigenous 
activity. It would also need be more open 
to foreign takeovers.
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Sweden
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.34 8.60 11 11
Political environment 9.5 9.7 2 1
 Political stability 10.0 10.0 1 1
 Political effectiveness 9.0 9.4 5 2
Macroeconomic environment 9.2 9.2 3 2
Market opportunities 6.8 6.9 24 24
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.3 8.8 16 10
Policy towards foreign investment 10.0 9.6 1 1
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.6 15 3
Taxes 6.0 6.3 32 42
Financing 8.9 9.6 14 8
Labour market 6.6 7.1 33 30
Infrastructure 9.6 9.4 1 3
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 349.1 357.3 384.1 437.0 470.5 475.4 482.9 492.5
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 279.5 290.0 308.9 321.7 340.2 358.3 376.1 394.6
GDP (% real change) 3.7 2.9 4.5 3.7 3.5 2.6 2.3 2.3
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 11.5 10.2 27.2 28.7 25.7 25.0 26.0 25.0
 % of GDP 3.3 2.8 7.1 6.6 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.1
 % of gross fixed investment 20.2 16.5 39.6 34.3 28.0 27.6 28.2 26.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 197.8 172.4 218.4 247.1 272.8 297.8 323.8 348.8
 % of GDP 56.7 48.2 56.9 56.5 58.0 62.6 67.1 70.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 21.8 26.5 24.6 35.0 31.5 30.2 28.4 30.6
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 216.3 201.8 263.0 298.0 329.4 359.6 388.0 418.6
 % of GDP 62.0 56.5 68.5 68.2 70.0 75.6 80.4 85.0
Key issues
A new centre-right government entered office in September 2006, ending 12 
years of Social Democratic rule. The four-party coalition’s main objective is 
to strengthen the economic incentives to work, with a view to easing welfare 
dependency and social exclusion and boosting labour supply. Measures include 
cuts in income tax; lower employers’ social security contributions (to encourage 
the hiring of younger workers, immigrants and the long-term unemployed); and 
reduced unemployment benefit. The welfare reforms have been criticised by trade 
unions, but a sharp deterioration in industrial relations is unlikely. The state’s 
role in the economy will be cut, with the planned sale of government stakes in 
six companies, including TeliaSonera, Nordea, OMX, and Vin & Sprit. Further 
liberalisation measures will see the opening of product markets (including public 
services) to wider private-sector competition. Fiscal reforms are to be introduced 
to boost the low level of entrepreneurship in Sweden by making it easier and 
more profitable to set up a business. Wealth tax was abolished at the beginning 
of 2007, and property tax is to be reformed. Despite a reduction in the state’s 
involvement in the economy, the tax burden in Sweden will still remain among 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Sweden
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows averaged around US$29bn 
per year between 1997 and 2000, 
peaking, at the height of the global 
merger and acquisition (M&A) boom, at 
US$61bn in 1999—in part driven by the 
acquisition of a Swedish pharmaceutical 
firm, Astra, by Zeneca of the UK. FDI 
inflows held up fairly well in 2001-02, 
despite the global recession, averaging 
US$11.8bn in the two-year period. 
After bottoming out at US$5bn in 2003, 
FDI inflows have recovered strongly, 
averaging US$10.8bn in 2004-05 and 
rising to US$27.2bn in 2006, driven in 
part by the robust growth performance 
of the economy. Measured at book value, 
Sweden’s inward FDI stock totalled an 
estimated US$218.4bn in 2006 (or 56.9% 
of GDP), up from US$77bn in 2000 (32% 
of GDP). In absolute terms, this places 
Sweden in a middle rank among the EU15 
countries, although it remains one of the 
larger hosts in the EU15 relative to the 
size of its economy, behind only Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands. With a 
fivefold increase over the past decade, 
the inward FDI stock has grown at a faster 
rate than the outward stock. FDI outflows 
have remained fairly stable in recent 
years, averaging US$23.5bn in 2003-06.
Origin and distribution
Since the mid-1990s the bulk of FDI 
inflows has originated in Europe. 
Between 1998 and 2003 EU countries 
accounted for around 70% of total 
inward investment, with the UK (30%), 
Finland (17%) and Germany (13%) 
the leading players. Flows from the 
Netherlands, Norway and Denmark have 
also been significant. Since 2000 the US 
has become an increasingly important 
direct investor in Sweden. At the end 
of 2005, 66% of Sweden’s inward FDI 
stock originated from other EU countries 
(Dutch, UK and Finnish companies being 
the largest investors); 18% from the US; 
and just 1.5% from Asia. Manufacturing 
remains the dominant sector for 
inward FDI into Sweden: the chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, engineering and 
energy sectors account for over 50% of 
the inward and outward stock. However, 
the sectoral composition of inward FDI is 
changing, as Sweden’s technology-based 
clusters and excellent research capability 
attract a growing share of FDI in sectors 
such as information technology (IT), 
electronics and software development, 
and financial and business services.
Determinants
Sweden’s main attraction as an 
investment location is its exceptional 
infrastructure, particularly its facilities 
for research and development (R&D), 
on which Sweden spends proportionally 
more than any other country. Its strong 
technological base, the close relationship 
between academia and industry, a 
highly educated workforce, a strong 
and stable economy, and well-informed 
consumers and suppliers also enhance 
Sweden’s attractions as a research and 
manufacturing base, particularly in high-
technology, capital-intensive industries. 
However, high labour costs (in terms 
of wages, payroll taxes and restrictive 
labour regulations) reduce the country’s 
appeal in labour-intensive industries, 
and a lack of competition still exists in 
certain sectors, notably retail trade, 
pharmaceuticals and construction.
Impact
Foreign-owned firms account for about 
11% of the labour force, although part 
of this share reflects acquisitions by 
overseas interests of existing Swedish 
firms, rather than new jobs created by 
start-up ventures. Foreign investors 
account for about one-third of R&D 
spending and may therefore have 
contributed to a virtuous circle by 
improving the technological base.
Potential
Although non-participation in European 
economic and monetary union could 
deter FDI in parts of the economy, most 
likely within the manufacturing sector, 
it will probably have less of an impact 
in most services sectors (which account 
for a rising share of FDI in Sweden). 
The country’s highly skilled workforce, 
excellent infrastructure and export-
oriented economy will remain positive 
features of the business environment, 
as will its good and improving transport 
links with northern and eastern Europe. 
Sweden’s well-developed research 
capabilities have helped to encourage 
inward investment in R&D and high-tech 
businesses, and although the country is 
somewhat vulnerable to a downturn in 
the technology cycle, its advanced status 
in this area should continue to attract FDI 
over the forecast period. High personal 
taxes and labour and other business 
costs remain disincentives, but the tax 
environment for firms is favourable, with 
the standard rate of corporation tax, 
at 28%, competitive by west European 
standards.
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United Kingdom
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.62 8.60 6 10
Political environment 8.1 8.1 16 15
 Political stability 7.8 7.8 27 27
 Political effectiveness 8.4 8.4 10 10
Macroeconomic environment 9.2 8.3 3 19
Market opportunities 7.8 7.8 7 7
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 9.5 9.5 1 1
Policy towards foreign investment 9.6 9.6 2 1
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.1 15 14
Taxes 7.3 7.3 14 19
Financing 10.0 10.0 1 1
Labour market 7.9 7.9 4 5
Infrastructure 8.3 8.5 17 20
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 59.8 60.0 60.3 60.5 60.7 60.9 61.2 61.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 2,168.3 2,243.6 2,391.3 2,731.3 2,801.0 2,837.0 2,910.4 2,957.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,913.2 1,993.5 2,102.9 2,207.3 2,317.4 2,438.2 2,558.3 2,687.0
GDP (% real change) 3.3 1.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 77.9 195.6 137.7 119.8 105.4 110.4 112.7 116.3
 % of GDP 3.6 8.7 5.8 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9
 % of gross fixed investment 21.0 50.8 31.9 23.7 20.2 21.0 20.9 21.1
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 742.4 863.0 1,135.3 1,255.1 1,360.5 1,470.9 1,583.6 1,699.8
 % of GDP 34.2 38.5 47.5 46.0 48.6 51.8 54.4 57.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 98.2 91.7 79.8 82.8 84.8 91.1 95.0 101.4
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 1,268.5 1,296.0 1,487.0 1,569.8 1,654.6 1,745.7 1,840.7 1,942.1
 % of GDP 58.5 57.8 62.2 57.5 59.1 61.5 63.2 65.7
Key issues
The UK will remain one of the world’s most attractive business locations. Its 
defining features will continue to be a favourable disposition to free enterprise, 
a tough and rigorously enforced competition policy, a relaxed attitude to 
foreign takeovers of domestic companies, flexible labour markets and deep and 
sophisticated capital markets. However, a number of factors could weaken the 
UK’s appeal over the next few years. High levels of consumer debt pose a threat 
to the stability of the macroeconomic environment. The tax regime is becoming 
more burdensome and complex. Improvements to the creaking and congested road 
and rail transport infrastructure will be slow to materialise. And despite concerted 
government efforts, the UK will struggle to close its productivity gap with the US 
and the best performers in western Europe. The UK’s low productivity will reflect 
a combination of factors, including skills deficiencies (both at managerial and 
lower levels), strict planning restrictions (which inhibit economies of scale), the 
continued deficiencies of the transport network, and comparatively low levels of 
spending on research and development (R&D).
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in the United Kingdom
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows into the UK have recovered 
sharply since the downturn in global 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
in 2001-03. Having bottomed out 
at US$25.5bn in 2002, FDI inflows 
recovered to total US$195.6bn in 2005 
and US$137.7bn in 2006. Although over 
half of the annual inflow into the UK 
in 2005 was accounted for by a major 
corporate reorganisation involving Royal 
Dutch Shell that had no real impact on 
the host economy, the number and scale 
of FDI inflows into the UK in 2005-06, 
which mostly took the form of M&As, 
confirmed the UK’s status as one of the 
world’s largest and most open hosts of 
FDI. In absolute terms, the UK is Europe’s 
largest and the world’s second-largest 
host of FDI, accounting for one-quarter 
of the total stock of inward FDI in the 
EU. Relative to GDP, the UK’s inward FDI 
stock is the highest in the G7 group of 
industrialised countries, although it is 
lower than that of some medium-sized EU 
economies such as the Netherlands and 
Sweden. Measured at book value, the inward 
FDI stock totalled an estimated US$1.1trn at 
the end of 2006, or 47% of GDP.
Origin and distribution
US firms have been the largest inward 
direct investors in the UK since two 
carmakers, Ford and General Motors, 
established a presence in the early 
20th century, but investments from EU 
countries have risen sharply and the UK 
has been the favoured destination in the 
EU for greenfield investments by Asian 
firms (even if the latter still account 
for a small share of the total inward FDI 
stock). At the end of 2005, 31% of the 
UK’s inward FDI stock originated from the 
US; 56% from other European countries 
(Dutch, French and German companies 
being the largest investors); and just 6% 
from Asia. The banking, electronics and 
automotive sectors have traditionally 
accounted for a large share of inward FDI 
into the UK, but the sectoral composition 
of inward FDI is changing, as the UK’s 
technology-based clusters and centres 
of scientific excellence attract more 
FDI in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, information technology 
(IT) and software development.
Determinants
The UK’s attractiveness as a location for 
FDI over the past 20 years has rested 
on a policy of openness to foreign 
investors, a strikingly relaxed attitude 
to foreign takeovers of domestic firms, 
liberalised product markets, a flexible 
labour market (particularly by European 
standards), deep and liquid capital 
markets, membership of the EU (which 
gives firms located in the UK access to 
the world’s largest trading bloc) and 
external economies of scale in sectors 
such as financial services (where 
London’s position as a financial centre 
has developed and fed on a large pool of 
qualified banking, legal and accounting 
staff). A less tangible but still important 
magnet has been the status of English as 
the world’s leading business language. 
Impact
FDI has had a positive impact on the 
economy, even if several studies suggest 
that this is sometimes exaggerated. 
Inward direct investors employ around 
2m workers in the UK, and many of the 
country’s most productive business 
units, such as the Japanese Nissan and 
Toyota car plants, are foreign-owned. The 
evidence for broader spillover effects is 
more mixed, however. Although foreign 
firms are often held to raise working 
practices and quality standards in local 
firms, the empirical evidence suggests 
that positive spillover effects—if they 
occur at all—are often geographically 
concentrated, partly because of low 
levels of labour mobility and partly 
because demonstration effects are often 
limited to the region where the foreign 
firm is located. By and large, positive 
productivity spillover effects from foreign 
firms to local firms have been limited.
Potential
Despite the publicity sparked by 
disinvestments to lower-cost countries 
in eastern Europe and Asia, the UK 
should remain an attractive location 
for FDI overall. The UK’s failure to join 
European economic and monetary union 
(EMU) could deter FDI in a handful of 
manufacturing sectors, but it will have 
less of an impact in most services sectors 
(which account for a rising share of FDI 
in the UK). Indeed, existing clusters and 
external economies of scale in sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, 
financial services and software 
development will remain powerful 
magnets to foreign entrants. One of 
the UK’s main weaknesses will be the 
congestion and unreliability of its land 
transport infrastructure, which exerts a 
drag on productivity.
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China
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.61 6.38 58 53
Political environment 4.6 4.8 62 61
 Political stability 5.5 5.1 55 62
 Political effectiveness 3.9 4.5 61 58
Macroeconomic environment 7.8 7.5 33 44
Market opportunities 8.7 8.5 1 1
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.8 4.8 67 68
Policy towards foreign investment 6.0 6.9 57 49
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.0 7.8 61 51
Taxes 5.3 6.0 52 54
Financing 3.6 5.9 71 60
Labour market 5.8 6.2 54 57
Infrastructure 4.7 5.6 56 55
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 1,299.9 1,307.6 1,314.5 1,323.1 1,331.1 1,336.7 1,342.5 1,351.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 1,936.5 2,278.3 2,720.2 3,250.2 3,832.6 4,481.9 5,232.0 6,080.6
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 7,642.3 8,692.3 9,903.8 11,192.9 12,587.2 13,993.8 15,453.8 16,970.8
GDP (% real change) 10.1 10.4 10.7 9.9 9.3 9.0 8.4 9.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 54.9 79.1 78.1 79.5 84.1 86.5 90.9 92.9
 % of GDP 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5
 % of gross fixed investment 7.0 8.4 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.3
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 542.3 621.4 699.5 779.0 863.1 949.5 1,040.4 1,133.4
 % of GDP 28.0 27.3 25.7 24.0 22.5 21.2 19.9 18.6
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.8 11.3 17.8 26.0 37.0 48.0 65.0 72.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 52.7 64.5 82.3 108.3 145.3 193.3 258.3 330.3
 % of GDP 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.4
Key issues
China is one of the world’s largest recipients of FDI. Although FDI inflows 
actually fell slightly in 2006, to US$78.1bn, this was still one of the highest 
totals in the world. Despite concerns about rising cost pressures, China remains 
a favoured base for foreign companies wishing to reduce production costs. 
Nevertheless, companies wishing to sell into the domestic market still find the 
country’s business environment a difficult one in which to operate. Despite 
improvements in recent years, the Chinese market is characterised by intense 
competition, bureaucratic hurdles and an opaque legal system. Nevertheless, 
many foreign companies are now starting to make good profits (even if there 
are significant variations across sectors). China is also becoming an important 
outward investor, and this trend will continue. Owing to its rising stock of 
foreign-exchange reserves, as well as booming demand for natural resources, in 
particular oil, China will become an increasingly important source of investment 
for many resource-rich countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America over 
the forecast period. Overall, these countries have given a cautious welcome to 
Chinese investment.
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Foreign direct investment 
in China
Stocks and flows
In absolute terms at least, China is one 
of the world’s largest hosts of FDI. In 
2006 FDI inflows totalled US$78.1bn (in 
balance-of-payments terms). FDI inflows 
into China have generally been increasing 
over the past two decades, with annual 
average inflows rising from US$3.9bn 
(again in balance-of-payments terms) 
in 1985-92 to US$37.8bn in 1993-2000 
and US$59bn for 2001-06. FDI inflows are 
forecast to remain high and to increase 
gradually throughout the forecast period, 
averaging US$87bn in 2007-11. The stock 
of inward FDI reached US$699.5bn by end-
2006, although it has actually been falling 
as a share of GDP in recent years (largely 
because the economy has been growing 
faster than FDI inflows). FDI data for China 
should, however, be treated with caution. 
FDI inflows are inflated by “round-
tripping”, whereby domestic investment 
from the mainland is taken offshore, 
usually to Hong Kong, and then returned 
to the mainland to take advantage of the 
preferential tax rates offered to foreign 
investors. The World Bank has estimated 
that round-tripping could account for up 
to 25% of total FDI into China. 
Origin and distribution
The major investors in China are Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Japan and the US. 
Most investment goes to the coastal 
provinces and provincial-level cities, 
despite attempts to attract investors 
inland. The three most important 
investment locations can be described 
as “greater Guangdong” (which 
comprises Guangdong, Fujian and 
Hainan provinces), “greater Shanghai” 
(Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang 
provinces) and “greater Beijing” 
(comprising the capital, together with 
Tianjin municipality and Hebei province).
Determinants
Most foreign investors have been 
attracted by China’s vast domestic market 
and low labour costs. Early arrivals, 
however, were largely disappointed 
with the initial results of their China 
operations, and either lived with losses or 
left the market. However, an increasing 
number of foreign-invested companies 
are now in profit, and the outlook for the 
economy is healthy, which suggests that 
there will be continued strong interest 
from foreign companies. Lingering 
barriers to trade are coming down, but 
high non-wage costs remain a concern. 
Problems of overcapacity, and strong 
competition from domestic companies, 
will continue to cause problems for many 
foreign firms. 
Impact
FDI has had a profound impact both 
on the overall level of industrial 
development in China and on its 
geographical distribution. The coastal 
provinces have seen the greatest 
transformation, with central and 
western provinces left on the sidelines. 
There is growing concern among some 
policymakers in China that the economy, 
and in particular the export sector, is 
becoming overly dependent on foreign 
investment. In 2006 foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) accounted for over 
50% of China’s total exports, and FIEs 
will remain a key driver of China’s export 
dynamism for years to come. 
Potential
China has been attracting sizeable 
amounts of FDI for some years, and 
FDI inflows are forecast to remain high 
during the forecast period. China is still 
ranked by many international firms as 
their preferred investment destination. 
The stock of inward FDI accounts for a 
high share of GDP (at 25.7% in 2006), but 
remains small per head of population. 
This suggests that China has the potential 
to absorb considerable additional FDI. 
China is committed to meeting its World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) obligations, 
which should boost FDI. The gradual 
opening up of sectors such as domestic 
commerce, financial services, insurance 
and tourism is under way. Geographical 
restrictions on where foreign companies 
are allowed to set up operations will 
also be relaxed in 2007-11. But the 
government is becoming more choosy 
about approving certain investment 
projects, and increasingly priority will 
be given to projects in the interior of 
the country or those that promise a 
greater degree of technology transfer. 
However, if the government’s plan to 
encourage more FDI in the interior is to 
be successful, the region will need better 
transport connections to international 
markets.
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Hong Kong
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.57 8.68 8 6
Political environment 7.2 7.6 23 22
 Political stability 7.0 7.0 37 40
 Political effectiveness 7.4 8.1 18 13
Macroeconomic environment 8.6 8.9 11 8
Market opportunities 7.2 6.7 15 31
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.5 8.8 10 10
Policy towards foreign investment 8.7 8.7 10 12
Foreign trade & exchange controls 9.6 10.0 3 1
Taxes 9.7 9.7 1 1
Financing 9.3 9.3 11 14
Labour market 8.3 8.6 2 2
Infrastructure 8.7 8.7 14 18
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.1
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 165.8 177.8 189.8 203.5 220.9 237.4 256.2 274.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 212.1 235.0 258.6 279.5 302.0 326.8 352.3 379.7
GDP (% real change) 8.6 7.5 6.9 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.3
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 34.0 33.6 42.9 50.0 49.0 49.0 47.0 45.0
 % of GDP 20.5 18.9 22.6 24.6 22.2 20.6 18.3 16.4
 % of gross fixed investment 96.4 90.4 103.9 112.9 104.4 99.1 90.3 81.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 453.1 523.2 566.1 616.1 665.1 714.1 761.1 806.1
 % of GDP 273.2 294.3 298.3 302.8 301.1 300.8 297.0 293.2
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 45.7 27.2 43.5 40.6 37.0 39.0 38.7 39.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 403.1 471.3 514.8 555.3 592.4 631.4 670.1 709.4
 % of GDP 243.1 265.1 271.2 273.0 268.2 265.9 261.5 258.1
Key issues
Hong Kong, Asia’s second-largest recipient of FDI, remains one of the world’s 
most attractive business environments. It boasts a world-class infrastructure, low 
rates of taxation and a strategic location. The potential of the territory’s domestic 
economy, which is set to grow strongly in the period to 2011, continues to draw 
foreign investors, even though concerns remain over the extent to which vested 
interests can hamper new market entrants in some sectors. Hong Kong’s position 
as a gateway to China’s booming economy, coupled with its impressive labour force 
and regulatory environment, are the main attractions. The development of the 
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with the mainland will continue 
to give Hong Kong-based companies special benefits when operating in China. As 
mainland Chinese locations such as Shanghai improve their infrastructure and skills 
base, some of Hong Kong’s advantages over them may be eroded, particularly in the 
logistics field. However, the territory’s advantages in the key field of professional 
services are unlikely to be surpassed, largely owing to political factors that hamper 
China’s regulatory development.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Hong Kong
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows have been volatile in recent 
years, ranging from US$9.7bn in 2002 
to US$42.9bn in 2006 (the record inflow 
occurred in 2000, when just under 
US$62bn was invested). FDI outflows 
from Hong Kong have been similarly 
volatile, rising from US$5.5bn in 2003 
to US$43.5bn in 2006. However, a large 
proportion of both inflows and outflows 
reflects “round-tripping”, whereby 
Chinese companies take money from 
the mainland, only to reinvest in China 
through Hong Kong entities in order 
to take advantage of the tax incentives 
offered to foreign investors in China. 
These tax breaks will be withdrawn 
from the start of 2008, which will cause 
FDI inflows and outflows alike to fall 
gradually as a proportion of GDP. The 
stock of FDI is likely to continue to climb 
in 2007-11 as more companies site their 
regional headquarters in the territory.
Origin and distribution
Official figures show that the largest 
source of FDI in Hong Kong was mainland 
China, accounting for around 28% of the 
total in 2005 (the latest year for which a 
full breakdown is available). The British 
Virgin Islands (BVI) accounted for 18% 
of inflows, reflecting the role of local and 
Chinese companies that have established 
operating companies in the tax haven. 
Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, also 
tax havens, feature in the list of the top 
ten sources of FDI for the same reason. 
Thailand, the Netherlands, Japan and 
the UK were important investors in 2005, 
accounting for 10.7%, 6.5%, 5.4% and 
5.2% of inflows, respectively. As of 2005 
China was also the holder of the largest 
stock of foreign investment, accounting 
for just over 31% of the total, closely 
followed by the BVI, also with just over 
31%. The majority of the stock of inward 
direct investment is in service industries, 
including investment-holding, real 
estate and business services; wholesale, 
retail and trading; banking, finance 
and insurance; and transport and 
communications. The first category, 
which includes “investment-holding”, 
is by far the most important, accounting 
for over 59% of the stock of inward 
investment.
Determinants
Hong Kong provides an attractive market 
for companies dealing in consumer 
goods, nearly all of which are imported, 
and services, including financial 
services. However, the main reason for 
investing in Hong Kong is its favourable 
institutional environment and its 
proximity to China. Hong Kong continues 
to provide the most convenient platform 
for foreign companies doing business 
on the mainland. Hong Kong’s entrepôt 
function and its strategic location have 
encouraged its development as a major 
regional financial centre. Unlike China 
and Singapore, traditionally Hong Kong’s 
government has not provided specific 
incentives to foreign investors, arguing 
that the open business environment 
provides sufficient reason to invest 
there. However, this attitude has begun 
to change in recent years: in 2000 an 
investment promotion agency was 
established, and land and infrastructure 
were provided to encourage a US 
entertainment company, Walt Disney, to 
establish a theme park in the territory. 
Such efforts have not all been successful: 
the government-backed Cyberport 
business park, designed to attract 
high-technology firms to Hong Kong, 
struggled at its launch.
Impact
In 2002-06 FDI inflows were equivalent 
to an average of 15.3% of GDP and over 
70% of fixed investment expenditure. 
However, this overstates the importance 
of FDI; domestic capital spending was 
unusually weak in this period. More 
generally, Hong Kong is a centre for 
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, 
as well as the formation of investment-
holding companies, but financial flows 
associated with such deals do not in 
themselves expand the capital asset base. 
In addition, an unknown proportion of 
the large FDI inflows from offshore tax 
havens is not truly foreign investment, as 
it either derives from Hong Kong-owned 
companies or is associated with round-
tripping. Nevertheless, FDI has been 
important in building up the territory as 
a business hub, and many companies site 
their regional or China headquarters in 
Hong Kong.
Potential
Under the terms of its reversion to 
Chinese rule Hong Kong remains an 
open economy, with foreign investment 
treated in largely the same way as 
domestic enterprise. Although China 
will endeavour to lure fresh investment 
directly to mainland business centres 
such as Shanghai, a sizeable proportion 
will continue to be attracted to Hong 
Kong, owing to its regulatory and 
infrastructural advantages.
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India
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.27 6.37 62 54
Political environment 5.2 5.7 50 50
 Political stability 5.5 6.3 55 49
 Political effectiveness 4.9 5.2 45 46
Macroeconomic environment 7.5 7.5 39 44
Market opportunities 7.6 7.7 10 9
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.0 6.0 51 50
Policy towards foreign investment 5.1 6.9 66 49
Foreign trade & exchange controls 3.7 6.4 76 68
Taxes 5.1 6.3 60 42
Financing 4.8 6.6 59 48
Labour market 5.6 6.2 64 56
Infrastructure 3.3 4.5 76 72
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 1,065.1 1,080.3 1,095.4 1,110.4 1,125.4 1,140.2 1,155.0 1,169.7
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 692.7 805.6 922.9 1,131.9 1,329.1 1,512.4 1,719.4 1,955.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 3,389.7 3,814.6 4,293.8 4,765.5 5,283.6 5,834.0 6,438.1 7,096.5
GDP (% real change) 8.3 9.2 9.4 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 5.8 6.7 17.5 17.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 25.0
 % of GDP 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
 % of gross fixed investment 3.2 2.9 6.4 4.8 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 43.6 50.3 67.7 84.7 102.7 122.7 144.7 169.7
 % of GDP 6.3 6.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 2.2 2.5 9.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 14.5 16.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 10.1 12.1 21.1 31.1 43.1 57.1 71.6 87.6
 % of GDP 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.2 4.5
Key issues
FDI inflows will rise sharply during the forecast period, but will still remain very 
low by international standards. The Congress-led coalition government has 
made significant progress in opening the economy to foreign investment, but 
further progress before the next election, due by May 2009 at the latest, will 
be constrained by opposition from the government’s political allies in the Left 
Front. The main opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is in some 
ways more free-market than Congress, but its Hindu-nationalist rhetoric, coupled 
with its reliance on groups such as small traders for support, would make it wary 
of moving too quickly were it to form the next government. Recognising that the 
Indian economy could easily absorb a much higher level of FDI, the government 
is progressively raising its annual FDI target; it stands at an ambitious US$25bn 
for fiscal year 2007/08 (April-March)—although continued problems of the 
business environment are likely to keep actual inflows below these targets. Foreign 
investors will be attracted by major new opportunities in infrastructure projects. 
Telecommunications and energy are likely to emerge as other high-potential 
industries for FDI.
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Foreign direct investment 
in India
Stocks and flows
FDI into India is rising rapidly. FDI 
inflows totalled US$17.5bn in 2006, 
compared with US$6.7bn in 2005 and 
US$2bn-3bn for most of the 1990s 
(although these figures are not strictly 
comparable, since in 2000/01 the 
government changed the means by 
which it measures FDI to include, for 
example, reinvested earnings). However, 
inflows of FDI into India are low by global 
standards (equivalent to 1.9% of GDP in 
2006), as is the stock of inward FDI, at 
around US$68bn in 2006 (equivalent to 
7.3% of GDP, or US$62 per head). This is 
below the figure for Pakistan (US$91 per 
head), and a fraction of the level in China 
(US$532 per head).
Origin and distribution
According to the Secretariat for Industrial 
Assistance, the largest source of FDI in 
2006/07 was Mauritius, which accounted 
for 40% of total inflows. Many companies 
incorporate in Mauritius to invest in India 
because of tax benefits. The UK was the 
second most important foreign investor, 
with 11.9% of the total, followed 
by the US (5.4%), the Netherlands 
(4%), Singapore (3.7%) and Germany 
(0.8%). Historically the electrical 
equipment sector, which includes India’s 
highly successful computer software 
industry, has attracted the most FDI, 
but in 2006/07 it was overtaken by 
the services sector. Financial and non-
financial services drew in US$4.7bn in 
investment, well above the US$2.7bn 
garnered by electrical equipment. The 
next most important sectors for FDI 
were construction activities (US$985m), 
telecommunications (US$521m) and 
transportation (US$466m). Foreign 
investment has been concentrated in 
the southern and western states, where 
more reform-minded administrations 
are in power. The top five destination 
states for FDI in recent years have 
been Maharashtra, Delhi, Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. FDI 
accounted for 6.4% of gross fixed 
investment in 2006, up sharply from 
2.9% in 2005.
Determinants
India’s skilled, English-speaking 
workforce has been a significant 
attraction for FDI, particularly in the 
information technology (IT) sector. Caps 
on FDI in protected industries have been 
steadily lifted: in January 2004 the limits 
on foreign investment in oil production 
and oil refining were abolished, and in 
private banking the limit was raised to 
74%. In October 2004 the sectoral caps 
were raised in insurance (to 26%), civil 
aviation (to 49%) and telecoms (to 49%). 
The limit for some telecoms services, 
for example Internet service providers 
(ISPs), was subsequently raised to 74% 
in February 2005, and all basic, mobile, 
and value-added telecoms services were 
moved under the 74% limit in November 
2005. In February 2006 FDI up to 51% 
was permitted for retail trading of 
“single brand” products. However, fuller 
liberalisation of the retail sector has 
been held up by political opposition, 
and some sectors, such as agriculture, 
remain off-limits to foreign investment. 
The approval process is gradually being 
simplified, and the government is 
expanding the number of industries 
that are subject to automatic approval. 
However, state-level impediments can be 
severe, and companies have been known 
to abandon FDI projects mid-way through 
the implementation stage. 
Impact
FDI has had the greatest impact on 
India’s software industry and on IT-
enabled services. Call centres and other 
forms of back-office administration 
have become important industries. The 
pharmaceutical, telecoms and power 
sectors have also been influenced 
significantly by FDI. 
Potential
India’s potential to attract increased 
FDI inflows is vast, although poor 
infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy 
and interdepartmental wrangling will 
slow the pace of opening in many sectors. 
The infrastructure, energy, telecoms, 
IT and insurance sectors are likely to be 
the main magnets for FDI. Producers 
and assemblers of cars and automotive 
components are also re-evaluating 
India’s potential, as are biotechnology 
firms. The establishment of special 
economic zones, in which 100% foreign 
ownership is allowed, in order to promote 
exports should attract increased FDI 
inflows into export-oriented industries. 
India’s privatisation programme 
accelerated in 2003/04 with the sale of 
shares in major car and oil companies, 
but since then has stalled owing to 
opposition from the Left Front, on the 
support of which the government relies.
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Malaysia
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.29 7.43 23 31
Political environment 7.1 6.7 25 37
 Political stability 7.4 7.0 32 40
 Political effectiveness 6.8 6.5 26 31
Macroeconomic environment 8.3 8.3 20 19
Market opportunities 6.5 6.7 29 28
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.3 6.8 33 37
Policy towards foreign investment 7.3 6.9 33 49
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 8.7 15 24
Taxes 8.4 8.1 6 10
Financing 6.6 7.8 31 27
Labour market 7.1 6.8 20 34
Infrastructure 6.8 7.6 28 30
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 25.6 26.1 26.6 27.1 27.6 28.1 28.6 29.2
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 118.5 130.8 148.9 177.8 196.5 215.9 233.8 255.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 255.8 276.7 301.7 326.9 354.6 384.8 416.6 450.1
GDP (% real change) 6.8 5.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 4.6 4.0 6.1 6.5 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.8
 % of GDP 3.9 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1
 % of gross fixed investment 19.1 15.2 20.1 18.4 15.8 15.4 15.2 15.5
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 43.6 47.5 53.6 60.1 66.2 72.7 79.7 87.5
 % of GDP 36.8 36.3 36.0 33.8 33.7 33.7 34.1 34.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 2.1 3.0 6.0 4.3 3.9 3.1 2.8 3.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 12.8 21.8 27.8 32.1 36.0 39.1 41.9 44.9
 % of GDP 10.8 16.7 18.7 18.0 18.3 18.1 17.9 17.6
Key issues
Large inflows of FDI will remain important to Malaysia’s economic development 
plans, especially the government’s goal of attaining developed-nation status by 
2020. Government attempts to position Malaysia as an attractive base for high-
tech manufacturing and high value-added services will lead to an increase in FDI 
during the forecast period compared with the historical period. However, despite 
business-friendly policies, there are a number of weaknesses that might deter 
prospective investors. The pursuit of developed-nation status will place huge 
demands on the country’s small pool of skilled labour, leading to higher wage 
costs. The enforcement of patents remains weak in Malaysia and the government 
has yet to establish a special court to deal with cases of patent infringements. 
Although prospective investors in the Iskander Development Region (located on 
the southern tip of the Malaysian peninsula) will be exempt from the “30% equity 
rule”—which requires 30% of equity to be held by bumiputera (ethnic Malays and 
other indigenous peoples)—this policy of positive discrimination will continue to 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Malaysia
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows peaked in 1997 at US$5.1bn 
(equivalent to 5.1% of GDP), but 
collapsed in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis to US$2.2bn in 1998. 
Inflows improved in 1999-2000, but 
plunged to US$600m in 2001, the lowest 
level since 1987, upon China’s admission 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
FDI inflows averaged around US$4bn a 
year in 2002-06, following an increase 
in government incentives. The bulk 
of FDI inflows into Malaysia usually 
consists of reinvested earnings by foreign 
multinationals companies operating in 
the country. At the end of 2006, the stock 
of FDI in Malaysia stood at US$53.6bn, 
equivalent to 36% of GDP.
Origin and distribution
According to the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), in 2006 the 
major foreign countries investing in 
Malaysia were Japan (21% of the total), 
the Netherlands (16.2%) and Australia 
(12.7%). MITI’s statistics are incomplete, 
however, because they measure the value 
of approved investments in manufacturing, 
but not services. Japan has traditionally 
had major production facilities in Malaysia. 
The focus of foreign investment in 2006 
was unusually narrow: the bulk of it went 
to the electronics and electrical goods 
sector, although there was also substantial 
foreign investment in chemicals, plastics, 
non-metallic mineral products, machinery 
and food-manufacturing. In electronics 
and electrical goods, foreign companies 
accounted for 85.8% of the value of total 
approved projects.
Determinants
Malaysia’s appeal as a destination for 
FDI—particularly FDI from new and 
innovative companies—has diminished, 
partly in the face of competition from 
China, and partly because the incentives 
on offer in Malaysia are being matched 
by other countries in the region. In 
recent years there has been a shift in 
foreign investment towards sectors that 
make use of Malaysia’s rich resources. 
Since the start of the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan, a medium-term spending plan 
covering 2006-10, the government 
has abolished the 30%-equity rule—a 
restriction on the ownership and control 
of companies imposed to raise the 
participation of the bumiputera (ethnic 
Malays and other indigenous peoples) 
in the economy—in some subsectors 
within manufacturing and services. 
Incentives are important: three-quarters 
of approved manufacturing projects 
proposed by foreign investors in 2005 
were given “pioneer” status, which 
accords them certain tax exemptions. A 
relatively well-educated workforce, good 
infrastructure (including the transport 
system) and strong foreign-language 
ability will mean that Malaysia remains 
an attractive investment destination in 
South-east Asia.
Impact
Foreign investment will continue to play 
an essential role in the leading sectors 
of the economy, helping to spur job-
creation in the technology sector, the 
transfer of technology, the growth of 
productivity and structural change in 
the economy. The importance of inward 
FDI to gross fixed capital formation has 
diminished in recent years, from an 
average of around 20% of the total before 
the Asian financial crisis to 15% in 2005. 
Despite a strong pick-up in 2006, when 
inward direct investment accounted for 
20% of gross fixed investment, we expect 
inward direct investment to average 
a more modest 16% a year during the 
forecast period. In recent years FDI 
inflows have also become more broad-
based, with more investment flowing into 
services and less into manufacturing, and 
this trend is likely to continue.
Potential
Access to the fast-growing Chinese 
market will continue to be a catalyst for 
regional change, forcing a move to higher 
value-added production and creating new 
opportunities in the commodity sector 
to satisfy Chinese demand. There will 
also be new opportunities in the services 
sector, including information technology 
(IT) services as well as manufacturing-
related services—areas targeted by the 
government. Privatisation is likely to 
receive a new boost as government-
linked corporations are reorganised, 
creating opportunities for strategic 
foreign investment. The government will 
look to outside investors to take stakes in 
some of the major national corporations, 
and will also seek strategic investors 
in information and communications 
technology (ICT), energy, infrastructure, 
tourism and finance. FDI inflows in 
2007-11 are projected to average about 
3% of GDP per year, which is near the 
emerging-market average.
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Singapore
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 8.71 8.72 1 3
Political environment 8.6 8.6 11 12
 Political stability 7.4 7.4 32 33
 Political effectiveness 9.7 9.7 1 1
Macroeconomic environment 8.3 8.6 20 13
Market opportunities 6.6 6.3 27 39
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.5 8.5 10 14
Policy towards foreign investment 9.6 9.6 2 1
Foreign trade & exchange controls 9.6 9.6 3 3
Taxes 9.0 9.0 3 2
Financing 9.6 9.6 6 8
Labour market 8.0 8.2 3 3
Infrastructure 9.3 9.3 6 9
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 107.4 116.7 132.2 146.7 156.6 167.0 179.9 192.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 136.2 149.6 166.1 178.3 190.9 205.3 219.7 234.9
GDP (% real change) 8.8 6.6 7.9 5.0 4.4 4.7 4.4 4.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 14.8 20.1 25.7 26.0 24.6 27.0 28.4 29.8
 % of GDP 13.8 17.2 19.5 17.7 15.7 16.2 15.8 15.4
 % of gross fixed investment 58.1 77.1 84.4 76.6 66.7 68.5 66.5 64.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 174.2 187.7 213.4 239.4 264.0 291.0 319.3 349.1
 % of GDP 162.2 160.9 161.5 163.2 168.6 174.2 177.5 181.1
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 8.5 5.5 8.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.9 9.4
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 108.0 110.5 118.6 127.5 136.4 145.4 154.3 163.7
 % of GDP 100.6 94.7 89.7 86.9 87.1 87.1 85.8 84.9
Key issues
The government has in recent years pushed up spending and intensified its efforts 
to restructure the economy. To this end, it is seeking to encourage innovation and 
to diversify the economy towards new services and consumer industries (away 
from lower value-added manufacturing). Higher value-added activities are being 
promoted to foster the development of a “knowledge-based” economy. Protected 
sectors, such as financial services, are being liberalised in an effort to increase 
overall efficiency. Various bilateral free-trade agreements have been negotiated 
to improve market access and encourage FDI. The government will also continue 
to focus on maintaining Singapore’s attractiveness as a destination for FDI by 
cutting corporation tax rates; the revenue losses are being offset by increases in the 
goods and services tax (GST). It will seek to balance the need to maintain business-
friendly fiscal policies with the growing need to address rising inequalities in 
income. The impact on poorer families of the higher GST rates, for example, is being 
mitigated by a system of GST credits. In all, despite increased competition from 
other Asian destinations, Singapore will remain an attractive location.
Business environment scores, 2007-11
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Foreign direct investment 
in Singapore
Stocks and flows
Singapore has been highly successful 
in attracting FDI. The stock of inward 
FDI stood at an estimated US$213.4bn 
in 2006, equivalent to around 160% of 
GDP. With strong growth of inflows in US 
dollar terms, FDI has accounted for over 
20% of nominal gross fixed investment 
expenditure every year since 1993. FDI 
inflows as a share of GDP averaged about 
10% a year in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and peaked at about 20% in 1999. The 
deterioration in the global electronics 
industry caused FDI inflows to fall from 
US$15.6bn (18.3% of GDP) in 2001 
to US$7.2bn (8.2% of GDP) in 2002, 
but a pick-up in this sector helped to 
raise inflows steadily since then to an 
estimated US$25.7bn (19.5% of GDP) in 
2006. Singapore has also been a major 
outward direct investor, particularly 
in China, Hong Kong and Malaysia. FDI 
outflows collapsed in 1998 following the 
Asian financial crisis, before recovering 
in 1999 and reaching a record high of 
US$20.3bn in 2001 (although a large 
part of this was attributable to a few 
large crossborder deals). Outflows fell 
to US$2.3bn in 2002 but have remained 
on a broadly upward trend since then, to 
stand at an estimated US$8.1bn in 2006. 
During the forecast period Singaporean 
companies are expected to continue to 
pursue their regional ambitions, thereby 
resulting in projected FDI outflows of 
close to US$9bn a year on average.
Origin and distribution
Around one-half of the stock of foreign 
investment in Singapore has come from 
the US. The second- and third-largest 
foreign investors are the EU and Japan, 
respectively. To date, inward FDI has 
been concentrated in manufacturing, 
with electronics attracting the largest 
proportion. In 2006 electronics 
accounted for around one-half of net 
investment commitments into Singapore. 
Determinants
There are many reasons why Singapore 
has been able to attract large volumes 
of FDI. The most important of these are 
its liberal investment climate, stable 
and uncorrupt political and business 
regime, world-class infrastructure, 
highly educated workforce, competitive 
economy and favourable tax system (with 
special incentives for FDI). Singapore 
initially focused on attracting companies 
that would help it to industrialise, 
but since then it has evolved into a 
base for research, high value-added 
manufacturing and distribution. As a 
result, it also provides support to the 
lower value-added assembly operations 
of multinational enterprises situated 
elsewhere in South-east Asia, where 
production and business costs are lower.
Impact
Foreign-owned companies, mainly 
multinational firms, account for three-
quarters of manufacturing output and 
almost 90% of manufactured exports. 
Since the early 1990s Singapore has 
been particularly successful in attracting 
firms that wish to establish value-
added services and production centres 
in the region, as well as acting as a 
research and development (R&D) base. 
This has provided opportunities for 
technology and information transfer—
most significantly in the electronics, 
pharmaceutical and financial services 
sectors. The economy relies heavily on 
foreign trade in terms of related services 
and re-exports. Exports of goods and 
services are estimated to have equalled a 
massive 252.6% of GDP in 2006.
Potential
According to the Economic Development 
Board (EDB), over one-half of 
investment commitments worth went 
into manufacturing projects in 2006, 
and much of the remainder went into 
services projects. The bulk of the 
investment commitments came from 
overseas investors. Despite increased 
competition in Asia for FDI flows, 
Singapore will remain an attractive 
destination for foreign investors 
during 2007-11, with its business 
environment remaining one of the most 
attractive in the world. FDI inflows will 
be enhanced by the increasing number 
of bilateral free-trade agreements 
that Singapore is negotiating, and the 
island state’s pivotal position within 
South-east Asia. Nevertheless, it has 
become an increasingly high-cost 
location. Accordingly, the government 
is now building on its high-quality 
physical and social infrastructure. 
Petroleum, electronics manufacturing 
and pharmaceuticals remain the 
prime magnets for investment, but 
the government is liberalising the 
financial and legal sectors, as well 
as telecommunications, in an effort 
to encourage the growth of the “new 
economy”. To this end it is trying to 
attract multinational corporations in 
high-technology sectors, as well as to 
turn the island into a financial hub. 
Other areas being promoted include life 
sciences and communications.
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Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.12 7.56 25 25
Political environment 7.1 7.2 25 26
 Political stability 7.0 7.0 37 40
 Political effectiveness 7.1 7.4 20 20
Macroeconomic environment 8.6 8.6 11 13
Market opportunities 8.1 7.6 4 13
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.5 7.3 29 27
Policy towards foreign investment 6.9 7.3 41 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.8 9.1 32 14
Taxes 7.0 6.9 19 30
Financing 5.9 7.4 45 33
Labour market 5.7 6.4 58 50
Infrastructure 7.8 7.9 22 27
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 48.1 48.3 48.7 49.0 49.2 49.4 49.6 49.7
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 680.5 791.4 888.0 964.9 1,078.2 1,200.9 1,316.0 1,445.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 993.8 1,061.4 1,117.5 1,163.2 1,223.2 1,307.3 1,391.4 1,478.2
GDP (% real change) 4.7 4.2 5.0 4.3 4.8 4.1 3.8 3.8
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 9.2 6.3 3.6 4.6 6.1 7.3 8.4 9.7
 % of GDP 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
 % of gross fixed investment 4.6 2.7 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 87.8 94.1 97.7 102.3 108.4 115.7 124.1 133.8
 % of GDP 12.9 11.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.4 9.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 4.7 4.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 32.2 36.5 43.6 50.7 57.9 64.9 71.9 79.3
 % of GDP 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5
South Korea
Key issues
The outlook for economic reform in South Korea is uncertain. The political authority 
of the president, Roh Moo-hyun, continues to weaken and, with jockeying for 
position by potential candidates ahead of the end-2007 presidential election 
already under way, is unlikely to recover in the remaining few months of his 
presidency. The main opposition party, the conservative Grand National Party 
(GNP), is currently well ahead in the opinion polls, and is the strong favourite 
to win power in the forthcoming election. Even under the GNP, however, pro-
business sentiment may not easily or automatically embrace foreign business as an 
equal partner. The government’s weakness may encourage increased trade union 
militancy. North Korea will continue to cast a long shadow over South Korea’s 
fortunes. Although inter-Korean relations are likely to remain generally peaceful, 
North Korea’s unpredictability means that an escalation of tension between the two 
countries cannot be discounted. On a more positive note, South Korean firms stand 
to benefit from rapprochement, particularly if they are allowed greater access to 
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Foreign direct investment 
in South Korea
Stocks and flows
With the exception of 2004, when they 
rose sharply on the back of a handful 
of high-profile deals, since 1999-
2000 FDI inflows have generally been 
disappointing, averaging US$2bn-4bn a 
year. Relative to the size of the economy, 
inward FDI also remains comparatively 
low. At end-2006 the stock of inward 
FDI stood at an estimated US$98bn, 
or around 11% of GDP. Outward direct 
investment has remained significant 
since the early 1990s, partly reflecting 
rising factor costs in South Korea, which 
have encouraged firms to establish 
operations in cheaper locations. The 
bulk of this investment has been in 
manufacturing. China and North America 
(mainly the US) have been the most 
favoured destinations for outward FDI; in 
2006 Asia and North America accounted 
for 56.5% and 20%, respectively, of 
South Korean outward FDI in value terms, 
according to data from the National 
Statistical Office. FDI outflows were 
not affected by the end-1997 financial 
crisis, and in balance-of-payments terms 
hovered around US$3bn-5bn a year 
in 1996-2005. Ceilings on investment 
in North Korea were removed in 1998, 
although the government maintains a list 
of restricted areas, including electronics 
and aerospace.
Origin and distribution
The US, Japan and the EU—principally 
Germany, the UK, the Netherlands 
and France—have been the largest 
foreign direct investors in South Korea 
since 1997. According to data from 
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Energy (MOCIE), the US, Japan 
and the UK accounted respectively for 
23.3%, 16.2% and 20% of the value of 
total inward FDI notifications in 2005. 
Services typically account for around 
80% of inward FDI notifications, with 
manufacturing making up most of the 
remainder. In terms of geographical 
distribution, most inward FDI is directed 
to the industrial heartlands in the south-
eastern Gyeongsang provinces and the 
area around the capital, Seoul.
Determinants
South Korea’s FDI regime used to be 
designed to protect domestic companies 
from foreign competition. Although 
accession to the OECD at end-1996 
brought some improvements, the 
restrictive nature of the regime remained 
broadly unchanged. The situation eased, 
however, in the wake of the financial 
crisis in 1997, as the government 
began to promote inward FDI in order 
to underpin the economic recovery. 
In November 1998 the government 
implemented the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Act, with the specific aim of 
creating a more transparent and open 
environment for FDI. It also increased 
the range of incentives for inward FDI, 
including tax exemptions and reductions 
for certain manufacturing businesses. 
Almost all sectors are now open to 
inward FDI. Despite the government’s 
official pro-inward FDI stance, South 
Korea’s inward FDI environment remains 
difficult by the standards of those of its 
competitors, owing to the continuing 
complexities of registration, notification, 
licensing and approval requirements. 
Other problems include inter-ministry 
turf wars, which frequently delay 
approvals.
Impact
The limited scale of FDI to date means 
that inward FDI has had only a small 
impact on gross fixed capital formation. 
FDI inflows accounted for an estimated 
1.4% of total gross fixed capital 
formation in 2006, a sharp fall from the 
peak of 7-8% recorded in 1999-2000. 
These rates compare with a range of 
between 0.5% and 2% for most of the 
early and mid-1990s.
Potential
Although FDI inflows are projected at 
US$4bn-10bn per year in 2007-11, this 
will remain well below the country’s 
absorptive potential. Despite boasting 
a market of nearly 50m (increasingly 
wealthy) people, one of the most 
advanced manufacturing bases in Asia 
and a government officially committed to 
encouraging inward FDI, South Korea is 
likely to remain one of the most difficult 
countries in Asia in which to invest. This 
will reflect a number of factors, including 
residual hostility towards foreign 
ownership of South Korean assets on 
the part of ordinary South Koreans, the 
continued lack of corporate transparency 
and, particularly since early 2003, 
increased labour militancy. As a result, 
annual FDI inflows will remain below 1% 
of GDP—far below the emerging-market 
average.
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Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.66 8.11 21 19
Political environment 7.1 7.1 25 29
 Political stability 7.0 7.0 37 40
 Political effectiveness 7.1 7.1 20 25
Macroeconomic environment 8.9 8.6 6 13
Market opportunities 6.9 6.7 23 26
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 7.5 8.0 21 21
Policy towards foreign investment 7.8 8.2 24 20
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.3 8.7 43 24
Taxes 8.4 8.4 6 6
Financing 7.4 8.9 24 18
Labour market 7.2 7.8 17 9
Infrastructure 8.3 8.9 17 17
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.7 22.8 22.8 22.9 23.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 322.2 346.4 355.7 367.0 396.1 422.8 449.5 484.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 617.1 661.4 712.3 760.8 815.8 870.6 927.5 987.3
GDP (% real change) 6.1 4.0 4.6 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.9 4.0
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.9 1.6 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.8 8.0
 % of GDP 0.6 0.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6
 % of gross fixed investment 2.8 2.3 10.3 9.7 8.3 7.3 7.2 7.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 40.3 41.9 49.4 56.6 63.3 69.8 76.6 84.6
 % of GDP 12.5 12.1 13.9 15.4 16.0 16.5 17.0 17.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 7.1 6.0 7.4 7.5 8.9 10.2 10.3 11.7
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 91.3 97.3 104.7 112.1 121.1 131.2 141.5 153.2
 % of GDP 28.3 28.1 29.4 30.6 30.6 31.0 31.5 31.6
Taiwan
Key issues
The government’s ability to implement its economic policymaking objectives 
is hindered by the opposition’s obstructiveness in parliament. Policy will focus 
on upgrading manufacturing and encouraging the development of services. 
Officials have been forced to prioritise these areas, as low-end manufacturing 
has largely relocated to mainland China. The government will also concentrate 
on cleaning up and consolidating the financial sector. Policies are also 
increasingly being directed at stemming rising income inequalities in the 
country. To this end, for example, the minimum wage was raised in July 2007. 
This agenda is affecting taxation policies, with tax reforms being focused, 
at least in the short term, on making the system more equitable rather than 
on improving the government’s overall revenue-collection performance. The 
need for broader tax reform is urgent, as the country suffers from a structural 
budget deficit, but the government fears that improving the corporate tax take 
by removing the large number of exemptions available would accelerate the 
relocation of local companies’ operations overseas.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Taiwan
Stocks and flows
FDI plays a less significant role in Taiwan 
than in most other Asian economies. 
According to the Central Bank of China 
(CBC, Taiwan’s central bank), even in the 
1990s—when inflows were significantly 
higher than they had been in the 1980s—
annual FDI inflows never exceeded 
US$3bn, equivalent to just 1% of GDP. 
FDI inflows rose to more than US$4bn a 
year in 2000-01, but this was the product 
of an unsustainable bubble in the global 
technology industry rather than the result 
of a structural upturn in foreign investor 
interest in Taiwan. FDI inflows fell to 
just US$453m in 2003. They averaged a 
relatively high US$1.8bn in 2004-05 and 
then surged to US$7.4bn in 2006, driven 
largely by investments in the financial and 
media sectors. Taiwan is a net investor 
abroad: the island’s stock of outward FDI 
is around double its inward stock. FDI 
data exclude much of Taiwan’s investment 
in mainland China, which many believe 
stands at a cumulative US$100bn over the 
past ten years.
Origin and distribution
According to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the largest foreign investors 
in Taiwan in recent years have been 
companies from the US, Japan and 
Europe. Reflecting Taiwan’s importance 
as a base for the manufacture—and, 
increasingly, the development—of 
information technology (IT) hardware, 
this sector has been the destination 
for most approved private foreign 
investment. The next most popular 
industrial sector has been chemicals. 
In the services industry, the banking 
and insurance sectors have attracted 
most foreign investment. As befits an 
increasingly sophisticated economy, non-
financial services and retail food and drink 
are attracting a growing share of FDI.
Determinants
Foreign investors are offered reduced 
tax rates, the opportunity of 100% 
foreign ownership and the right to 
repatriate 100% of investment capital 
and profits at any time. For firms wishing 
to establish research and development 
(R&D) centres in Taiwan, talent support 
is also available: engineers who have 
just left university may be permitted to 
take up a four-year contract with an R&D 
centre rather than enrolling in otherwise 
compulsory national service. Taiwan has 
an adequate infrastructure, an educated 
workforce, a strategic location and a pro-
business attitude. But foreign investors 
complain about inadequate protection 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
and difficulty in securing government 
contracts. The restrictions on links 
between Taiwan and China also cause 
problems: Taiwan continues to restrict 
the import of more than 2,000 products 
from China, despite the fact that both 
countries are members of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). Moreover, it 
remains difficult for companies to bring 
Chinese nationals to work on the island, 
and travel across the Taiwan Strait is 
restricted.
Impact
Apart from an exceptional period in 
2000-01 and in 2006, FDI inflows have 
traditionally made up around 2-3% of 
fixed investment expenditure, a relatively 
modest contribution compared with 
the rest of Asia, where foreign capital 
accounts for around 10% of total fixed 
capital formation. However, the raw 
figures understate the importance of FDI 
to the overall economy. For example, 
although the sums involved in the 
establishment by foreign firms of R&D 
facilities on the island may not be large, 
the “positive externalities” generated 
by the resultant inflows of expertise and 
technology are significant.
Potential
New privatisations, market liberalisation 
and the continued expansion of services 
will ensure a pick-up in FDI inflows 
over the forecast period. Further sales 
of state assets in the banking, oil, 
telecommunications, transport and 
power sectors are planned, and these 
should also lift inward FDI. However, 
Taiwan will find it increasingly difficult 
to compete with lower-cost China as a 
destination for manufacturing FDI. Many 
foreign companies will also be reluctant 
to invest in Taiwan until the government 
frees up economic links with the 
mainland. If restrictions on investments 
by mainland-Chinese companies in 
Taiwan were removed, it is likely that 
many would seek to invest on the island. 
However, many in Taiwan fear that 
allowing Chinese companies to invest 
could have significant repercussions 
for the island’s economic and political 
security, and as a result restrictions are 
likely to remain in place.
142 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
PART 2  COUNTRY PROFILES WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.71 6.81 37 42
Political environment 6.5 5.3 37 56
 Political stability 8.1 5.5 19 58
 Political effectiveness 5.2 5.2 42 46
Macroeconomic environment 8.6 7.8 11 36
Market opportunities 6.5 6.2 28 42
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.5 6.5 45 41
Policy towards foreign investment 7.3 6.4 33 61
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.8 8.7 32 24
Taxes 7.5 7.5 12 18
Financing 6.3 7.4 41 33
Labour market 6.4 7.0 44 31
Infrastructure 4.8 5.4 54 57
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 65.1 65.5 66.0 66.5 67.0 67.5 67.9 68.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 161.3 176.2 206.3 239.5 253.6 264.6 279.0 296.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 515.3 554.7 599.6 639.1 688.4 737.0 790.2 846.0
GDP (% real change) 6.3 4.5 5.0 4.2 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 5.9 9.0 9.7 8.5 8.7 9.2 9.0 9.0
 % of GDP 3.6 5.1 4.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.0
 % of gross fixed investment 14.0 17.6 16.5 12.8 12.0 11.8 10.5 9.5
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 53.2 58.3 68.0 76.5 85.2 94.4 103.4 112.4
 % of GDP 33.0 33.1 33.0 32.0 33.6 35.7 37.1 37.9
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 3.7 4.8 5.6 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.3
 % of GDP 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Thailand
Key issues
Thailand’s investment environment has been undermined by the deterioration in 
political stability since early 2006, culminating in the military coup in September 
of that year. A new government could be in place by early 2008, but there are 
concerns over how effective it will be—the most likely scenario is that it will be a 
weak coalition government. The interim military-appointed government’s efforts 
to amend the Foreign Business Act, ostensibly to prevent foreign investors from 
circumventing limits on foreign ownership of Thai firms, has also had a serious 
negative impact on foreign investor confidence. Progress on privatisation will be 
slow, with the government moving in mid-2007 to restrict the sale of state assets, 
particularly utilities. However, Thailand’s economy is expected to grow steadily, 
which will provide opportunities for investors interested in making sales into the 
local market. Thailand’s geographical position, at the centre of the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) free-trade area, is also proving an incentive. 
However, Thailand can no longer compete regionally for investment in labour-
intensive, low-tech industries owing to rising wages, and a lack of specialised 
workers is making it difficult for Thailand to move up the value-added chain.
Business environment scores, 2007-11
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Foreign direct investment 
in Thailand
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows (including re-invested 
earnings by companies already operate 
in the country) have increased sharply 
over the past five years. After falling 
to US$3.3bn in 2002, inflows rose to 
US$9.7bn in 2006, despite the upsurge 
in political instability in that year. The 
stock of inward FDI stood at 33% of GDP 
in 2006.
Origin and distribution
The privately owned manufacturing 
sector attracts the majority of FDI 
inflows into Thailand. In particular, 
automotive-parts manufacturers, and 
electronic and electrical appliance 
producers, have attracted significant 
foreign interest in recent years. Much of 
this investment has come from Japan—in 
1990-2006 Japanese firms invested a 
total of US$22.7bn, around 35% of the 
total inflow during this period. Other 
leading sources of FDI include Singapore 
(accounting for 17% of the total in 1990-
2006), the US (12%) and Hong Kong 
(8.4%). Geographically, FDI has been 
unevenly distributed in Thailand, with 
inflows into rural areas, particularly in 
the north of the country, deterred by 
a lack of adequate infrastructure and 
services.
Determinants
Thailand has traditionally been an 
attractive investment destination owing 
to its relatively low labour costs, a low 
cost of living, and flexible labour laws. 
Incentives offered by the Board of 
Investment (BoI, a government agency 
tasked with promoting investment) 
generally take the form of tax 
exemptions, with regard to corporate 
income tax and duties on imported 
machinery. The BoI also offers non-tax 
incentives, including permission to 
bring in foreign workers, own land and 
take or remit foreign currency abroad. 
Thailand has generally been regarded as 
open to foreign investment, but planned 
amendments to the Foreign Business 
Act, which were introduced in early 
2007, have been interpreted as being 
nationalistic. The changes are aimed at 
removing ambiguities in the law that 
have been used by foreign firms to evade 
restrictions already imposed on overseas 
ownership of firms in certain sectors.
Impact
A surge in FDI inflows, combined with 
the lower US dollar value of GDP as a 
consequence of the devaluation of the 
Thai baht during the Asian financial 
crisis, caused the ratio of FDI inflows to 
GDP to rise to 6.5% in 1998. This ratio 
fell to only 2.6% in 2002, but has since 
picked up, reaching 5.1% in 2005 and 
4.7% in 2006. The large scale of FDI in 
recent years has helped to bolster overall 
economic growth and has contributed to 
the development of Thailand as a regional 
export hub in a number of sectors, 
notably in automotives (particularly light 
pick-up trucks), electronics (hard-disk 
drives) and electrical appliances.
Potential
Thailand is currently in the midst of a 
political crisis following the September 
2006 military coup. Until a degree of 
political stability is restored, some 
foreign investors are likely to maintain a 
wait-and-see approach before pushing 
ahead with major investment plans. 
(However, based on the value and 
number of investment applications 
lodged with the BoI in the first half of 
2007, foreign firms remain keen to invest 
in the country.) Aside from concerns 
over short-term political instability, 
there are still a number of weaknesses 
that limit the potential for strong 
growth in FDI in Thailand in the next 
five years or so. The country has been 
losing its attractiveness as a location for 
investment owing to a rising cost base 
(particularly for labour) and uncertainty 
about the political commitment to 
liberalisation—particularly in key sectors 
such as telecommunications and utilities. 
The country’s poor infrastructure (a 
result of under-investment since the 
financial crisis) has been another factor 
deterring potential investors. The 
Thaksin Shinawatra government, which 
was ousted in the coup, had planned 
an ambitious five-year infrastructure 
development programme involving 
expenditure of Bt17trn (US$48.5bn). 
This programme has now largely 
been scrapped, but some transport 
development projects are moving 
forward, and the next government 
is likely to continue to push ahead 
with plans to upgrade the country’s 
infrastructure. Notwithstanding such 
weaknesses, Thailand continues to 
attract foreign investment by virtue of 
its leading position in the development 
of the ASEAN free-trade area and also 
because it is well positioned to service 
the growing Chinese market.
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 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.83 5.95 70 65
Political environment 5.2 5.3 50 56
 Political stability 6.3 6.3 48 49
 Political effectiveness 4.2 4.5 57 58
Macroeconomic environment 6.9 6.9 56 64
Market opportunities 5.7 6.3 50 41
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.8 5.5 67 58
Policy towards foreign investment 6.0 6.9 57 49
Foreign trade & exchange controls 5.1 7.3 66 59
Taxes 4.6 5.9 73 57
Financing 2.5 5.5 76 66
Labour market 5.7 5.9 58 62
Infrastructure 3.0 4.1 78 77
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 82.7 83.8 84.9 85.9 87.0 88.1 89.2 90.3
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 45.3 52.8 61.6 70.0 81.2 93.7 108.1 123.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 225.5 251.9 280.5 310.9 345.1 382.0 421.5 465.4
GDP (% real change) 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.7
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.6 2.0 4.1 4.4 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.7
 % of GDP 3.6 3.7 6.7 6.3 7.4 7.5 6.9 6.2
 % of gross fixed investment 10.7 11.2 20.6 18.7 21.1 20.7 18.7 16.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 21.7 23.6 26.3 30.7 36.7 43.7 51.2 58.9
 % of GDP 47.9 44.7 42.7 43.8 45.2 46.6 47.3 47.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Vietnam
Key issues
New legislation governing private enterprises and investment, which came into 
effect in mid-2006, will improve the operating environment for local and foreign 
investors, as will Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
which was completed in January 2007. The government will also push ahead with 
its plans to reform state-owned enterprises, and there will be progress in levelling 
the playing-field for private enterprises. Wage costs for unskilled labour will 
remain low, although shortages of skilled labour are becoming a problem. Vietnam 
moves up to 65th place out of 82 countries in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
global business environment rankings for 2007-11, but remains near the bottom 
of the regional rankings. Poor infrastructure and a cumbersome bureaucracy will 
remain key business environment weaknesses. The Communist Party of Vietnam 
will maintain a strong grip on power. The party will resist major political reform and 
will remain the dominant political force. The president, Nguyen Minh Triet, and the 
prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung, are set to remain in office during 2007-11. They 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Vietnam
Stocks and flows
FDI flows into Vietnam increased rapidly 
in the early to mid-1990s as liberalising 
reforms were launched. However, after 
peaking at US$2.2bn in 1997, annual 
FDI inflows fell back in 1998 as foreign 
investor sentiment soured in the wake 
of the 1997-98 Asian crisis. Annual 
FDI inflows continued to decline in the 
beginning of this decade, before picking 
up steadily over the following few years 
to reach US$4.1bn in 2006. At end-2006 
the estimated stock of inward FDI stood 
at US$26.3bn, equivalent to around 43% 
of GDP.
Origin and distribution
FDI has flowed in from a wide range of 
countries, a trend that has helped to 
stabilise inflows. At end-March 2007, 
Singapore was the leading source of FDI 
commitments, with a total of US$8.8bn 
in commitments. Other leading sources 
of commitments include Taiwan, Japan, 
South Korea and Hong Kong. Nearly 80% 
of all FDI commitments to date have 
gone to just six provinces: Ho Chi Minh 
City, Hanoi, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau and Haiphong. Ho Chi Minh 
City alone accounted for around 25% of 
all FDI committed in the country by the 
end of 2006. Heavy industry accounts 
for the bulk of FDI commitments, with 
nearly 27% of the total, followed by light 
industry, construction, agriculture, and 
transport and telecommunications.
Determinants
Foreign investors have generally been 
attracted to Vietnam’s rapidly expanding 
economy. Other favourable factors 
include its stable political scene and 
low-cost labour base. Vietnam has been 
viewed as an ideal alternative to China by 
many foreign investors keen to diversify 
their investment. In an effort to bolster 
foreign investor interest, the government 
has appeared willing to implement 
reforms, most notably eradicating 
discrimination by putting into effect a 
Unified Enterprise Law and a Common 
Investment Law in July 2006. Foreign 
investors are also now permitted to 
convert profits and principal into foreign 
exchange without any restrictions. 
Foreign investors, however, are still 
discouraged by pervasive red tape, in 
addition to problems involving access 
to land and capital. The government is 
aware of these difficulties, and is moving 
to tackle them.
Impact
Vietnam has received less FDI than most 
of its South-east Asian neighbours, 
and the impact of foreign investment 
has been less marked, with little in the 
way of technology transfer between 
foreign firms and joint-venture partners. 
Nevertheless, in recent years output by 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) has 
grown strongly, and in 2006 the value 
of their industrial output increased by 
almost 19%. Around 6% of this output 
is accounted for by the oil and gas 
industry, which is practically controlled 
by FIEs. Reflecting the export-oriented 
nature of many foreign firms operating 
in the country, FIEs’ share of exports 
stood at 58% in 2006, with exports 
growing by 23% year on year in US dollar 
terms, compared with growth of 21% 
in the export receipts of domestic firms 
(although much of the growth in exports 
by FIEs was accounted for by rising crude 
oil exports).
Potential
Vietnam joined the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in January 2007, a 
development that should bring about 
far-reaching changes to benefit foreign 
investors and increase the attractiveness 
of Vietnam as an investment destination. 
In particular, Vietnam will lower barriers 
to entry in a number of important sectors, 
such as insurance, banking and telecoms. 
However, the government’s reform 
rhetoric will remain more impressive 
than actual changes on the ground, as 
the authorities remain intent on limiting 
what they perceive as the more harmful 
effects of FDI. Thus, certain barriers and 
a degree of obstructive red tape will 
continue to deter some foreign investors. 
However, with the economy forecast to 
continue to post high rates of growth, 
foreign investors will remain keen to 
tap into the rapidly expanding domestic 
market, especially in the services sector. 
FDI inflows into Vietnam are projected to 
rise steadily over the medium term and 
to reach almost US$8bn by 2011. Annual 
FDI inflows in 2007-11 are forecast to 
average almost 7% of GDP.
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 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.70 6.33 55 57
Political environment 5.7 6.0 45 45
 Political stability 6.6 7.4 45 33
 Political effectiveness 4.9 4.9 45 57
Macroeconomic environment 5.8 7.8 71 36
Market opportunities 6.3 6.0 36 47
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.5 5.5 45 58
Policy towards foreign investment 6.0 6.4 57 61
Foreign trade & exchange controls 5.5 6.9 64 65
Taxes 4.6 5.2 72 70
Financing 4.8 6.3 59 57
Labour market 7.3 7.0 13 32
Infrastructure 5.6 6.3 45 46
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 38.2 38.6 39.0 39.4 39.7 40.1 40.5 40.9
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 153.1 183.2 214.3 245.6 278.2 310.7 343.3 372.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 510.3 574.0 640.7 705.4 762.3 812.5 863.2 913.8
GDP (% real change) 9.0 9.2 8.5 7.6 5.4 3.8 3.7 3.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.9
 % of GDP 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
 % of gross fixed investment 15.6 12.7 9.6 8.8 8.8 9.1 8.9 8.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 50.6 54.6 59.4 64.6 70.4 77.0 84.2 92.1
 % of GDP 33.0 29.8 27.7 26.3 25.3 24.8 24.5 24.7
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.4 1.2 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 21.6 22.9 25.0 25.5 26.0 26.5 27.0 27.5
 % of GDP 14.1 12.5 11.6 10.4 9.3 8.5 7.9 7.4
Argentina
Key issues
The challenge facing the next government that takes office in December 2007 
will be to bring about a smooth transition from the strong rebound after the 
deep recession in 2001-02 to more sustainable rates of GDP growth. The current 
government has restructured and reduced its external debt, but public debt, at 64% 
of GDP (excluding another 10% of GDP in “holdouts” that the government currently 
does not recognise), remains large as a share of national income. Following 
the early repayment of IMF debt in January 2006, the government regained full 
autonomy in policymaking. Political considerations will preclude rapid progress in 
reforming institutions and restoring the confidence of investors. In contrast with 
the market-oriented policies of the 1990s, the state will play a more active role 
in the economy. The renegotiation of public utilities contracts and dealing with 
energy shortages will move to the centre-stage of policymaking. The government 
is expected to continue to impose distortionary taxes and will seek to channel 
available resources into infrastructure without jeopardising its target of budgetary 
surpluses. However, this will only go some of the way to relieving the structural 
bottlenecks which impede Argentina’s prospects.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Argentina
Stocks and flows
During the first half of the 1990s, 
inflows of FDI were mainly attracted by 
the privatisation programme launched 
by the first Menem administration 
(1989-95). In contrast, most of the 
large-scale investment during the latter 
part of the decade came in the form of 
acquisitions of domestic private firms. 
After reaching US$24bn in 1999 (when 
a Spanish oil firm, Repsol, took over the 
local energy firm, YPF), FDI inflows into 
the Argentinian economy fell in every 
year between 2000 and 2003, reaching 
a trough of US$1.7bn in 2003, but they 
recovered substantially afterwards. FDI 
reached US$4.8bn in 2006. Most FDI 
inflows into Argentina were reinvested 
profits by local subsidiaries of foreign 
multinationals. The stock of FDI (at 
book value) reached US$59.4bn in 2006 
(27.7% of GDP). 
Origin and distribution
According to the latest available official 
estimates, in 2004 Spanish firms 
accounted for 22.2% of the stock of FDI, 
followed by US (21.7%), Dutch (8.7%), 
French (6.3%) and Chilean (4.4%) 
firms. Spanish firms initially invested 
mainly in privatised public utilities, but 
they have now moved into banking and 
petroleum. In 1992-2001, 43% of total 
FDI inflows went into services. The crisis 
that followed the collapse of the currency 
board hit European firms harder than 
US firms. As European firms disinvested 
after the crisis, firms from elsewhere 
in Latin America, mainly Brazil, Mexico 
and Chile, bought up cheap assets. After 
the devaluation of the peso, net FDI 
inflows into service-producing sectors 
were negative, whereas FDI into goods-
producing sectors was positive. In 2004 
the main recipients of FDI inflows were 
petroleum (with FDI reaching US$2.1bn), 
the motor vehicle industry (US$606m) 
and food, beverages and tobacco 
(US$419m). More recently, firms outside 
the region have become more active 
again, with medium-sized investments in 
banking.
Determinants
FDI has mostly flowed into oil and gas, 
arable land and mineral resources. 
Petroleum investment has tended to 
weather economic turmoil better than 
investment in other areas. Mining 
investment has also proved resilient, 
encouraged by a more investor-friendly 
regime. Argentina has attracted investors 
hoping to take advantage of a relatively 
affluent and protected domestic market. 
Efficiency-seeking investment has been 
less common, and has been mainly 
limited to the automobile industry, where 
special government incentives have 
been in place for over a decade. Since 
the devaluation, FDI has been attracted 
by a weak currency, with acquisitions 
accounting for the bulk of inflows and 
relatively little greenfield investment. 
Recent FDI in services (including 
information technology—IT) has been 
attracted by a skilled workforce and 
relatively low wages. 
Impact
The presence of foreign subsidiaries 
has brought positive spillovers 
(both within and across industries) 
in manufacturing, but only where 
domestic firms have proved sufficiently 
adaptable. In other cases, increased 
competition from foreign investors, or 
a preference on the part of the latter for 
foreign suppliers, damaged local firms. 
Telecommunications is one example 
of a sector where the quality of service 
and technology was transformed by 
foreign investment. However, prior to 
2001, limited competition kept prices 
and profits high. Foreign investors own 
most of the country’s privatised utilities. 
Their reluctance to invest since the crisis 
(as the maxi-devaluation in effect broke 
the terms of their contracts) has led to 
a decline in service. The contribution 
of foreign firms to local research and 
development (R&D) activities has been 
marginal. 
Potential
Over the forecast period, the major 
attractions for FDI will be an expanding 
domestic market, a still competitive 
exchange rate, strong natural resource 
endowments, including rich mineral 
deposits, and, to a lesser extent, 
Argentina’s potential as a base for 
manufacturing. A relatively large and 
cheap pool of skilled human capital, 
together with a large stock of natural 
resources, constitute Argentina’s long-
term advantages. Uncertainty over the 
regulatory framework, especially in 
infrastructure, will be the main negative 
factor, but the Economist Intelligence 
Unit expects the renegotiation of 
contracts with investors in privatised 
utilities gradually to improve the 
situation.
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Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.53 6.69 41 46
Political environment 6.2 6.2 40 40
 Political stability 8.1 8.1 19 16
 Political effectiveness 4.5 4.5 51 58
Macroeconomic environment 7.8 8.0 33 25
Market opportunities 7.1 7.1 19 18
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.3 6.5 33 41
Policy towards foreign investment 7.3 7.3 33 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.9 7.8 47 51
Taxes 4.7 4.7 69 78
Financing 7.0 7.0 27 43
Labour market 6.6 6.5 32 48
Infrastructure 5.5 5.8 46 52
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 181.6 184.2 186.8 189.3 191.9 194.4 196.8 199.5
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 663.6 882.0 1,067.4 1,267.1 1,394.7 1,422.7 1,454.2 1,483.5
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,507.1 1,598.2 1,705.7 1,809.3 1,925.9 2,048.6 2,180.8 2,317.7
GDP (% real change) 5.7 2.9 3.7 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.7
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 18.2 15.2 18.8 34.5 27.0 25.0 25.0 26.0
 % of GDP 2.7 1.7 1.8 2.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
 % of gross fixed investment 17.0 10.6 10.5 15.4 10.4 9.1 8.7 8.6
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 161.2 195.6 214.3 248.8 275.8 300.8 325.8 351.8
 % of GDP 24.3 22.2 20.1 19.6 19.8 21.1 22.4 23.7
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 9.5 2.5 28.2 5.0 10.0 8.0 9.1 10.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 69.2 79.3 107.5 112.5 122.5 130.5 139.6 149.6
 % of GDP 10.4 9.0 10.1 8.9 8.8 9.2 9.6 10.1
Brazil
Key issues
Policy improvements over the past decade have placed Brazil on a path of 
sustainable, albeit moderate, growth. An inflation-targeting regime has 
helped to bring inflation closer towards OECD levels, exchange-rate volatility 
has been reduced, real incomes are expanding and interest rates are declining 
(although they remain high). A large domestic market, natural resource wealth 
and a welcoming attitude to foreign investment have attracted foreign firms 
across a wide array of sectors. However, the current president, Luis Inácio 
Lula da Silva, of the left-wing Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), who began his 
second four-year term in January 2007, seems unlikely to capitalise on his 
government’s strong starting position to put forward any ambitious structural 
reforms. Brazil’s overall business environment remains impaired by weak political 
effectiveness, which hampers efforts to reform a complex and burdensome tax 
system, improve regulation, tackle crime and address deficiencies in the labour 
market and bottlenecks in the physical infrastructure. These shortcomings will 
continue to restrict investment expansion, constraining GDP growth to below the 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Brazil
Stocks and flows
In absolute terms at least, Brazil is one of 
the three largest recipients of FDI among 
emerging-market economies. The stock 
of inward FDI totalled US$214bn in 2006, 
almost twice as high as the 2001 stock 
of FDI. At just 20%, however, Brazil’s 
ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP is low 
by international standards. Average 
annual inflows of FDI fell back in 2000-06 
following a privatisation-induced peak 
in the late 1990s, but inward FDI started 
to pick up in 2006 and has been surging 
in 2007, amid strong inflows into export-
oriented extractive and associated 
activities. Outward FDI has risen strongly 
in recent years, as the appreciation of 
the Real has facilitated Brazilian firms’ 
expansion abroad. Most outward FDI 
is directed towards Argentina and the 
US. The outward stock of FDI stood at 
US$107.5bn at end-2006, roughly 10% 
of GDP.
Origin and distribution
The US still accounts for the lion’s 
share of FDI inflows into Brazil, 
although in the past decade inflows 
from Europe have risen, particularly 
into telecommunications and financial 
services, in response to the government’s 
privatisation programme. In the past 
couple of years, new emerging markets, 
notably India, Mexico and Colombia, 
have become a more significant source of 
FDI. In 2002-06, 19% of FDI inflows came 
from the US, 20% from the Netherlands, 
8% from the Cayman Islands (a tax 
haven) and around 6% each from 
France and Spain. In 2001-06 services 
accounted for 54% of inflows, with a 
further 38% channelled into industry and 
just over 7% into agriculture. Inflows 
since the beginning of 2007 have been 
characterised by a marked increase 
in flows channelled into industry, 
accounting for 47% of the total of just 
over US$25bn in inflows recorded in the 
first half of the year.
Determinants
As steady low-inflationary economic 
growth underpins sustainable growth of 
real incomes, Brazil—the world’s fifth-
most populous country and the tenth-
largest in terms of GDP—is becoming 
an increasingly attractive location 
for market-seeking FDI. Brazil is also 
the world’s third-largest agricultural 
exporter and a major producer and 
exporter of hard commodities and 
processed goods, such as iron ore, 
steel and aluminium. The country has 
an extensive and diversified industrial 
base, ranging from heavy engineering 
to consumer goods, with most of 
these sectors having attracted foreign 
investment. Trade liberalisation in the 
1990s and a more proactive policy of 
export promotion in the past five years 
have boosted the attractiveness of other 
sectors. As a result, most of the world’s 
100 largest multinational companies are 
investing in Brazil.
Impact
Evidence concerning the impact of 
increased FDI on aggregate productivity 
is inconclusive, but it is clear that 
increased foreign participation has 
boosted modernisation of public utilities 
(in particular in telecoms). Foreign 
investors have made strong inroads into 
the retail sector, with the three largest 
supermarket chains now controlled by 
France’s Casino (in a 50/50 shareholding 
with Brazil’s Pão de Açúcar), Carrefour 
(another French chain of super- and 
hypermarkets) and the US’s Wal-Mart. 
The pulp and paper sector is also 
attracting significant foreign investment. 
Traditionally, FDI has been directed to 
the most developed south-eastern states, 
but in the past decade an increasing 
share has been channelled into southern 
states (automotive, food and beverages, 
tobacco) and the north-eastern states 
(automotive, retail).
Potential
Brazil is expected to attract sustained, 
if moderate, inflows of FDI in the 
medium term as its market size, natural 
resource endowment and political and 
macroeconomic stability will partly 
compensate for deficiencies in the 
business environment. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s forecasts envisage 
that, conscious of the increasing urgency 
of tackling logistical bottlenecks that 
constrain growth, the government will 
accelerate efforts to attract private 
including foreign investment into the 
physical infrastructure, primarily through 
the new public-private partnership (PPP) 
mechanism. Steady economic growth, 
coupled with a sustained increase in 
real incomes, will open new avenues for 
investors in the consumer goods and 
retailing industries. There may also be 
fresh opportunities in natural resource 
sectors, especially in those activities 
currently suffering restrictions, such as 
mining.
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 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.77 8.04 19 20
Political environment 7.8 7.9 19 17
 Political stability 8.5 8.1 16 16
 Political effectiveness 7.1 7.8 20 18
Macroeconomic environment 8.9 9.2 6 2
Market opportunities 5.9 6.1 44 45
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 8.5 8.8 10 10
Policy towards foreign investment 9.1 9.6 6 1
Foreign trade & exchange controls 9.1 9.6 9 3
Taxes 7.4 6.9 13 28
Financing 8.5 8.5 18 24
Labour market 6.7 6.6 31 46
Infrastructure 5.9 7.3 39 33
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 16.1 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.8 16.9 17.1 17.2
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 95.8 118.9 145.8 158.1 170.3 174.5 175.7 184.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 175.3 190.9 204.3 221.2 238.5 257.1 276.1 296.5
GDP (% real change) 6.0 5.7 4.0 5.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.9
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 7.2 7.0 8.1 10.0 9.8 10.9 11.8 12.0
 % of GDP 7.5 5.9 5.5 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.7 6.5
 % of gross fixed investment 39.2 28.4 28.7 31.8 27.3 27.6 27.6 25.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 60.5 73.9 82.0 92.0 101.8 112.7 124.5 136.5
 % of GDP 63.2 62.2 56.2 58.2 59.8 64.6 70.8 74.0
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 17.4 21.4 24.2 27.1 30.2 33.5 36.9 40.6
 % of GDP 18.2 18.0 16.6 17.1 17.8 19.2 21.0 22.0
Chile
Key issues
Chile began a process of structural reform in 1974, some 15 years earlier than 
the rest of Latin America and most other developing countries. There is strong 
consensus among the governing elite on the desirability of maintaining a liberal 
market economy and pursuing prudent fiscal and monetary policies. Differences 
in economic policy tend to be a matter of degree rather than substance. Reforms 
already under way will further enhance the attractiveness of the business 
environment over the next few years by promoting a more transparent judicial 
system, cutting red tape, opening the capital markets and liberalising the 
financial sector further. Diversification of exports since the 1980s, particularly 
into agriculture, viniculture and fisheries, has reduced the country’s dependence 
on copper, although copper still accounted for 56% of export earnings in 2006. 
Chile’s network of free-trade agreements, particularly those with the US, the EU 
and China, and a forthcoming deal with Japan, give Chile privileged access to the 
world’s richest and largest markets. Such access, combined with low country risk 
and continued investment in human capital and physical infrastructure, will ensure 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Chile
Stocks and flows
Annual FDI inflows peaked in 1999 
at US$9.9bn, mostly owing to the 
takeover by Spain’s Endesa of two 
leading electricity companies in Chile, 
Enersis and Endesa. FDI inflows have 
remained robust since then, reaching 
US$8.1bn (5.5% of GDP) in 2006. Further 
investment opportunities have lifted 
FDI in 2007, when it is forecast to reach 
a new peak of US$10bn (6.4% of GDP). 
Strong FDI inflows have raised the stock 
of FDI, which reached US$82bn (56.2% 
of GDP) in 2006, the largest ratio to GDP 
of FDI stock in the region. Although 
Chile’s basic infrastructure is reaching 
maturity, and there are few chances 
that the remaining state companies will 
be privatised, annual FDI inflows are 
forecast to remain robust in 2007-11, 
averaging just over 6% of GDP—still 
high by historical comparison—led by 
investment into telecommunications, 
mining, energy and transport, livestock, 
aquaculture and tourism. In recent 
years Chile’s importance as a regional 
investor has increased, particularly in 
the airline, shipping and retail sectors. 
FDI outflows totalled US$2.8bn in 2006, 
and are forecast to rise further as Chilean 
companies continue to expand abroad.
Origin and distribution
The US remains the largest investor, 
accounting for 25.3% of FDI into Chile in 
the period from 1974 to 2006. However, 
Spanish companies have been the most 
active foreign investors in recent years, 
raising the country’s share of cumulative 
FDI flows to 21.7% (a result, among other 
things, of the acquisition by Spanish 
companies of leading local operators 
in energy and telecoms, and heavy 
investment in transport infrastructure 
projects through build-operate-transfer—
BOT—concessions). Canada is the third-
largest source country, with 16.4% of the 
total, as a result of its strong participation 
in local mining ventures. These countries 
are followed by the UK (8.9%); Australia 
(4.8%); Japan (2.9%); and Italy (2.6%). 
Mining accounts for 33.2% of the total 
foreign investment in Chile since 1974, 
compared with 20.1% into utilities 
(electricity, water and gas); 10.3% into 
communications; 10% into financial 
services; 4.6% into the chemical industry; 
3.6% into the food and beverages 
industry; 3.3% into insurance; and 2.3% 
into other manufacturing industries. 
Other sectors have received smaller FDI 
injections, including construction and 
the retail, forestry, aquaculture and 
agricultural sectors.
Determinants
The regime governing foreign investment 
has been in place for three decades, during 
which time it has been one of the most 
liberal in the world. Based on the principle 
of non-discrimination between local 
and foreign investors, foreign investors 
are able to sign formal contracts with 
the state that guarantee them access to 
foreign exchange at the best market rate 
for the repatriation of capital and profits. 
Investors also enjoy additional protection 
as a result of the rapidly expanding 
network of investment-protection accords 
and double-taxation treaties signed 
with other countries. Generally sound 
regulation, combined with political and 
economic stability and firm growth, have 
helped to boost FDI inflows since the 
early 1990s. Chile’s managerial talent 
and comparatively well-qualified labour 
force, together with a reputation for order 
and safety, are also combining with the 
country’s rapidly expanding network of 
free-trade agreements to attract a growing 
number of multinationals to use the 
capital, Santiago, as their headquarters for 
Latin America.
Impact
FDI funded a growing share of gross 
fixed investment in Chile in the 
1990s, averaging 25.5% of gross fixed 
investment in 1996-98, compared with 
10.4% in 1990-92. In 1999 currency 
depreciation and depressed domestic 
private investment lifted the ratio to 
61.1%, but this fell back to 28.5% in 
2000. In 2001-06 FDI funded 28% of the 
gross fixed investment that materialised 
in Chile in that period, contributing to 
the modernisation of infrastructure, 
including telecoms. FDI has also made 
a major contribution in terms of the 
transfer of technology and managerial 
expertise, and has helped to open access 
to foreign markets for Chilean investors.
Potential
Transparent business operating 
conditions, a healthy economy and an 
enviable network of free-trade, double-
taxation and investment-protection 
accords will combine with the most 
modern infrastructure in Latin America 
and a growing pool of skilled labour to 
ensure that Chile continues to attract 
substantial FDI inflows. Services will 
overtake mining as the main magnet 
for foreign investment in the forecast 
period, but opportunities will also grow in 
agro-industry, aquaculture, the utilities, 
telecoms and communications, as well as 
in tourism infrastructure.
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Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.74 6.26 53 59
Political environment 4.5 5.2 64 59
 Political stability 4.4 5.1 70 62
 Political effectiveness 4.5 5.2 51 46
Macroeconomic environment 7.2 7.5 45 44
Market opportunities 5.7 5.3 50 61
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.8 6.5 42 41
Policy towards foreign investment 6.9 7.3 41 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.4 7.8 54 51
Taxes 4.4 4.4 75 80
Financing 5.9 6.6 45 48
Labour market 6.3 6.6 47 47
Infrastructure 4.4 5.5 60 56
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 44.9 45.6 46.3 47.0 47.6 48.3 48.9 49.6
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 98.1 122.9 136.0 167.5 171.4 165.3 165.9 174.1
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 325.9 351.6 386.5 415.6 445.5 473.4 502.0 531.4
GDP (% real change) 4.9 4.7 6.8 5.1 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 3.1 10.3 6.3 8.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.5
 % of GDP 3.1 8.3 4.6 4.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.2
 % of gross fixed investment 17.0 41.3 20.2 18.5 13.8 12.6 11.3 10.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 24.7 36.8 44.8 52.8 59.3 65.3 70.8 76.3
 % of GDP 25.2 30.0 32.9 31.5 34.6 39.5 42.7 43.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.1 4.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 4.4 8.9 10.0 11.0 11.9 12.7 13.4 14.1
 % of GDP 4.4 7.3 7.4 6.6 6.9 7.7 8.1 8.1
Colombia
Key issues
In an effort to restore the fragile authority of the state, the president, Álvaro 
Uribe, who began his second four-year term in office in August 2006, has taken a 
hard line against the country’s guerrilla groups. This strategy has reaped rewards, 
with levels of violence falling to their lowest point in decades. Nevertheless, the 
security climate remains fragile, limiting Colombia’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors. Right-wing paramilitary forces were fully demobilised in 2006, but 
long-term benefits will hinge on whether the legal framework for demobilisation 
succeeds in permanently dismantling organisational structures. Economic policy 
is likely to remain orthodox during the remainder of Mr Uribe’s second term, which 
will improve the macroeconomic environment, as well the climate for foreign 
investment. However, challenges remain: the government faces rising inflationary 
pressures arising from strong domestic demand, as well as still-high levels of public 
debt. In spite of reforms to the tax and transfer systems, fiscal inflexibility remains 
a key weakness. An active liability management strategy has improved the maturity 
profile of the country’s external debt and reduced exposure to currency volatility, 
but Colombia’s liquidity ratios remain high.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Colombia
Stocks and flows
Inflows of FDI rose from an annual average 
of US$818m in 1990-94 to a record 
US$10.3bn in 2005, but this included 
the one-off effect of acquisitions of 
large Colombian companies by foreign 
multinationals, such as the US$4.7bn 
purchase of a beer producer, Bavaria, 
by SABMiller (UK) and the US$300m 
acquisition of a tobacco producer, 
Coltabaco, by Philip Morris (US). By 
historical standards, inward FDI remained 
high at US$6.3bn in 2006. The stock of FDI 
stood at US$44.8bn at the end of 2006, 
representing almost 33% of GDP, up from 
US$24.7bn in 2004 (25.2% of GDP). FDI 
outflows have traditionally been modest. 
However, FDI outflows from Colombia rose 
sharply to US$4.7bn in 2005, reflecting an 
outflow of US$3.3bn as part of the shares 
exchange between Bavaria and SABMiller. 
In 2006 outflows fell back again, closer to 
trend, to around US$1.1bn.
Origin and distribution
There is some uncertainty with regard 
to the origin of FDI into Colombia, but it 
seems clear that the importance of the 
US, Spain and South American countries 
as inward investors is understated in 
official FDI statistics, as much of this 
investment is channelled through 
offshore tax-havens such as the Cayman 
Islands, Panama and the British Virgin 
Islands, which together account for 
around one-third of the non-oil FDI 
stock. In 2006 official data indicate 
that 48% of FDI came from the US, 23% 
from Europe, 8% from Central America 
and 3% from South America. Since the 
mid-1990s FDI inflows have traditionally 
been concentrated in the oil sector, in 
financial services and in public utilities. 
In 2006 non-oil mining accounted for 
32% of FDI inflows, followed by oil (28%), 
transportation and telecommunications 
(13%) and manufacturing (11%). After 
years of sluggish performance, FDI in oil 
rose significantly in 2006, attracted by 
high international oil prices and improved 
contract terms.
Determinants
In the first half of the 1990s large oil 
discoveries attracted investment, and 
financial liberalisation during the same 
period led to the entrance of foreign 
banks. In the second half of the decade 
FDI was encouraged by privatisation and 
concessions in electricity distribution, 
gas, coal and telecoms. Political 
and economic instability, delays in 
privatisation, the maturation of oilfields 
and increased risk-aversion towards Latin 
American assets caused FDI inflows to 
underperform in 1998-2002. However, 
there has been a strong recovery since 
late 2003, reflecting stronger confidence 
in Colombia’s prospects, and also an 
attractive new regulatory and tax regime 
in the oil sector, as well as strong global 
commodity prices.
Impact
The impact of FDI inflows on aggregate 
productivity and export competitiveness 
has been limited because most 
investment has been directed towards 
capital-intensive natural resource sectors 
or the acquisition of existing facilities 
in non-tradeable services. However, FDI 
has helped to boost export earnings, 
particularly in the hydrocarbons and 
mining industries. FDI in the financial 
sector has improved asset quality and 
productivity, but spreads between 
deposit and lending interest rates remain 
wide. Manufacturing has benefited from 
technology transfer in activities such as 
chemicals, petrochemicals and plastics. 
Telecoms services users have also 
benefited from improved technologies 
and higher levels of competition. 
FDI in the retail sector has increased 
competition, forcing incumbents to 
modernise and expand.
Potential
Assuming that economic conditions 
remain solid and security does not 
deteriorate, Colombia has the potential 
to attract around US$6bn in FDI annually. 
This could be higher if a free-trade 
agreement with the US is ratified, as the 
assurance of permanent market access to 
the US would offer additional security to 
investors. Privatisation and concessions 
will require foreign participation, owing 
to the low financial and technological 
capacity of local firms. Concessions 
for utilities and infrastructure will be 
granted in the medium term. Exploitation 
in the energy and mining sectors will 
also require international capital. The 
government recently introduced long-
term stability contracts, which will 
protect investors from tax and regulatory 
changes. The private sector will continue 
to pursue alliances and joint ventures 
with international corporations, 
principally in manufacturing and 
services. Nonetheless, uncertainty about 
the future of the internal conflict or 
setbacks on fiscal consolidation could 
keep FDI inflows below the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s baseline forecasts. 
Other limitations include infrastructure 
deficiencies and a shortage of highly-
skilled labour. 
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 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.65 7.02 38 39
Political environment 5.8 6.2 42 40
 Political stability 7.4 7.4 32 33
 Political effectiveness 4.5 5.2 51 46
Macroeconomic environment 7.8 8.0 33 25
Market opportunities 7.4 7.7 13 10
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.0 5.3 51 61
Policy towards foreign investment 7.8 7.8 24 25
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.6 15 3
Taxes 5.5 5.6 47 62
Financing 7.4 7.4 24 33
Labour market 6.0 6.7 51 39
Infrastructure 5.2 6.1 48 48
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 105.0 106.2 107.4 108.7 110.0 111.2 112.5 113.8
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 683.5 767.7 840.0 876.4 905.3 952.4 1,000.8 1,054.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,017.5 1,077.7 1,162.3 1,225.6 1,302.3 1,383.8 1,469.1 1,557.7
GDP (% real change) 4.2 2.8 4.8 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 22.4 19.7 19.0 21.3 21.5 22.5 23.7 24.5
 % of GDP 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3
 % of gross fixed investment 16.6 13.2 11.1 11.5 10.8 10.5 10.3 9.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 197.5 217.2 236.2 257.5 279.0 301.5 325.2 349.7
% of GDP  28.9 28.3 28.1 29.4 30.8 31.7 32.5 33.2
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 4.4 6.5 5.8 5.8 6.8 6.7 7.7 8.5
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 22.2 28.0 33.8 39.6 46.4 53.1 60.8 69.2
 % of GDP 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.6
Mexico
Key issues
Continued commitment to orthodox fiscal and monetary policy will help to 
consolidate policy credibility and ensure macroeconomic stability. However, a 
number of weaknesses in Mexico’s policy environment are likely to persist. The tax 
system is convoluted and characterised by evasion; labour market regulations are 
complex and inflexible; and private enterprise is hindered by a weak competition 
policy and political resistance to the liberalisation of some sectors, including 
energy. Structural reform in these areas would help to tackle the poor levels of 
competitiveness, address a looming crisis at the state-owned oil company, Pemex, 
secure long-term fiscal sustainability and raise GDP growth rates. Reform has, 
however, been hampered for several years by Congress, which is dominated by the 
opposition. Felipe Calderon, who began a six-year term as president in December 
2006, is proving markedly more successful than his predecessor in obtaining 
legislative backing, and there is renewed optimism about the chances for passage 
of structural reforms. However, the more politically sensitive reforms are likely to 
be watered down substantially. Consequently progress will only be gradual, and FDI 
inflows will remain below potential.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(US$ bn)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Mexico
Stocks and flows
Mexico is the largest host of FDI in 
nominal terms in Latin America. Its 
stock of FDI is estimated to have reached 
US$236bn (28% of GDP) at end-2006. 
However, FDI inflows into Mexico 
have remained short of potential. As a 
percentage of GDP, inflows averaged 
3% in 1996-2006, equal to Brazil but 
below China (3.5% of GDP) and Chile 
(6.5% of GDP). FDI inflows peaked 
in 1995-98, immediately following 
implementation of the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
again in 2000-02, reflecting the sale 
of several government assets in a 
privatisation move, as well as merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity. Annual 
inflows have been volatile, with peaks 
in 2001 and 2004 mainly reflecting M&A 
activity. FDI inflows fell back in 2005 to 
US$19.7bn (2.6% of GDP) and slipped 
further, to US$19bn (2.3% of GDP) in 
2006. Outflows of FDI are small compared 
with inflows, but high relative to most of 
the rest of the region, reflecting activity 
by a very small number of Mexican 
multinational companies. Mexico’s stock 
of outward FDI stood at US$33.8bn at 
end-2006. 
Origin and distribution
Since NAFTA came into force in 1994, 
almost two-thirds of FDI inflows have 
come from the US and Canada and around 
one-quarter from the EU (two-thirds of 
this from Spain). The implementation 
of NAFTA prompted a boom in FDI into 
manufacturing in the second half of the 
1990s; in 1994-99 it accounted for just 
over 60% of FDI. Within the sector, the 
automotive industry and electronics and 
computer industries, particularly those 
related to maquila (offshore assembly 
for re-export), received the majority. 
In the past five years, inflows have 
shifted from low-technology to higher-
tech manufacturing activity. At the 
same time, the lifting of restrictions on 
foreign ownership of banks in 1998 and 
considerable reform and consolidation 
in the sector have attracted substantial 
FDI inflows into financial services. These 
accounted for 25% of all inflows in 
2001-06 (although manufacturing still 
accounted for almost half of all inflows). 
Determinants
NAFTA provided the main stimulus 
to the sharp rise in FDI inflows of the 
past decade: annual average inflows 
rose from US$2.6bn in 1980-93 to 
US$14.1bn in 1994-2004. Mexico’s 
geographical location and openness to 
trade are allowing it to graduate from 
being a supplier of cheap manufacturing 
labour to the US to becoming more 
closely integrated in the production and 
distribution systems of US industry. In 
sectors where “just-in-time logistics” 
and transportation costs are crucial to 
competitiveness, Mexico’s locational 
advantages have more than compensated 
for higher labour costs relative to 
emerging markets such as China. Reform 
and consolidation have attracted 
investment in other sectors, such as 
financial services. 
Impact
For much of the decade following NAFTA’s 
implementation, FDI funded a growing 
share of gross fixed investment. FDI 
rose from 6% of gross fixed investment 
in 1980-93 to 17% in 1995-2001. Since 
then, the trend has been downwards, as 
improvements in bank balance sheets 
and cheaper financing have encouraged 
greater domestic financing of fixed 
investment. FDI has had an important 
impact on the transformation and 
modernisation of Mexican industry, with 
a first wave of inflows aimed at investing 
in maquila (particularly electronics, 
computers and cars), followed by a 
second wave of investment channelled 
into other branches of manufacturing. 
Potential
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects 
FDI inflows to rise to close to US$25bn by 
the end of the forecast period (although 
as a share of GDP they are likely to remain 
stable at around 2.4%). This assumes 
that the government’s track-record of 
pro-market orthodox economic policy 
continues, that structural reform makes 
gradual progress, and that global growth 
trends are positive. An expanding 
network of free-trade agreements creates 
potential for expansion of inflows from 
outside of the US, particularly the EU. 
Export-oriented industries will continue 
to be the primary destination of inflows, 
but there will also be growth, from a 
low base, of inflows directed at the 
domestic market, given its large size 
and projected growth in disposable 
incomes and consumer credit. Nationalist 
sentiment will continue to limit growth 
of FDI in certain sectors, but progress 
on liberalisation and regulatory 
reforms would boost opportunities 
for foreign investment in energy and 
telecommunications in particular.
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Venezuela
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.81 4.30 71 81
Political environment 3.8 3.1 75 78
 Political stability 4.8 4.0 64 74
 Political effectiveness 2.9 2.3 76 81
Macroeconomic environment 5.2 5.2 76 81
Market opportunities 4.8 5.0 69 67
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.8 2.5 67 79
Policy towards foreign investment 4.6 3.3 73 80
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.0 5.1 61 77
Taxes 5.1 4.4 62 79
Financing 4.8 4.4 59 75
Labour market 4.9 4.8 76 79
Infrastructure 5.2 5.4 48 57
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 26.0 26.5 26.9 27.3 27.8 28.2 28.6 29.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 112.5 144.8 181.9 212.8 209.0 207.2 211.3 214.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 157.9 179.5 203.8 219.3 231.1 244.6 257.8 271.2
GDP (% real change) 18.3 10.3 10.3 5.2 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.5 2.6 -0.5 -2.4 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.1
 % of GDP 1.3 1.8 -0.3 -1.1 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
 % of gross fixed investment 7.2 8.8 -1.3 -4.7 2.4 3.8 3.8 3.6
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 42.4 44.4 45.4 43.0 44.2 46.2 48.3 50.4
 % of GDP 37.7 30.7 25.0 20.2 21.2 22.3 22.9 23.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.6 1.2 2.1 2.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 9.2 9.5 11.6 13.9 14.7 15.5 16.3 17.0
 % of GDP 8.2 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.7 8.0
Key issues
Despite its oil riches, Venezuela will remain one of least attractive investment 
locations among emerging-market economies. The operating environment has 
long been a challenge for investors because of weak institutions and persistent 
cycles of boom and bust. However, conditions have deteriorated in recent years as 
a result of political conflict and the erosion of the legal framework for investors, 
and the political and policy environment is set to weaken further under the 
current president, Hugo Chávez. The politicisation of already weak institutions 
will impair mechanisms to contain corruption and entrench chronic bureaucratic 
inefficiency. Price and exchange controls will complicate business operations and 
create economic distortions. Promotion of a state-led model of development will 
hit private enterprise and competition. Although not officially restricted, foreign 
investment will be limited by the growing risk of expropriation of private assets as 
the government undertakes a programme of nationalisation of “strategic” sectors. 
Even where FDI remains welcome, terms for businesses will be increasingly onerous, 
given growing competition from the state and an emerging emphasis on links with 
investors from “friendly” countries.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Venezuela
Stocks and flows
At end-2006 the stock of FDI was 
estimated at US$45.4bn, or roughly 
25% of GDP. This is in the mid-range of 
the major Latin American economies, 
well below Chile (56% of GDP), in the 
same range as Mexico (28% of GDP), and 
significantly above Brazil (20% of GDP). 
During the opening of the oil sector in 
1996-98, inward FDI peaked at an annual 
average of US$4bn a year (5% of GDP). 
By historical standards, inward FDI held 
up well in the first three years of the 
presidency of Hugo Chávez, averaging 
US$3.8bn per year in 1999-2001. 
However, inflows declined precipitously 
as political conflict intensified in 
2002-04. In this period, inward FDI 
averaged just US$1.4bn per year. 
Inward FDI showed some signs of 
recovery in 2005, but lagged well behind 
overall economic activity. In 2006, for 
the first time ever, inward FDI was a 
negative US$543m, largely reflecting 
disinvestment by foreign oil companies 
in the face of forced revisions to the 
ownership structure of their operations. 
As a result of this, the stock of FDI in 
Venezuela is forecast to fall in 2007, to 
US$43bn (20.2% of GDP).
Origin and distribution
Venezuela’s hydrocarbons sector is the 
main magnet for FDI. US and European oil 
companies have major investments in the 
country, even after recent changes to the 
ownership structure of most contracts. 
After hydrocarbons, the banking and 
communications sectors have been 
the main targets of FDI. Spanish banks 
have the largest foreign presence in 
the financial sector, over 50% of which 
is now owned by foreign companies. 
Other notable FDI inflows come from 
Chile, mainly in forestry activities, and 
from Canada, in the mining industry. 
Venezuela is actively courting new 
investment partners in Brazil, China, 
Russia and Iran, but as yet the amounts of 
FDI into Venezuela from these countries 
are still relatively small.
Determinants 
Following a period of booming 
FDI inflows in the 1990s, driven 
by oil and telecommunications 
openings, an uncertain political and 
policy environment and a volatile 
macroeconomic climate have served to 
keep FDI below potential, particularly 
in the non-extractive sectors. In the 
extractive sector, FDI inflows have been 
affected by the Chávez government’s 
more restrictive hydrocarbons 
investment regime. The new regime 
partly reverses the oil opening of the 
1990s by mandating that Petróleos 
de Venezuela (PDVSA, the state oil 
company) hold a minimum 51% stake in 
most activities, and raises the national 
take from taxes and royalties in the 
sector. 
Impact
Foreign investment in the hydrocarbons 
sector initially led to accelerated growth 
of output in the sector, from 2.4m 
barrels/day in 1994 to a peak of 3.4m 
b/d in 1999. Fresh foreign investment 
has driven a partial recovery in output in 
recent years following a crippling general 
strike in 2002-03, the effects of which are 
still being felt by PDVSA. Receipts from 
the oil sector account for roughly half of 
total fiscal revenue. Foreign involvement 
has had a less dramatic impact in other 
sectors, but has contributed to the 
start of a much-needed consolidation 
of the banking system, and to better 
infrastructure and increased competition 
in telecoms. As FDI has flowed mostly 
into capital-intensive industries, its 
impact on employment and skills levels 
has been limited. 
Potential
Potentially attractive opportunities for 
FDI exist in an array of sectors, such 
as oil and gas, petrochemicals, coal, 
aluminium, gold, forestry, power, 
tourism and telecoms. There is additional 
potential in some manufacturing 
and agricultural niches. A relatively 
good transport infrastructure and a 
strategic geographic location are further 
comparative attractions. However, FDI 
will be hit by the nationalisation of 
utilities in 2007. The nationalisation 
programme appears likely to curb FDI 
inflows well into the medium term, as it 
adds to concerns about macroeconomic 
stability and about the weakness 
of the legal framework protecting 
investor interests. The drawing up of a 
constitutional reform likely to be put 
to referendum in 2008, which could 
redefine the number of strategic sectors 
whose development is reserved for the 
state, will have a particular bearing on 
future investment prospects. Even where 
foreign companies are still attracted to 
Venezuela, there may be favouritism on 
the part of the Chávez government for 
investment from countries with which 
Mr Chávez is keen to develop links on 
ideological (socialist) grounds.
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Azerbaijan
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.53 5.30 73 72
Political environment 3.9 4.1 72 73
 Political stability 4.4 4.8 70 66
 Political effectiveness 3.6 3.6 65 70
Macroeconomic environment 7.2 7.8 45 36
Market opportunities 6.0 6.2 42 43
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.0 3.8 75 76
Policy towards foreign investment 4.6 5.1 73 73
Foreign trade & exchange controls 5.1 7.3 66 59
Taxes 4.0 5.3 79 69
Financing 2.5 4.0 76 77
Labour market 4.7 5.2 78 74
Infrastructure 4.4 4.4 60 74
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 8.7 13.2 19.9 28.7 38.0 46.8 55.5 64.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 37.8 49.2 68.2 83.6 98.4 111.1 122.6 131.7
GDP (% real change) 10.2 26.4 33.0 17.5 9.5 5.2 5.0 6.0
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 3.6 1.7 -0.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
 % of GDP 41.1 12.7 -3.6 5.2 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.6
 % of gross fixed investment 71.0 30.7 -11.2 17.6 14.9 13.1 12.0 11.2
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 11.5 13.2 12.5 14.0 15.6 17.2 18.9 20.5
 % of GDP 132.7 99.4 62.8 48.5 40.9 36.8 33.9 31.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 2.5 3.7 4.3 5.5 6.8 8.2 9.7 11.3
 % of GDP 28.5 27.8 21.5 19.0 17.8 17.5 17.4 17.5
Key issues
The legal and regulatory environment for foreign investment in the hydrocarbons 
sector will remain comparatively favourable, although growing oil-related revenue 
will result in the government becoming more assertive when drawing up new 
contracts with foreign investors. Rising oil and gas output, and relatively high 
foreign investment—which in the hydrocarbons sector is relatively insensitive to 
the overall investment climate—will ensure rapid real GDP growth rates over the 
next few years, although the large inflows of oil-related revenue, in conjunction 
with fiscal loosening, will result in considerable inflationary pressure. The 
government has not yet developed a strategy for managing oil revenue over the 
long term, and instead is focusing on short-term goals, such as increases in public-
sector wages. Rising revenue will reduce the government’s incentive to implement 
deeper structural reforms, as will resistance from domestic industrial business 
groups. The reforms needed to improve the business environment and encourage 
more diversified growth—such as greater transparency in public governance and 
banking sector reforms—will proceed only slowly.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Azerbaijan
Stocks and flows
In per-head terms, Azerbaijan has 
been among the most successful of 
the members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in attracting 
FDI, and with a stock per head of 
US$1,480 in 2006 was second only to 
Kazakhstan. The stock of inward FDI as 
a share of GDP in 2006, at 62.8%, is one 
of the highest in the region. FDI inflows 
were equivalent to an annual average of 
about 30% of GDP in 2002-05, but 2006 
FDI inflows turned negative, owing to the 
repatriation of capital by hydrocarbons 
investors. FDI had fallen sharply in 
2000-01, owing to increased efforts by 
the largest energy consortium in the 
country, the Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company (AIOC), to recover 
operating costs, delayed investment 
and uncertainties over negotiations 
concerning the construction of a main 
export pipeline. However, from 2002 
FDI started to rise again, as AIOC 
began massive investment in oilfield 
development, construction of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil export pipeline and 
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline picked up, 
and development of offshore gasfields 
got under way. Inflows declined again 
from 2005, as the major construction 
work in the hydrocarbons sector was 
completed.
Origin and distribution
The origin of FDI in Azerbaijan is 
reflected in the distribution of shares 
in AIOC. UK companies hold 34% of 
AIOC shares, US companies 25%, Japan 
holds 14%, Norway 9% and Turkey 
around 7%. Russian companies are also 
important investors in non-oil sectors. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of FDI (more than 
90% in 2004-06) has been directed to 
the oil industry. FDI inflows are heavily 
concentrated in the Baku region, where 
most of the oil industry is located. The 
second most important destination 
for FDI is the neighbouring industrial 
city of Sumgait, where the country’s oil 
refining and petrochemicals industries 
are located.
Determinants
FDI inflows to Azerbaijan have been 
almost entirely driven by its oil and gas 
endowment. Outside the hydrocarbons 
sector there has been little FDI activity—
in 2004-06 less than 10% of total FDI 
inflows were directed towards sectors 
other than oil and gas. This is mainly 
attributable to a poor investment climate 
and severe bureaucratic obstacles, 
as well as infrastructure constraints. 
Azerbaijan’s law provides for standard 
investment incentives: free repatriation 
of profits; guarantees against 
nationalisation without compensation; 
exemption from customs duties on 
imported materials and equipment; a 
ten-year guarantee against “damaging” 
legislation; and preferential treatment in 
development areas.
Impact
FDI inflows have helped to cover 
Azerbaijan’s large current-account 
deficits and have been an important 
engine of growth. Oil and gas 
investments have contributed most 
to GDP growth since 1995, and FDI 
into these sectors has created positive 
spillover effects in other parts of the 
economy. However, as FDI has been 
narrowly based and directed to a capital-
intensive sector, it has not generated 
substantial levels of employment. 
Nevertheless, the spillover effects in 
services and construction have led to 
rising employment in these areas.
Potential
Estimates of Azerbaijan’s oil reserves 
have risen in recent years, indicating 
that there is still great potential for FDI 
inflows into the hydrocarbons sector, 
although the resolution of the country’s 
Caspian Sea borders with Iran and 
Turkmenistan will be a prerequisite for 
the development of several offshore 
fields. Downstream activities, such as 
petrochemicals and related industries, 
could also prove attractive to investors. 
Although there will also be opportunities 
in other areas—for example, in 
manufacturing sectors such as food-
processing—securing FDI inflows into 
sectors other than oil and gas will depend 
in the long term on structural reforms, 
progress in privatisation, the creation of 
a more transparent investment climate, 
and an improvement in infrastructure. 
Whereas the business environment for 
large oil companies is comparatively 
favourable, operating conditions for non-
oil companies are generally perceived 
to have deteriorated over the past three 
years, as growing oil wealth has allowed 
the authorities to become more assertive 
in their relations with foreign investors.
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Bulgaria
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.89 6.77 49 44
Political environment 5.5 6.2 47 40
 Political stability 7.0 7.4 37 33
 Political effectiveness 4.2 5.2 57 46
Macroeconomic environment 7.2 7.5 45 44
Market opportunities 4.9 5.5 65 56
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 4.8 6.5 58 41
Policy towards foreign investment 6.9 7.3 41 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.9 8.7 47 24
Taxes 5.4 6.5 51 35
Financing 5.1 6.3 56 57
Labour market 6.4 6.8 44 38
Infrastructure 5.9 6.6 39 41
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 24.3 26.7 31.5 37.8 41.5 42.8 44.4 46.0
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 64.6 70.7 77.2 83.6 90.6 97.8 105.0 111.8
GDP (% real change) 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.1 4.7 4.1
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 3.5 3.9 5.2 3.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
 % of GDP 14.2 14.5 16.4 9.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3
 % of gross fixed investment 68.3 60.9 62.6 32.0 16.7 15.4 14.2 12.8
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 9.8 13.0 20.9 24.4 26.6 28.9 31.3 33.8
 % of GDP 40.1 48.6 66.2 64.4 64.1 67.5 70.6 73.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5
 % of GDP 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.4
Key issues
Bulgaria’s gradually improving business environment is reflected in its rise of five 
places in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s rankings between 2002-06 and 
2007-11. In addition to continuing EU integration, the improvement is driven by a 
stable economic policy backdrop. Since the financial crisis of 1996-97, the economy 
has grown steadily under an IMF-backed currency board that keeps the external 
value of the lev fixed to the euro. Although the economy’s external balance is 
under strain from rapidly growing imports, fiscal policy has been very tight and the 
government budget has been in surplus since 2004. Despite higher private-sector 
borrowing, the debt/GDP ratio is falling owing to public-sector debt repayments, 
and foreign-exchange reserves are high. The main risks to stability are the current-
account deficit, which rose to 15.9% of GDP in 2006, and inflation, which could 
frustrate Bulgaria’s hopes of adopting the euro by 2010. The main impediments 
to a higher business environment rating are corruption, organised crime and the 
lack of an independent judiciary. Corporate tax rates are low—at 10% in 2007—and 
employers’ social security contributions were cut in January 2006. They will be cut 
further in October 2007.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Bulgaria
Stocks and flows
The stock of inward FDI in Bulgaria at the 
end of 2006 was US$20.9bn. Annual FDI 
inflows have been substantial in recent 
years, and in 2006 some significant 
privatisations and reinvestment of local 
earnings by foreign parent companies 
brought the annual total up to a record 
high of US$5.2bn. FDI penetration of the 
economy, as measured by the share of 
the inward FDI stock in GDP, was at 66% 
the third-highest in the region in 2006 
(behind only Estonia and Hungary). With 
the privatisation of the financial sector 
having been largely completed and many 
of the government’s industrial assets 
already under private ownership, there 
has been a gradual re-direction of FDI 
towards the real estate, transport and 
domestic trade (wholesale and retail) 
sectors in recent years.
Origin and distribution
According to figures from the Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB, the central bank), 
manufacturing accounted for 27% of the 
stock of FDI at the end of 2006. However, 
the share of manufacturing has declined 
from almost 50% in 1999. Of the total 
FDI stock, 17% was directed to financial 
intermediation, reflecting the process of 
financial market development. Most large 
state-owned banks have already been 
sold off. Real estate; transport, storage 
and communication; and wholesale and 
retail trade all accounted for around 
15% of the stock of FDI as at end-2006. 
Austria was the largest foreign investor at 
the end of 2006, with US$4bn, followed 
by the Netherlands (US$1.5bn), Greece 
(US$1.4bn), the UK (US$1.4bn) Germany 
(US$850m), Italy (US$660m) and the 
US (US$657m). The country ranking by 
investing country has varied from year to 
year, with individual deals often making a 
substantial difference.
Determinants
Bulgaria’s performance in attracting 
FDI was disappointing for most of 
the 1990s, owing to a poor business 
environment, a record (up to 1997) of 
macroeconomic and political instability, 
ineffective public administration, a harsh 
tax regime and the unpredictability 
of rules affecting foreign investors. 
An additional factor deterring foreign 
investors was the regional instability 
associated with conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia. Privatisation was also slow 
to start: the most attractive industrial 
enterprises were not offered for sale 
until 1997 or later, and sales of telecoms 
and power-distribution assets were only 
completed in 2004, with many energy 
sector privatisations still to be carried 
out. However, the investment climate 
has improved greatly in recent years, 
as greater macroeconomic and political 
stability, stronger economic growth and 
the prospect of EU membership have 
boosted investors’ confidence. Low labour 
costs for a relatively skilled workforce 
are an attraction, although high social 
security costs and low productivity may 
offset some of the advantages of cheap 
labour. There are a number of agreements 
on mutual protection and promotion of 
FDI, as well as double-taxation treaties. 
Foreign investments are granted 
full national treatment and, above a 
certain value threshold, provided with 
institutional support.
Impact
Although accurate figures for the 
contribution of foreign-owned 
companies to the Bulgarian economy 
are difficult to find, FDI in Bulgaria has 
been a prominent engine of growth for 
the economy and especially for export 
production. Foreign owners have played 
the main role in the modernisation of the 
country’s financial and telecoms systems. 
In addition, FDI inflows to Bulgaria have 
played an important stabilising role for 
the country’s balance of payments, which 
has experienced large current-account 
deficits.
Potential
FDI inflows will continue to be high 
by historical standards, albeit lower 
than in 2005-06, over the next few 
years. Infrastructure investment 
and improvements in the economic 
climate and the regional political 
situation should contribute to a more 
attractive environment for investment. 
Privatisation-related inflows are set to 
play a smaller role, as the energy sector is 
the only branch remaining for large-scale 
privatisation and several asset sales in the 
electricity sector have proved difficult. 
However, capital-intensive investment 
projects in the water, electric power, 
coal mining and transport sectors should 
keep annual inflows of FDI high over the 
forecast period. FDI inflows are projected 
to decline steadily as a share of GDP, 
although the annual average ratio in 
2007-11 is still expected to be around 6%.
162 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
PART 2  COUNTRY PROFILES WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Czech Republic
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.03 7.55 28 26
Political environment 7.1 7.2 25 26
 Political stability 8.1 8.1 19 16
 Political effectiveness 6.1 6.5 31 31
Macroeconomic environment 7.8 8.0 33 25
Market opportunities 6.3 6.8 35 25
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.5 7.3 29 27
Policy towards foreign investment 8.2 8.2 17 20
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.1 15 14
Taxes 4.7 6.2 69 48
Financing 6.6 7.4 31 33
Labour market 7.2 7.3 18 25
Infrastructure 7.3 8.0 25 25
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.1
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 109.6 125.0 142.5 163.4 180.0 187.1 192.6 199.7
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 174.9 191.9 210.2 226.3 241.4 258.9 276.0 292.4
GDP (% real change) 4.6 6.5 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 5.0 11.6 6.0 6.5 6.0 4.5 4.8 5.1
 % of GDP 4.5 9.3 4.2 4.0 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
 % of gross fixed investment 17.6 37.3 16.7 15.6 12.8 9.1 9.3 9.5
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 57.3 60.7 77.5 84.0 90.0 94.5 99.3 104.4
 % of GDP 52.2 48.5 54.4 51.4 50.0 50.5 51.5 52.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.0 0.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 3.8 3.6 5.1 6.1 6.8 8.3 10.3 12.6
 % of GDP 3.4 2.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 5.4 6.3
Key issues
The Czech Republic’s macroeconomic environment is currently favourable but 
worries about the sustainability of the present strong economic performance 
remain. Economic growth has been robust, inflation is relatively low, with little 
risk that it will rise sharply, and the current-account deficit is also relatively 
small. However, there are still important policy initiatives that need to be taken 
in order to lay the basis for sustainable long-term growth, such as dealing with 
the country’s fiscal problems and preparing for entry to European economic and 
monetary union (EMU). The government still needs to undertake comprehensive 
reform of the health, pensions and tax systems. Labour costs are among the highest 
in the region, which is partly a reflection of the extremely high social welfare taxes 
imposed on employers. Consensus on deeper structural reform could prove to be 
elusive in the current fractured political environment, which is characterised by 
ideological differences between the coalition parties and the administration’s lack 
of a parliamentary majority. However, the wide-ranging reforms carried out in 
previous years will ensure that the Czech Republic will maintain the second-best 
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Foreign direct investment 
in the Czech Republic
Stocks and flows
The stock of inward FDI in the Czech 
Republic was US$77.5bn at the end 
of 2006. The stock of inward FDI as a 
share of GDP stood at 54%, and the 
stock per head (at US$7,570) was the 
third-highest in the region, behind 
Estonia and Hungary. Although 
privatisation opportunities will soon dry 
up, steady inflows of FDI should come 
from reinvested earnings of foreign-
owned firms and some new greenfield 
investments.
Origin and distribution
The Netherlands is the largest foreign 
investor (with 28% of the inward FDI 
stock at the end of 2005), not only 
because of investments by Dutch 
companies, but also because of the 
large number of overseas investors 
investing through European subsidiaries 
established in the Netherlands for tax 
reasons. Germany’s commercial and 
industrial links with the Czech Republic 
have long made it the second-largest 
inward investor (with 19.9% of the 
inward FDI stock at the end of 2005). A 
significant portion of FDI inflows into the 
Czech Republic has been concentrated 
in the services sector (about 55% of 
total FDI as of the end of 2005), and 
disproportionately in Prague and large 
cities. Manufacturing has been the 
second-largest beneficiary (38% of total 
FDI stock in 2005), especially transport 
equipment (particularly automotives 
and related components), chemicals, 
metal products and electrical and 
optical equipment. More investment is 
now being directed towards more high-
technology sectors and research and 
development (R&D). 
Determinants
As an early reformer in east-central 
Europe, the Czech Republic led the 
way in the early 1990s in adopting far-
reaching stabilisation, liberalisation 
and privatisation programmes. The 
implementation of EU rules and 
regulations has also helped to improve 
the business environment and attract 
FDI. However, investors have cited 
problems, such as the overbearing 
bureaucracy, as well as high levels of 
taxation: the Czech Republic’s overall 
tax burden is one of the highest in 
Europe. Generally lower wage costs than 
in western Europe and a strengthening 
institutional environment over the next 
few years means that the Czech Republic 
will continue to serve as a manufacturing 
base for the EU, further integrating with 
European supply chains, and increasingly 
serving as a hub for back-office and other 
support services. The attitude of the local 
business community and the general 
public is broadly positive towards foreign 
investment. 
Impact
Firms that have received FDI account for 
72% of total exports of manufactures and 
48% of industrial production. FDI inflows 
have been a significant factor behind the 
strength of gross fixed investment: in 
2001-06 FDI averaged just over 25% of 
gross fixed investment. They have also 
had a significant impact on industrial 
restructuring in certain industries. For 
example, car production was 854,907 
units in 2006, the highest in the region, 
following major capital investment 
programmes by Volkswagen (Germany) 
and the Toyota Motors (Japan) and PSA 
Peugeot-Citroën (France) alliance. In 
addition, FDI has played an important 
role in financing the Czech Republic’s 
large current-account deficits: average 
FDI inflows exceeded by a considerable 
margin the average current-account 
deficit in 2001-06.
Potential
With an advantageous geographical 
location in the EU, the country remains 
attractive to foreign investors despite the 
strong competition offered by Slovakia, 
which is a cheaper and more tax-friendly 
neighbour, and which was preferred 
as a location by two large automotive 
investors, PSA Peugeot-Citroën and 
Hyundai (South Korea). Nevertheless, the 
Czech Republic is to be the beneficiary 
of a third major injection of cash into its 
automotive sector, following Hyundai’s 
decision in May 2006 to build a new car 
factory in the country. More generally, 
foreign investment in the Czech Republic 
will be underpinned by a steady flow of 
smaller investments by medium-sized 
companies from Europe and elsewhere 
that aim to reduce costs while retaining 
most of the conveniences associated with 
doing business in Western markets. The 
sale of some residual state shareholdings 
will play a much smaller part, as overall 
progress on privatisation will be sluggish, 
owing to disagreements within the ruling 
coalition, as well as obstructionist tactics 
on the part of the opposition.
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Hungary
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.79 7.12 32 35
Political environment 6.7 7.1 33 29
 Political stability 7.8 7.8 27 27
 Political effectiveness 5.8 6.5 35 31
Macroeconomic environment 6.1 5.8 70 78
Market opportunities 5.9 5.5 44 56
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 7.0 7.8 25 24
Policy towards foreign investment 8.2 8.7 17 12
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 8.7 15 24
Taxes 5.2 6.0 56 52
Financing 6.6 7.4 31 33
Labour market 6.8 6.8 27 35
Infrastructure 6.8 7.6 28 30
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.8
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 102.2 111.6 112.9 129.9 139.1 141.5 149.0 158.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 157.9 169.5 181.2 190.4 201.4 214.6 228.7 242.9
GDP (% real change) 4.8 4.2 3.9 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.8 3.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 4.5 7.5 6.1 4.8 4.8 5.9 5.4 4.8
 % of GDP 4.4 6.8 5.4 3.7 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.0
 % of gross fixed investment 19.7 30.0 24.6 17.3 15.8 18.6 15.6 12.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 62.6 61.3 81.8 86.5 91.4 97.3 102.7 107.5
 % of GDP 61.2 54.9 72.4 66.6 65.7 68.8 68.9 67.7
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.1 1.8 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 6.0 8.0 12.7 15.5 18.5 21.5 24.5 27.7
 % of GDP 5.9 7.2 11.2 12.0 13.3 15.2 16.5 17.4
Key issues
Economic and institutional change in Hungary has been among the most 
thoroughgoing of the east-central European countries undergoing the transition 
to a fully-fledged market economy. However, foreign businesses still cite as 
problems the cumbersome nature of Hungarian bureaucracy and a lack of 
transparency. Hungary’s low corporate tax rate is in large part offset by hefty 
social security contributions. High fiscal deficits have led to a deterioration in 
public debt levels and the external accounts. The government’s fiscal austerity 
package (introduced in the months following the April 2006 parliamentary 
election) has reassured markets, although buoyant global risk appetite has also 
helped. The fiscal measures rely overwhelmingly on tax increases and subsidy 
cuts, which the authorities hope will reduce the budget deficit by about 5 
percentage points over 2007-08. However, sustainable fiscal consolidation can 
only be achieved through the implementation of structural expenditure reforms, 
but the authorities have yet to outline detailed reform measures for 2008 and 
beyond. The risk facing Hungary is of a global shock, combined with insufficient 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Hungary
Stocks and flows
Hungary was among the most successful 
countries in the world in attracting 
FDI in the 1990s. FDI inflows averaged 
about 6.5% of GDP per year until 2001, 
although this figure fell in 2002-03 
before recovering in 2004-06. Inward 
FDI into Hungary in 2005 was boosted 
significantly by the purchase of 75-year 
operating rights for Budapest Airport 
by the UK-based BAA for €1.83bn 
(US$2.3bn). FDI inflows remained 
robust in 2006, and a large portion 
was made up of inter-company loans 
from foreign parent companies to 
Hungarian subsidiaries. The stock of FDI 
at end-2006 amounted to US$81.8bn, 
or 72% of GDP (this represented the 
second-highest level of FDI penetration 
in the region, behind only Estonia). 
Hungary has become one of the main 
capital exporters among the transition 
countries. The Hungarian petroleum and 
natural gas company MOL has been the 
largest Hungarian investor. Hungary’s 
largest bank, the National Savings Bank, 
OTP, has also embarked on a foreign 
expansion programme. 
Origin and distribution
More than 30,000 joint ventures and 
foreign subsidiaries are registered 
in Hungary, and 35 of the world’s 50 
largest multinational companies have 
a Hungarian subsidiary. About 80 
international companies have their 
regional headquarters in the country. 
Almost 85% of the foreign investment 
in Hungary comes from the EU15. The 
main investor countries at the end of 
2005 were Germany (28% of the total), 
the Netherlands (15%) and Austria 
(11%). Investment has been highly 
concentrated, with most foreign capital 
going to the central region around 
Budapest, or to western Hungary around 
Gyor. Some 41% of FDI, as of the end 
of 2005, has gone into manufacturing, 
concentrated mainly in the automotive 
sector, electronics, finance, chemicals, 
and food and beverages.
Determinants
Hungary has attracted large volumes of 
FDI for a number of reasons. It started 
reform early, so that many Western 
companies were already familiar 
with doing business in the country. 
Hungary also pursued policies generally 
favourable towards foreign investment, 
and operated special tax incentives for 
foreign investors. Political stability and 
a skilled pool of labour are other factors 
that have attracted foreign investors. 
Perhaps the primary factor was that the 
sale of state assets to foreign investors 
formed the cornerstone of Hungary’s 
privatisation strategy. Hungary’s 
membership of the EU means that 
there is full legal protection for foreign 
investment.
Impact
FDI has played a significant role in 
modernising production and redirecting 
trade from east to west, a process that 
began with an aggressive privatisation 
policy in the mid-1990s. Foreign-owned 
companies account for more than three-
quarters of Hungary’s foreign trade, 
one-third of its GDP and one-quarter of 
private-sector employment. Currently, 
foreign firms control some two-thirds 
of manufacturing, nine-tenths of 
telecommunications and three-fifths 
of the energy sector. Restructuring 
has been most rapid in foreign-owned 
sectors. Some foreign companies are 
also beginning to locate research and 
development (R&D) facilities in their 
Hungarian subsidiaries. On the negative 
side, Hungary’s cost base is no longer 
as attractive as in the past, and there 
have already been instances of investors 
relocating to lower-cost destinations.
Potential
With privatisation nearly complete, 
FDI will be based mainly on greenfield 
investment and reinvested earnings. 
Despite the erosion of Hungary’s previous 
competitive edge, movement up the 
value-added chain should help to attract 
future investment. Low value-added 
investment will move to lower labour cost 
locations, such as Romania, Bulgaria 
or Ukraine. Apart from large deals, 
foreign investment will be underpinned 
by a steady flow of smaller investments 
by medium-sized companies from 
Europe and elsewhere that are aiming 
to reduce costs but to retain most 
of the conveniences associated with 
doing business in Western markets. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit expects 
inward FDI to average around US$5bn 
per year in the medium term, with a large 
share of this in the form of reinvested 
earnings.
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Kazakhstan
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.10 5.60 66 69
Political environment 4.6 4.8 62 61
 Political stability 5.9 6.3 52 49
 Political effectiveness 3.6 3.6 65 70
Macroeconomic environment 8.3 7.5 20 44
Market opportunities 5.8 6.7 47 27
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.3 4.3 73 72
Policy towards foreign investment 5.1 3.7 66 76
Foreign trade & exchange controls 5.5 7.3 64 59
Taxes 4.8 5.1 68 74
Financing 4.4 5.5 64 66
Labour market 5.7 6.0 57 61
Infrastructure 3.5 5.2 74 59
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 15.1 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 16.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 43.2 57.1 77.2 95.4 119.4 149.7 185.2 225.3
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 112.1 126.7 144.2 161.8 180.0 203.1 229.4 257.4
GDP (% real change) 9.4 9.7 10.6 9.6 8.4 9.9 10.1 9.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 4.2 2.0 6.1 6.2 7.0 8.0 6.5 6.0
 % of GDP 9.6 3.5 8.0 6.5 5.9 5.3 3.5 2.7
 % of gross fixed investment 38.4 14.2 31.3 23.4 18.8 15.6 10.1 7.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 22.4 25.6 31.7 37.9 44.9 52.9 59.4 65.4
 % of GDP 51.9 44.8 41.1 39.8 37.6 35.4 32.1 29.0
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) -1.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.9 5.9
 % of GDP 4.2 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
Key issues
A period of high oil prices has underpinned strong real GDP growth rates since 
1999, and this is likely to be sustained over the medium term. In conjunction with 
continued high oil prices, rising oil export volumes and double-digit investment 
growth will keep average annual real GDP growth above 9%. Nevertheless, 
Kazakhstan’s continued dependence on oil for both export and fiscal revenue 
is a source of vulnerability. Even more serious is the steady deterioration of the 
investment climate since 2001, a period in which the government has not only 
pursued policies with a strong flavour of economic nationalism, but also taken 
an increasingly antagonistic stance against foreign investors. In the energy 
sector, this will lead to more onerous contract terms, including more stringent 
local content requirements. Such policies are expected to lead to further clashes 
between domestic and Western interests in Kazakhstan. Moreover, foreign 
companies are at even greater risk of arbitrary treatment in the non-oil sector, 
which will continue to deter investment. With little foreign investment outside the 
oil sector, progress in diversifying the economy will remain slow.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Kazakhstan
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows play a more significant role in 
the Kazakh economy than in other former 
Soviet republics, and the country has 
been relatively successful in attracting 
FDI since its independence in 1991. 
Kazakhstan’s stock of FDI per head is by 
far the highest in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), and, at 
US$2,080 as of end-2006, was more 
than 40% larger than that of Azerbaijan, 
its closest rival. Kazakhstan is likely to 
retain its dominant position in terms 
of FDI per head over the medium term, 
as investment is ramped up ahead of 
the start of production at the Kashagan 
offshore oilfield. 
Origin and distribution
The US is the largest single country 
of origin for FDI into Kazakhstan, 
accounting for 27% of the cumulative 
total by the end of 2006. However, in 
2002 it was overtaken by the EU as a 
whole—mainly as a result of increased 
investment from the Netherlands, France 
and the UK—all three countries home 
to large oil companies. In 2006 the EU 
accounted for around 43% of cumulative 
inflows of FDI, with the Netherlands 
alone responsible for just over 25%, 
while France and the UK accounted for 
7% and 5%, respectively. China (3.6% 
of the cumulative total in 2006) and 
Japan (3.5%) have become increasingly 
important investors in recent years, 
reflecting growing interest from these 
countries in Central Asia’s energy 
resources. 
FDI remains concentrated in the 
oil and gas sector, which by end-2006 
accounted for 38% of Kazakhstan’s 
cumulative FDI gross inflows; geological 
services (much of which are connected 
with the hydrocarbons industry) 
accounted for a further 42%. Western 
Kazakhstan, the site of most major oil- 
and gasfields, has received the greatest 
investment. Central Kazakhstan, rich in 
copper, iron ore, coal and manganese, 
ranks as the second-placed FDI recipient, 
and East Kazakhstan province, with major 
gold and mineral deposits, is third.
Determinants
Kazakhstan’s large reserves of minerals 
(mainly oil and gas, but also uranium, 
gold, chromium, rare earth metals and 
diamonds) are the main attraction for 
foreign investors. Foreign investors have 
in the past been attracted by a stable 
government, and an improving legal, tax 
and regulatory framework. However, in 
recent years the business environment 
has become noticeably more hostile 
towards Western investors, in particular. 
Whereas powerful multinationals might 
be able to obtain exemptions from the 
government through lobbying and other 
means, the current business climate will 
almost certainly deter investors with 
fewer resources.
Impact
FDI inflows into Kazakhstan, in addition 
to high global commodity prices and 
the tenge devaluation of 1999, have 
been one of the most important factors 
contributing to economic recovery in the 
years since the Russian financial crisis of 
1998. FDI has brought new technology 
and jobs for domestic suppliers and 
subcontractors, and generated new 
types of employment and training 
for Kazakh nationals. Furthermore, 
oil sector investment has played an 
important role in the development of 
Kazakhstan’s financial sector, centred 
on the old capital, Almaty. Nonetheless, 
as the oil sector does not generate 
large-scale employment, the narrow 
range of Kazakhstan’s FDI has not had 
as widespread or beneficial an impact on 
living standards across the country as a 
more diversified FDI profile might have 
achieved.
Potential
The Kazakh government’s nationalist 
economic policies, and increasingly 
assertive stance, will continue to tarnish 
its relations with Western investors, as a 
result of which there will be disputes with 
foreign companies, leading to occasional 
but high-profile confrontations. 
However, the magnitude of potential oil 
profits is likely to mean that the more 
unfavourable investment climate will 
only dampen—rather than seriously 
disrupt—FDI inflows into Kazakhstan. 
Furthermore, the government’s reliance 
on oil revenue would make it pull back if 
the oil majors were seriously to consider 
withdrawing. This game of brinkmanship 
carries considerable risks, but the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s baseline 
scenario of mutual—if problematic—
accommodation envisages continued 
strong inflows of FDI, driven mainly by 
the large-scale development project at 
the Kashagan oilfield.
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Poland
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.73 7.17 35 34
Political environment 6.5 6.5 37 39
 Political stability 7.8 7.4 27 33
 Political effectiveness 5.5 5.8 40 40
Macroeconomic environment 6.9 7.5 56 44
Market opportunities 7.4 7.5 14 14
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.3 7.0 33 33
Policy towards foreign investment 7.8 7.8 24 25
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.8 8.2 32 41
Taxes 5.5 6.1 47 50
Financing 7.0 7.4 27 33
Labour market 6.4 6.9 41 33
Infrastructure 5.8 6.9 42 38
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 38.2 38.2 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.0
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 252.9 303.9 340.8 408.9 446.3 459.7 478.7 508.2
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 463.6 494.8 540.4 587.5 633.6 678.1 725.0 773.2
GDP (% real change) 5.3 3.6 6.1 6.3 5.1 4.2 4.2 4.0
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 12.9 9.6 14.5 12.5 12.0 12.6 12.9 13.1
 % of GDP 5.1 3.2 4.3 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
 % of gross fixed investment 28.2 17.4 21.5 14.0 11.8 11.6 11.0 10.2
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 86.4 89.7 103.6 116.1 128.1 140.7 153.6 166.7
 % of GDP 34.1 29.5 30.4 28.4 28.7 30.6 32.1 32.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.8 3.0 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.4
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 3.2 6.4 10.7 14.7 18.9 22.9 27.2 31.6
 % of GDP 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.6 4.2 5.0 5.7 6.2
Key issues
Poland’s business environment is expected to improve between 2002-06 and 
2007-11. Its global rank rises by one place, to 34th. The strongest features of 
Poland’s business environment are the breadth of market opportunities and policy 
towards foreign investment. The present conservative government is likely to be 
very active in taking legal measures to combat corruption and may make some 
progress in reducing bureaucratic barriers to setting up new businesses. However, 
its hostility to further privatisation means that state-owned firms will retain an 
important role in the energy and financial sectors. Poland’s overall attractiveness 
as an investment location will also continue to be undermined by the rigidities of its 
labour market and the poor quality of infrastructure (particularly the road system), 
which will be upgraded only slowly. The weakness of the government’s budgetary 
position is the main economic policy concern, and the present government has set 
itself unambitious targets for bringing down the budget deficit. The government is 
sceptical towards European economic and monetary union (EMU), and Poland is not 
likely to join the euro zone until 2012 at the earliest.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(US$ bn)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Poland
Stocks and flows
The National Bank of Poland (NBP, the 
central bank) is now responsible for 
producing all estimates of the stock and 
flow of FDI in Poland. The Polish agency 
for information and foreign investment 
(PAIIZ) previously produced its own 
figures but ceased to do so in 2006. The 
NBP estimates the stock of inward FDI in 
Poland at some US$89.7bn at the end of 
2005, the highest absolute level received 
by any east European country since the 
fall of communism. However, Poland’s 
record at attracting investment is less 
impressive if judged relative to the size 
of the country. Per head of population, 
the FDI stock was US$2,350 at end-2005, 
less than half the level in Hungary or the 
Czech Republic. However, NBP figures 
suggest that 2006 was the strongest year 
yet for FDI, with inflows of US$14.5bn, up 
from US$9.6bn in 2005. 
Origin and distribution
According to the NBP, Dutch companies 
had invested around US$19.5bn in Poland 
by end-2005, making them collectively 
the largest investors in the country, 
ahead of firms from Germany, which 
had invested US$14.6bn, and France 
(US$11.3bn). The US ranked fourth, with 
US$6.7bn, followed by Sweden, Italy 
and the UK, each with investments of 
US$3bn-4bn. Around 85% of total foreign 
investment had come from companies 
headquartered in EU member states, and 
a further 8% from the US and Canada. 
Manufacturing had attracted 
US$32.8bn of FDI by end-2005, 37% 
of the total. Of this, around US$5.6bn 
has been invested in the automotive 
sector and US$5.4bn in food-processing. 
Financial services had attracted 
US$18.2bn by end-2005, much of 
which took the form of acquisitions 
of banks through the privatisation 
programme. FDI has been concentrated 
in the central region of Warsaw and the 
more industrialised areas of western 
Poland. These regions have a more 
highly developed infrastructure, skilled 
labour force, and better access to office 
space and production facilities. The 
less-developed east of the country has 
attracted much less foreign investment.
Determinants
Poland attracted relatively little foreign 
investment in the first years after the 
fall of communism because investors 
perceived it as politically unstable and 
economically underdeveloped. However, 
FDI inflows expanded rapidly from 1992 
to 2000, as investors were attracted by 
the size of the Polish domestic market 
and the country’s potential as a base 
for exporting into the EU. The economic 
slowdown and the de facto halt to large-
scale privatisation led to a fall in FDI in 
2001 02, but economic recovery has been 
accompanied by a significant rise in FDI 
inflows, as foreign-owned companies 
have reinvested much of the rising flow 
of profits earned in Poland and new 
investors have set up in the country, 
attracted by its large domestic market 
and good supply of skilled labour.
Impact
FDI inflows were a significant factor 
behind the strength of gross fixed 
investment over most of the past decade. 
In 1995-2006 FDI inflows averaged 17% 
of gross fixed investment. FDI inflows 
have also had a significant impact 
on industrial restructuring in certain 
industries. For example, car production 
rose dramatically in the 1990s, following 
major investment programmes by Fiat 
(Italy) and Daewoo (South Korea). 
This sector illustrates both the positive 
effects of FDI—the growth of the sector 
has given a boost to the components 
industry—and the risks attached, as 
Daewoo then suffered financial problems, 
which ultimately forced the government 
to renationalise its Polish plant (it now 
belongs to Avtozaz of Ukraine). Foreign 
firms’ operations in Poland appear to 
have been responsible for much of the 
strong growth in exports over the past 
few years, which has been the main driver 
of the present economic recovery.
Potential
Whereas most central European countries 
have already privatised their most 
attractive assets, the Polish state still 
has important assets, including much 
of the energy sector, majority stakes 
in the country’s largest bank and its 
biggest insurance company, and some 
manufacturing plants. The government 
is likely to sell some of these firms over 
the next few years, but the governing 
Law and Justice party (PiS) is keen to 
maintain some role for the state in 
strategic sectors. It is also reluctant to 
see state-owned firms in the financial 
and energy sectors fall under foreign 
control after they are privatised. As 
the privatisation process has slowed, 
greenfield investment and reinvested 
earnings are making up a much greater 
proportion of FDI. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit expects that inflows 
of FDI will continue to recover and sees 
them continuing at around 2-3% of GDP 
over the medium term.
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Romania
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.79 6.58 51 48
Political environment 5.2 5.5 50 53
 Political stability 6.6 6.6 45 44
 Political effectiveness 3.9 4.5 61 58
Macroeconomic environment 6.6 6.3 64 72
Market opportunities 6.4 6.6 31 34
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 4.8 6.0 58 50
Policy towards foreign investment 7.3 7.3 33 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.9 8.2 47 41
Taxes 4.2 6.2 77 46
Financing 5.1 6.6 56 48
Labour market 6.2 6.7 49 42
Infrastructure 5.2 6.3 48 46
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 21.7 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.5
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 75.5 97.1 121.9 161.5 188.4 202.8 220.4 242.5
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 176.2 189.0 209.5 228.0 246.8 265.4 283.9 300.3
GDP (% real change) 8.4 4.1 7.7 6.4 5.5 4.7 4.3 3.4
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 6.4 6.5 11.4 9.8 7.2 7.3 7.0 7.2
 % of GDP 8.5 6.7 9.4 6.1 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.0
 % of gross fixed investment 39.5 28.5 38.7 23.6 13.9 12.5 10.6 9.6
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 20.5 25.9 37.3 47.1 54.3 61.6 68.6 75.8
 % of GDP 27.2 26.7 30.6 29.2 28.8 30.4 31.1 31.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5
 % of GDP 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Key issues
Romania’s improving business environment is reflected in its rise of three places in 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s business environment rankings between 2002-06 
and 2007-11. This improvement has in large part been driven by preparations for EU 
membership, which occurred in January 2007. After a recession in 1997-99, 
macroeconomic stability improved and real GDP growth averaged 6.1% per year in 
2002-06. Annual inflation has been brought below 5% in 2007 and the fiscal 
position has improved. The main risk to macroeconomic stability is the current-
account deficit (10.3% of GDP in 2006). Bringing down the external deficit will 
require a tightening of fiscal policy. The government is reluctant to cut spending, 
and ample foreign-exchange reserves and large FDI inflows have given it some 
leeway to delay a policy tightening. The government introduced a 16% flat-rate 
income and profit tax in 2005, but is under pressure to raise either this or the rate 
of value-added tax (VAT) to boost budget revenue. The authorities have resisted so 
far, but a major tax increase may become inevitable. Despite improvements in the 
operating climate, weaknesses in the legal, tax and regulatory systems and 
excessive red tape remain obstacles for investors.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Romania
Stocks and flows
Romania’s stock of FDI at end-2006 was 
an estimated US$37.3bn. Despite the 
strong pick-up in FDI inflows in recent 
years, the ratio of the end-2006 stock to 
GDP (30.6%) was still among the lowest 
in east-central Europe, comparable 
to that of Poland (30.4%). Although 
Romania is the leading recipient of FDI in 
the Balkans when measured in US dollar 
terms, it lags behind Croatia and Bulgaria 
in terms of FDI per head (with US$1,730 
at end-2006). FDI inflows into Romania 
have been rising strongly since 2004 and 
reached a record total of US$11.4bn in 
2006.
Origin and distribution
According to the latest available data 
from the National Bank of Romania 
(NBR, the central bank), at the end of 
2005 the Netherlands was the leading 
country of origin for FDI into Romania 
(19.5% of the inward stock); Austria was 
a close second, with 15.4%, following the 
acquisition of Petrom by OMV and Banca 
Comerciala Romana (BCR) by Erste Bank; 
next came Germany, with 10.7%; Greece, 
with 8.5%; and France, with 8.4%. Many 
multinational companies, including 
LNM Ispat (now Mittal Steel) and Lukoil 
(Russia), have registered in Romania 
through the Netherlands or through the 
Netherlands Antilles. The distribution of 
FDI by country of origin indicates a high 
degree of sectoral specialisation. Dutch 
investment is concentrated in the steel 
and oil sectors. Investment from France 
is concentrated in consumer goods and 
the retail sector. Germany is a leading 
investor in industry. 
FDI in most countries in the 
Balkans has been concentrated in 
telecommunications, banking and other 
services. In Romania, however, FDI has 
also played a prominent role in industry 
(which accounted for 49% of the inward 
FDI stock at the end of 2005). FDI has also 
been significant in some services: retail 
and wholesale trade (15% of total FDI); 
financial services (14.5%) and telecoms 
(11%). Foreign firms have invested in 
the capital-intensive steel and chemical 
industries, as well as the labour-intensive 
textiles, leather and clothing sector—
although the latter accounts for only 
2.6% of the total FDI stock. Automotive 
and electrical machinery producers have 
also chosen Romania as their location. As 
these firms sell more than 50% of their 
production abroad, Romania is becoming 
a significant export platform. About 60% 
of manufacturing output and exports 
are now produced by foreign affiliates, a 
similar ratio to that in the Czech Republic.
Determinants
Romania’s advantages as a location 
for investment include a domestic 
market of about 22m consumers and 
the potential—partly owing to a good 
geographical position at a crossroads of 
traditional trade routes—to emerge as 
a regional hub. It has a comparatively 
cheap and skilled workforce, as well as 
a diversified industrial structure that 
allows intermediate inputs to be bought 
locally. In the past, economic instability, 
poor reform progress, high regional risk, 
excessive red tape, and the unpredictable 
legal and regulatory system were the 
main obstacles to FDI.
Impact
FDI inflows into Romania have played 
an important role in financing the 
current-account deficit and in helping 
to modernise important economic 
sectors. Foreign investment has also 
generated an increasing proportion of 
private-sector employment, foreign 
trade and GDP. Foreign capital has been 
involved in the privatisation of some 
large strategic companies. Restructuring 
and competitiveness gains have taken 
place more rapidly in those sectors that 
have benefited from foreign investment. 
Food-processing, automotives, telecoms, 
banking and brewing have all benefited 
in recent years from the introduction 
of new technologies and know-how by 
foreign investors.
Potential
Strong GDP growth and improvements 
in the business environment should 
underpin strong FDI inflows in the 
coming years. FDI inflows are expected to 
reach nearly US$10bn in 2007, boosted 
by receipts from further privatisations in 
the energy sector, continued greenfield 
investment and reinvestment by foreign-
owned firms. As large privatisations 
are completed, FDI inflows (based 
increasingly on reinvested earnings 
by foreign companies in Romania) will 
decline, but are still expected to average 
about US$7bn per year in 2008-11.
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Russia
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.44 6.07 59 63
Political environment 4.1 4.5 68 69
 Political stability 5.1 5.1 59 62
 Political effectiveness 3.3 3.9 74 68
Macroeconomic environment 8.0 8.0 25 25
Market opportunities 8.4 8.4 2 2
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.3 4.5 73 70
Policy towards foreign investment 3.3 3.7 79 76
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.9 7.8 47 51
Taxes 5.3 6.0 52 54
Financing 4.0 5.5 65 66
Labour market 6.4 6.7 42 43
Infrastructure 4.8 5.8 54 52
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 143.5 142.8 142.3 141.9 141.2 140.4 139.2 138.6
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 591.7 764.4 984.6 1,183.3 1,361.4 1,523.6 1,697.9 1,888.7
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 1,440.5 1,579.0 1,734.2 1,891.5 2,055.1 2,214.7 2,374.6 2,534.0
GDP (% real change) 7.2 6.4 6.7 6.5 5.9 4.8 4.5 4.3
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 15.4 12.8 28.7 35.0 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0
 % of GDP 2.6 1.7 2.9 3.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7
 % of gross fixed investment 14.2 9.4 16.3 15.6 10.8 9.7 8.7 7.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 50.6 65.2 93.9 128.9 157.9 187.9 218.9 250.9
 % of GDP 8.6 8.5 9.5 10.9 11.6 12.3 12.9 13.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 13.8 12.8 18.0 24.0 22.0 22.5 25.0 26.0
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 44.4 57.2 75.2 99.2 121.2 143.7 168.7 194.7
 % of GDP 7.5 7.5 7.6 8.4 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.3
Key issues
Russia’s business environment will benefit from improvements in infrastructure, 
gradual reforms in the financial sector, and regulatory changes in the trade 
regime and other areas associated with expected membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). However, many problems will remain and the rate 
of improvement will be much slower than seemed possible in the early years of 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency. Although Russia’s business environment is forecast 
to improve in 2007-11, its global rank slips by four places, to 63rd. Trends in 
the direction of greater state control have increased investor uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, foreign investors will be attracted by Russia’s natural resources 
and large and dynamic domestic market. Surveys show that foreign investment 
in Russia often yields higher returns than investment in other leading emerging 
markets. This suggests that many foreign companies have developed the skills 
and local knowledge necessary to navigate the Russian business environment. An 
Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 455 Western companies in early 2007 showed 
that the majority were optimistic about the likely evolution of Russia’s operating 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Russia
Stocks and flows
According to balance-of-payments data 
from the Russian Central Bank (RCB), 
FDI inflows averaged a paltry US$3bn 
per year in 1998-2002, before picking 
up markedly, to US$8bn in 2003 and 
an average of US$14bn in 2004-05. 
FDI inflows more than doubled in 2006 
to US$28.7bn, and to an estimated 
US$24bn in the first half of 2007. FDI 
data from RosStat shows more modest 
rises. However, unlike the RCB numbers, 
the RosStat data exclude most financial 
sector investment and reinvested 
earnings, and are gross of repatriated 
capital. Even after the recent upsurge, 
cumulative FDI inflows into Russia from 
1990 up until the end of 2006 amounted 
to some US$94bn, equal to only 9.5% 
of GDP—still one of the lowest shares 
among all 28 countries of the transition 
region. Whereas Russia’s share in the 
transition region’s population, GDP and 
exports is about one-third, its share in 
the region’s stock of FDI is below 20%.
Origin and distribution
The RCB does not report data by sector 
or by country of origin. According to 
RosStat figures, a large share of FDI 
comes from Cyprus and the Netherlands 
(where many Russian companies have 
offshore enterprises), which indicates 
that a significant share of Russian FDI 
is actually repatriated flight capital. 
At the end of 2005 investors from the 
Netherlands accounted for 32% of the 
stock of inward FDI; those from Cyprus, 
28%; and US investors came a distant 
third with 9%. Inward FDI in Russia is 
highly concentrated, both sectorally and 
geographically. Investments into trade, 
transport and communications, the 
energy sector and the food industry make 
up most of the cumulative inflows. Up to 
two-thirds of FDI inflows since 2000 have 
gone into just three regions: Moscow, 
Sakhalin and Moscow region. In addition 
to the energy sector, retail, food-
processing, automotive and consumer 
goods have been among the main targets 
of FDI.
Determinants
In the past, Russia’s attractions—
primarily its market size and natural 
resources—had been more than offset 
by serious deficiencies in the business 
environment. Several factors appear to 
explain the narrowing of the gap between 
actual and potential performance. A 
track-record of several years of stability 
and robust growth has been built 
up. Some long-standing deterrents 
to foreign investment—such as 
macroeconomic and political instability, 
and high and unpredictable taxes—have 
eased. Surveys of investors show that 
inadequate protection of property rights, 
problems with customs and corruption 
are still seen as the main barriers to 
investment. However, the majority 
of those doing business in Russia are 
satisfied with their success and plan to 
expand their investments in the country.
Impact
FDI inflows averaged only about 8% 
of domestic fixed capital formation 
in 1994-2006, and only 1.3% of GDP 
over the same period. Given a strong 
current-account position and, until 
recently, the small size of FDI inflows, 
the impact on the balance of payments 
has been negligible. In addition, the 
sectoral distribution of FDI (to energy 
and ventures mainly serving domestic 
demand for traditional products) limits 
the impact on Russian technological 
capacity and competitiveness. However, 
FDI flows are now reaching a level at 
which they can begin to have a significant 
impact on the economy.
Potential
Strong market opportunities will make 
Russia attractive to foreign companies. 
Western oil majors will be limited to 
minority stakes and may be affected 
by regulatory uncertainty. However, 
they are accustomed to operating in 
difficult business environments and 
cannot afford to shun Russia, given its 
huge oil and gas reserves. The other 
main sectors that will continue to prove 
attractive for foreign investors are retail, 
real estate, banking and fast-moving 
consumer goods. Foreign involvement 
is also growing in some manufacturing 
sectors, most notably food-processing 
and the automotive industry. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts 
that annual FDI inflows into Russia will 
average more than US$30bn per year in 
2007-11. There are risks to the baseline 
FDI outlook. Russia remains highly 
vulnerable to a significant decline in 
international commodity prices. Much 
of manufacturing will be adversely 
affected by real rouble appreciation. 
Many negative features of the business 
environment will persist, including an 
inefficient bureaucracy and judicial 
system.
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Slovakia
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.81 7.44 31 29
Political environment 6.9 7.2 29 26
 Political stability 8.1 8.1 19 16
 Political effectiveness 5.8 6.5 35 31
Macroeconomic environment 6.6 7.8 64 36
Market opportunities 5.4 6.7 56 28
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 6.5 6.5 29 41
Policy towards foreign investment 7.8 7.8 24 25
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 8.7 15 24
Taxes 6.6 7.7 25 15
Financing 6.3 7.8 41 27
Labour market 7.3 7.4 15 20
Infrastructure 6.2 7.0 35 35
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 42.0 47.4 55.3 72.5 79.8 81.8 85.3 91.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 79.2 86.5 96.4 106.5 115.9 125.8 136.6 147.8
GDP (% real change) 5.4 6.0 8.3 8.0 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.1 1.9 4.2 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
 % of GDP 2.7 4.0 7.5 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7
 % of gross fixed investment 11.1 15.0 28.6 10.5 9.7 10.3 10.7 10.6
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 14.5 15.8 25.5 27.5 29.5 31.7 34.1 36.6
 % of GDP 34.5 33.3 46.1 37.9 37.0 38.8 39.9 40.0
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7
 % of GDP 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Key issues
Slovakia’s impressive record in reform in recent years, as well as membership of 
the EU, improved greatly investors’ perceptions of the country and boosted FDI, 
although the presence of a populist government could yet dampen investor interest 
to a limited extent. The current government, headed by Smer-SD (Direction-Social 
Democracy), has maintained the previous administration’s commitment to the 
goal of accession to European economic and monetary union (EMU) in 2009, and 
favourable economic conditions should allow Slovakia to fulfil the Maastricht 
accession criteria. Slovakia’s reforms under the previous government, as well as 
strong growth and comparatively low costs, have led to strong FDI inflows in recent 
years, and some diversion away from other central European locations. Real GDP 
growth is expected to average above 6% over the medium term. FDI inflows will 
cover most of the country’s current-account deficits, which will fall after peaking 
in 2006. Monetary policy will be relatively tight, given the requirements of EMU 
entry, although a buoyant economy and high global energy prices will generate 
inflationary pressures.
GDP per head, 2006
(US$ at PPP)






 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 175
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS COUNTRY PROFILES  PART 2
Foreign direct investment 
in Slovakia
Stocks and flows
In 2004 FDI inflows—on a balance-
of-payments basis—benefited from a 
large number of greenfield projects, 
and amounted to US$1.1bn. In 2005 
FDI worth US$1.9bn flowed in, despite 
the absence of any large privatisation 
deals. Inflows rose sharply in 2006, to 
US$4.2bn, the figure boosted by the sale 
of a 66% stake in Slovenske Elektrarne 
(SE) to Enel (Italy). The stock of FDI at 
end-2006 amounted to US$25.5bn. In 
absolute US dollar terms, this was just 
around one-third of the amount invested 
in the Czech Republic and in Hungary, 
and one-quarter of that received by 
Poland. Slovakia’s FDI stock at end-2006 
was nevertheless equivalent to 46% of 
GDP, and to US$4,700 per head. Outflows 
of FDI from Slovakia are still modest, with 
the stock of outward FDI amounting to 
only 2.3% of GDP in 2006.
Origin and distribution
According to data from the National Bank 
of Slovakia (NBS, the central bank), the 
two leading investors in Slovakia at the 
end of 2006 were the Netherlands (20% 
of the total stock) and Germany (18%). 
The manufacturing sector received the 
largest share of FDI (39%), of which most 
was directed to automotive components, 
consumer electronics and precision 
engineering. Another important recipient 
of FDI was financial intermediation. 
FDI inflows have been heavily skewed 
towards the western regions of the 
country, which are geographically closer 
to the EU—Slovakia’s main source of 
FDI. In 2004 and 2005 the first large 
investments into eastern Slovakia were 
announced, as regional labour shortages 
persuaded several investors to locate 
their plants further east of Bratislava.
Determinants
In the early to mid-1990s many foreign 
investors were wary of the Slovak 
business environment. Slovakia lost 
out to its central European neighbours 
because of its smaller market, the 
unreformed nature of many of its 
companies, and a less developed 
infrastructure. The situation has 
improved markedly since then, as 
the policies of governments in 1998-
2006 created a much more favourable 
environment. Foreign investors have 
taken notice of the much friendlier 
business environment, Slovakia’s 
cheap yet qualified labour force and 
its strategic location and proximity to 
markets in both western and eastern 
Europe. The substantial FDI inflows in the 
early part of this decade were the result 
of privatisation of banks and utilities. 
Slovakia has in particular attracted large 
investments into its automotive sector. 
Impact
The impact of FDI on the Slovak 
economy has been important, especially 
in recent years. Sectors that have 
received significant levels of FDI, such 
as the automotive and steel industries, 
contributed disproportionately to 
Slovakia’s export-led growth in 2000-06. 
Their importance will rise further during 
the forecast period, as production at 
several car plants boosts the already 
large share of the transport equipment 
sector in total manufacturing. In turn, 
that should underpin strong economic 
growth, as production capacity is 
expanded and services sector activities in 
the regions where the plants are located 
receive a boost. In the second half of the 
forecast period greenfield investment, 
attracted by Slovakia’s still-favourable 
business climate, should underpin 
growth and job creation.
Potential
Slovakia still lags significantly behind its 
neighbours, mainly the Czech Republic, 
in terms of research and development 
(R&D) activities. To attract investment 
with higher value-added potential, 
the current government will boost 
investment in universities and state-
sponsored R&D activities. In the first 
half of the forecast period the majority 
of foreign investors will continue to 
place mostly production plants in 
Slovakia, but later on the share of more 
sophisticated activities could increase. 
The setting up of industrial parks across 
the country—including the hitherto 
relatively neglected eastern region—
should add to Slovakia’s attractiveness 
as a destination for FDI. The current 
government is markedly less inclined 
than the previous one to sell state assets. 
However, membership of the EU, NATO 
and the OECD, allied to the government’s 
recognition of the importance of FDI in 
Slovakia’s economic development, means 
that the conditions will be in place for 
strong FDI inflows to continue over the 
forecast period.
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Ukraine
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.44 5.45 76 70
Political environment 3.9 4.1 72 73
 Political stability 5.5 5.5 55 58
 Political effectiveness 2.6 2.9 79 76
Macroeconomic environment 7.5 7.2 39 54
Market opportunities 5.5 5.8 55 51
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 2.5 4.0 78 73
Policy towards foreign investment 4.2 5.5 77 70
Foreign trade & exchange controls 5.1 6.4 66 68
Taxes 2.8 5.1 82 73
Financing 2.9 5.1 74 71
Labour market 5.8 6.1 56 59
Infrastructure 4.4 5.2 60 59
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 47.1 46.7 46.5 46.2 46.0 45.8 45.6 45.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 64.9 82.9 105.5 136.2 147.8 166.5 195.1 223.9
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 306.4 323.7 358.0 390.9 423.8 461.0 503.2 549.7
GDP (% real change) 12.1 2.6 7.4 6.8 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.7 7.8 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.3
 % of GDP 2.6 9.4 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.4
 % of gross fixed investment 11.7 42.8 21.2 17.5 14.1 12.0 11.1 10.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 9.6 17.3 22.5 27.7 32.5 37.1 41.9 47.2
 % of GDP 14.8 20.9 21.3 20.4 22.0 22.3 21.5 21.1
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6
 % of GDP 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Key issues
Real GDP growth will ease in 2007-08, but is expected to average around 6% 
and should remain solid over the medium term. Although reform prospects have 
generally improved in recent years, the influence of big business in parliament 
and a destabilising power struggle between the presidency and the government/
parliament have constrained progress. There should be at least some advances 
in structural reforms, deregulation and liberalisation over the next few years. 
These are also prerequisites for Ukraine’s joining the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and deepening links with the EU. Overall, however, the continued 
influence of vested interests, combined with low administrative capacity and 
legislative efficacy, will inevitably slow the rate of improvements in the business 
environment in crucial areas. So too will the lack of political stability, which 
is expected to be a feature throughout the forecast period. Even though the 
Economist Intelligence Unit anticipates notable progress in almost all aspects of 
the business environment, Ukraine’s regional and global rankings will therefore 
remain low.
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Foreign direct investment 
in Ukraine
Stocks and flows
Despite Ukraine’s strategic location, 
rich natural resources, and cheap but 
skilled labour force—all of which make 
it a potentially attractive investment 
location—inflows of FDI have been 
comparatively low. Even including the 
sale of the Kryvorizhstal steel plant 
for US$4.8bn in October 2005, and 
a subsequent acceleration in non-
privatisation-related inflows in 2006, 
Ukraine still lags far behind central 
Europe in terms of per-capita FDI. The 
US$22.5bn stock of FDI in Ukraine by 
end-2006 amounted to only around 
US$480 per head.
Origin and distribution
The Kryvorizhstal sale and the role 
played by offshore Ukrainian and 
Russian investors mean that the official 
data on the origin of FDI are somewhat 
misleading. As Kryvorizhstal’s new 
owners, Mittal Steel (Netherlands), 
bought the plant through a German-
registered company, Germany was 
propelled into first place in terms of FDI 
sources, and retained that position at the 
end of 2006, when it accounted for 26% 
of cumulative FDI into Ukraine. Germany 
thereby replaced the US (6.6% of total 
FDI at end-2006). Cyprus (14%) is also 
now ranked ahead of the US, although 
Cypriot capital inflows represent Russian 
or Ukrainian offshore capital (Russia 
officially accounts for just 4.6% of all 
FDI despite being a major player in the 
Ukrainian economy). Other important 
sources include Austria (7.5%)—largely 
because of Raiffeisen International’s 
purchase of Aval Bank in 2005—as well as 
the UK (7.5%) and the Netherlands (7%). 
The Kryvorizhstal sale also distorted the 
sectoral distribution of FDI inflows. Up 
until 2005, the sectors attracting most 
FDI had been those in which government 
interference is relatively low, such as the 
food- and agro-processing industry, or 
those offering relatively quick returns, 
such as domestic trade. By contrast, 
heavy industry had attracted only limited 
FDI prior to the Kryvorizhstal sale, but 
as of early 2006 the metals sector had 
become by far the greatest recipient of 
FDI. Another more recent development 
is increasing inflows of FDI into the 
financial sector. The Aval Bank sale 
has been the largest to date, raising 
over US$1bn, but has been followed by 
others—including a 51% stake purchased 
in the country’s fourth-largest bank, 
Ukrsibbank, by France’s BNP Paribas in 
2006—and foreign interest in the sector 
remains strong.
Determinants
Despite claims by various governments 
during the 1990s that FDI was a priority, 
Ukraine offered only weak incentives 
and few investor-friendly policies. The 
country’s volatile and risky business 
environment has been the main deterrent 
for foreign investors. Ukraine’s excessive 
tax burden also acts as a barrier, especially 
as foreign-owned companies have been 
easy targets for tax authorities attempting 
to compensate for poor revenue intake 
and widespread exemptions. Nor has 
Ukraine’s privatisation programme always 
been conducive to attracting FDI, since 
privatisation efforts in the 1990s focused 
on voucher privatisation, or on sales to 
management and employees. Strategic 
foreign investors are frequently kept at 
bay, owing to a lack of transparency in the 
privatisation process and unrealistic offer 
prices.
Impact
Because of its low volume, FDI in Ukraine 
has so far not had as much of an impact 
as in other transition economies in 
central and eastern Europe. A number 
of the special economic zones (SEZs) in 
the west of the country have had some 
limited successes, but the benefits 
available to SEZ investors were cancelled 
by the government led by Yuliya 
Tymoshenko in 2005 and remain a highly 
controversial issue.
Potential
Prospects for FDI inflows into Ukraine 
look more promising now than in the 
first decade following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In 2000-04 Ukraine 
showed somewhat greater commitment 
to economic reform and to making the 
business environment more friendly 
to investors. The governments in place 
during that period made some progress 
on regulatory, administrative and fiscal 
reform, and took important steps towards 
privatisation of the agricultural sector. 
They also accelerated the privatisation 
of large enterprises, which had long 
been postponed because of opposition 
from parliament. Since 2005 efforts have 
been accelerated to level the playing-
field and simplify the tax and regulatory 
environment. However, government 
policies have continued to scare away 
investments occasionally, and vested 
business interests will remain politically 
powerful in the medium term. This will 
slow the structural reforms and further 
regulatory improvements needed, and 
Ukraine will continue to lag behind most 
countries in the region as a result.
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Turkey
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.66 6.42 57 52
Political environment 5.2 5.7 50 50
 Political stability 5.9 5.9 52 54
 Political effectiveness 4.5 5.5 51 43
Macroeconomic environment 4.9 6.1 79 75
Market opportunities 7.8 6.9 8 23
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.5 6.3 45 47
Policy towards foreign investment 6.4 6.9 50 49
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.0 8.2 61 41
Taxes 5.2 6.1 56 51
Financing 5.5 6.6 51 48
Labour market 5.1 5.6 71 66
Infrastructure 5.1 5.9 52 50
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 72.3 73.3 74.3 75.2 76.2 77.2 78.1 79.1
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 302.0 362.6 403.5 471.9 489.6 547.3 601.8 666.8
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 556.1 615.2 671.8 728.7 786.8 850.3 916.2 986.8
GDP (% real change) 8.9 7.4 6.1 6.0 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.0
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 2.9 9.8 20.1 19.0 20.0 21.0 20.0 20.0
 % of GDP 1.0 2.7 5.0 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.0
 % of gross fixed investment 5.4 13.8 23.7 20.0 19.4 17.9 15.1 13.3
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 38.5 64.4 84.5 103.5 123.5 144.5 164.5 184.5
 % of GDP 12.8 17.8 20.9 21.9 25.2 26.4 27.3 27.7
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.9 1.1 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.7
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 7.1 8.3 8.9 10.9 11.9 13.1 14.6 16.3
 % of GDP 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Key issues
The IMF-backed reform programmes in place since late 1999, allied to Turkey’s 
EU membership bid, have made Turkey a more attractive location for FDI. The 
economy has become more robust and resilient to shocks, although it is still 
vulnerable to sudden shifts in investor sentiment because of its large current-
account deficit, substantial external debt-servicing, heavy reliance on short-
term capital inflows, and periodic domestic political tensions. Emerging-market 
risk-aversion has risen as global interest rates have increased, making it more 
difficult for Turkey to meet its large external financing needs and increasing 
exchange-rate volatility. The clear-cut victory of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) in the July 2007 election should ensure the continuation of most of 
its policies, particularly Turkey’s EU membership bid and economic reform. Some 
form of co-operation with the IMF is therefore expected after the current three-
year stand-by agreement expires in early 2008. EU accession negotiations, which 
will not be completed during the forecast period, will proceed slowly because of 
substantial obstacles in Turkey and in the EU. Nevertheless, the AKP government 
is unlikely to abandon its bid. 
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Turkey
Stocks and flows
Compared with many other emerging 
markets and much of central and eastern 
Europe, FDI inflows into Turkey have been 
modest, averaging less than 1% of GDP 
a year in 1990-2004. However, in 2005 
and 2006 inflows of FDI capital surged. 
They totalled US$9.8n, or 2.7% of GDP, in 
2005, and US$20.1bn, or 5% of GDP, in 
2006. In the first five months of 2007 FDI 
inflows totalled US$11bn (more than half 
of this was in January), compared with 
US$8.5bn in the same period of 2006. 
The stock of inward FDI was an estimated 
US$84.5bn (or 21% of GDP) at end-2006.
Origin and distribution
Traditional sources of foreign capital in 
Turkey have been major EU countries, 
especially the Netherlands, Germany, 
the UK, France and Italy, followed by 
other OECD countries such as the US, 
Switzerland and Japan. In 2005 the EU 
accounted for about 60% of the total 
FDI inflow into Turkey. Historically, 
manufacturing (particularly the chemical, 
food and motor vehicle industries) and 
financial services attracted the most 
FDI. The sharp increase in FDI inflows 
in 2005-06 was primarily attributable 
to acquisitions by multinational 
companies of large stakes in a handful 
of large Turkish companies, especially 
in banking and telecommunications, 
as a result of privatisation and private-
sector takeovers. From end-2001 to 
May 2006 almost half (US$8.7bn) of all 
FDI inflows were related to transport, 
storage and communications (primarily 
telecommunications). The financial 
sector attracted US$4.7bn. Retailing 
attracted US$1.7bn, mainly as a result 
of supermarket chain acquisitions. 
Manufacturing industries—led by food 
and beverages, the motor industry, 
chemicals and textiles—attracted 
another US$1.7bn. Most foreign 
investors have local partners. 
Determinants
The recent upsurge in FDI reflects the 
conjunction of several factors: the 
relative stability and strong growth of 
the economy; reforms in sectors such 
as energy, telecommunications and 
banking; and EU accession talks, which 
although currently making slow progress, 
are seen as likely to lead to further 
reform of the business environment. 
The 2001 financial crisis led to a new 
drive for reform and privatisation, as 
well as reducing enthusiasm for bank 
ownership among Turkish entrepreneurs 
and leaving some banks and companies 
in need of fresh capital. The Justice 
and Development Party government in 
power since 2002 has been more willing 
than its predecessors to sell majority 
stakes in state-owned companies to 
foreigners, even in “strategic” sectors. 
The Turkish private sector has also been 
more willing to seek foreign partners. 
This may reflect the thinking of a new 
generation of management, strategies 
of specialisation in certain sectors, a 
desire to raise capital for privatisation 
bids and fear of increasing foreign 
competition. Significant deterrents to 
foreign investment remain, however. 
Standing out among them are the slow 
and unpredictable judicial system, 
bureaucratic hassles, weak protection of 
intellectual property rights, perceptions 
of potential political instability or 
corruption, and unfair competition from 
smuggled goods and the informal sector.
Impact
FDI inflows have until recently been 
small for an economy of Turkey’s 
size. Nevertheless, several leading 
multinationals, such as Unilever and 
Ford, have had a long-standing presence 
in Turkey, and companies with foreign 
partners play a significant role in 
the economy. The increasing foreign 
presence is particularly important 
in spreading modern management 
practices. The presence of foreign banks 
may improve services and productivity, 
but foreign-owned banks may attach a 
greater risk premium than local banks 
to lending to the Turkish government or 
Turkish companies.
Potential
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects 
the recent positive trend to continue 
as a result of further privatisation and 
other crossborder acquisitions. The 
establishment of an investment support 
and promotion agency in the near 
future, coupled with further market 
liberalisation and other measures to 
improve the business environment, 
should also help to attract foreign 
investment. Accordingly, we anticipate 
that FDI inflows will average more 
than 3.5% of GDP a year in 2007-11. 
However, privatisation in the energy 
sector, for instance, may prove difficult, 
and the international climate and the 
performance of the Turkish economy 
may not always be as conducive as in the 
recent past. 
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Algeria
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.31 5.25 77 73
Political environment 3.9 4.6 72 64
 Political stability 4.0 4.8 75 66
 Political effectiveness 3.9 4.5 61 58
Macroeconomic environment 8.0 8.3 25 19
Market opportunities 5.9 6.1 44 44
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 3.5 4.0 72 73
Policy towards foreign investment 4.6 6.0 73 65
Foreign trade & exchange controls 4.2 6.4 74 68
Taxes 3.0 4.3 81 81
Financing 2.1 3.6 80 78
Labour market 4.8 4.6 77 81
Infrastructure 3.1 4.5 77 72
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 32.4 32.8 33.4 33.9 34.4 34.9 35.4 35.9
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 85.0 102.3 111.9 120.0 124.1 131.3 139.9 144.6
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 178.5 194.0 205.3 220.1 238.6 259.4 281.9 306.5
GDP (% real change) 5.2 5.5 2.8 4.8 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 2.5 3.8 3.2 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3
 % of GDP 2.9 3.7 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7
 % of gross fixed investment 12.2 16.6 12.8 14.1 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.1
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 7.2 8.3 11.5 15.5 20.0 24.8 29.9 35.2
 % of GDP 8.5 8.1 10.2 12.9 16.1 18.9 21.4 24.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7
 % of GDP 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
Key issues
Algeria’s political system continues to limit the country’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors outside of the lucrative hydrocarbons sector. Privatisation of state assets 
is still patchy, as rival clans in the military-dominated regime often compete for 
influence by extending patronage in public-sector firms, and hence can be reluctant 
to see certain firms sold off. The corollary of this is a state-dominated banking 
sector that is poorly managed, infrastructurally weak and hampered by bad loans to 
loss-making state firms. Credit for private investment is therefore thin. However, 
the president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, continues to strengthen his position vis-à-vis 
the old military elite (le pouvoir), and is likely to press for more liberalisation and 
economic reform to boost growth. High unemployment, especially among young 
people, remains the most pressing socioeconomic problem that the government 
needs to address. In order to stimulate economic growth, the government will 
continue to solicit foreign investment in sectors such as infrastructure, including 
telecommunications, roads, power and water. However, the hydrocarbons sector 
will remain the main engine of GDP growth, and the economy will remain vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the world oil market. 
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Algeria
Stocks and flows
Algeria’s total stock of FDI is estimated 
to have reached some US$11.5bn 
(10.2% of GDP) in 2006. Inflows of FDI 
accelerated in the late 1990s as the 
civil conflict started to abate and the 
government opened up the hydrocarbons 
sector to foreign investment. In recent 
years inflows have increased further, 
as the government is proceeding with a 
large-scale programme to upgrade the 
country’s infrastructure. FDI inflows 
were around US$3.8bn in 2005 and were 
estimated at US$3.2bn in 2006. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit expects FDI 
inflows to average just under US$5bn a 
year over the forecast period.
Origin and distribution
No official data are available on 
the geographical origin or sectoral 
distribution of FDI inflows. US and 
European firms have been dominant in 
the hydrocarbons sector, and the main 
companies now operating in the sector 
are BP of the UK, Statoil of Norway, BHP 
Billiton of Australia and Anadarko of 
the US. Investors from the Arab world, 
primarily Egypt and the Gulf, have been 
prominent in other sectors, notably 
telecommunications and construction 
(especially cement). The bulk of FDI 
inflows relate to upstream oil and gas 
projects, but have in recent years been 
supplemented by investment in telecoms, 
the building materials industry and 
electricity and water.
Determinants
The main factor drawing FDI into Algeria 
has been the country’s oil and gas 
resources. It still not clear to what extent 
the recent changes to the investment 
regime will affect interest in the sector. 
Since August 2006 investors in the sector 
have also faced a windfall profits tax 
under which foreign company oil profits 
generated from benchmark dated Brent 
Blend prices in excess of US$30/barrel 
will be subject to an additional tax on 
a sliding scale of 5-50% (natural gas 
production is not subject to the tax). 
Moderate economic liberalisation since 
the late 1990s has opened up new 
opportunities for foreign investors 
outside the hydrocarbons sector. Mining 
has been deregulated and standard 
exploitation and exploration permits are 
being offered, and gas distribution is 
also being liberalised. More recently the 
government has launched a substantial 
drive to upgrade Algeria’s infrastructure, 
which will also attract foreign bidders. 
However, excessive bureaucracy and a 
lack of transparency and predictability all 
constrain Algeria’s FDI potential.
Impact
As a proportion of total gross fixed 
investment, FDI inflows have increased 
sharply since 1996. However, the share of 
FDI in total investment remains small, at 
about 13-14% in recent years (although 
this has risen from just 2.3% in 1996). 
With extremely low domestic savings and 
private investment rates, achievement 
of the government’s target to reduce 
unemployment will depend on Algeria’s 
attracting high levels and a wide range 
of foreign investment over the medium 
term. As most inward investment to date 
has been directed into capital-intensive 
sectors of the economy, the impact on 
employment has been limited. This is 
unlikely to change significantly in the 
medium term, although a greater level of 
investment in the housing sector over the 
next five years should help to generate 
some jobs. Technology transfer has been 
more successful, although this is likely 
to remain confined to the hydrocarbons, 
telecoms and power sectors.
Potential
Algeria’s investment climate is 
improving, albeit from a low base. The 
government’s desire to expand crude oil 
and natural gas production, combined 
with relatively healthy medium-term 
gas demand from Europe, should 
ensure that the hydrocarbons sector 
continues to attract strong inflows of 
FDI. The mid-2006 amendments to the 
hydrocarbons law may prompt some 
foreign oil companies to reappraise 
Algeria’s prospects, however, and 
escalating engineering and construction 
costs in the oil and gas sector may result 
in some projects being abandoned or 
delayed. The overall attitude of the 
government towards foreign investment 
will also be affected by the outcome of 
the presidential election in 2009. The 
dominant political forces in Algeria are 
broadly in favour of market-oriented 
reforms, but to different degrees. A 
third victory for the president, Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, would bode well for continued 
liberalisation. Another critical issue will 
be whether plans to privatise up to three 
state-owned commercial banks come to 
fruition.
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Egypt
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 5.11 6.23 65 60
Political environment 5.0 5.2 56 59
 Political stability 5.1 4.4 59 69
 Political effectiveness 4.9 5.8 45 40
Macroeconomic environment 4.1 6.1 82 75
Market opportunities 5.3 6.7 59 28
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.0 6.0 51 50
Policy towards foreign investment 6.9 7.3 41 39
Foreign trade & exchange controls 4.6 7.3 71 59
Taxes 5.6 6.9 42 28
Financing 4.8 6.6 59 48
Labour market 5.6 5.3 63 73
Infrastructure 4.4 4.9 60 63
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 72.6 74.0 75.4 76.8 78.2 79.6 80.9 82.3
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 78.3 93.2 107.9 126.5 143.1 158.0 174.2 192.0
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 305.9 329.2 362.1 396.4 436.3 476.1 514.5 556.8
GDP (% real change) 4.1 4.5 6.8 7.0 7.2 6.3 5.3 5.5
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.3 5.4 10.0 8.0 7.0 5.5 4.8 4.5
 % of GDP 1.6 5.8 9.3 6.3 4.9 3.5 2.8 2.3
 % of gross fixed investment 9.8 32.2 49.7 29.8 21.0 13.9 10.6 8.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 23.5 28.9 38.9 46.9 53.9 59.4 64.2 68.7
 % of GDP 30.0 31.0 36.1 37.1 37.7 37.6 36.9 35.8
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.2
 % of GDP 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Key issues
The government is pressing ahead with structural reform, spurred by the need 
to generate jobs for the fast-rising population. Privatisation, the reduction 
of trade barriers and liberalisation are being carried out as part of plans to 
stimulate private-sector-led growth, with some success, as real GDP rose by 6.8% 
in 2006. However, the dismantling of Egypt’s centralised, bureaucratic system 
is proceeding far more erratically and cautiously. In particular, fears that job 
losses could endanger social stability are limiting the scope of privatisation. Such 
concerns are being exacerbated by the heightened regional political tension, 
which has the potential to spill over to the local population. With political 
liberalisation not matching that in the economy, discontent could lead to unrest, 
although it is unlikely that this would seriously destabilise the country’s long-
standing political regime. Economic reform, the resolution of Egypt’s exchange-
rate difficulties and the consolidation of the banking sector have increased the 
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors, but there remain many problems 
in the financial sector. Egypt’s investment environment is expected to continue 
to improve over the next five years, but its position in the global business 
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Foreign direct investment 
in Egypt
Stocks and flows
The stock of FDI in Egypt climbed to 
US$38.9bn at end-2005, equivalent to 
36.1% of GDP. Owing to strong inflows 
of FDI, the Economist Intelligence Unit 
estimates that, by the end of 2008, 
the stock of FDI will have exceeded 
US$50bn. Data supplied by the Central 
Bank of Egypt indicate that inflows of FDI 
(including investment in the petroleum 
sector and privatisation proceeds) 
totalled US$6.1bn in fiscal year 2005/06 
(July 1st-June 30th), up from US$3.9bn 
in 2004/05. Available figures for the first 
half of 2006/07 (July-December 2006) 
indicate that the total from the previous 
fiscal year has already been exceeded, 
with inward FDI totalling US$8.3bn over 
the six-month period.
Origin and distribution
US companies accounted for US$4.6bn 
or roughly three-quarters of all inward 
FDI in fiscal year 2005/06. The petroleum 
sector is the most important destination 
for US capital. US-based companies 
account for 65% of all inward investment 
in the oil and gas industry. At the end 
of December 2006, according to Egypt’s 
General Authority for Investment and 
Free Zones, the stock of non-oil US 
investment in Egypt totalled US$1.46bn, 
divided among 496 companies and 
belonging mostly to the banking, 
chemicals, engineering, manufacturing 
and pharmaceutical industries. Investors 
from the Gulf and from the EU are also 
increasingly investing in Egypt, mainly, 
but not exclusively, in the petroleum 
sector, with BP and BG Group, two 
British firms, and Royal Dutch Shell, 
an Anglo-Dutch company, noteworthy 
investors in oil and gas exploration and 
production. In 2006/07 Egypt sold off 
an 80% share of Bank of Alexandria, the 
first fully government-owned bank to 
be divested. The acquirer was an Italian 
financial institution, Sanpaolo, which 
paid US$1.6bn in October 2006. Italy 
thus became the largest single source of 
foreign investment by country in Egypt.
Determinants
The reformist government appointed 
in July 2004 under the prime minister, 
Ahmed Nazif, has maintained its 
commitment to economic liberalisation 
and privatisation. However, the pace 
and scope of the reform process has 
been uneven and, in certain areas, 
frustratingly slow. A continued 
commitment to improving the business 
environment by initiating tax reform, 
tackling administrative bureaucracy, 
combating corruption, introducing 
more efficient business regulations 
and supporting a range of investment 
incentives will play a major part in 
determining the levels of foreign 
investment. Bilateral trade and foreign 
diplomacy with non-traditional 
investors, such as Russia and China, 
will boost investment, principally in the 
manufacturing sector. The government 
will also seek to maximise further the 
potential of overseas investment by 
securing a free-trade deal with the US.
Impact
The attempts to attract inward FDI are 
driven by Egypt’s low domestic savings 
and investment rates. Moreover, the 
quality of human capital, including 
managerial and technical skills, is poor, 
a shortcoming that is overcome by 
capitalising on foreign business expertise 
and technology transfer. The government 
hopes to lift the rate of job-creation and 
boost domestic private-sector activity 
through stronger inward investment.
Potential
The government is working hard to 
attract more investment from overseas. 
The improved performance of the 
Egyptian economy, assisted by more 
coherent and transparent policymaking, 
is helping to achieve this aim. Although 
the government will continue to privatise 
smaller, non-strategic industrial 
companies, it is the sale of shares in 
larger state-owned industrial enterprises 
and utilities, such as Telecom Egypt, 
that will attract the largest amounts 
of FDI. The government also hopes to 
persuade foreign investors to participate 
in the upgrading of Egypt’s transport 
and communications infrastructure. 
In particular the government would 
like to increase roadbuilding, upgrade 
the railway network, expand the 
telecoms infrastructure and modernise 
the ports. The petroleum sector will 
remain the most lucrative sector, 
but the expanding tourism industry 
along the Mediterranean and Red Sea 
coasts will create new opportunities 
for manufacturers of hotel equipment, 
project managers, and building and 
construction experts to expand the 
regional infrastructure serving the resort 
areas. Other sectors likely to be attractive 
for overseas investment are finance, 
power generation and transmission, 
as well as telecoms and information 
technology (IT).
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Nigeria
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 4.46 4.88 74 75
Political environment 3.1 3.1 80 78
 Political stability 4.0 3.6 75 78
 Political effectiveness 2.3 2.6 80 79
Macroeconomic environment 7.2 7.5 45 44
Market opportunities 6.9 6.5 22 35
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 2.8 2.8 77 78
Policy towards foreign investment 5.1 5.5 66 70
Foreign trade & exchange controls 3.3 4.6 78 78
Taxes 5.6 5.2 42 71
Financing 4.0 5.9 65 60
Labour market 5.0 4.8 72 80
Infrastructure 1.8 3.0 82 79
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 136.5 139.8 144.0 146.2 149.5 152.2 155.4 158.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 72.1 91.3 115.9 127.4 142.2 150.8 164.2 172.3
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 148.6 162.5 176.7 190.9 210.2 228.1 247.6 268.1
GDP (% real change) 6.4 6.2 5.6 5.5 7.4 5.7 5.9 5.8
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3
 % of GDP 2.6 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
 % of gross fixed investment 11.7 9.7 8.3 6.2 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 27.2 29.2 31.7 33.6 35.7 37.9 40.0 42.2
 % of GDP 37.7 32.0 27.3 26.4 25.1 25.1 24.3 24.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0
 % of GDP 6.7 5.5 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.5
Key issues
A new president and government are now in place following elections in April 
2007. This has created some uncertainty for investors unsure as to the path the 
new administration will take regarding the investment climate. However, early 
indications are that the new president, Umaru Yar’Adua, will push ahead with 
a programme of reform broadly similar to that of the previous administration. 
Priority will be given to improving the country’s electricity supply; boosting the 
agricultural sector; reducing food insecurity; fighting corruption; attempting to 
reduce the size of the federal government; and initiating reform of land ownership. 
Of these, arguably the greatest challenge—and the greatest failing of the previous 
administration—will be to solve the country’s power problems. Relatively quick 
progress on this front would not only make a visible difference to businesses and 
the everyday lives of individuals but would also give a huge boost to the overall 
reform effort. Only if Nigeria’s business climate improves will the country see 
substantial investment into non-oil sectors. However, to speed up  improvement, 
new licences for the oil sector include requirements for the bidders to make 
commitments to build infrastructure as part of their overall bid.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in Nigeria
Stocks and flows
Using data from both the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates 
that the stock of inward FDI stood at 
US$31.7bn (27.3% of GDP) at the end of 
2006. Annual FDI inflows were broadly 
steady in the 1990s, at around US$1bn-
1.5bn per year, but since 2002 have 
picked up steadily, to around US$2bn. 
We expect FDI inflows to remain above 
US$2bn over the next five to ten years as 
the country’s offshore oil and gas sector 
continues to attract FDI inflows. However, 
this is below Nigeria’s potential, and the 
stock of inward FDI as a share of GDP is 
expected to fall to 24.5% by 2011. 
Origin and distribution
There is little information on the 
geographic origin of foreign investors 
in Nigeria. Most FDI inflows into Nigeria 
are reinvested earnings from the oil 
multinationals. Reinvested earnings have 
averaged two-thirds of overall FDI inflows 
in recent years, with the bulk directed 
towards the energy sector. There has been 
a modest surge in non-oil sector foreign 
investment in Nigeria in recent years, 
after it became clear that the previous 
regime, of Olusegun Obasanjo, was firmly 
established and that economic growth 
was picking up. Although much of the 
investment was by large multinational 
companies that were already operating 
in the country, there have been some 
new European entrants since the 
beginning of this decade, and South 
African companies have also strongly 
increased their presence in recent years, 
particularly in the mobile-phone sector. 
The recent banking consolidation exercise 
also boosted FDI (and portfolio inflows) 
into Nigeria as existing foreign banks 
increased the capitalisation of their 
subsidiaries to meet the new minimum 
capital requirements.
Determinants
The main factors attracting investment 
by oil firms to Nigeria are low production 
costs and high-quality crude oil, both 
of which offset economic problems and 
political instability. Investor interest in 
Nigeria has surged in recent years on the 
back of the previous administration’s 
reform programme. Although the 
majority of investment has still been 
in the oil and gas sector, there have 
been new inflows into the aviation, 
retail, telecommunications, banking 
and manufacturing sectors. A number 
of gas projects are moving ahead, 
stimulated by abundant supplies, growing 
demand and the government’s policy 
goal of eliminating gas flaring by 2008. 
Privatisation to date has been a stop-
start process. However, the opening-up 
of the mobile-phone market has been a 
success. Otherwise, the main rationale 
for investment by multinationals is 
to establish a presence in Africa’s 
largest market, which could be highly 
profitable, despite the difficult operating 
environment.
Impact
The energy sector, which has received 
most foreign investment to date, provides 
more than 80% of government revenue 
and the vast majority of foreign-exchange 
earnings. However, it is also a capital-
intensive sector, with limited linkages to 
the rest of the economy and little effect 
on employment. One area where FDI has 
had a strong impact is in mobile-phone 
networks, led by MTN of South Africa. 
Their success could attract other investors 
outside the energy sector. 
Potential
With the largest population in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Nigeria is potentially an 
important market, although the poor 
business environment is likely to keep FDI 
inflows substantially below their potential 
for years to come. The government 
will continue to promote Nigeria as a 
rewarding target for foreign investment, 
although interest will largely be confined 
to the oil and gas sector, particularly 
offshore, in the next few years. Given 
the country’s OPEC quota, which 
partly constrains oil output, and the 
government’s commitment to reducing 
gas flaring to zero by 2008, gas-related 
investments hold particular promise 
for the energy industry and there are a 
number of projects currently under way. 
The failure of public enterprises to provide 
an adequate level of service, notably in 
the electricity and water sectors, and 
the success of the liberalisation of the 
telephone market make privatisation 
almost inevitable, which will provide 
investment opportunities, although 
this will be a protracted and convoluted 
process considering the vested interests 
involved. There is considerable potential 
in the agricultural sector, which has been 
in decline for decades, in the production 
of food for domestic consumption, 
although export opportunities will be 
limited in the near term by the overvalued 
local currency.
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Qatar
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.93 7.60 30 24
Political environment 6.9 7.4 29 24
 Political stability 7.0 7.8 37 27
 Political effectiveness 6.8 7.1 26 25
Macroeconomic environment 8.6 8.3 11 19
Market opportunities 6.9 7.1 20 16
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.5 6.8 45 37
Policy towards foreign investment 7.3 7.8 33 25
Foreign trade & exchange controls 7.8 8.7 32 24
Taxes 7.2 8.4 17 6
Financing 6.6 7.4 31 33
Labour market 6.6 7.3 36 22
Infrastructure 5.9 6.9 39 38
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 31.6 42.1 52.7 58.4 66.1 80.1 92.6 97.0
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 29.9 32.7 36.1 38.9 42.6 47.3 51.1 54.6
GDP (% real change) 20.8 6.1 7.1 7.8 9.5 11.0 8.0 6.8
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 2.2 2.3 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.1
 % of GDP 7.0 5.5 5.4 5.4 4.9 3.8 3.2 3.2
 % of gross fixed investment 25.4 16.2 14.0 12.3 10.9 9.2 8.2 7.7
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 6.8 9.1 11.9 15.1 18.3 21.4 24.4 27.5
 % of GDP 21.4 21.5 22.6 25.8 27.7 26.6 26.3 28.3
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.6 4.6 5.7 6.8 7.9
 % of GDP 4.0 4.1 4.8 6.1 6.9 7.1 7.3 8.2
Key issues
Despite being located in a volatile region, Qatar’s domestic political scene is 
largely stable, with the position of the emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 
unlikely to come under threat. Qatar’s security is guaranteed by its close ties 
to the US—which has considerable military assets in the emirate. However, the 
presence of US forces has raised concerns that Qatar could find itself in the firing 
line if tensions between the US and Iran over the latter’s nuclear programme 
culminate in a military stand-off. Qatar’s generally pro-Western outlook is also 
unpopular with militant Islamists, and in March 2005 a theatre frequented by 
Westerners was attacked by a suicide bomber. However, the bombing has so far 
proved an isolated incident, and the Qatari authorities have since strengthened 
their internal security structure. The economy will continue to be driven by the 
country’s enormous hydrocarbons reserves, with, in particular, large sums of 
foreign investment being directed into developing the opportunities provided by 
the North Field (the largest known non-associated natural gasfield in the world). 
With both the economy and the population growing rapidly, the government is 
spending large sums on improving Qatar’s infrastructure, and is inviting foreign 
investors and companies to participate.


















FDI inflows per head; US$; left scale
GDP per head; US$ at market exchange rates;
right scale
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Foreign direct investment 
in Qatar
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows into Qatar have strengthened 
in recent years, as the country has 
attracted foreign firms to help finance its 
ambitious US$75bn gas industrialisation 
programme. No local data for the 
country’s FDI stock are available, but 
according to the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) it 
surged from just US$1.9bn in 2000 to 
over US$6.1bn in 2005. However, this is 
probably a significant understatement, 
given that the Office of the US Trade 
Representative puts the stock of US 
FDI alone at US$5.4bn in 2005. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit estimates 
that the stock of FDI stood at US$11.9bn 
(22.6% of GDP) in 2006. FDI inflows have 
been growing strongly in recent years, 
rising from around US$700m in 2001 to 
US$2.9bn in 2006 (equivalent to around 
5.4% of GDP). The accelerating pace of 
new projects should see a further pick-up 
in inflows in the coming years, reaching a 
peak of around US$3.3bn in 2008. 
Origin and distribution
Although no official data are available on 
the geographical origin of FDI in Qatar, 
the majority at present is likely to come 
from the US, as several large US-based 
energy firms, led by ExxonMobil, have 
invested heavily in Qatar’s liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) sector. However, the 
increased variety of gas-based industrial 
programmes under way in the emirate 
has driven some diversification of new 
international firms investing in Qatar. 
The oil sector will also continue to attract 
FDI from a range of sources, with the 
largest programme—a US$5bn project 
to double production in the Al Shaheen 
field—being undertaken with Maersk of 
Denmark. In addition, as the country’s 
diversification strategy progresses, FDI 
inflows into non-energy sectors should 
grow. For instance, the state-owned oil 
firm, Qatar Petroleum, and a Norwegian 
company, Hydro, have formed a joint 
venture to set up a large aluminium 
factory, which is scheduled to come on 
stream in September 2009.
Determinants
Since 1995 the government has sought 
primarily to realise the vast potential of 
the country’s enormous gas reserves. This 
strategy has been extremely successful, 
and with energy prices set to remain 
high over the next five years the bulk of 
foreign investor activity will continue to be 
centred on Qatar’s hydrocarbons sector. 
However, a new investment law, which 
was passed in 2000, saw Qatar begin to 
broaden its economic foundations, leading 
to a revision of the foreign investment 
environment in order to allow 100% 
foreign ownership in the agricultural, 
tourism and health sectors, among others. 
Although a “Qatarisation” programme for 
the employment of nationals is in place 
in the energy and industrial sectors, it is 
neither as specific, nor as strictly enforced, 
as in some other Gulf states.
Impact
FDI has been, and will remain, crucial in 
enabling the government to realise its 
ambitious economic goals. In a country 
as small as Qatar—both geographically 
and demographically—the authorities 
are aware that they need considerable 
foreign expertise and finance to ensure 
the successful implementation of their 
ambitious development plans. Until now, 
however, most of the foreign finance 
entering the economy has been directed 
into the LNG sector, with impressive 
results—in early 2006 Qatar became 
the world’s largest producer of LNG. 
With the country also seeking to attract 
investment into the petrochemicals and 
non-energy-based sectors, the impact of 
FDI on the economy is set both to grow 
and to broaden.
Potential
Qatar is likely to remain a prime regional 
location for FDI inflows, largely because 
of its welcoming climate for foreign 
investors (at least relative to some of 
its neighbours) and, more particularly, 
its possession of the third-largest non-
associated gas reserves in the world. In 
an acknowledgment of the enormous 
business opportunities provided by 
Qatar’s vast hydrocarbons reserves, 
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2006 
placed the country in tenth place among 
141 states in the FDI Potential Index. 
However, in 2005 the government 
announced a “pause” in new gas projects, 
which could last until 2012, in part 
to reassess the scope of its reserves. 
Nevertheless, with a spate of LNG, gas-
to-liquids (GTL) and petrochemicals 
projects set to come on stream into the 
early part of the next decade, there will 
be considerable opportunities for foreign 
firms associated with the building and 
operation of such facilities. In addition, 
if plans for a new investment law come to 
fruition, more sectors will be opened to 
foreign investors, although it remains to 
be seen whether they will hold the same 
appeal as the energy sector.
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South Africa
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 6.09 6.97 46 41
Political environment 5.0 5.8 56 49
 Political stability 5.1 6.6 59 44
 Political effectiveness 4.9 5.2 45 46
Macroeconomic environment 7.2 7.8 45 36
Market opportunities 7.1 7.1 17 16
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.8 6.5 42 41
Policy towards foreign investment 6.0 6.0 57 65
Foreign trade & exchange controls 6.4 7.8 54 51
Taxes 6.4 7.0 28 26
Financing 6.6 8.1 31 26
Labour market 4.0 5.5 81 68
Infrastructure 6.5 8.2 32 22
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 46.7 47.2 47.4 47.6 47.8 48.0 48.2 48.3
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 216.8 242.0 255.4 250.6 257.6 263.6 270.9 278.3
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 509.3 551.5 595.9 638.6 689.6 746.6 810.0 868.7
GDP (% real change) 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.4 5.7 4.6
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 0.7 6.1 0.0 1.7 2.0 3.5 4.1 4.5
 % of GDP 0.3 2.5 0.0 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6
 % of gross fixed investment 2.0 14.9 0.0 3.5 4.1 6.9 8.1 8.9
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 63.1 69.2 69.2 70.9 72.9 76.4 80.5 85.0
 % of GDP 29.1 28.6 27.1 28.3 28.3 29.0 29.7 30.5
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 1.3 0.9 6.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 38.7 36.8 43.3 44.6 45.9 47.4 49.1 50.9
 % of GDP 17.8 15.2 17.0 17.8 17.8 18.0 18.1 18.3
Key issues
South Africa maintains a relatively welcoming attitude to FDI and is the main 
destination for FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa, although the government still 
views foreign participation in the economy with some caution. South Africa 
is also a major outward investor, especially in Africa, and particularly in the 
services sector (which is often neglected by other investors more keen on 
natural resource exploitation). The single largest outward investment to date 
was sealed in 2006 with the purchase by a mobile-phone operator, MTN, of 
Dubai-listed Investcom for US$5.5bn. Inward FDI will be encouraged but will be 
somewhat restricted by the government’s decision to delay the privatisation of 
state assets. The main source of inflows will be through either the takeover of 
existing South African companies or greenfield investments in new operations. 
Official support to foreign investors should be provided by the implementation 
of specific incentives, including the creation of a “one-stop shop”. However, 
foreign investors across all economic sectors will still have to contend with a high 
tax burden, a burdensome regulatory environment, a relative dearth of skilled 
labour, and the requirements of black economic empowerment (BEE). 
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Foreign direct investment 
in South Africa
Stocks and flows
FDI inflows into South Africa averaged 
US$3bn a year in 2001-05, although 
annual figures can vary greatly because of 
the discontinuous nature of FDI. Inflows 
surged to a record US$6.1bn in 2005, for 
instance, following the acquisition by 
Barclays (UK) of 60% of Amalgamated 
Banks of South Africa (ABSA), which 
was the biggest single FDI deal to date. 
Inflows turned slightly negative in 2006, 
because of disinvestment in the second 
half of the year. The disinvestment was 
largely owing to the sale of gold mining 
interests by Canada’s Barrick (in South 
Deep mine) and Russia’s Polyus (in Gold 
Fields). Nonetheless, FDI inflows are 
forecast to rise steadily, to US$4.5bn 
in 2011, boosted in 2007-10 by foreign 
investor involvement in preparing for 
the 2010 football World Cup and gradual 
liberalisation of capital-account controls. 
From around US$69bn in 2006, the 
stock of inward FDI is forecast to reach 
US$85bn (30.5% of GDP) in 2011.
Origin and distribution
Most FDI comes from the UK, which 
accounted for 74% of the total in 1991-
2001, and recent deals with Barclays 
(2005) and Vodafone (2006) suggest 
that this pattern has continued. Other 
significant investors during the period 
were Germany (6% of the total), the 
US (6%) and the Netherlands (3%). 
The financial and other services 
sector attracted the most investment 
(39%), followed by mining (28%) and 
manufacturing (26%). Major investors 
include Mercedes-Benz and BMW from 
Germany, and General Motors and 
Coca-Cola from the US. South Africa has 
attracted greenfield projects—in sectors 
such as motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, 
food-processing, information technology 
(IT) and beverages—as well as buyouts of 
existing firms. The economically powerful 
Gauteng province has received the bulk of 
inward FDI, followed by the impoverished 
Eastern Cape province (mostly mining). 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape 
have benefited to some extent, but the 
other five provinces have received little 
FDI. South Africa has preferential access 
to the EU market through a free-trade 
agreement, and to the US market under 
the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), which came into force in 
November 2000. The latter has attracted 
some FDI into textile manufacturing, 
particularly in the Eastern Cape. 
Determinants
FDI inflows have been boosted by the 
country’s status as the most advanced 
economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
privatisation programme (although 
this has now assumed less importance), 
and the relatively large domestic and 
regional market (bolstered by the 
emergence of a black middle class). 
The 2010 football World Cup is serving 
as an additional spur. Set against this, 
however, high rates of crime, an over-
regulated labour market, low capital and 
labour productivity, and uncertainties 
surrounding the black economic 
empowerment (BEE) programme have 
somewhat constrained FDI inflows. 
Disincentives are likely to recede in the 
next few years as the government steps 
up its efforts to make South Africa a more 
attractive destination for FDI, including 
making BEE provisions more business-
friendly. However, in line with the 
government’s medium-term policy, the 
big four parastatals—Transnet, Eskom, 
Denel and South African Airways—will be 
restructured, not privatised.
Impact
FDI has had a positive impact in South 
Africa, especially in key sectors such 
as automobiles, telecommunications, 
banking and mining, and has played a 
key role in boosting exports, facilitating 
growth, and employment. FDI provides 
capital, allows for technology and skills 
transfer, and binds South Africa more 
closely to the global economy.
Potential
Barclays’ return to South Africa (after 
disinvestment during the apartheid 
era) is a clear vote of confidence in the 
country’s economic prospects, and the 
outlook for future FDI inflows is fairly 
promising. However, the government’s 
ability to boost greenfield investment 
will depend on its success in tackling 
substantial disincentives for investors 
such as crime, skills shortages and 
excessive labour regulations, and 
calming investor nervousness about 
BEE and HIV/AIDS. Recent measures to 
ease employment of expatriate workers 
and tone down the provisions of BEE 
charters for multinational firms will help. 
There is considerable potential in export 
industries, tourism, minerals, agriculture 
and IT (including call centres, given an 
English-speaking, educated workforce 
in a similar time-zone to the EU). The 
government is also keen to promote 
South Africa as a regional financial 
centre for companies with pan-African 
operations (with a range of functions 
from providing banking services to 
raising capital).
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United Arab Emirates
Business environment rankings
 Score (out of 10)  Rank (out of 82)
 2002-06 2007-11 2002-06 2007-11
Overall scores and ranks 7.27 7.48 24 28
Political environment 6.2 6.7 40 37
 Political stability 6.3 6.3 48 49
 Political effectiveness 6.1 7.1 31 25
Macroeconomic environment 8.3 7.8 20 36
Market opportunities 8.0 7.7 5 12
Policy towards private enterprise & competition 5.0 6.0 51 50
Policy towards foreign investment 7.8 7.8 24 25
Foreign trade & exchange controls 8.7 9.1 15 14
Taxes 9.1 9.0 2 2
Financing 6.6 7.0 31 43
Labour market 6.8 7.2 27 27
Infrastructure 6.2 6.6 35 41
Market summary
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Population (m) 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.4
GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates) 105.2 132.2 163.1 196.4 231.4 264.9 292.5 331.4
GDP (US$ bn at PPP) 79.4 89.8 100.0 111.4 123.5 134.9 146.1 159.4
GDP (% real change) 9.7 8.2 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.2 7.4 7.2
Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn) 10.0 12.0 16.0 15.0 12.0 11.8 12.3 13.0
 % of GDP 9.5 9.1 9.8 7.6 5.2 4.4 4.2 3.9
 % of gross fixed investment 45.2 42.5 45.0 33.2 22.3 19.0 17.4 16.3
Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 16.2 28.2 44.2 59.2 71.2 82.9 95.2 108.2
 % of GDP 15.4 21.3 27.1 30.1 30.8 31.3 32.5 32.6
Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn) 2.2 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.0 3.8 4.0 4.5
Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn) 3.4 10.1 14.1 17.8 20.8 24.6 28.6 33.1
 % of GDP 3.3 7.6 8.6 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.8 10.0
Key issues
The president of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-
Nahyan, is widely respected and there is unlikely to be any challenge to his 
authority. The UAE’s well-established, relatively liberal social and economic 
policies, as well as its pro-Western foreign policy stance, are therefore likely to 
remain in place in the forecast period. As a result of both the ruler’s leadership 
and external pressure from bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), an 
ongoing programme of economic liberalisation will continue, although the pace 
of reform will be gradual. Economic growth will remain strong, bolstered by high 
oil earnings and sustained expansion in the non-oil economy, especially in the 
booming real estate sector. The strength of oil revenue will ensure that the public 
finances also remain robust, and that the trade and current-account balances 
continue to record large surpluses. Inflation has been rising sharply over the past 
year, however, which could threaten the UAE’s competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
locations in the Gulf. Furthermore, the government is prioritising “Emiritisation” of 
the largely expatriate workforce by setting employment quotas for the hire of UAE 
nationals, which could increase companies’ overheads.
Inward FDI stock, 2006
(% of GDP)
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Foreign direct investment 
in the United Arab Emirates
Stocks and flows
The UAE does not publish official FDI 
figures, but semi-official data suggest 
that inflows are high and rising. The UN 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) puts FDI inflows into the 
UAE at US$12bn in 2005—some 60% of 
total inflows into the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) that year. In view of the 
ongoing real-estate boom in the country, 
which is drawing investors to Dubai and 
to Abu Dhabi, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit estimates that FDI inflows rose 
to US$16bn in 2006. Based on these 
figures and trends, we estimate that the 
stock of FDI stood at US$44bn or 27% 
of GDP in 2006. With international oil 
prices forecast to remain above their 
long-term average over the next five 
years, and concomitant liquidity in the 
region therefore expected to remain 
high, we expect the stock of FDI to exceed 
US$100bn by 2011 (around 33% of GDP).
Origin and distribution
The lack of official data makes it difficult 
to analyse the sources of FDI into the UAE, 
but in mid-2007 the Ministry of Finance 
and Industry published its Investment 
Environment Report 2006, which stated 
that in 2006 the EU accounted for 35% 
of FDI, followed by other GCC countries 
with 26%, Asia-Pacific (led by Japan) 
with 19% and the Americas with 2%. 
Firms from each of these regions have 
invested in Abu Dhabi’s energy industry, 
and major companies from each of these 
markets tend to locate their Middle East 
sales and distribution headquarters in 
Dubai, the UAE’s second city and a key 
regional entrepôt. GCC countries have 
been increasingly investing in their own 
region, particularly since September 11th 
2001. Since then, some Arab investors 
have found that investments in developed 
markets have come under intense 
international scrutiny as authorities 
pursue sources of “terrorist financing”. 
Furthermore, the high levels of regional 
liquidity mean that Gulf investors are 
keen to diversify their international asset 
portfolios. 
Determinants
Three sectors have traditionally attracted 
FDI into the UAE: energy, real estate 
and trade. The UAE is the only major 
Middle East oil producer that did not fully 
nationalise its oil industry in the 1970s. 
The large multinational oil companies 
have significant equity stakes in the 
upstream oil and gas sector, downstream 
ventures and electricity generation. 
Since 2004 real estate has attracted 
massive FDI inflows, particularly from 
other GCC countries. Trade is the third 
major area. Dubai is home to the region’s 
leading container port (Jebel Ali) and 
airport (Dubai International), and offers 
the region’s most liberal lifestyle. This, 
coupled with dozens of tax-free zones 
offering 100% foreign ownership, makes 
it by far the most popular location for 
the regional sales and distribution hubs 
for multinational firms. Processing 
industries and the water and electricity 
sector accounted for nearly one-third 
of total FDI in 2006, followed by the 
wholesale and retail sector with 21.7%. 
Impact
FDI inflows have had a significant 
impact in recent years, particularly 
in Dubai, where they have helped to 
fuel an economic boom. International 
companies have either set up new 
regional headquarters in the city or 
expanded existing operations, attracting 
a large influx of expatriate workers. 
High levels of oil-related liquidity have 
funded outward FDI, such as the Dubai 
government’s US$6.8bn acquisition of 
P&O, a UK-based ports operator, in March 
2006. However, private equity firms have 
become increasingly subject to public 
scrutiny in the West, and some politicians 
have voiced their hostility to Arab 
companies acquiring national assets. 
Potential
FDI inflows into the UAE are likely 
to remain strong, as high oil prices 
fuel a regional economic boom. This 
encourages investment from OECD 
countries keen to tap into the regional 
economy. High oil prices also generate 
surpluses in oil-producing neighbours. 
However, inflation is making the UAE 
an increasingly expensive place to 
do business, and its rapid expansion 
is placing pressure on domestic 
infrastructure, particularly transport 
and energy. At the same time, investors 
are beginning to complain about 
unfriendly laws: the UAE is imposing 
employment quotas that force firms to 
hire UAE nationals at relatively high 
minimum wages; outside the free zones 
the maximum foreign ownership stake 
remains 49%; and foreign firms selling 
into the UAE must do so through a local 
partner. In addition, rising construction 
costs could also hinder the UAE’s 
development plans.
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Developed countries Emerging markets   
European Union Sub-Saharan Africa North Africa The Pacific Developing Europe
Austria Angola Algeria Fiji Cyprus
Belgium Benin Egypt Kiribati Malta
Denmark Botswana Libya New Caledonia Turkey
Finland Burkina Faso Morocco Papua New Guinea 
France Burundi Sudan Vanuatu Transition economies
Germany Cameroon Tunisia Samoa East-central Europe
Greece Cape Verde  Solomon Islands Czech Republic
Ireland Central African Republic Middle East1 Tonga Hungary
Italy Chad Bahrain  Poland
Luxembourg Comoros Iran Latin America & the Caribbean Slovakia
Netherlands Congo, Democratic Republic Iraq South America Slovenia
Portugal Congo, Republic Jordan Argentina Balkans 
Spain Cote d’Ivoire Kuwait Bolivia  Albania
Sweden Djibouti Lebanon Brazil   Bosnia and Hercegovina
UK Equatorial Guinea Oman Chile  Bulgaria
 Ethiopia Qatar Colombia  Croatia
Other western Europe Gabon Saudi Arabia Ecuador  Macedonia
Gibraltar Gambia Syria Guyana  Montenegro
Iceland Ghana UAE Paraguay  Romania
Norway Guinea Yemen Peru  Serbia
Switzerland Guinea-Bissau  Suriname  Baltics
 Kenya Developing Asia2 Uruguay  Estonia
North America Lesotho Bangladesh Venezuela  Latvia
Canada Liberia Brunei  Lithuania 
United States Madagascar Cambodia Other Latin America & Caribbean  CIS
 Malawi China Antigua & Barbuda Russia
Other developed countries Mali Hong Kong Aruba   Ukraine
Australia Mauritania India Bahamas  Belarus
Israel Mauritius Indonesia Barbados  Moldova
Japan Mozambique Laos Belarus  Armenia
New Zealand Namibia Macau Bermuda   Azerbaijan
 Niger Malaysia Cayman Islands  Georgia
 Nigeria Maldives Costa Rica  Kazakhstan
 Rwanda Mongolia Cuba  Kyrgyz Republic
 Senegal Myanmar Dominica  Tajikistan
 Seychelles Nepal Dominican Republic   Turkmenistan
 Somalia North Korea El Salvador   Uzbekistan
 South Africa Pakistan Grenada   
 Swaziland Philippines Guatemala  
 Tanzania Singapore Haiti 
 Togo South Korea Honduras 
 Uganda Sri Lanka Jamaica 
 Zambia Taiwan Mexico 
 Zimbabwe Thailand Netherlands Antilles 
  Vietnam Nicaragua 
   Panama 
   Saint Kitts & Nevis 
   Saint Lucia 
   Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 
   Trinidad & Tobago 
   Virgin Islands 
1. In regional classification, Middle East also includes Israel, classified as a developed economy.
2. In regional classification, Asia and Australasia includes developing Asia, the Pacific and also the developed economies of Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
Appendix 1: World classification
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Sources
The main sources for the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
reported in this report are the IMF and central bank 
statistics. In a few cases, data are obtained from the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or 
national sources (usually foreign investment agencies). 
In recent years there has been a concerted effort in 
many countries to compile and report FDI statistics 
in accordance with long-standing IMF and OECD 
definitions. The inter-country comparability of the data 
has increased but is still far from perfect.
Definitions
The OECD defines direct investment as a type of 
crossborder investment made by a resident entity in 
one economy (the “direct investor”) with the objective 
of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the investor 
(the “direct investment enterprise”). This implies 
influence by the investor on the management of an 
enterprise. A minimum stake of 10% of the ordinary 
shares of an enterprise is generally regarded as being 
the minimum threshold for a foreign investment to be 
classified as direct investment.
FDI inflows and outflows: capital provided by a 
foreign investor to an FDI enterprise or received from 
a FDI enterprise by an FDI investor. These consist of 
three components:
Equity capital comprises equity in branches; shares in 
subsidiaries and associates (except non-participating, 
preferred shares that are treated as debt securities 
and included under direct investment, other capital); 
and other capital contributions. 
Reinvested earnings reflect earnings on equity 
accruing to direct investors less distributed earnings.
Other capital (or inter-company debt transactions) 
consist of borrowing and lending of funds between 
direct investors and subsidiaries, associates and 
branches.
FDI flows are calculated on a net basis (capital 
transactions’ credits less debits between direct 
investors and their foreign affiliates). Net decreases 
in assets or net increases in liabilities are recorded 
as credits (with a positive sign in the balance of 
payments), and net increases in assets or net 
decreases in liabilities are recorded as debits (with a 
negative sign in the balance of payments).
All data, unless otherwise indicated, are expressed 
in US dollars. Data reported in national currencies 
are converted to US dollars by using period-average 
exchange rates for flow data and end-period exchange 
rates for stock.
FDI stocks
FDI stocks are the value of the share of capital and 
reserves attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the 
net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise. 
Data on FDI are usually reported at book value (all 
the stock data cited in this report are at book value), 
although a few countries also report data at market 
prices. For many countries FDI stocks are estimated 
by cumulating FDI flows over a period of time. For 
some countries up-to-date estimates of FDI stocks are 
obtained by adding flows to an FDI stock estimate that 
has been obtained for a particular year from national 
sources or the IMF data series on assets and liabilities 
of direct investment.
Mergers and acquisitions and FDI
There is no one-to-one correspondence between 
FDI flows and crossborder mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). M&As may be financed by local or 
international capital market funds that are not 
reported as FDI, as recorded in balance-of-payments 
statistics. Data on M&As refer to amounts recorded 
at the time of closure of deals, and values are not 
necessarily paid out in a single year. In addition, FDI—
the change in inward and outward direct investment 
assets and liabilities—is reported on a “net” basis: for 
example, FDI inflows equal inward investment flows 
minus repatriated capital. M&A data are on a gross 
basis, and, furthermore, associated payments can 
be phased over several years. Finally, M&A statistics 
usually record the total amount of capital, whereas FDI 
refers only to transactions involving more than 10% of 
the equity capital of firms (if less than 10%, the flows 
are classified as portfolio investments). 
Appendix 2: Data sources and definitions
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The global economy to 2011
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
Real GDP growth (%)          
World (market exchange rates) 1.9 2.7 4.1 3.5 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2
 US 1.6 2.5 3.9 3.2 3.3 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7
 Japan 0.3 1.5 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.3 1.7
 Euro area 0.9 0.8 1.9 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0
 China 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.1 11.0 10.1 8.4 7.8 7.3
World (PPP exchange rates) 3.0 4.0 5.2 4.8 5.4 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.3 4.2  
World trade growth (%)          
 Goods 3.7 6.3 10.9 7.5 10.2 7.3 7.9 8.1 8.0 8.1    
Consumer price inflation (%; av)          
World 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8
 US 1.6 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.2 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5
 Japan -0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.0
 Euro area 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8  
Export price inflation (%)          
Manufactures (US$) 2.3 14.2 9.4 3.6 1.8 4.0 3.6 0.9 0.9 1.4   
Commodity prices          
Commodity prices          
Oil (US$/barrel; Brent) 24.97 28.83 38.51 54.72 65.28 69.91 69.00 63.25 55.75 58.25
 % change 2.0 15.5 33.6 42.1 19.3 7.1 -1.3 -8.3 -11.9 4.5  
Main policy interest rates (%, end-period)
Federal Reserve 1.25 1.00 2.25 4.25 5.25 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.00
Bank of Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 1.25 2.00 2.25 2.50
European Central Bank 2.75 2.00 2.00 2.25 3.50 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
Appendix 3: Select market and foreign direct investment data
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Select market and foreign direct investment data by country
Population (m)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 288.0 290.9 293.7 296.4 299.4 302.1 304.8 307.6 310.3 313.1
Canada 31.4 31.7 32.0 32.3 32.6 32.9 33.2 33.5 33.8 34.0
Western Europe          
Austria 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
Belgium 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Denmark 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Finland 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3
France 59.9 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.9 61.1 61.4 61.6 61.9 62.1
Germany 82.5 82.5 82.5 82.5 82.6 82.6 82.7 82.8 83.0 82.9
Greece 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0
Ireland 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
Italy 57.9 58.0 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.1 58.0
Netherlands 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.6 16.7 16.8
Norway 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8
Portugal 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.8
Spain 41.0 41.8 42.7 44.1 45.1 45.4 45.8 46.2 46.6 46.9
Sweden 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.4
Switzerland 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7
Turkey 70.3 71.3 72.3 73.3 74.3 75.2 76.2 77.2 78.1 79.1
UK 59.3 59.6 59.8 60.0 60.3 60.5 60.7 60.9 61.2 61.4
Eastern Europe          
Azerbaijan 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9.0
Bulgaria 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4
Croatia 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
Cyprus 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Czech Republic 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.1
Estonia 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Hungary 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.8
Kazakhstan 14.9 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 16.0
Latvia 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.2
Lithuania 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3
Poland 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.1 38.0
Romania 21.8 21.7 21.7 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.6 21.5
Russia 145.0 144.2 143.5 142.8 142.3 141.9 141.2 140.4 139.2 138.6
Serbia 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.3
Slovakia 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Slovenia 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Ukraine 47.8 47.4 47.1 46.7 46.5 46.2 46.0 45.8 45.6 45.4
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Population (m)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Asia & Australasia          
Australia 19.5 19.7 19.9 20.1 20.3 20.4 20.6 20.8 20.9 21.1
Bangladesh 134.0 136.6 139.2 141.8 144.5 147.2 150.0 152.8 155.6 158.5
China 1,284.5 1,292.3 1,299.9 1,307.6 1,314.5 1,323.1 1,331.1 1,336.7 1,342.5 1,351.0
Hong Kong 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.1
India 1,034.2 1,049.7 1,065.1 1,080.3 1,095.4 1,110.4 1,125.4 1,140.2 1,155.0 1,169.7
Indonesia 231.3 234.9 238.5 242.0 245.5 248.9 252.3 255.6 258.8 262.0
Japan 127.1 127.2 127.3 127.5 127.5 127.5 127.4 127.4 127.3 127.3
Malaysia 24.5 25.1 25.6 26.1 26.6 27.1 27.6 28.1 28.6 29.2
New Zealand 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4
Pakistan 148.8 151.8 154.8 157.9 159.6 162.5 165.5 168.5 171.5 174.5
Philippines 83.0 84.6 86.2 87.9 89.5 91.1 92.7 94.3 95.9 97.5
Singapore 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
South Korea 47.6 47.8 48.1 48.3 48.7 49.0 49.2 49.4 49.6 49.7
Sri Lanka 20.2 20.4 20.6 20.7 20.9 21.1 21.3 21.5 21.7 21.8
Taiwan 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.6 22.7 22.7 22.8 22.8 22.9 23.0
Thailand 63.5 64.0 65.1 65.5 66.0 66.5 67.0 67.5 67.9 68.4
Vietnam 80.6 81.6 82.7 83.8 84.9 85.9 87.0 88.1 89.2 90.3
Latin America          
Argentina 37.5 37.9 38.2 38.6 39.0 39.4 39.7 40.1 40.5 40.9
Brazil 176.4 179.0 181.6 184.2 186.8 189.3 191.9 194.4 196.8 199.5
Chile 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.8 16.9 17.1 17.2
Colombia 43.5 44.2 44.9 45.6 46.3 47.0 47.6 48.3 48.9 49.6
Costa Rica 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.8
Cuba 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2
Dominican Republic 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.9
Ecuador 12.7 12.8 13.0 13.2 13.4 13.6 13.8 14.0 14.2 14.4
El Salvador 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.6
Mexico 102.5 103.7 105.0 106.2 107.4 108.7 110.0 111.2 112.5 113.8
Peru 26.7 27.1 27.5 27.9 28.4 28.8 29.2 29.7 30.1 30.6
Venezuela 25.0 25.5 26.0 26.5 26.9 27.3 27.8 28.2 28.6 29.0
Africa & Middle East          
Algeria 31.4 31.9 32.4 32.8 33.4 33.9 34.4 34.9 35.4 35.9
Angola 14.6 15.0 15.5 15.9 16.4 16.9 17.3 17.8 18.3 18.8
Bahrain 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Egypt 69.9 71.3 72.6 74.0 75.4 76.8 78.2 79.6 80.9 82.3
Iran 67.6 68.2 68.8 69.5 70.1 70.8 71.4 72.1 72.7 73.4
Israel 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.7
Jordan 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8
Kenya 32.0 32.7 33.5 34.3 35.1 35.9 36.7 37.4 38.2 38.9
Kuwait 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.0
Libya 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5
Morocco 30.1 30.6 31.0 31.5 31.9 32.4 32.9 33.4 33.9 34.4
Nigeria 129.9 133.2 136.5 139.8 144.0 146.2 149.5 152.2 155.4 158.4
Qatar 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
Saudi Arabia 22.7 23.3 24.0 24.6 25.3 25.9 26.6 27.4 28.1 28.9
South Africa 45.7 46.2 46.7 47.2 47.4 47.6 47.8 48.0 48.2 48.3
Tunisia 9.8 9.9 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7
UAE 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.4
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Nominal GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
North America         
US 10,469.6 10,971.3 11,734.3 12,487.2 13,272.1 14,019.5 14,909.4 15,812.8 16,739.2 16,739.2
Canada 734.6 866.1 992.1 1,131.8 1,268.8 1,351.0 1,341.7 1,349.4 1,399.9 1,465.8
Western Europe          
Austria 208.7 255.8 293.2 305.3 321.9 366.8 386.5 379.3 380.5 390.4
Belgium 252.8 310.5 359.3 372.6 394.5 442.4 461.5 446.3 437.2 439.9
Denmark 173.9 212.6 243.6 258.8 275.4 315.4 336.3 334.5 337.9 347.7
Finland 136.0 165.0 189.4 195.8 210.8 231.7 240.8 234.5 231.9 237.3
France 1,464.5 1,804.6 2,061.2 2,137.4 2,252.0 2,540.1 2,693.6 2,667.5 2,699.5 2,780.8
Germany 2,025.1 2,444.3 2,744.2 2,791.7 2,899.5 3,235.4 3,398.4 3,296.9 3,244.4 3,294.6
Greece 171.0 222.3 264.5 284.2 308.7 344.4 371.9 379.1 392.5 409.0
Ireland 122.8 157.1 183.5 200.8 220.7 258.9 275.9 276.7 284.1 297.6
Italy 1,223.8 1,511.0 1,726.8 1,773.2 1,854.3 2,109.7 2,222.2 2,182.8 2,192.3 2,239.0
Netherlands 439.6 539.3 609.0 629.9 662.9 762.3 814.8 812.5 827.7 854.9
Norway 191.9 225.1 258.6 301.6 335.5 378.3 411.6 392.3 394.1 401.9
Portugal 128.0 156.7 179.3 185.5 194.9 218.3 231.3 229.3 233.1 240.5
Spain 689.0 884.9 1,044.5 1,128.0 1,225.8 1,430.1 1,529.4 1,521.4 1,551.0 1,608.1
Sweden 243.9 304.4 349.1 357.3 384.1 437.0 470.5 475.4 482.9 492.5
Switzerland 276.2 322.7 359.7 365.8 378.4 406.9 427.7 423.4 430.6 440.6
Turkey 184.2 239.7 302.0 362.6 403.5 471.9 489.6 547.3 601.8 666.8
UK 1,582.4 1,825.8 2,168.3 2,243.6 2,391.3 2,731.3 2,801.0 2,837.0 2,910.4 2,957.9
Eastern Europe          
Azerbaijan 6.2 7.3 8.7 13.2 19.9 28.7 38.0 46.8 55.5 64.4
Bulgaria 15.6 20.0 24.3 26.7 31.5 37.8 41.5 42.8 44.4 46.0
Croatia 22.7 29.4 31.4 33.7 36.3 42.2 51.7 53.7 56.4 56.4
Cyprus 10.5 13.3 15.8 16.9 18.2 20.5 21.8 21.6 22.0 22.7
Czech Republic 75.3 91.4 109.6 125.0 142.5 163.4 180.0 187.1 192.6 199.7
Estonia 7.3 9.6 11.6 13.8 16.4 20.5 23.0 24.2 25.6 27.4
Hungary 66.6 84.4 102.2 111.6 112.9 129.9 139.1 141.5 149.0 158.8
Kazakhstan 24.6 30.8 43.2 57.1 77.2 95.4 119.4 149.7 185.2 225.3
Latvia 9.3 11.2 13.8 16.0 20.1 25.7 29.7 31.1 33.0 35.3
Lithuania 14.2 18.6 22.5 25.7 29.8 36.2 41.0 42.7 45.1 48.3
Poland 198.2 216.8 252.9 303.9 340.8 408.9 446.3 459.7 478.7 508.2
Romania 45.8 59.5 75.5 97.1 121.9 161.5 188.4 202.8 220.4 242.5
Russia 345.1 431.5 591.7 764.4 984.6 1,183.3 1,361.4 1,523.6 1,697.9 1,888.7
Serbia 15.9 20.4 24.4 26.0 31.2 38.7 42.0 43.4 45.4 48.4
Slovakia 24.5 33.0 42.0 47.4 55.3 72.5 79.8 81.8 85.3 91.4
Slovenia 22.3 28.1 32.6 34.4 37.4 44.2 48.9 49.9 51.9 55.1
Ukraine 42.4 50.1 64.9 82.9 105.5 136.2 147.8 166.5 195.1 223.9
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Nominal GDP (US$ bn at market exchange rates)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 412.5 524.9 638.4 712.4 755.4 857.3 832.0 808.5 807.5 827.6
Bangladesh 47.6 51.9 56.5 60.0 62.0 68.0 73.9 79.7 85.9 90.5
China 1,454.0 1,647.9 1,936.5 2,278.3 2,720.2 3,250.2 3,832.6 4,481.9 5,232.0 6,080.6
Hong Kong 163.7 158.5 165.8 177.8 189.8 203.5 220.9 237.4 256.2 274.9
India 507.8 596.1 692.7 805.6 922.9 1,131.9 1,329.1 1,512.4 1,719.4 1,955.2
Indonesia 200.1 234.8 254.3 287.0 364.5 423.8 477.0 520.1 577.3 640.2
Japan 3,919.4 4,231.5 4,607.1 4,549.3 4,365.2 4,381.5 4,954.4 5,745.0 6,002.3 6,218.3
Malaysia 95.3 104.0 118.5 130.8 148.9 177.8 196.5 215.9 233.8 255.2
New Zealand 59.8 79.2 97.5 108.4 103.8 121.1 118.0 118.0 115.9 116.2
Pakistan 72.3 83.3 98.0 111.3 128.8 142.6 155.6 170.5 184.4 201.3
Philippines 76.8 79.6 86.9 98.7 117.6 139.9 151.7 163.0 178.4 193.5
Singapore 88.1 92.3 107.4 116.7 132.2 146.7 156.6 167.0 179.9 192.8
South Korea 546.9 608.1 680.5 791.4 888.0 964.9 1,078.2 1,200.9 1,316.0 1,445.8
Sri Lanka 16.5 18.2 20.1 23.5 27.0 30.8 34.5 37.6 40.7 43.9
Taiwan 294.8 299.8 322.2 346.4 355.7 367.0 396.1 422.8 449.5 484.2
Thailand 126.9 142.6 161.3 176.2 206.3 239.5 253.6 264.6 279.0 296.8
Vietnam 35.1 39.6 45.3 52.8 61.6 70.0 81.2 93.7 108.1 123.9
Latin America          
Argentina 102.0 129.6 153.1 183.2 214.3 245.6 278.2 310.7 343.3 372.4
Brazil 505.9 552.2 663.6 882.0 1,067.4 1,267.1 1,394.7 1,422.7 1,454.2 1,483.5
Chile 67.5 74.0 95.8 118.9 145.8 158.1 170.3 174.5 175.7 184.4
Colombia 81.2 79.4 98.1 122.9 136.0 167.5 171.4 165.3 165.9 174.1
Costa Rica 16.8 17.5 18.6 20.0 22.1 24.5 26.3 28.0 29.5 31.2
Cuba 28.4 29.9 32.0 35.8 40.3 44.2 47.9 52.0 55.8 59.8
Dominican Republic 25.0 19.5 21.7 34.7 36.5 38.1 40.9 44.4 48.1 48.1
Ecuador 24.9 28.6 32.6 36.5 40.9 41.3 42.5 44.6 47.4 50.0
El Salvador 14.3 15.0 15.8 17.0 18.3 19.7 21.1 22.6 23.9 25.3
Mexico 649.1 639.1 683.5 767.7 840.0 876.4 905.3 952.4 1,000.8 1,054.4
Peru 57.1 61.5 69.7 79.4 93.4 104.1 110.4 115.6 121.2 128.0
Venezuela 92.9 83.5 112.5 144.8 181.9 212.8 209.0 207.2 211.3 214.2
Africa & Middle East          
Algeria 57.0 68.1 85.0 102.3 111.9 120.0 124.1 131.3 139.9 144.6
Angola 10.8 13.8 13.7 20.2 28.8 40.0 50.4 64.4 76.6 94.2
Bahrain 8.4 9.6 11.0 13.4 15.4 16.9 18.0 18.3 18.9 19.8
Egypt 84.2 71.5 78.3 93.2 107.9 126.5 143.1 158.0 174.2 192.0
Iran 116.4 134.0 161.3 188.5 203.8 239.8 277.9 308.7 340.9 376.9
Israel 109.3 115.2 122.5 129.8 140.4 154.5 170.1 180.1 190.7 204.6
Jordan 9.6 10.2 11.4 12.7 14.3 15.9 17.4 18.9 20.2 21.7
Kenya 13.0 15.0 16.2 18.7 23.3 27.5 28.5 30.7 32.2 34.1
Kuwait 38.1 47.8 59.3 80.8 95.3 100.8 106.3 110.8 118.1 123.6
Libya 19.2 23.3 28.0 37.3 45.3 47.4 45.8 45.7 49.9 53.7
Morocco 38.3 46.5 53.4 55.6 63.3 70.2 73.0 76.0 78.3 83.0
Nigeria 46.7 58.3 72.1 91.3 115.9 127.4 142.2 150.8 164.2 172.3
Qatar 19.7 23.7 31.6 42.1 52.7 58.4 66.1 80.1 92.6 97.0
Saudi Arabia 188.6 214.6 250.3 309.2 347.4 369.0 395.2 419.6 445.1 472.8
South Africa 111.1 166.8 216.8 242.0 255.4 250.6 257.6 263.6 270.9 278.3
Tunisia 22.5 25.0 28.2 28.7 29.8 32.7 34.1 34.9 35.9 37.5
UAE 74.3 87.6 105.2 132.2 163.1 196.4 231.4 264.9 292.5 331.4
202 © The Economist Intelligence Unit
PART 3  APPENDIX 3 WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS
Nominal GDP (US$ bn at PPP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
North America         
US 10,469.6 10,960.8 11,712.5 12,455.8 13,246.6 13,832.8 14,574.8 15,373.7 16,204.4 17,067.0
Canada 938.1 975.4 1,036.8 1,098.9 1,170.2 1,229.8 1,281.0 1,353.0 1,426.1 1,499.1
Western Europe          
Austria 242.2 249.2 264.4 276.4 281.7 297.2 312.8 328.7 344.9 361.1
Belgium 302.9 312.1 328.0 342.0 354.8 365.4 375.1 393.1 410.6 428.1
Denmark 162.9 165.4 173.8 184.7 195.5 206.5 216.4 226.7 237.6 248.7
Finland 148.9 149.9 158.4 164.4 179.6 182.2 186.3 195.7 205.3 214.9
France 1,722.0 1,765.3 1,813.8 1,902.2 1,995.0 2,074.6 2,162.4 2,267.2 2,373.8 2,488.1
Germany 2,234.8 2,277.7 2,368.2 2,454.5 2,469.6 2,519.8 2,604.0 2,734.4 2,858.6 2,980.7
Greece 258.6 275.6 296.9 317.3 340.7 361.5 383.1 405.3 427.9 450.8
Ireland 129.7 136.2 146.5 160.8 172.4 186.1 195.0 207.1 219.9 233.0
Italy 1,569.9 1,583.2 1,632.1 1,674.6 1,755.9 1,843.8 1,909.0 1,990.8 2,077.5 2,164.0
Netherlands 505.3 516.7 546.4 573.0 608.9 647.0 679.8 713.7 747.8 782.3
Norway 167.6 171.8 189.8 203.6 218.4 228.0 236.0 247.8 260.5 273.4
Portugal 205.8 195.2 203.4 212.1 235.9 247.5 257.8 270.6 284.3 298.2
Spain 981.4 1,044.8 1,108.3 1,183.6 1,267.8 1,365.5 1,436.7 1,509.2 1,586.3 1,664.9
Sweden 253.2 266.0 279.5 290.0 308.9 321.7 340.2 358.3 376.1 394.6
Switzerland 238.6 246.9 259.0 267.3 282.9 291.0 304.5 318.9 333.7 348.7
Turkey 464.2 499.8 556.1 615.2 671.8 728.7 786.8 850.3 916.2 986.8
UK 1,730.8 1,792.1 1,913.2 1,993.5 2,102.9 2,207.3 2,317.4 2,438.2 2,558.3 2,687.0
Eastern Europe          
Azerbaijan 29.4 33.4 37.8 49.2 68.2 83.6 98.4 111.1 122.6 131.7
Bulgaria 55.7 59.5 64.6 70.7 77.2 83.6 90.6 97.8 105.0 111.8
Croatia 45.0 48.4 51.9 55.7 60.1 64.4 69.4 74.5 79.6 86.1
Cyprus 13.6 14.2 15.2 16.2 17.3 18.4 19.5 20.8 22.1 23.5
Czech Republic 154.3 163.2 174.9 191.9 210.2 226.3 241.4 258.9 276.0 292.4
Estonia 16.4 17.9 19.9 22.6 26.0 29.1 31.5 34.0 36.8 41.1
Hungary 138.2 145.9 157.9 169.5 181.2 190.4 201.4 214.6 228.7 242.9
Kazakhstan 89.3 99.6 112.1 126.7 144.2 161.8 180.0 203.1 229.4 257.4
Latvia 21.4 23.5 26.2 29.9 34.4 38.5 42.7 46.7 50.9 55.9
Lithuania 36.0 40.5 44.7 49.6 54.9 60.1 65.6 71.4 77.5 85.6
Poland 403.9 428.1 463.6 494.8 540.4 587.5 633.6 678.1 725.0 773.2
Romania 147.1 158.0 176.2 189.0 209.5 228.0 246.8 265.4 283.9 300.3
Russia 1,193.4 1,307.1 1,440.5 1,579.0 1,734.2 1,891.5 2,055.1 2,214.7 2,374.6 2,534.0
Serbia 37.3 39.1 43.6 47.7 51.9 56.1 60.5 65.3 70.4 75.8
Slovakia 68.7 73.1 79.2 86.5 96.4 106.5 115.9 125.8 136.6 147.8
Slovenia 38.0 39.8 42.7 45.8 49.6 53.1 56.8 60.6 64.5 68.5
Ukraine 237.4 265.8 306.4 323.7 358.0 390.9 423.8 461.0 503.2 549.7
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Nominal GDP (US$ bn at PPP)       
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011   
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 567.9 601.4 638.6 676.8 721.2 763.5 802.0 847.2 894.4 940.8
Bangladesh 205.3 220.7 241.2 263.3 289.3 313.9 341.5 371.9 404.6 439.2
China 6,089.0 6,783.1 7,642.3 8,692.3 9,903.8 11,192.9 12,587.2 13,993.8 15,453.8 16,970.8
Hong Kong 184.0 190.3 212.1 235.0 258.6 279.5 302.0 326.8 352.3 379.7
India 2,787.5 3,082.2 3,389.7 3,814.6 4,293.8 4,765.5 5,283.6 5,834.0 6,438.1 7,096.5
Indonesia 677.8 731.2 785.2 854.8 928.1 1,009.2 1,096.9 1,184.9 1,286.0 1,389.7
Japan 3,420.8 3,532.6 3,727.5 3,893.6 3,963.4 4,162.9 4,365.3 4,556.7 4,728.9 4,922.8
Malaysia 220.1 233.2 255.8 276.7 301.7 326.9 354.6 384.8 416.6 450.1
New Zealand 88.2 93.2 99.5 104.4 106.6 112.3 116.7 123.5 130.3 136.9
Pakistan 292.8 311.2 338.4 376.5 411.5 449.7 489.1 533.0 578.8 627.8
Philippines 329.6 346.3 376.6 406.9 441.6 478.7 519.0 562.3 609.0 658.6
Singapore 115.5 121.7 136.2 149.6 166.1 178.3 190.9 205.3 219.7 234.9
South Korea 878.6 924.3 993.8 1,061.4 1,117.5 1,163.2 1,223.2 1,307.3 1,391.4 1,478.2
Sri Lanka 59.5 64.4 69.9 76.3 84.4 92.0 100.2 109.0 118.7 129.3
Taiwan 535.5 565.7 617.1 661.4 712.3 760.8 815.8 870.6 927.5 987.3
Thailand 432.4 472.5 515.3 554.7 599.6 639.1 688.4 737.0 790.2 846.0
Vietnam 187.9 204.8 225.5 251.9 280.5 310.9 345.1 382.0 421.5 465.4
Latin America          
Argentina 418.4 457.9 510.3 574.0 640.7 705.4 762.3 812.5 863.2 913.8
Brazil 1,377.0 1,405.0 1,507.1 1,598.2 1,705.7 1,809.3 1,925.9 2,048.6 2,180.8 2,317.7
Chile 154.6 164.5 175.3 190.9 204.3 221.2 238.5 257.1 276.1 296.5
Colombia 285.2 305.1 325.9 351.6 386.5 415.6 445.5 473.4 502.0 531.4
Costa Rica 32.5 35.3 37.8 41.3 45.8 49.2 53.1 57.0 61.2 66.3
Cuba 77.7 81.6 87.3 96.9 105.5 114.4 123.7 133.9 144.3 144.3
Dominican Republic 58.8 60.4 62.9 70.9 80.9 88.9 96.9 104.1 111.9 121.3
Ecuador 45.2 47.3 51.7 55.8 59.7 63.0 66.4 69.8 74.0 78.2
El Salvador 21.6 22.4 23.4 24.8 26.6 28.1 30.0 31.8 33.8 36.2
Mexico 922.2 952.6 1,017.5 1,077.7 1,162.3 1,225.6 1,302.3 1,383.8 1,469.1 1,557.7
Peru 133.8 143.3 156.5 171.6 190.9 209.0 226.4 244.4 264.0 284.5
Venezuela 138.1 129.7 157.9 179.5 203.8 219.3 231.1 244.6 257.8 271.2
Africa & Middle East          
Algeria 151.3 165.0 178.5 194.0 205.3 220.1 238.6 259.4 281.9 306.5
Angola 31.8 37.0 39.6 45.7 55.6 65.8 74.9 85.5 94.0 107.3
Bahrain 13.6 14.9 16.3 18.1 20.0 21.8 23.9 26.0 28.1 30.5
Egypt 271.4 285.6 305.9 329.2 362.1 396.4 436.3 476.1 514.5 556.8
Iran 538.6 589.2 636.8 684.6 735.0 783.9 836.7 891.1 947.0 1,004.5
Israel 150.2 154.9 165.7 180.3 195.0 210.6 226.1 242.4 258.8 274.8
Jordan 22.3 23.7 26.2 29.1 31.9 34.6 37.7 40.7 43.7 47.5
Kenya 39.4 41.4 44.6 48.7 52.9 57.5 62.6 67.8 73.2 79.6
Kuwait 60.6 72.2 82.0 92.9 108.0 115.4 125.9 135.0 144.4 159.4
Libya 67.1 71.1 73.1 80.0 86.6 94.2 102.4 111.2 121.0 133.2
Morocco 120.0 129.3 138.6 145.2 163.4 173.5 188.3 204.4 220.4 240.9
Nigeria 117.6 133.5 148.6 162.5 176.7 190.9 210.2 228.1 247.6 268.1
Qatar 22.8 24.1 29.9 32.7 36.1 38.9 42.6 47.3 51.1 54.6
Saudi Arabia 243.1 267.3 289.4 317.6 340.7 362.1 389.9 418.6 448.4 478.6
South Africa 464.1 488.5 509.3 551.5 595.9 638.6 689.6 746.6 810.0 868.7
Tunisia 63.8 68.8 74.9 80.2 86.9 93.8 102.6 111.9 121.3 132.8
UAE 65.9 69.0 79.4 89.8 100.0 111.4 123.5 134.9 146.1 159.4
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Real GDP (% change, year on year)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
North America         
US 1.6 2.5 3.9 3.2 3.3 1.9 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.7
Canada 2.9 1.9 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.5
Western Europe          
Austria 0.9 1.1 2.4 2.0 3.2 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3
Belgium 1.4 1.0 2.8 1.4 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9
Denmark 0.5 0.4 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.2 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1
Finland 1.6 1.9 3.5 3.0 5.5 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.3
France 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.2
Germany 0.0 -0.2 1.3 0.9 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9
Greece 3.9 4.9 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.7
Ireland 6.0 4.3 4.3 5.5 6.0 5.0 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.6
Italy 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.6
Netherlands 0.1 0.3 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0
Norway 1.5 1.0 3.9 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5
Portugal 0.8 -0.7 1.3 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
Spain 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.5
Sweden 2.0 1.8 3.7 2.9 4.5 3.7 3.5 2.6 2.3 2.3
Switzerland 0.3 -0.2 2.3 1.9 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9
Turkey 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4 6.1 6.0 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.0
UK 2.1 2.8 3.3 1.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.4
Eastern Europe          
Azerbaijan 10.6 11.2 10.2 26.4 33.0 17.5 9.5 5.2 5.0 6.0
Bulgaria 4.5 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.1 4.7 4.1
Croatia 5.6 5.3 4.3 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 4.1
Cyprus 2.0 1.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7
Czech Republic 1.9 3.6 4.6 6.5 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.5
Estonia 8.0 7.1 8.1 10.5 11.4 9.4 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.3
Hungary 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.2 3.9 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.8 3.5
Kazakhstan 9.8 9.3 9.4 9.7 10.6 9.6 8.4 9.9 10.1 9.4
Latvia 6.5 7.2 8.7 10.6 11.9 9.6 7.5 6.2 6.0 5.8
Lithuania 6.9 10.3 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.5 6.7 6.0 5.9 5.8
Poland 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.1 6.3 5.1 4.2 4.2 4.0
Romania 5.1 5.2 8.4 4.1 7.7 6.4 5.5 4.7 4.3 3.4
Russia 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 6.7 6.5 5.9 4.8 4.5 4.3
Serbia 4.2 2.5 8.4 6.2 5.7 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.7
Slovakia 4.1 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.3 8.0 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.5
Slovenia 3.5 2.7 4.4 4.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.9
Ukraine 5.2 9.5 12.1 2.6 7.4 6.8 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.5
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Real GDP (% change, year on year)      
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 4.1 3.1 3.7 2.8 2.7 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6
Bangladesh 4.4 5.3 6.3 6.0 6.7 6.1 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.9
China 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.4 10.7 9.9 9.3 9.0 8.4 9.4
Hong Kong 1.8 3.2 8.6 7.5 6.9 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.3
India 3.7 8.4 8.3 9.2 9.4 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.5
Indonesia 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 5.2 5.9 5.6
Japan 0.3 1.5 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.7
Malaysia 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.6
New Zealand 4.5 4.2 4.0 2.5 1.7 2.8 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.7
Pakistan 4.2 4.9 7.4 8.0 6.2 6.8 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.8
Philippines 4.4 4.9 6.4 4.9 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4
Singapore 4.2 3.1 8.8 6.6 7.9 5.0 4.4 4.7 4.4 4.5
South Korea 7.0 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.0 4.3 4.8 4.1 3.8 3.8
Sri Lanka 4.0 6.0 5.4 6.0 7.4 6.6 6.1 6.0 6.1 6.2
Taiwan 4.2 3.4 6.1 4.0 4.6 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.9 4.0
Thailand 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5 5.0 4.2 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.4
Vietnam 7.1 7.3 7.8 8.4 8.2 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.7
Latin America          
Argentina -10.9 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.5 7.6 5.4 3.8 3.7 3.4
Brazil 2.7 1.2 5.7 2.9 3.7 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.7
Chile 2.2 4.0 6.0 5.7 4.0 5.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.9
Colombia 1.9 3.9 4.9 4.7 6.8 5.1 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.4
Costa Rica 2.9 6.4 4.3 5.9 7.9 5.0 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4
Cuba 1.5 2.9 4.2 8.5 9.5 7.1 5.7 5.6 4.6 4.6
Dominican Republic 4.3 0.5 1.2 9.5 10.7 7.5 5.5 4.4 4.5 4.4
Ecuador 4.2 3.6 7.9 4.7 4.1 3.1 2.7 2.3 3.3 3.0
El Salvador 2.5 1.7 1.5 2.8 4.2 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.3
Mexico 0.8 1.4 4.2 2.8 4.8 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4
Peru 5.2 3.9 5.2 6.4 8.0 7.1 5.5 5.1 5.2 5.1
Venezuela -8.9 -7.8 18.3 10.3 10.3 5.2 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8
Africa & Middle East          
Algeria 4.1 6.8 5.2 5.5 2.8 4.8 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.2
Angola 14.3 4.7 12.2 18.2 15.0 15.9 10.2 10.8 6.9 9.9
Bahrain 5.3 6.8 6.4 7.8 7.4 6.6 6.0 5.8 5.0 4.7
Egypt 3.0 3.2 4.1 4.5 6.8 7.0 7.2 6.3 5.3 5.5
Iran 7.5 7.1 5.1 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.4
Israel -0.9 1.5 4.8 5.6 5.1 5.6 4.6 4.4 4.0 3.5
Jordan 5.7 4.1 7.7 7.7 6.4 5.9 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.7
Kenya 0.6 3.0 4.9 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.7
Kuwait 3.0 16.5 10.5 10.0 12.9 4.4 5.7 4.2 4.0 6.3
Libya 1.1 7.1 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.0
Morocco 3.2 5.5 4.2 1.7 9.3 3.8 5.1 5.4 4.8 5.3
Nigeria 3.8 10.4 6.4 6.2 5.6 5.5 7.4 5.7 5.9 5.8
Qatar 7.1 3.5 20.8 6.1 7.1 7.8 9.5 11.0 8.0 6.8
Saudi Arabia 0.1 7.7 5.3 6.5 4.2 3.9 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.3
South Africa 3.7 3.1 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.4 5.7 4.6
Tunisia 1.7 5.6 5.8 4.0 5.2 5.6 5.8 6.0 5.4 5.4
UAE 2.6 11.9 9.7 8.2 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.2 7.4 7.2
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GDP per head (US$ at market exchange rates) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 36,350 37,690 39,880 42,020 44,240 45,790 47,820 49,990 52,220 54,510
Canada 23,420 27,350 31,030 35,070 38,890 41,050 40,410 40,300 41,460 43,050
Western Europe
Austria 25,810 31,520 35,870 37,090 38,860 44,090 46,270 45,240 45,210 46,220
Belgium 24,510 30,050 34,720 35,920 38,010 42,570 44,360 42,850 41,940 42,180
Denmark 32,390 39,500 45,130 47,820 50,740 57,970 61,650 61,190 61,670 63,330
Finland 26,200 31,710 36,320 37,480 40,300 44,240 45,920 44,670 44,130 45,120
France 24,450 30,000 34,130 35,220 36,990 41,550 43,880 43,290 43,640 44,790
Germany 24,540 29,620 33,260 33,820 35,120 39,150 41,070 39,800 39,110 39,730
Greece 15,590 20,260 24,100 25,870 28,110 31,350 33,830 34,490 35,700 37,200
Ireland 30,950 38,890 44,970 48,150 52,180 60,640 64,300 64,200 65,460 68,090
Italy 21,130 26,050 29,740 30,520 31,900 36,280 38,220 37,550 37,740 38,580
Netherlands 27,310 33,270 37,440 38,580 40,410 46,250 49,200 48,830 49,540 50,980
Norway 42,420 49,450 56,490 65,470 72,300 81,080 87,710 83,090 83,010 84,160
Portugal 12,360 15,120 17,240 17,670 18,470 20,600 21,740 21,430 21,700 22,310
Spain 16,820 21,180 24,470 25,570 27,210 31,470 33,360 32,910 33,300 34,290
Sweden 27,280 33,910 38,740 39,500 42,140 47,680 51,040 51,310 51,830 52,570
Switzerland 37,760 43,820 48,500 49,030 50,390 53,840 56,260 55,380 56,000 57,000
Turkey 2,620 3,360 4,170 4,950 5,430 6,270 6,430 7,090 7,710 8,430
UK 26,670 30,660 36,270 37,380 39,690 45,160 46,140 46,560 47,580 48,170
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 760 880 1,040 1,570 2,330 3,340 4,370 5,320 6,260 7,190
Bulgaria 1,990 2,570 3,150 3,480 4,140 4,990 5,510 5,730 5,970 6,240
Croatia 5,040 6,490 6,910 7,400 7,960 9,260 10,130 10,300 10,670 11,190
Cyprus 14,690 18,170 21,050 22,100 23,350 25,870 27,220 26,780 26,940 27,490
Czech Republic 7,380 8,910 10,700 12,220 13,950 16,010 17,660 18,390 18,960 19,680
Estonia 5,380 7,090 8,630 10,220 12,210 15,280 17,220 18,080 19,200 20,600
Hungary 6,610 8,400 10,190 11,150 11,310 13,040 14,010 14,280 15,080 16,130
Kazakhstan 1,660 2,060 2,860 3,750 5,020 6,160 7,670 9,520 11,710 14,100
Latvia 3,970 4,800 5,930 6,960 8,770 11,270 13,110 13,870 14,820 16,030
Lithuania 4,090 5,370 6,540 7,500 8,760 10,710 12,200 12,760 13,570 14,630
Poland 5,180 5,680 6,620 7,960 8,940 10,730 11,720 12,080 12,580 13,360
Romania 2,100 2,740 3,480 4,490 5,630 7,470 8,720 9,390 10,210 11,280
Russia 2,380 2,990 4,120 5,350 6,920 8,340 9,640 10,850 12,200 13,630
Serbia 2,120 2,730 3,270 3,500 4,210 5,230 5,710 5,910 6,200 6,630
Slovakia 4,560 6,080 7,730 8,710 10,140 13,280 14,600 14,960 15,580 16,700
Slovenia 11,080 13,950 16,210 17,100 18,580 21,570 21,760 22,050 22,550 22,560
Ukraine 890 1,060 1,380 1,770 2,270 2,950 3,210 3,640 4,280 4,930
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 207
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS APPENDIX 3  PART 3
GDP per head (US$ at market exchange rates)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 21,100 26,600 32,060 35,460 37,280 41,950 40,390 38,940 38,590 39,270
Bangladesh 350 380 410 420 430 460 490 520 550 570
China 1,130 1,280 1,490 1,740 2,070 2,460 2,880 3,350 3,900 4,500
Hong Kong 24,210 23,270 24,190 25,770 27,350 29,150 31,470 33,650 36,140 38,600
India 490 570 650 750 840 1,020 1,180 1,330 1,490 1,670
Indonesia 870 1,000 1,070 1,190 1,480 1,700 1,890 2,030 2,230 2,440
Japan 30,850 33,260 36,180 35,690 34,250 34,380 38,880 45,100 47,140 48,850
Malaysia 3,880 4,150 4,630 5,000 5,590 6,550 7,110 7,680 8,160 8,740
New Zealand 15,180 19,750 23,990 26,360 24,970 28,800 27,740 27,460 26,670 26,460
Pakistan 490 550 630 700 810 880 940 1,010 1,080 1,150
Philippines 930 940 1,010 1,120 1,310 1,540 1,640 1,730 1,860 1,990
Singapore 21,060 22,020 25,340 26,910 29,470 32,690 34,400 36,180 38,410 40,600
South Korea 11,480 12,720 14,140 16,370 18,220 19,690 21,910 24,310 26,560 29,080
Sri Lanka 820 890 970 1,130 1,290 1,460 1,620 1,750 1,880 2,010
Taiwan 13,130 13,300 14,300 15,360 15,700 16,200 17,390 18,540 19,620 21,090
Thailand 2,000 2,230 2,480 2,690 3,130 3,600 3,780 3,920 4,110 4,340
Vietnam 440 480 550 630 730 810 930 1,060 1,210 1,370
Latin America
Argentina 2,720 3,420 4,010 4,750 5,500 6,240 7,000 7,740 8,470 9,100
Brazil 2,870 3,090 3,650 4,790 5,720 6,690 7,270 7,320 7,390 7,440
Chile 4,290 4,650 5,960 7,310 8,880 9,520 10,160 10,310 10,280 10,690
Colombia 1,870 1,800 2,180 2,700 2,940 3,570 3,600 3,420 3,390 3,510
Costa Rica 4,110 4,190 4,370 4,610 5,020 5,450 5,760 6,010 6,230 6,460
Cuba 2,540 2,660 2,850 3,180 3,590 3,930 4,270 4,630 4,970 5,330
Dominican Republic 2,900 2,240 2,440 3,860 3,970 4,080 4,320 4,620 4,930 4,860
Ecuador 1,970 2,230 2,510 2,760 3,050 3,030 3,080 3,190 3,340 3,470
El Salvador 2,190 2,270 2,340 2,470 2,620 2,760 2,910 3,070 3,200 3,330
Mexico 6,330 6,160 6,510 7,230 7,820 8,060 8,230 8,560 8,900 9,260
Peru 2,130 2,270 2,530 2,840 3,290 3,620 3,780 3,900 4,020 4,190
Venezuela 3,720 3,270 4,330 5,470 6,760 7,790 7,520 7,350 7,380 7,380
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 1,820 2,140 2,630 3,120 3,360 3,540 3,610 3,770 3,960 4,030
Angola 740 920 880 1,270 1,760 2,370 2,910 3,620 4,190 5,020
Bahrain 12,070 13,530 15,290 18,330 20,750 22,520 23,540 23,680 24,100 24,770
Egypt 1,200 1,000 1,080 1,260 1,430 1,650 1,830 1,980 2,150 2,330
Iran 1,720 1,970 2,340 2,710 2,910 3,390 3,890 4,280 4,690 5,140
Israel 16,640 17,230 18,000 18,730 19,910 21,510 23,250 24,170 25,130 26,470
Jordan 1,820 1,880 2,050 2,230 2,420 2,620 2,790 2,950 3,080 3,220
Kenya 410 460 480 550 660 770 780 820 840 880
Kuwait 15,760 18,780 21,520 27,010 29,950 30,030 30,140 30,060 30,810 31,020
Libya 3,480 4,130 4,880 6,370 7,610 7,830 7,440 7,290 7,810 8,270
Morocco 1,270 1,520 1,720 1,770 1,980 2,170 2,220 2,280 2,310 2,410
Nigeria 360 440 530 650 810 870 950 990 1,060 1,090
Qatar 29,310 33,510 42,460 52,900 61,890 64,050 68,140 77,860 84,860 84,280
Saudi Arabia 8,310 9,200 10,450 12,570 13,750 14,220 14,830 15,330 15,840 16,380
South Africa 2,430 3,610 4,640 5,130 5,390 5,260 5,390 5,490 5,620 5,760
Tunisia 2,300 2,530 2,820 2,840 2,920 3,170 3,280 3,320 3,380 3,490
UAE 19,790 21,680 24,360 28,600 32,980 37,470 41,830 45,610 47,960 51,760
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GDP per head (US$ at PPP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
North America         
US 36,350 37,690 39,880 42,020 44,240 45,790 47,820 49,990 52,220 54,510
Canada 29,900 30,800 32,430 34,050 35,870 37,370 38,590 40,410 42,240 44,030
Western Europe
Austria 29,960 30,700 32,350 33,570 34,000 35,720 37,450 39,200 40,980 42,750
Belgium 29,380 30,210 31,690 33,000 34,190 35,170 36,050 37,750 39,390 41,040
Denmark 30,350 30,720 32,190 34,140 36,030 37,950 39,670 41,460 43,360 45,300
Finland 28,670 28,800 30,380 31,470 34,330 34,780 35,520 37,270 39,070 40,870
France 28,750 29,350 30,030 31,370 32,760 33,940 35,230 36,800 38,380 40,070
Germany 27,080 27,600 28,710 29,760 29,910 30,490 31,470 33,010 34,460 35,950
Greece 23,570 25,110 27,040 28,900 31,030 32,900 34,860 36,870 38,930 41,000
Ireland 32,690 33,720 35,920 38,560 40,760 43,580 45,470 48,040 50,660 53,320
Italy 27,100 27,300 28,110 28,820 30,210 31,710 32,830 34,250 35,760 37,280
Netherlands 31,390 31,880 33,590 35,090 37,120 39,260 41,050 42,890 44,760 46,650
Norway 37,050 37,750 41,460 44,200 47,060 48,880 50,280 52,480 54,860 57,240
Portugal 19,890 18,840 19,560 20,200 22,360 23,350 24,230 25,290 26,470 27,660
Spain 23,960 25,000 25,960 26,850 28,140 30,050 31,340 32,650 34,060 35,500
Sweden 28,330 29,630 31,010 32,050 33,900 35,110 36,900 38,670 40,370 42,110
Switzerland 32,620 33,530 34,920 35,830 37,670 38,510 40,060 41,700 43,410 45,110
Turkey 6,600 7,010 7,690 8,390 9,050 9,690 10,330 11,020 11,730 12,480
UK 29,180 30,090 32,000 33,210 34,900 36,500 38,170 40,010 41,830 43,760
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 3,580 4,040 4,530 5,840 7,990 9,710 11,320 12,650 13,810 14,680
Bulgaria 7,110 7,640 8,360 9,210 10,140 11,040 12,040 13,080 14,130 15,160
Croatia 9,980 10,700 11,430 12,250 13,180 14,110 15,230 16,330 17,460 18,880
Cyprus 19,040 19,380 20,240 21,180 22,230 23,220 24,390 25,730 27,120 28,570
Czech Republic 15,130 15,930 17,080 18,760 20,570 22,170 23,690 25,450 27,170 28,810
Estonia 12,050 13,220 14,740 16,820 19,320 21,670 23,560 25,490 27,610 30,850
Hungary 13,710 14,510 15,740 16,940 18,150 19,130 20,280 21,660 23,150 24,670
Kazakhstan 6,000 6,660 7,440 8,320 9,370 10,440 11,560 12,920 14,500 16,110
Latvia 9,140 10,070 11,320 12,960 15,010 16,880 18,880 20,810 22,870 25,350
Lithuania 10,350 11,710 12,980 14,470 16,120 17,750 19,490 21,340 23,310 25,900
Poland 10,560 11,210 12,140 12,970 14,170 15,410 16,640 17,810 19,050 20,330
Romania 6,750 7,270 8,120 8,740 9,680 10,540 11,420 12,290 13,150 13,970
Russia 8,230 9,070 10,040 11,060 12,190 13,330 14,550 15,770 17,060 18,280
Serbia 4,980 5,230 5,840 6,420 7,000 7,590 8,220 8,900 9,620 10,390
Slovakia 12,770 13,460 14,570 15,890 17,690 19,520 21,210 22,990 24,950 27,000
Slovenia 18,870 19,780 21,250 22,780 24,670 26,450 28,280 30,210 32,190 34,260
Ukraine 4,960 5,600 6,500 6,920 7,700 8,460 9,210 10,070 11,040 12,110
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GDP per head (US$ at PPP)       
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 29,050 30,480 32,070 33,690 35,590 37,370 38,930 40,800 42,740 44,640
Bangladesh 1,530 1,620 1,730 1,860 2,000 2,130 2,280 2,430 2,600 2,770
China 4,740 5,250 5,880 6,650 7,530 8,460 9,460 10,470 11,510 12,560
Hong Kong 27,210 27,950 30,950 34,060 37,260 40,040 43,030 46,320 49,690 53,310
India 2,700 2,940 3,180 3,530 3,920 4,290 4,690 5,120 5,570 6,070
Indonesia 2,930 3,110 3,290 3,530 3,780 4,060 4,350 4,640 4,970 5,300
Japan 26,920 27,770 29,270 30,550 31,090 32,660 34,260 35,770 37,140 38,670
Malaysia 8,970 9,310 10,000 10,590 11,330 12,040 12,830 13,680 14,550 15,420
New Zealand 22,390 23,240 24,490 25,390 25,640 26,720 27,440 28,740 29,980 31,170
Pakistan 1,970 2,050 2,190 2,380 2,580 2,770 2,950 3,160 3,380 3,600
Philippines 3,970 4,090 4,370 4,630 4,940 5,260 5,600 5,960 6,350 6,760
Singapore 27,640 29,010 32,120 34,490 37,040 39,740 41,940 44,460 46,910 49,470
South Korea 18,440 19,330 20,650 21,960 22,930 23,740 24,860 26,470 28,080 29,730
Sri Lanka 2,940 3,160 3,400 3,680 4,030 4,360 4,710 5,080 5,480 5,920
Taiwan 23,850 25,100 27,380 29,320 31,440 33,570 35,820 38,170 40,490 43,010
Thailand 6,810 7,380 7,920 8,470 9,080 9,610 10,280 10,920 11,640 12,370
Vietnam 2,330 2,510 2,730 3,010 3,310 3,620 3,960 4,330 4,720 5,150
Latin America
Argentina 11,150 12,090 13,350 14,870 16,440 17,920 19,180 20,240 21,300 22,340
Brazil 7,810 7,850 8,300 8,680 9,130 9,560 10,040 10,540 11,080 11,620
Chile 9,820 10,330 10,890 11,740 12,440 13,320 14,230 15,190 16,150 17,190
Colombia 6,550 6,900 7,260 7,710 8,350 8,850 9,360 9,810 10,260 10,720
Costa Rica 7,920 8,440 8,900 9,530 10,390 10,960 11,600 12,240 12,910 13,750
Cuba 6,940 7,270 7,770 8,620 9,390 10,180 11,010 11,930 12,860 12,860
Dominican Republic 6,840 6,940 7,060 7,880 8,790 9,520 10,230 10,830 11,470 12,270
Ecuador 3,570 3,680 3,970 4,220 4,460 4,630 4,810 4,980 5,210 5,430
El Salvador 3,310 3,370 3,460 3,600 3,800 3,950 4,140 4,320 4,510 4,760
Mexico 9,000 9,180 9,690 10,150 10,820 11,270 11,840 12,440 13,060 13,680
Peru 5,000 5,280 5,680 6,140 6,730 7,260 7,750 8,240 8,770 9,310
Venezuela 5,520 5,080 6,080 6,780 7,580 8,020 8,320 8,670 9,010 9,340
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 4,820 5,180 5,520 5,910 6,160 6,500 6,940 7,440 7,970 8,540
Angola 2,180 2,460 2,550 2,860 3,390 3,910 4,320 4,800 5,140 5,710
Bahrain 19,480 20,960 22,610 24,770 26,980 28,990 31,280 33,560 35,700 38,240
Egypt 3,880 4,010 4,210 4,450 4,800 5,160 5,580 5,980 6,360 6,760
Iran 7,970 8,640 9,260 9,850 10,480 11,080 11,720 12,370 13,030 13,690
Israel 22,870 23,150 24,350 26,030 27,640 29,320 30,900 32,540 34,100 35,540
Jordan 4,240 4,380 4,720 5,110 5,420 5,710 6,040 6,350 6,640 7,020
Kenya 1,230 1,260 1,330 1,420 1,510 1,600 1,710 1,810 1,920 2,050
Kuwait 25,070 28,340 29,780 31,060 33,930 34,350 35,720 36,650 37,690 40,000
Libya 12,160 12,630 12,740 13,670 14,550 15,560 16,610 17,720 18,960 20,520
Morocco 3,980 4,230 4,470 4,610 5,110 5,350 5,720 6,120 6,500 7,010
Nigeria 900 1,000 1,090 1,160 1,230 1,310 1,410 1,500 1,590 1,690
Qatar 33,900 34,060 40,240 41,100 42,330 42,660 43,870 45,950 46,840 47,410
Saudi Arabia 10,710 11,460 12,080 12,910 13,490 13,960 14,630 15,300 15,950 16,580
South Africa 10,150 10,570 10,910 11,700 12,570 13,410 14,430 15,560 16,810 17,980
Tunisia 6,520 6,960 7,490 7,940 8,520 9,110 9,860 10,650 11,430 12,390
UAE 17,540 17,090 18,390 19,420 20,220 21,250 22,330 23,230 23,960 24,900
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Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America
US 74.5 53.1 122.4 99.4 183.6 237.7 235.0 252.0 260.0 270.0
Canada 22.2 7.5 -0.4 28.9 69.0 84.8 59.1 56.0 57.0 59.0
Western Europe
Austria 0.3 7.1 3.9 9.1 0.2 1.6 3.9 5.5 3.3 5.9
Belgium 18.1 34.5 44.4 32.0 72.5 71.0 68.0 71.0 73.0 75.0
Denmark 4.4 1.2 -8.8 13.1 6.3 6.5 7.5 8.6 9.0 9.3
Finland 8.3 3.5 3.0 4.6 3.7 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2
France 49.5 43.1 38.7 70.7 86.9 84.4 71.1 72.6 79.8 83.1
Germany 53.6 30.9 -8.9 35.3 43.4 60.4 62.2 65.2 69.7 72.5
Greece 0.1 1.3 2.1 0.6 5.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
Ireland 29.5 22.4 -11.0 -29.7 12.8 16.0 19.1 19.6 22.5 24.3
Italy 14.7 16.5 16.8 19.6 39.0 38.8 40.7 42.8 42.8 42.8
Netherlands 25.5 20.4 2.0 40.4 3.8 29.9 27.4 36.8 45.1 53.1
Norway 0.7 3.6 2.5 7.8 5.8 4.9 4.6 6.4 7.6 8.6
Portugal 1.8 8.8 2.1 4.1 7.4 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.3 9.6
Spain 40.0 25.6 24.8 24.6 20.2 40.3 42.4 44.0 47.1 50.4
Sweden 12.2 5.0 11.5 10.2 27.2 28.7 25.7 25.0 26.0 25.0
Switzerland 6.8 17.5 2.3 -0.6 26.0 21.4 18.5 17.6 16.7 16.9
Turkey 1.1 1.8 2.9 9.8 20.1 19.0 20.0 21.0 20.0 20.0
UK 25.5 27.6 77.9 195.6 137.7 119.8 105.4 110.4 112.7 116.3
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 1.4 3.3 3.6 1.7 -0.7 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7
Bulgaria 0.9 2.1 3.5 3.9 5.2 3.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5
Croatia 1.1 2.0 1.2 1.8 3.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7
Cyprus 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
Czech Republic 8.5 2.0 5.0 11.6 6.0 6.5 6.0 4.5 4.8 5.1
Estonia 0.3 0.9 1.0 3.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
Hungary 3.0 2.2 4.5 7.5 6.1 4.8 4.8 5.9 5.4 4.8
Kazakhstan 2.6 2.1 4.2 2.0 6.1 6.2 7.0 8.0 6.5 6.0
Latvia 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
Lithuania 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5
Poland 4.1 4.6 12.9 9.6 14.5 12.5 12.0 12.6 12.9 13.1
Romania 1.1 1.8 6.4 6.5 11.4 9.8 7.2 7.3 7.0 7.2
Russia 3.5 8.0 15.4 12.8 28.7 35.0 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0
Serbia 0.5 1.4 1.0 1.7 5.6 3.2 4.5 2.0 1.9 2.0
Slovakia 4.1 0.7 1.1 1.9 4.2 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
Slovenia 1.7 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.8 0.9 1.2
Ukraine 0.7 1.4 1.7 7.8 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.3
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Foreign direct investment inflows (US$ bn)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia
Australia 17.0 8.1 36.6 -35.1 24.7 40.0 35.0 36.0 38.0 40.0
Bangladesh 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
China 49.3 47.1 54.9 79.1 78.1 79.5 84.1 86.5 90.9 92.9
Hong Kong 9.7 13.6 34.0 33.6 42.9 50.0 49.0 49.0 47.0 45.0
India 5.6 4.3 5.8 6.7 17.5 17.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 25.0
Indonesia 0.1 -0.6 1.9 5.3 7.5 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
Japan 9.1 6.2 7.8 3.2 -6.8 12.4 11.0 12.0 15.0 16.0
Malaysia 3.2 2.5 4.6 4.0 6.1 6.5 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.8
New Zealand 1.8 2.5 2.8 1.7 8.1 5.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1
Pakistan 0.8 0.5 1.1 2.2 4.3 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3
Philippines 1.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4
Singapore 7.2 10.4 14.8 20.1 25.7 26.0 24.6 27.0 28.4 29.8
South Korea 2.4 3.5 9.2 6.3 3.6 4.6 6.1 7.3 8.4 9.7
Sri Lanka 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Taiwan 1.4 0.5 1.9 1.6 7.4 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.8 8.0
Thailand 3.3 5.2 5.9 9.0 9.7 8.5 8.7 9.2 9.0 9.0
Vietnam 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.0 4.1 4.4 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.7
Latin America
Argentina 2.1 1.7 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.6 7.2 7.9
Brazil 16.6 10.1 18.2 15.2 18.8 34.5 27.0 25.0 25.0 26.0
Chile 2.6 4.3 7.2 7.0 8.1 10.0 9.8 10.9 11.8 12.0
Colombia 2.1 1.8 3.1 10.3 6.3 8.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.5
Costa Rica 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cuba 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Dominican Republic 0.9 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8
Ecuador 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
El Salvador 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
Mexico 19.3 15.3 22.4 19.7 19.0 21.3 21.5 22.5 23.7 24.5
Peru 2.2 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
Venezuela 0.8 2.0 1.5 2.6 -0.5 -2.4 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.1
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 1.1 0.6 2.5 3.8 3.2 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3
Angola 1.7 3.5 1.4 -1.3 2.2 1.8 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.8
Bahrain 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Egypt 0.6 0.2 1.3 5.4 10.0 8.0 7.0 5.5 4.8 4.5
Iran 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
Israel 1.7 3.9 2.1 4.8 14.2 9.5 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.2
Jordan 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2
Kenya 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Kuwait 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8
Libya 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
Morocco 0.1 2.3 0.8 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5
Nigeria 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3
Qatar 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.1
Saudi Arabia 0.5 0.8 1.9 4.6 5.3 6.1 7.0 7.8 8.7 9.6
South Africa 0.7 0.8 0.7 6.1 0.0 1.7 2.0 3.5 4.1 4.5
Tunisia 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.6
UAE 0.1 4.3 10.0 12.0 16.0 15.0 12.0 11.8 12.3 13.0
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Foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Canada 3.0 0.9 0.0 2.6 5.4 6.3 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.0
Western Europe
Austria 0.2 2.8 1.3 3.0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.5
Belgium 7.2 11.1 12.4 8.6 18.4 16.0 14.7 15.9 16.7 17.0
Denmark 2.5 0.6 -3.6 5.0 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.7
Finland 6.1 2.1 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6
France 3.4 2.4 1.9 3.3 3.9 3.3 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.0
Germany 2.6 1.3 -0.3 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2
Greece 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.2 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Ireland 24.0 14.3 -6.0 -14.8 5.8 6.2 6.9 7.1 7.9 8.2
Italy 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.9
Netherlands 5.8 3.8 0.3 6.4 0.6 3.9 3.4 4.5 5.5 6.2
Norway 0.3 1.6 1.0 2.6 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.1
Portugal 1.4 5.6 1.1 2.2 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0
Spain 5.8 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
Sweden 5.0 1.6 3.3 2.8 7.1 6.6 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.1
Switzerland 2.5 5.4 0.6 -0.2 6.9 5.3 4.3 4.2 3.9 3.8
Turkey 0.6 0.7 1.0 2.7 5.0 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.0
UK 1.6 1.5 3.6 8.7 5.8 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.9
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 22.3 45.1 41.1 12.7 -3.6 5.2 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.6
Bulgaria 5.8 10.5 14.2 14.5 16.4 9.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.3
Croatia 5.0 7.0 3.9 5.3 9.8 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.3 4.8
Cyprus 10.5 6.8 7.1 7.0 8.1 8.6 6.8 4.8 4.6 4.6
Czech Republic 11.3 2.2 4.5 9.3 4.2 4.0 3.3 2.4 2.5 2.6
Estonia 3.9 9.6 8.3 21.8 9.8 6.8 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.3
Hungary 4.5 2.6 4.4 6.8 5.4 3.7 3.5 4.2 3.6 3.0
Kazakhstan 10.5 6.8 9.6 3.5 8.0 6.5 5.9 5.3 3.5 2.7
Latvia 2.7 2.7 4.6 4.6 8.1 3.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4
Lithuania 5.0 1.0 3.4 4.0 6.1 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.0
Poland 2.1 2.1 5.1 3.2 4.2 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
Romania 2.5 3.1 8.5 6.7 9.4 6.1 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.0
Russia 1.0 1.8 2.6 1.7 2.9 3.0 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7
Serbia 3.0 6.7 4.0 6.3 17.8 8.3 10.7 4.6 4.2 4.2
Slovakia 16.9 2.0 2.7 4.0 7.5 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7
Slovenia 7.4 1.1 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.9 2.8 1.6 1.7 2.2
Ukraine 1.6 2.8 2.6 9.4 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.4  
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Foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP)      
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia     
Australia 4.1 1.5 5.7 -4.9 3.3 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 4.8
Bangladesh 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
China 3.4 2.9 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5
Hong Kong 5.9 8.6 20.5 18.9 22.6 24.6 22.2 20.6 18.3 16.4
India 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Indonesia 0.1 -0.3 0.7 1.8 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Malaysia 3.4 2.4 3.9 3.0 4.1 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1
New Zealand 2.9 3.1 2.9 1.6 7.8 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4
Pakistan 1.1 0.6 1.1 2.0 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
Philippines 2.0 0.6 0.8 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2
Singapore 8.2 11.2 13.8 17.2 19.5 17.7 15.7 16.2 15.8 15.4
South Korea 0.4 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Sri Lanka 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Taiwan 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6
Thailand 2.6 3.7 3.6 5.1 4.7 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.0
Vietnam 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.7 6.7 6.3 7.4 7.5 6.9 6.2
Latin America
Argentina 2.1 1.3 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
Brazil 3.3 1.8 2.7 1.7 1.8 2.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
Chile 3.8 5.8 7.5 5.9 5.5 6.4 5.8 6.2 6.7 6.5
Colombia 2.6 2.2 3.1 8.3 4.6 4.8 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.2
Costa Rica 3.9 4.8 4.3 4.3 6.5 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2
Cuba 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0
Dominican Republic 3.7 3.1 4.2 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.8
Ecuador 5.1 5.4 3.6 4.5 5.1 4.8 3.5 2.9 2.7 2.6
El Salvador 3.3 0.9 2.4 3.0 1.1 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8
Mexico 3.0 2.4 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3
Peru 3.8 2.2 2.6 3.2 3.7 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6
Venezuela 0.8 2.4 1.3 1.8 -0.3 -1.1 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 1.9 0.9 2.9 3.7 2.9 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7
Angola 15.5 25.4 10.6 -6.5 7.5 4.6 3.3 3.3 2.4 1.9
Bahrain 2.6 5.4 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.2 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.1
Egypt 0.8 0.3 1.6 5.8 9.3 6.3 4.9 3.5 2.8 2.3
Iran 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Israel 1.6 3.4 1.7 3.7 10.1 6.1 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.0
Jordan 0.8 4.3 5.7 12.1 15.5 15.8 11.5 10.0 9.9 10.1
Kenya 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Kuwait 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6
Libya 0.8 0.6 4.1 2.8 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.2
Morocco 0.2 5.0 1.5 2.8 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9
Nigeria 4.0 3.4 2.6 2.2 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
Qatar 9.1 8.0 7.0 5.5 5.4 5.4 4.9 3.8 3.2 3.2
Saudi Arabia 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0
South Africa 0.7 0.5 0.3 2.5 0.0 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6
Tunisia 3.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 9.1 7.0 5.6 4.3 4.2 4.3
UAE 0.1 4.9 9.5 9.1 9.8 7.6 5.2 4.4 4.2 3.9
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Foreign direct investment inflows (% of gross fixed investment)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 4.7 3.2 6.7 4.9 8.5 11.1 10.4 10.5 10.1 9.9
Canada 15.4 4.4 -0.2 12.3 25.3 29.1 19.8 18.3 17.6 17.1
Western Europe
Austria 0.7 13.0 6.4 14.5 0.2 2.0 4.6 6.4 3.7 6.4
Belgium 37.2 59.2 63.5 43.3 90.1 76.0 67.6 72.0 74.0 74.8
Denmark 12.9 2.9 -18.5 24.5 10.2 9.0 9.8 11.2 11.5 11.4
Finland 33.9 11.6 8.8 12.3 9.2 10.6 10.4 10.8 10.8 10.6
France 18.0 12.7 9.7 16.7 18.9 16.1 12.8 13.3 14.5 14.8
Germany 14.4 7.1 -1.9 7.3 8.4 10.2 9.8 10.3 10.8 10.9
Greece 0.1 2.5 3.3 1.0 7.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6
Ireland 107.4 62.0 -24.4 -54.8 21.3 23.4 26.6 27.5 30.9 32.3
Italy 5.7 5.4 4.7 5.4 10.1 8.9 8.7 9.2 9.1 8.8
Netherlands 29.0 19.5 1.8 33.2 2.8 19.2 16.0 21.1 25.2 28.4
Norway 1.9 9.1 5.5 14.0 9.3 6.6 5.5 7.9 9.2 10.0
Portugal 5.5 24.5 5.1 10.1 17.9 18.7 18.9 19.4 19.4 19.3
Spain 22.1 10.6 8.5 7.4 5.4 9.3 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.6
Sweden 30.2 10.3 20.2 16.5 39.6 34.3 28.0 27.6 28.2 26.9
Switzerland 11.4 26.2 3.0 -0.8 31.8 24.2 19.9 19.1 17.9 17.6
Turkey 3.7 4.7 5.4 13.8 23.7 20.0 19.4 17.9 15.1 13.3
UK 9.4 9.1 21.0 50.8 31.9 23.7 20.2 21.0 20.9 21.1
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 65.5 85.4 71.0 30.7 -11.2 17.6 14.9 13.1 12.0 11.2
Bulgaria 31.7 54.2 68.3 60.9 62.6 32.0 16.7 15.4 14.2 12.8
Croatia 20.1 24.2 11.8 15.8 27.9 16.8 16.6 14.7 13.5 13.7
Cyprus 58.0 38.8 37.8 36.9 42.1 43.2 33.6 23.1 21.6 21.0
Czech Republic 41.0 8.3 17.6 37.3 16.7 15.6 12.8 9.1 9.3 9.5
Estonia 13.1 32.7 26.5 70.2 28.8 20.0 16.9 16.8 15.8 15.0
Hungary 19.6 11.7 19.7 30.0 24.6 17.3 15.8 18.6 15.6 12.9
Kazakhstan 43.8 29.4 38.4 14.2 31.3 23.4 18.8 15.6 10.1 7.9
Latvia 11.5 11.1 16.9 14.9 23.6 11.0 8.9 8.8 8.7 9.2
Lithuania 24.7 4.6 15.4 17.9 26.3 11.5 10.4 11.2 12.1 11.5
Poland 11.1 11.6 28.2 17.4 21.5 14.0 11.8 11.6 11.0 10.2
Romania 11.7 14.5 39.5 28.5 38.7 23.6 13.9 12.5 10.6 9.6
Russia 5.6 10.0 14.2 9.4 16.3 15.6 10.8 9.7 8.7 7.9
Serbia 25.3 50.5 20.2 31.9 88.8 40.9 51.5 21.9 19.4 18.8
Slovakia 61.9 8.1 11.1 15.0 28.6 10.5 9.7 10.3 10.7 10.6
Slovenia 32.9 4.6 10.4 6.4 4.0 7.1 11.0 6.3 6.8 8.7
Ukraine 8.5 13.8 11.7 42.8 21.2 17.5 14.1 12.0 11.1 10.9 
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Foreign direct investment inflows (% of gross fixed investment)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia         
Australia 17.1 6.1 22.6 -18.8 12.3 17.4 15.7 16.7 17.8 18.3
Bangladesh 0.5 2.2 3.3 5.6 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.1 3.0 3.0
China 9.4 7.3 7.0 8.4 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.3
Hong Kong 26.4 40.6 96.4 90.4 103.9 112.9 104.4 99.1 90.3 81.8
India 4.7 2.9 3.2 2.9 6.4 4.8 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7
Indonesia 0.4 -1.3 3.4 7.8 8.6 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.0 4.7
Japan 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.3 -0.7 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
Malaysia 14.5 10.8 19.1 15.2 20.1 18.4 15.8 15.4 15.2 15.5
New Zealand 13.8 13.9 12.1 6.5 33.8 20.9 17.6 17.7 18.4 19.0
Pakistan 7.4 4.2 7.6 12.0 18.0 10.5 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.5
Philippines 11.4 3.7 4.9 8.0 14.4 12.1 11.7 10.8 9.3 8.9
Singapore 32.0 46.5 58.1 77.1 84.4 76.6 66.7 68.5 66.5 64.7
South Korea 1.5 1.9 4.6 2.7 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3
Sri Lanka 5.7 5.7 4.7 4.4 6.2 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7
Taiwan 2.7 0.8 2.8 2.3 10.3 9.7 8.3 7.3 7.2 7.7
Thailand 11.5 15.2 14.0 17.6 16.5 12.8 12.0 11.8 10.5 9.5
Vietnam 12.8 11.0 10.7 11.2 20.6 18.7 21.1 20.7 18.7 16.8
Latin America
Argentina 17.6 8.4 15.6 12.7 9.6 8.8 8.8 9.1 8.9 8.9
Brazil 20.0 12.0 17.0 10.6 10.5 15.4 10.4 9.1 8.7 8.6
Chile 18.5 28.9 39.2 28.4 28.7 31.8 27.3 27.6 27.6 25.9
Colombia 18.0 13.3 17.0 41.3 20.2 18.5 13.8 12.6 11.3 10.7
Costa Rica 20.8 24.8 22.9 22.7 32.3 19.5 17.7 16.3 15.2 14.2
Cuba 1.7 2.7 6.4 9.6 11.8 10.0 7.1 6.1 6.8 7.4
Dominican Republic 17.4 19.9 24.7 19.6 21.9 24.0 23.3 22.5 22.0 23.7
Ecuador 22.0 25.4 16.5 20.6 23.4 21.6 15.6 12.8 12.3 11.7
El Salvador 19.8 5.6 15.3 19.8 6.8 15.0 15.2 15.0 14.6 14.0
Mexico 15.5 12.7 16.6 13.2 11.1 11.5 10.8 10.5 10.3 9.8
Peru 21.6 12.2 14.5 16.8 18.9 9.5 8.0 6.9 6.8 6.5
Venezuela 3.8 15.8 7.2 8.8 -1.3 -4.7 2.4 3.8 3.8 3.6
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 7.6 3.9 12.2 16.6 12.8 14.1 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.1
Angola 116.8 198.3 61.2 -41.8 51.5 32.4 23.2 23.3 16.8 13.1
Bahrain 14.9 27.8 36.4 35.9 34.3 30.8 23.2 18.3 15.3 13.5
Egypt 4.3 2.0 9.8 32.2 49.7 29.8 21.0 13.9 10.6 8.7
Iran 1.7 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
Israel 8.8 19.6 10.0 21.8 58.3 33.8 20.6 18.4 17.1 14.7
Jordan 4.1 20.9 23.0 46.7 56.5 55.0 39.4 34.2 33.5 34.1
Kenya 1.2 3.5 1.8 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
Kuwait 0.1 -0.8 0.2 1.6 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.4
Libya 5.5 5.8 23.3 13.9 17.2 14.6 13.2 11.9 11.2 10.1
Morocco 1.0 22.0 6.4 11.9 9.3 8.8 9.4 8.4 8.2 7.6
Nigeria 15.4 14.5 11.7 9.7 8.3 6.2 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.9
Qatar 29.9 23.2 25.4 16.2 14.0 12.3 10.9 9.2 8.2 7.7
Saudi Arabia 1.3 2.0 4.7 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.6 9.7 10.0 10.4
South Africa 4.4 3.0 2.0 14.9 0.0 3.5 4.1 6.9 8.1 8.9
Tunisia 14.9 9.2 9.2 11.2 39.4 30.1 23.2 17.4 16.4 16.2
UAE 0.6 21.4 45.2 42.5 45.0 33.2 22.3 19.0 17.4 16.3
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Foreign direct investment inflows per head (US$)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 261 185 421 339 620 794 778 827 845 870
Canada 714 238 -11 905 2,139 2,601 1,797 1,687 1,702 1,747
Western Europe
Austria 40 878 479 1,108 19 191 473 660 391 700
Belgium 1,757 3,350 4,299 3,088 6,999 6,841 6,543 6,824 7,010 7,195
Denmark 828 221 -1,635 2,418 1,157 1,206 1,384 1,569 1,646 1,696
Finland 1,598 669 584 874 712 966 1,032 1,087 1,131 1,174
France 830 719 644 1,170 1,433 1,387 1,162 1,183 1,295 1,343
Germany 650 375 -107 428 526 732 753 788 842 874
Greece 5 121 192 58 489 146 137 127 136 146
Ireland 7,539 5,650 -2,722 -7,287 3,080 3,772 4,473 4,576 5,217 5,609
Italy 254 285 289 337 671 667 700 735 736 736
Netherlands 1,595 1,270 126 2,485 231 1,822 1,665 2,220 2,713 3,176
Norway 146 785 559 1,705 1,258 1,052 995 1,358 1,601 1,801
Portugal 170 848 199 394 702 803 847 861 873 896
Spain 988 625 593 576 458 895 932 961 1,019 1,083
Sweden 1,367 559 1,278 1,127 3,012 3,150 2,806 2,712 2,806 2,683
Switzerland 935 2,391 312 -81 3,481 2,848 2,450 2,317 2,191 2,195
Turkey 16 25 40 136 274 256 266 276 259 256
UK 432 465 1,309 3,271 2,294 1,988 1,743 1,818 1,849 1,901
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 171 400 430 201 -84 176 186 190 188 186
Bulgaria 115 268 445 500 673 459 297 306 321 330
Croatia 250 455 271 393 781 548 598 548 537 592
Cyprus 1,564 1,270 1,532 1,577 1,926 2,258 1,869 1,298 1,251 1,277
Czech Republic 831 198 486 1,133 589 636 588 442 472 502
Estonia 208 676 718 2,222 1,188 1,042 970 1,031 1,048 1,080
Hungary 298 216 449 751 606 477 486 596 542 486
Kazakhstan 174 141 278 131 404 403 452 514 413 379
Latvia 107 130 274 315 709 436 417 442 468 539
Lithuania 204 52 223 299 529 294 310 357 419 436
Poland 108 120 337 251 381 328 315 331 339 344
Romania 51 85 296 299 529 453 333 338 324 333
Russia 24 55 107 89 201 246 204 212 221 230
Serbia 61 181 129 221 749 432 609 272 259 276
Slovakia 770 124 207 351 765 364 375 403 430 457
Slovenia 825 150 413 269 190 408 692 398 449 599
Ukraine 14 30 36 166 111 112 104 100 105 116 
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Foreign direct investment inflows per head (US$)    
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 878 412 1,856 -1,764 1,231 1,975 1,713 1,748 1,830 1,912
Bangladesh 0 2 3 6 4 4 5 5 5 5
China 39 37 43 61 60 60 64 65 68 69
Hong Kong 1,442 2,015 4,998 4,904 6,217 7,204 7,020 6,981 6,662 6,347
India 6 4 5 6 16 16 16 18 19 22
Indonesia 1 -3 8 22 31 24 24 26 27 29
Japan 72 49 61 25 -53 97 86 94 118 126
Malaysia 133 101 185 155 232 244 225 235 249 272
New Zealand 453 623 693 416 1,962 1,375 1,123 1,128 1,144 1,170
Pakistan 6 4 7 14 27 18 16 17 18 19
Philippines 19 6 8 13 27 26 26 26 24 25
Singapore 1,739 2,485 3,538 4,735 5,931 5,790 5,475 5,931 6,140 6,357
South Korea 51 74 193 131 75 94 124 148 171 195
Sri Lanka 10 11 11 13 23 13 13 15 17 18
Taiwan 65 20 84 72 329 318 297 285 300 348
Thailand 53 82 92 138 149 129 131 137 133 133
Vietnam 18 18 20 24 49 52 70 80 85 86
Latin America
Argentina 58 44 121 131 125 133 147 166 179 195
Brazil 95 58 101 84 102 185 143 130 129 132
Chile 164 274 451 432 495 611 590 649 696 702
Colombia 50 40 70 228 138 173 138 126 114 112
Costa Rica 164 203 190 203 332 227 223 219 215 211
Cuba 4 7 18 36 54 56 44 41 49 53
Dominican Republic 108 71 104 115 131 149 156 164 174 185
Ecuador 102 123 90 126 158 149 110 94 93 92
El Salvador 73 22 57 77 30 73 81 86 92 95
Mexico 191 150 216 188 179 198 198 205 213 218
Peru 82 50 67 91 124 76 71 66 69 68
Venezuela 32 82 58 99 -21 -88 44 72 74 73
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 34 20 78 117 97 120 133 140 146 150
Angola 118 240 96 -84 135 111 99 122 105 98
Bahrain 319 738 1,219 1,456 1,580 1,635 1,395 1,237 1,097 1,026
Egypt 9 3 18 74 136 106 91 70 60 56
Iran 8 7 1 0 4 3 3 5 7 7
Israel 266 589 312 699 2,043 1,347 905 875 872 817
Jordan 15 83 120 276 388 425 330 305 312 334
Kenya 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Kuwait 2 -28 9 91 35 46 83 98 123 196
Libya 27 26 204 181 256 260 260 261 272 272
Morocco 3 77 26 50 43 46 50 46 47 45
Nigeria 15 15 14 15 18 14 14 14 14 14
Qatar 2,816 2,826 3,111 3,091 3,580 3,698 3,566 3,142 2,916 2,842
Saudi Arabia 21 34 83 193 216 242 271 293 317 343
South Africa 16 17 15 131 -0.2 35 42 73 85 93
Tunisia 82 55 60 72 267 225 184 144 143 151
UAE 27 1,134 2,475 2,778 3,461 3,033 2,289 2,124 2,109 2,132
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Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 1,500.0 1,577.0 1,727.1 1,874.3 2,057.9 2,295.6 2,530.6 2,782.6 3,042.6 3,312.6
Canada 224.2 289.2 318.6 350.0 385.2 470.0 529.1 585.1 642.1 701.1
Western Europe
Austria 44.6 56.5 66.4 66.2 70.1 71.6 75.6 81.1 84.4 90.3
Belgium 255.7 357.1 471.1 474.7 547.2 618.2 686.2 757.2 830.2 905.2
Denmark 82.8 100.2 115.2 115.5 138.5 145.0 152.5 161.1 170.1 179.4
Finland 34.0 50.3 57.2 54.3 64.2 69.2 74.6 80.3 86.3 92.4
France 385.2 527.6 641.8 627.9 783.0 867.5 938.5 1,011.2 1,091.0 1,174.1
Germany 529.3 666.2 709.4 660.4 761.1 821.5 883.7 948.9 1,018.7 1,091.2
Greece 15.6 22.5 28.5 29.3 41.3 42.9 44.4 45.8 47.3 48.9
Ireland 182.9 223.0 234.0 211.2 224.0 240.0 259.1 278.7 301.2 325.6
Italy 130.8 180.9 220.7 224.1 294.8 333.6 374.3 417.0 459.8 502.5
Netherlands 352.6 426.6 469.9 447.1 487.5 517.4 544.8 581.6 626.7 679.8
Norway 42.9 49.0 76.1 83.9 89.7 94.6 99.2 105.6 113.2 121.7
Portugal 44.0 62.2 70.6 65.6 85.5 94.0 103.0 112.1 121.5 131.1
Spain 257.1 339.7 395.2 371.5 443.3 483.6 526.0 570.0 617.1 667.6
Sweden 117.8 151.9 197.8 172.4 218.4 247.1 272.8 297.8 323.8 348.8
Switzerland 124.8 162.0 197.7 169.0 207.1 228.5 247.0 264.6 281.4 298.3
Turkey 18.8 33.5 38.5 64.4 84.5 103.5 123.5 144.5 164.5 184.5
UK 549.0 634.5 742.4 863.0 1,135.3 1,255.1 1,360.5 1,470.9 1,583.6 1,699.8
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 5.4 8.6 11.5 13.2 12.5 14.0 15.6 17.2 18.9 20.5
Bulgaria 4.0 6.1 9.8 13.0 20.9 24.4 26.6 28.9 31.3 33.8
Croatia 6.9 10.5 12.9 11.5 15.1 17.6 20.3 22.8 25.3 28.0
Cyprus 4.9 6.7 8.6 8.7 10.2 11.9 13.4 14.5 15.5 16.5
Czech Republic 39.4 45.3 57.3 60.7 77.5 84.0 90.0 94.5 99.3 104.4
Estonia 4.2 7.0 10.1 12.3 13.9 15.3 16.6 18.0 19.4 20.8
Hungary 36.2 48.3 62.6 61.3 81.8 86.5 91.4 97.3 102.7 107.5
Kazakhstan 15.5 17.6 22.4 25.6 31.7 37.9 44.9 52.9 59.4 65.4
Latvia 2.8 3.3 4.5 5.0 7.4 8.4 9.3 10.3 11.4 12.6
Lithuania 4.0 5.0 6.4 8.2 10.9 11.9 13.0 14.2 15.6 17.0
Poland 48.3 57.9 86.4 89.7 103.6 116.1 128.1 140.7 153.6 166.7
Romania 7.8 12.2 20.5 25.9 37.3 47.1 54.3 61.6 68.6 75.8
Russia 27.2 35.2 50.6 65.2 93.9 128.9 157.9 187.9 218.9 250.9
Serbia 4.7 3.7 4.7 6.4 11.9 15.1 19.6 21.6 23.5 25.6
Slovakia 8.5 11.3 14.5 15.8 25.5 27.5 29.5 31.7 34.1 36.6
Slovenia 4.1 6.4 7.6 7.1 7.4 8.3 9.6 10.4 11.3 12.5
Ukraine 5.9 7.6 9.6 17.3 22.5 27.7 32.5 37.1 41.9 47.2
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Inward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 141.1 198.4 259.1 206.3 247.1 287.2 322.2 358.2 396.2 436.2
Bangladesh 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.7 6.3 7.1 7.9
China 440.2 487.3 542.3 621.4 699.5 779.0 863.1 949.5 1,040.4 1,133.4
Hong Kong 336.3 381.3 453.1 523.2 566.1 616.1 665.1 714.1 761.1 806.1
India 31.2 38.2 43.6 50.3 67.7 84.7 102.7 122.7 144.7 169.7
Indonesia 7.1 10.3 15.9 13.5 21.0 27.0 33.0 39.5 46.5 54.0
Japan 78.1 89.7 97.0 100.9 107.6 120.0 131.0 143.0 158.0 174.0
Malaysia 37.5 41.2 43.6 47.5 53.6 60.1 66.2 72.7 79.7 87.5
New Zealand 30.2 44.2 52.7 52.0 60.1 65.8 70.5 75.3 80.2 85.3
Pakistan 6.1 8.2 8.4 10.5 14.8 17.6 20.2 23.0 26.0 29.3
Philippines 12.0 11.8 12.9 14.8 17.1 19.4 21.8 24.2 26.5 28.9
Singapore 135.7 151.4 174.2 187.7 213.4 239.4 264.0 291.0 319.3 349.1
South Korea 62.7 66.1 87.8 94.1 97.7 102.3 108.4 115.7 124.1 133.8
Sri Lanka 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.5
Taiwan 33.5 36.1 40.3 41.9 49.4 56.6 63.3 69.8 76.6 84.6
Thailand 38.0 48.9 53.2 58.3 68.0 76.5 85.2 94.4 103.4 112.4
Vietnam 17.1 20.1 21.7 23.6 26.3 30.7 36.7 43.7 51.2 58.9
Latin America
Argentina 43.1 48.3 50.6 54.6 59.4 64.6 70.4 77.0 84.2 92.1
Brazil 100.8 132.8 161.2 195.6 214.3 248.8 275.8 300.8 325.8 351.8
Chile 44.9 54.1 60.5 73.9 82.0 92.0 101.8 112.7 124.5 136.5
Colombia 17.9 20.4 24.7 36.8 44.8 52.8 59.3 65.3 70.8 76.3
Costa Rica 3.7 4.3 4.6 5.4 6.9 7.9 8.9 9.9 10.9 11.9
Cuba 2.6 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.4 6.0 6.6
Dominican Republic 7.2 7.8 8.5 9.5 10.7 12.0 13.5 15.0 16.7 18.5
Ecuador 9.7 11.2 12.5 14.1 16.2 18.2 19.7 21.0 22.3 23.6
El Salvador 3.1 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.1 6.8 7.5
Mexico 154.3 172.8 197.5 217.2 236.2 257.5 279.0 301.5 325.2 349.7
Peru 11.7 12.9 13.3 15.8 19.4 21.5 23.5 25.5 27.5 29.6
Venezuela 39.0 41.4 42.4 44.4 45.4 43.0 44.2 46.2 48.3 50.4
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 5.7 6.3 7.2 8.3 11.5 15.5 20.0 24.8 29.9 35.2
Angola 11.8 12.0 13.4 12.1 14.3 16.1 17.8 19.9 21.8 23.6
Bahrain 6.2 6.7 7.4 8.3 9.4 10.6 11.7 12.6 13.5 14.3
Egypt 20.7 21.0 23.5 28.9 38.9 46.9 53.9 59.4 64.2 68.7
Iran 3.1 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.8 5.3 5.8
Israel 23.7 30.3 32.2 36.9 51.1 60.6 67.1 73.5 80.0 86.2
Jordan 2.5 2.9 3.6 5.1 7.3 9.8 11.8 13.7 15.7 17.9
Kenya 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Kuwait 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.7
Libya 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.8 3.3 4.8 6.4 8.0 9.7 11.5
Morocco 12.1 17.1 19.9 22.1 23.5 25.0 26.6 28.1 29.7 31.2
Nigeria 23.3 25.3 27.2 29.2 31.7 33.6 35.7 37.9 40.0 42.2
Qatar 3.4 4.9 6.8 9.1 11.9 15.1 18.3 21.4 24.4 27.5
Saudi Arabia 17.7 18.5 20.5 25.1 30.4 36.5 43.6 51.4 60.0 69.7
South Africa 29.6 45.7 63.1 69.2 69.2 70.9 72.9 76.4 80.5 85.0
Tunisia 13.9 16.2 17.8 16.9 19.6 21.9 23.8 25.3 26.8 28.4
UAE 3.6 7.8 16.2 28.2 44.2 59.2 71.2 82.9 95.2 108.2
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Inward foreign direct investment stock (% of GDP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 14.3 14.4 14.7 15.0 15.5 16.4 17.0 17.6 18.2 19.8
Canada 30.5 33.4 32.1 30.9 30.4 34.8 39.4 43.4 45.9 47.8
Western Europe
Austria 21.4 22.1 22.7 21.7 21.8 19.5 19.6 21.4 22.2 23.1
Belgium 101.2 115.0 131.1 127.4 138.7 139.7 148.7 169.7 189.9 205.8
Denmark 47.6 47.1 47.3 44.6 50.3 46.0 45.4 48.2 50.3 51.6
Finland 25.0 30.5 30.2 27.7 30.4 29.9 31.0 34.2 37.2 39.0
France 26.3 29.2 31.1 29.4 34.8 34.2 34.8 37.9 40.4 42.2
Germany 26.1 27.3 25.9 23.7 26.2 25.4 26.0 28.8 31.4 33.1
Greece 9.1 10.1 10.8 10.3 13.4 12.5 11.9 12.1 12.1 12.0
Ireland 149.0 141.9 127.5 105.2 101.5 92.7 93.9 100.7 106.0 109.4
Italy 10.7 12.0 12.8 12.6 15.9 15.8 16.8 19.1 21.0 22.4
Netherlands 80.2 79.1 77.2 71.0 73.5 67.9 66.9 71.6 75.7 79.5
Norway 22.4 21.8 29.4 27.8 26.7 25.0 24.1 26.9 28.7 30.3
Portugal 34.4 39.7 39.4 35.4 43.9 43.1 44.5 48.9 52.1 54.5
Spain 37.3 38.4 37.8 32.9 36.2 33.8 34.4 37.5 39.8 41.5
Sweden 48.3 49.9 56.7 48.2 56.9 56.5 58.0 62.6 67.1 70.8
Switzerland 45.2 50.2 55.0 46.2 54.7 56.2 57.8 62.5 65.4 67.7
Turkey 10.2 14.0 12.8 17.8 20.9 21.9 25.2 26.4 27.3 27.7
UK 34.7 34.8 34.2 38.5 47.5 46.0 48.6 51.8 54.4 57.5
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 85.9 118.7 132.7 99.4 62.8 48.5 40.9 36.8 33.9 31.8
Bulgaria 25.8 30.5 40.1 48.6 66.2 64.4 64.1 67.5 70.6 73.3
Croatia 30.4 35.8 41.1 34.2 41.6 41.7 39.3 42.5 44.8 49.6
Cyprus 46.7 50.7 54.5 51.4 55.9 58.3 61.6 66.8 70.4 72.9
Czech Republic 52.3 49.6 52.2 48.5 54.4 51.4 50.0 50.5 51.5 52.3
Estonia 57.8 73.0 86.4 89.2 84.6 74.6 71.9 74.3 75.6 75.9
Hungary 54.4 57.2 61.2 54.9 72.4 66.6 65.7 68.8 68.9 67.7
Kazakhstan 62.8 57.0 51.9 44.8 41.1 39.8 37.6 35.4 32.1 29.0
Latvia 29.5 29.3 32.8 31.1 36.5 32.5 31.4 33.1 34.4 35.5
Lithuania 28.0 26.7 28.3 32.0 36.7 32.9 31.6 33.2 34.6 35.2
Poland 24.4 26.7 34.1 29.5 30.4 28.4 28.7 30.6 32.1 32.8
Romania 17.0 20.5 27.2 26.7 30.6 29.2 28.8 30.4 31.1 31.3
Russia 7.9 8.1 8.6 8.5 9.5 10.9 11.6 12.3 12.9 13.3
Serbia 4.7 3.7 4.7 6.4 11.9 15.1 19.6 21.6 23.5 25.6
Slovakia 34.8 34.2 34.5 33.3 46.1 37.9 37.0 38.8 39.9 40.0
Slovenia 18.6 22.7 23.3 20.5 19.9 18.7 19.7 20.9 21.9 22.8
Ukraine 14.0 15.1 14.8 20.9 21.3 20.4 22.0 22.3 21.5 21.1 
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Inward foreign direct investment stock (% of GDP)    
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 34.2 37.8 40.6 29.0 32.7 33.5 38.7 44.3 49.1 52.7
Bangladesh 5.4 5.7 5.0 6.2 6.9 7.3 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.7
China 30.3 29.6 28.0 27.3 25.7 24.0 22.5 21.2 19.9 18.6
Hong Kong 205.4 240.6 273.2 294.3 298.3 302.8 301.1 300.8 297.0 293.2
India 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 8.1 8.4 8.7
Indonesia 3.5 4.4 6.2 4.7 5.8 6.4 6.9 7.6 8.1 8.4
Japan 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8
Malaysia 39.4 39.6 36.8 36.3 36.0 33.8 33.7 33.7 34.1 34.3
New Zealand 50.5 55.8 54.0 48.0 57.9 54.4 59.8 63.8 69.3 73.4
Pakistan 8.4 9.8 8.5 9.4 11.5 12.3 13.0 13.5 14.1 14.5
Philippines 15.7 14.8 14.9 15.0 14.6 13.9 14.4 14.9 14.9 14.9
Singapore 154.1 163.9 162.2 160.9 161.5 163.2 168.6 174.2 177.5 181.1
South Korea 11.5 10.9 12.9 11.9 11.0 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.4 9.3
Sri Lanka 10.4 10.6 10.8 10.4 10.9 10.4 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.4
Taiwan 11.4 12.0 12.5 12.1 13.9 15.4 16.0 16.5 17.0 17.5
Thailand 29.9 34.3 33.0 33.1 33.0 32.0 33.6 35.7 37.1 37.9
Vietnam 48.8 50.8 47.9 44.7 42.7 43.8 45.2 46.6 47.3 47.5
Latin America
Argentina 42.3 37.3 33.0 29.8 27.7 26.3 25.3 24.8 24.5 24.7
Brazil 19.9 24.0 24.3 22.2 20.1 19.6 19.8 21.1 22.4 23.7
Chile 66.5 73.1 63.2 62.2 56.2 58.2 59.8 64.6 70.8 74.0
Colombia 22.0 25.7 25.2 30.0 32.9 31.5 34.6 39.5 42.7 43.8
Costa Rica 22.2 24.3 24.9 27.1 30.9 32.1 33.6 35.2 36.7 38.0
Cuba 9.0 8.8 8.9 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.4 10.5 10.7 11.0
Dominican Republic 28.9 40.1 39.0 27.3 29.2 31.6 33.0 33.9 34.8 38.5
Ecuador 38.9 39.3 38.2 38.7 39.7 44.2 46.3 47.1 47.0 47.2
El Salvador 21.9 21.8 23.1 24.6 23.9 24.9 25.9 27.0 28.3 29.5
Mexico 23.8 27.0 28.9 28.3 28.1 29.4 30.8 31.7 32.5 33.2
Peru 20.5 20.9 19.1 19.9 20.7 20.7 21.3 22.0 22.7 23.1
Venezuela 42.0 49.5 37.7 30.7 25.0 20.2 21.2 22.3 22.9 23.5
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 10.0 9.3 8.5 8.1 10.2 12.9 16.1 18.9 21.4 24.3
Angola 109.3 86.7 98.2 60.1 49.6 40.2 35.3 30.9 28.4 25.0
Bahrain 73.4 70.0 66.8 61.8 61.3 62.8 65.1 68.9 71.2 72.3
Egypt 24.6 29.3 30.0 31.0 36.1 37.1 37.7 37.6 36.9 35.8
Iran 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5
Israel 21.7 26.3 26.3 28.5 36.4 39.2 39.4 40.8 41.9 42.1
Jordan 26.1 28.9 31.4 40.2 51.4 61.9 67.9 72.5 77.7 82.5
Kenya 7.4 7.0 6.7 5.9 5.0 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.7
Kuwait 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.2
Libya 2.5 2.7 2.7 4.8 7.3 10.2 14.0 17.5 19.5 21.4
Morocco 31.7 36.8 37.2 39.8 37.2 35.5 36.4 37.0 37.9 37.6
Nigeria 49.9 43.4 37.7 32.0 27.3 26.4 25.1 25.1 24.3 24.5
Qatar 17.0 20.7 21.4 21.5 22.6 25.8 27.7 26.6 26.3 28.3
Saudi Arabia 9.4 8.6 8.2 8.1 8.8 9.9 11.0 12.2 13.5 14.7
South Africa 26.7 27.4 29.1 28.6 27.1 28.3 28.3 29.0 29.7 30.5
Tunisia 61.7 65.0 63.0 59.0 65.8 67.0 69.8 72.6 74.7 75.9
UAE 4.8 8.9 15.4 21.3 27.1 30.1 30.8 31.3 32.5 32.6
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Inward foreign direct investment stock per head (US$)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 5,260 5,480 5,940 6,380 6,940 7,670 8,380 9,130 9,890 10,670
Canada 7,230 9,220 10,060 10,950 11,940 14,410 16,080 17,630 19,180 20,770
Western Europe
Austria 5,550 6,990 8,180 8,090 8,510 8,650 9,080 9,710 10,060 10,720
Belgium 24,850 34,630 45,600 45,870 52,800 59,570 66,030 72,780 79,720 86,850
Denmark 15,480 18,660 21,400 21,400 25,590 26,720 28,030 29,530 31,110 32,740
Finland 6,560 9,680 10,990 10,410 12,290 13,230 14,250 15,320 16,430 17,590
France 6,460 8,810 10,670 10,400 12,910 14,250 15,350 16,470 17,710 18,980
Germany 6,420 8,070 8,600 8,010 9,230 9,950 10,690 11,470 12,300 13,160
Greece 1,420 2,050 2,590 2,670 3,760 3,910 4,040 4,170 4,300 4,450
Ireland 46,780 56,200 57,910 51,760 53,730 56,740 60,680 64,970 69,890 75,010
Italy 2,260 3,120 3,810 3,860 5,070 5,740 6,440 7,170 7,910 8,650
Netherlands 22,100 26,500 28,990 27,490 29,860 31,540 33,060 35,120 37,660 40,690
Norway 9,530 10,830 16,720 18,330 19,480 20,390 21,270 22,500 23,970 25,630
Portugal 4,250 6,010 6,810 6,310 8,140 8,910 9,710 10,540 11,350 12,210
Spain 6,350 8,290 9,460 8,700 10,060 10,730 11,570 12,430 13,350 14,330
Sweden 13,220 16,990 22,040 19,130 24,140 27,110 29,770 32,310 34,940 37,440
Switzerland 17,200 22,150 26,840 22,790 27,760 30,430 32,690 34,810 36,800 38,800
Turkey 270 480 540 890 1,150 1,390 1,640 1,900 2,130 2,360
UK 9,290 10,700 12,470 14,430 18,910 20,830 22,500 24,230 25,990 27,790
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 660 1,050 1,390 1,580 1,480 1,640 1,810 1,980 2,150 2,310
Bulgaria 510 780 1,260 1,680 2,720 3,200 3,510 3,840 4,190 4,550
Croatia 1,540 2,330 2,850 2,540 3,310 3,860 4,450 5,000 5,540 6,130
Cyprus 6,960 9,410 11,770 11,620 13,280 15,300 16,950 18,080 19,150 20,240
Czech Republic 3,850 4,440 5,590 5,920 7,570 8,220 8,810 9,270 9,760 10,270
Estonia 3,100 5,150 7,440 9,100 10,310 11,370 12,360 13,420 14,490 15,600
Hungary 3,580 4,790 6,220 6,110 8,170 8,670 9,180 9,800 10,360 10,880
Kazakhstan 1,040 1,180 1,500 1,700 2,080 2,460 2,900 3,400 3,780 4,140
Latvia 1,160 1,400 1,940 2,150 3,190 3,640 4,080 4,550 5,060 5,640
Lithuania 1,140 1,430 1,850 2,380 3,190 3,510 3,840 4,220 4,660 5,130
Poland 1,260 1,510 2,260 2,350 2,710 3,040 3,360 3,690 4,040 4,380
Romania 350 560 940 1,190 1,730 2,180 2,510 2,850 3,180 3,510
Russia 190 240 350 450 660 910 1,110 1,330 1,560 1,800
Serbia 4,730 3,690 4,730 6,380 11,950 15,150 19,650 21,650 23,550 25,570
Slovakia 1,590 2,100 2,670 2,900 4,680 5,040 5,410 5,800 6,230 6,680
Slovenia 2,060 3,170 3,780 3,510 3,700 4,110 4,800 5,200 5,660 6,260
Ukraine 120 160 200 370 480 600 700 810 920 1,040 
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Inward foreign direct investment stock per head (US$)    
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 7,290 10,150 13,130 10,360 12,300 14,170 15,770 17,390 19,080 20,840
Bangladesh 20 20 20 30 30 30 40 40 50 50
China 340 380 420 480 530 590 650 710 780 840
Hong Kong 50,090 56,390 66,530 76,330 82,060 88,770 95,280 101,740 107,880 113,700
India 30 40 40 50 60 80 90 110 130 150
Indonesia 30 40 70 60 90 110 130 160 180 210
Japan 620 710 760 790 840 940 1,030 1,120 1,240 1,370
Malaysia 1,560 1,680 1,740 1,860 2,050 2,260 2,440 2,630 2,830 3,060
New Zealand 7,770 11,210 13,130 12,800 14,620 15,830 16,780 17,720 18,670 19,640
Pakistan 40 60 60 70 90 110 120 140 150 170
Philippines 150 140 150 170 190 220 240 260 280 300
Singapore 32,780 36,210 41,530 44,290 49,220 53,390 58,820 63,910 69,150 74,550
South Korea 1,320 1,390 1,840 1,950 2,020 2,100 2,210 2,350 2,510 2,700
Sri Lanka 90 100 110 120 140 150 160 180 190 210
Taiwan 1,500 1,610 1,790 1,860 2,190 2,500 2,790 3,060 3,360 3,690
Thailand 600 770 830 900 1,040 1,160 1,280 1,410 1,530 1,660
Vietnam 220 250 270 290 310 360 430 500 580 660
Latin America
Argentina 1,160 1,290 1,340 1,430 1,540 1,660 1,790 1,940 2,100 2,270
Brazil 580 750 900 1,080 1,160 1,330 1,460 1,570 1,680 1,790
Chile 2,880 3,430 3,800 4,590 5,040 5,600 6,130 6,720 7,350 7,980
Colombia 420 470 560 820 980 1,140 1,260 1,370 1,470 1,560
Costa Rica 930 1,040 1,110 1,270 1,580 1,780 1,970 2,150 2,330 2,500
Cuba 230 240 250 290 340 400 440 480 530 590
Dominican Republic 850 910 970 1,070 1,190 1,310 1,450 1,590 1,740 1,900
Ecuador 780 890 970 1,080 1,230 1,360 1,450 1,520 1,590 1,660
El Salvador 490 500 550 620 640 700 770 840 920 1,000
Mexico 1,520 1,690 1,900 2,070 2,220 2,400 2,570 2,740 2,920 3,110
Peru 440 480 490 570 690 760 820 870 930 980
Venezuela 1,590 1,650 1,660 1,710 1,710 1,600 1,620 1,660 1,710 1,760
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 180 200 230 260 350 460 590 720 860 990
Angola 830 820 890 780 900 980 1,060 1,150 1,220 1,290
Bahrain 9,120 9,600 10,360 11,490 12,920 14,360 15,540 16,550 17,400 18,170
Egypt 300 300 330 400 530 620 700 760 810 850
Iran 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 70 70 80
Israel 3,680 4,610 4,810 5,430 7,370 8,590 9,340 10,040 10,730 11,350
Jordan 490 560 660 920 1,290 1,670 1,950 2,200 2,450 2,720
Kenya 30 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 40
Kuwait 220 180 180 240 260 290 350 440 540 710
Libya 90 110 130 310 560 810 1,060 1,300 1,550 1,800
Morocco 410 570 650 710 750 780 820 850 890 920
Nigeria 180 190 200 210 230 230 240 250 260 270
Qatar 5,240 7,290 9,540 12,160 14,950 17,670 20,080 22,000 23,670 25,170
Saudi Arabia 800 820 880 1,050 1,240 1,450 1,680 1,930 2,190 2,480
South Africa 650 1,000 1,360 1,480 1,470 1,500 1,530 1,600 1,680 1,760
Tunisia 1,430 1,660 1,800 1,690 1,940 2,150 2,310 2,430 2,550 2,680
UAE 1,020 2,080 4,000 6,520 9,560 11,960 13,570 14,990 16,390 17,740
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Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 134.9 129.4 222.4 12.7 248.9 225.0 220.0 239.0 245.0 265.0
Canada 26.8 22.9 43.7 33.5 45.2 51.0 48.0 43.0 45.0 47.5
Western Europe
Austria 5.7 7.1 8.7 10.1 4.0 2.8 4.8 5.0 3.9 3.5
Belgium 8.9 39.0 34.7 30.1 63.2 70.9 71.3 80.0 78.8 84.3
Denmark 2.7 0.9 9.9 15.0 8.0 7.5 6.3 8.1 9.6 10.2
Finland 7.5 2.3 1.1 4.7 0.1 3.8 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.6
France 50.6 53.4 76.7 133.6 136.3 135.5 92.1 91.3 94.8 102.8
Germany 19.6 5.2 14.1 56.9 79.0 83.8 85.0 89.0 95.6 96.0
Greece 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.5 4.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.9 4.0
Ireland 11.1 5.6 18.1 13.8 22.3 16.7 14.8 13.7 10.5 11.8
Italy 17.2 9.0 19.1 40.7 41.8 52.7 55.4 58.1 61.0 64.1
Netherlands 31.8 44.6 26.4 140.5 22.3 63.6 79.2 80.4 79.9 84.6
Norway 4.6 2.7 3.5 21.1 12.2 19.4 18.9 19.3 20.2 22.0
Portugal 0.2 8.1 7.8 2.2 3.5 4.2 5.1 5.8 6.7 7.7
Spain 33.7 28.8 61.5 41.9 88.7 95.8 86.2 86.2 87.1 88.0
Sweden 10.6 21.1 21.8 26.5 24.6 35.0 31.5 30.2 28.4 30.6
Switzerland 8.6 15.7 26.1 54.1 81.6 76.0 71.0 70.0 72.0 75.0
Turkey 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.9 2.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.7
UK 50.3 65.6 98.2 91.7 79.8 82.8 84.8 91.1 95.0 101.4
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 0.3 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
Croatia 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8
Cyprus 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
Czech Republic 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.0 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.5 2.0 2.3
Estonia 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7
Hungary 0.3 1.7 1.1 1.8 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2
Kazakhstan 0.4 -0.1 -1.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
Latvia 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Poland 0.2 0.3 0.8 3.0 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.4
Romania 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
Russia 3.5 9.7 13.8 12.8 18.0 24.0 22.0 22.5 25.0 26.0
Serbia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Slovenia 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.2
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
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Foreign direct investment outflows (US$ bn)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 7.8 17.2 10.9 34.8 21.0 30.2 27.7 27.3 27.1 27.7
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 2.5 0.2 1.8 11.3 17.8 26.0 37.0 48.0 65.0 72.0
Hong Kong 17.5 5.5 45.7 27.2 43.5 40.6 37.0 39.0 38.7 39.3
India 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 9.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 14.5 16.0
Indonesia 0.2 0.0 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.5
Japan 32.0 28.8 31.0 45.4 50.2 53.5 56.2 55.6 55.4 59.0
Malaysia 1.9 1.4 2.1 3.0 6.0 4.3 3.9 3.1 2.8 3.0
New Zealand 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Philippines 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Singapore 2.3 3.2 8.5 5.5 8.1 8.9 8.9 9.0 8.9 9.4
South Korea 2.6 3.4 4.7 4.3 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.3
Sri Lanka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 4.9 5.7 7.1 6.0 7.4 7.5 8.9 10.2 10.3 11.7
Thailand 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Latin America
Argentina 0.6 0.8 0.4 1.2 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Brazil 2.5 0.2 9.5 2.5 28.2 5.0 10.0 8.0 9.1 10.0
Chile 0.3 1.6 1.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7
Colombia 0.9 0.9 0.1 4.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 0.9 1.3 4.4 6.5 5.8 5.8 6.8 6.7 7.7 8.5
Peru 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Venezuela 1.0 1.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 2.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Angola 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Bahrain 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Iran 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Israel 1.0 2.1 4.5 3.3 13.6 8.0 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.8
Jordan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kuwait 0.1 5.0 2.5 4.7 7.4 6.6 4.6 4.5 5.0 5.5
Libya 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Nigeria 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Qatar 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2
South Africa 0.4 0.6 1.3 0.9 6.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UAE 0.4 1.0 2.2 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.0 3.8 4.0 4.5
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Foreign direct investment outflows (% of GDP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 1.3 1.2 1.9 0.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6
Canada 3.6 2.6 4.4 3.0 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2
Western Europe
Austria 2.8 2.8 3.0 3.3 1.2 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.0 0.9
Belgium 3.5 12.6 9.7 8.1 16.0 16.0 15.4 17.9 18.0 19.2
Denmark 1.5 0.4 4.1 5.8 2.9 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.8 2.9
Finland 5.5 1.4 0.6 2.4 0.0 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.4
France 3.5 3.0 3.7 6.3 6.1 5.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.7
Germany 1.0 0.2 0.5 2.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9
Greece 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0
Ireland 9.0 3.6 9.9 6.9 10.1 6.4 5.4 4.9 3.7 4.0
Italy 1.4 0.6 1.1 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9
Netherlands 7.2 8.3 4.3 22.3 3.4 8.3 9.7 9.9 9.6 9.9
Norway 2.4 1.2 1.4 7.0 3.6 5.1 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.5
Portugal 0.2 5.2 4.3 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2
Spain 4.9 3.3 5.9 3.7 7.2 6.7 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.5
Sweden 4.4 6.9 6.2 7.4 6.4 8.0 6.7 6.3 5.9 6.2
Switzerland 3.1 4.9 7.2 14.8 21.6 18.7 16.6 16.5 16.7 17.0
Turkey 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
UK 3.2 3.6 4.5 4.1 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 5.2 12.8 13.9 9.2 2.9 4.2 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5
Bulgaria 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7
Croatia 2.4 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.4
Cyprus 5.2 4.4 4.5 2.8 4.7 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.1
Czech Republic 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.2
Estonia 1.8 1.6 2.3 4.4 6.3 4.4 3.0 3.1 2.7 2.6
Hungary 0.4 2.0 1.1 1.6 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Kazakhstan 1.7 0.4 3.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Latvia 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Lithuania 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Poland 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Romania 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Russia 1.0 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4
Serbia 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Slovakia 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Slovenia 0.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.9
Ukraine 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
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Foreign direct investment outflows (% of GDP)    
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 1.9 3.3 1.7 4.9 2.8 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Hong Kong 10.7 3.5 27.6 15.3 22.9 19.9 16.8 16.4 15.1 14.3
India 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Indonesia 0.1 0.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Japan 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
Malaysia 2.0 1.3 1.7 2.3 4.0 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.2 1.2
New Zealand 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5
Pakistan 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philippines 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Singapore 2.6 3.4 7.9 4.7 6.1 6.1 5.7 5.4 4.9 4.9
South Korea 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
Sri Lanka 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Taiwan 1.7 1.9 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4
Thailand 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Latin America
Argentina 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Brazil 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.3 2.6 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7
Chile 0.5 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0
Colombia 1.1 1.2 0.1 3.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Costa Rica 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
El Salvador 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mexico 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Peru 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Venezuela 1.1 1.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Angola 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bahrain 2.2 7.7 9.4 8.4 7.8 8.6 6.7 7.1 7.4 7.6
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Iran 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Israel 0.9 1.8 3.7 2.6 9.7 5.2 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3
Jordan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Kuwait 0.2 10.4 4.3 5.8 7.8 6.5 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.4
Libya 0.7 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Morocco 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Nigeria 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Qatar 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2
Saudi Arabia 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
South Africa 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
UAE 0.6 1.1 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4
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Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 1,867.0 2,059.9 2,399.2 2,453.9 2,702.8 2,927.8 3,147.8 3,386.8 3,631.8 3,896.8
Canada 274.4 312.2 369.8 392.7 449.0 500.0 548.0 591.0 636.0 683.5
Western Europe
Austria 44.1 58.3 71.2 80.3 84.4 87.2 92.0 97.0 100.9 104.3
Belgium 223.9 313.9 369.2 374.6 437.7 508.6 579.9 659.9 738.8 823.1
Denmark 86.7 102.6 111.7 127.1 150.1 157.6 163.9 172.1 181.6 191.8
Finland 63.9 76.1 85.0 80.6 90.9 94.7 98.7 103.2 108.3 113.8
France 586.3 724.5 845.5 882.3 1,075.9 1,211.4 1,303.6 1,394.9 1,489.7 1,592.4
Germany 602.8 720.7 810.6 801.4 940.4 1,024.1 1,109.1 1,198.1 1,293.7 1,389.7
Greece 9.0 12.3 13.8 13.3 19.6 24.1 28.1 31.6 35.5 39.5
Ireland 58.9 74.5 106.0 102.9 125.2 141.9 156.7 170.4 180.8 192.6
Italy 194.5 238.9 280.5 293.5 375.8 428.5 483.8 542.0 603.0 667.1
Netherlands 396.5 523.2 597.9 629.9 729.7 793.3 872.4 952.9 1,032.7 1,117.3
Norway 68.1 76.5 88.9 100.0 112.2 131.6 150.5 169.9 190.1 212.1
Portugal 21.1 35.9 48.3 50.6 54.1 58.3 63.3 69.1 75.8 83.5
Spain 233.9 292.5 371.2 372.6 508.0 603.8 690.0 776.3 863.4 951.4
Sweden 144.1 181.3 216.3 201.8 263.0 298.0 329.4 359.6 388.0 418.6
Switzerland 292.3 341.5 399.4 426.6 545.4 621.4 692.4 762.4 834.4 909.4
Turkey 5.8 6.1 7.1 8.3 8.9 10.9 11.9 13.1 14.6 16.3
UK 994.1 1,187.0 1,268.5 1,296.0 1,487.0 1,569.8 1,654.6 1,745.7 1,840.7 1,942.1
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 0.3 1.3 2.5 3.7 4.3 5.5 6.8 8.2 9.7 11.3
Bulgaria 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5
Croatia 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.6
Cyprus 1.3 2.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 5.1 6.0 6.7 7.4 8.1
Czech Republic 1.5 2.3 3.8 3.6 5.1 6.1 6.8 8.3 10.3 12.6
Estonia 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.0 3.6 4.5 5.2 5.9 6.6 7.3
Hungary 2.2 3.5 6.0 8.0 12.7 15.5 18.5 21.5 24.5 27.7
Kazakhstan 0.4 0.5 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.9 5.9
Latvia 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5
Lithuania 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.0
Poland 1.5 2.1 3.2 6.4 10.7 14.7 18.9 22.9 27.2 31.6
Romania 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.5
Russia 20.9 30.7 44.4 57.2 75.2 99.2 121.2 143.7 168.7 194.7
Serbia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovakia 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7
Slovenia 1.5 2.4 3.0 3.5 4.2 5.2 6.4 7.8 9.5 11.7
Ukraine 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6  
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Outward foreign direct investment stock (US$ bn)     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 114.9 161.9 204.2 178.3 226.3 256.4 284.2 311.4 338.5 366.2
Bangladesh 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
China 36.6 36.5 52.7 64.5 82.3 108.3 145.3 193.3 258.3 330.3
Hong Kong 309.4 339.6 403.1 471.3 514.8 555.3 592.4 631.4 670.1 709.4
India 5.8 7.8 10.1 12.1 21.1 31.1 43.1 57.1 71.6 87.6
Indonesia 7.2 7.3 10.7 13.7 17.2 20.8 24.6 28.6 32.9 37.4
Japan 304.2 333.0 370.5 386.6 436.8 490.2 546.4 602.0 657.4 716.4
Malaysia 10.2 12.0 12.8 21.8 27.8 32.1 36.0 39.1 41.9 44.9
New Zealand 9.3 11.5 12.5 12.9 14.1 15.6 17.3 19.0 20.7 22.5
Pakistan 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Philippines 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
Singapore 90.4 96.1 108.0 110.5 118.6 127.5 136.4 145.4 154.3 163.7
South Korea 20.7 25.0 32.2 36.5 43.6 50.7 57.9 64.9 71.9 79.3
Sri Lanka 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Taiwan 76.9 84.1 91.3 97.3 104.7 112.1 121.1 131.2 141.5 153.2
Thailand 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.8 5.6 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.3
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Latin America
Argentina 20.6 21.5 21.6 22.9 25.0 25.5 26.0 26.5 27.0 27.5
Brazil 54.4 54.9 69.2 79.3 107.5 112.5 122.5 130.5 139.6 149.6
Chile 12.2 13.7 17.4 21.4 24.2 27.1 30.2 33.5 36.9 40.6
Colombia 3.6 4.4 4.4 8.9 10.0 11.0 11.9 12.7 13.4 14.1
Costa Rica 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ecuador n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
El Salvador 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Mexico 12.9 16.6 22.2 28.0 33.8 39.6 46.4 53.1 60.8 69.2
Peru 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Venezuela 8.7 9.5 9.2 9.5 11.6 13.9 14.7 15.5 16.3 17.0
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7
Angola 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Bahrain 2.2 2.9 3.9 5.1 6.3 7.7 8.9 10.2 11.6 13.1
Egypt 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.2
Iran 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Israel 10.3 13.1 16.5 20.7 34.9 42.9 48.9 55.1 61.6 68.4
Jordan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Kenya 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Kuwait 1.6 1.6 4.1 5.4 12.8 19.4 24.0 28.5 33.5 39.0
Libya 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.1 -0.2
Morocco 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5
Nigeria 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0
Qatar 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.6 4.6 5.7 6.8 7.9
Saudi Arabia 1.7 1.8 2.5 3.7 5.2 6.8 8.5 10.3 12.2 14.4
South Africa 22.0 27.2 38.7 36.8 43.3 44.6 45.9 47.4 49.1 50.9
Tunisia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
UAE 1.4 2.4 3.4 10.1 14.1 17.8 20.8 24.6 28.6 33.1
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Outward foreign direct investment stock (% of GDP)
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America         
US 17.8 18.8 20.4 19.7 20.4 20.9 21.1 21.4 21.7 23.3
Canada 37.3 36.0 37.3 34.7 35.4 37.0 40.8 43.8 45.4 46.6
Western Europe
Austria 21.1 22.8 24.3 26.3 26.2 23.8 23.8 25.6 26.5 26.7
Belgium 88.6 101.1 102.8 100.5 111.0 115.0 125.7 147.9 169.0 187.1
Denmark 49.8 48.3 45.8 49.1 54.5 50.0 48.7 51.4 53.8 55.2
Finland 47.0 46.1 44.9 41.2 43.1 40.9 41.0 44.0 46.7 48.0
France 40.0 40.1 41.0 41.3 47.8 47.7 48.4 52.3 55.2 57.3
Germany 29.8 29.5 29.5 28.7 32.4 31.7 32.6 36.3 39.9 42.2
Greece 5.3 5.5 5.2 4.7 6.3 7.0 7.5 8.3 9.0 9.6
Ireland 48.0 47.4 57.8 51.2 56.7 54.8 56.8 61.6 63.6 64.7
Italy 15.9 15.8 16.2 16.6 20.3 20.3 21.8 24.8 27.5 29.8
Netherlands 90.2 97.0 98.2 100.0 110.1 104.1 107.1 117.3 124.8 130.7
Norway 35.5 34.0 34.4 33.1 33.4 34.8 36.6 43.3 48.2 52.8
Portugal 16.5 22.9 27.0 27.2 27.7 26.7 27.4 30.2 32.5 34.7
Spain 34.0 33.1 35.5 33.0 41.4 42.2 45.1 51.0 55.7 59.2
Sweden 59.1 59.6 62.0 56.5 68.5 68.2 70.0 75.6 80.4 85.0
Switzerland 105.8 105.8 111.1 116.6 144.1 152.7 161.9 180.1 193.8 206.4
Turkey 3.2 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
UK 62.8 65.0 58.5 57.8 62.2 57.5 59.1 61.5 63.2 65.7
Eastern Europe
Azerbaijan 5.2 17.3 28.5 27.8 21.5 19.0 17.8 17.5 17.4 17.5
Bulgaria 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.4
Croatia 8.0 7.0 7.1 6.4 6.6 6.1 5.5 6.0 6.8 8.2
Cyprus 12.2 15.4 20.2 19.2 22.6 25.1 27.7 31.2 33.8 35.9
Czech Republic 2.0 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.4 5.4 6.3
Estonia 9.3 10.7 12.2 14.4 21.7 21.8 22.4 24.5 25.8 26.7
Hungary 3.3 4.2 5.9 7.2 11.2 12.0 13.3 15.2 16.5 17.4
Kazakhstan 1.7 1.7 4.2 3.2 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
Latvia 0.6 1.0 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.2
Lithuania 0.4 0.6 1.9 2.8 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.4 5.9 6.3
Poland 0.7 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.1 3.6 4.2 5.0 5.7 6.2
Romania 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Russia 6.1 7.1 7.5 7.5 7.6 8.4 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.3
Serbia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovakia 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9
Slovenia 6.8 8.5 9.3 10.2 11.4 11.8 13.1 15.6 18.4 21.2
Ukraine 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
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Outward foreign direct investment stock (% of GDP)    
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Asia & Australasia          
Australia 27.9 30.8 32.0 25.0 29.9 29.9 34.2 38.5 41.9 44.2
Bangladesh 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
China 2.5 2.2 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.9 5.4
Hong Kong 189.0 214.3 243.1 265.1 271.2 273.0 268.2 265.9 261.5 258.1
India 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.2 4.5
Indonesia 3.6 3.1 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.8
Japan 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.5 10.0 11.2 11.0 10.5 11.0 11.5
Malaysia 10.7 11.6 10.8 16.7 18.7 18.0 18.3 18.1 17.9 17.6
New Zealand 15.5 14.5 12.8 11.9 13.6 12.9 14.7 16.1 17.9 19.4
Pakistan 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Philippines 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
Singapore 102.7 104.1 100.6 94.7 89.7 86.9 87.1 87.1 85.8 84.9
South Korea 3.8 4.1 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5
Sri Lanka 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Taiwan 26.1 28.1 28.3 28.1 29.4 30.6 30.6 31.0 31.5 31.6
Thailand 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Vietnam n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Latin America
Argentina 20.2 16.6 14.1 12.5 11.6 10.4 9.3 8.5 7.9 7.4
Brazil 10.8 9.9 10.4 9.0 10.1 8.9 8.8 9.2 9.6 10.1
Chile 18.1 18.5 18.2 18.0 16.6 17.1 17.8 19.2 21.0 22.0
Colombia 4.4 5.5 4.4 7.3 7.4 6.6 6.9 7.7 8.1 8.1
Costa Rica 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cuba n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Ecuador n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
El Salvador 0.2 1.0 0.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6
Mexico 2.0 2.6 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.6
Peru 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
Venezuela 9.4 11.4 8.2 6.5 6.4 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.7 8.0
Africa & Middle East
Algeria 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
Angola 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Bahrain 25.5 30.2 35.7 37.8 40.7 45.5 49.6 55.7 61.3 66.4
Egypt 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Iran 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Israel 9.4 11.3 13.5 15.9 24.8 27.8 28.7 30.6 32.3 33.4
Jordan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Kenya 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
Kuwait 4.3 3.4 7.0 6.7 13.5 19.3 22.6 25.7 28.4 31.6
Libya 10.3 8.8 6.3 5.1 3.4 2.5 1.8 1.1 0.2 -0.4
Morocco 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Nigeria 9.4 7.8 6.7 5.5 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.5
Qatar 2.8 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.8 6.1 6.9 7.1 7.3 8.2
Saudi Arabia 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0
South Africa 19.8 16.3 17.8 15.2 17.0 17.8 17.8 18.0 18.1 18.3
Tunisia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
UAE 1.9 2.8 3.3 7.6 8.6 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.8 10.0
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No. of FDI projects by country 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-06 total % of world total Rank out of 82  
North America
US  596 602 563 725 2,486 5.93 3
Canada  243 224 206 177 850 2.03 13
Western Europe 
Austria  81 100 103 82 366 0.87 33
Belgium  66 115 159 110 450 1.07 28
Cyprus  8 6 6 13 33 0.08 81
Denmark  74 92 79 65 310 0.74 35
Finland  30 32 35 41 138 0.33 55
France  162 233 489 582 1,466 3.49 6
Germany  276 276 271 333 1,156 2.76 7
Ireland  136 131 193 140 600 1.43 20
Italy  114 131 140 138 523 1.25 24
Netherlands  105 104 109 129 447 1.07 29
Norway  27 25 21 19 92 0.22 65
Portugal  62 80 28 45 215 0.51 44
Spain  224 266 152 242 884 2.11 10
Sweden  109 138 105 120 472 1.13 27
Switzerland  58 73 72 93 296 0.71 36
Turkey  71 66 67 84 288 0.69 38
UK  427 528 633 668 2,256 5.38 4
Eastern Europe 
Azerbaijan  25 26 20 13 84 0.20 69
Bulgaria  98 109 140 286 633 1.51 18
Croatia  44 40 46 37 167 0.40 51
Czech Republic  145 148 149 174 616 1.47 19
Estonia  30 43 63 54 190 0.45 48
Hungary  218 224 206 235 883 2.10 11
Kazakhstan  36 30 29 24 119 0.28 58
Latvia  44 29 84 109 266 0.63 40
Lithuania  42 23 77 59 201 0.48 45
Poland  154 240 271 324 989 2.36 8
Romania  116 181 261 362 920 2.19 9
Russia  429 382 511 386 1,708 4.07 5
Serbia 48 50 53 46 197 0.47 46
Slovakia  66 90 118 115 389 0.93 32
Slovenia  23 22 19 23 87 0.21 67
Ukraine  71 84 125 124 404 0.96 31
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No. of FDI projects by country 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-06 total % of world total Rank out of 82  
Asia & Australasia
Australia  182 139 110 126 557 1.33 21
Bangladesh  17 7 7 10 41 0.10 77
China  1,318 1,545 1,237 1,378 5,478 13.06 1
Hong Kong  90 128 125 151 494 1.18 26
India  452 695 590 979 2,716 6.47 2
Indonesia  62 59 77 93 291 0.69 37
Japan  134 157 121 145 557 1.33 21
Malaysia  186 125 93 123 527 1.26 23
New Zealand  33 21 17 27 98 0.23 64
Pakistan  23 20 69 27 139 0.33 54
Philippines  74 75 65 60 274 0.65 39
Singapore  155 176 159 189 679 1.62 15
South Korea  114 106 119 84 423 1.01 30
Sri Lanka  10 11 12 10 43 0.10 76
Vietnam  130 161 169 196 656 1.56 16
Thailand  162 126 117 111 516 1.23 25
Taiwan  115 84 68 66 333 0.79 34
Latin America
Argentina  64 75 41 47 227 0.54 42
Brazil  289 259 170 145 863 2.06 12
Chile  61 56 37 38 192 0.46 47
Colombia  43 47 46 30 166 0.40 52
Costa Rica  13 7 11 20 51 0.12 75
Cuba  6 5 5 1 17 0.04 83
Dominican Republic  11 9 7 7 34 0.08 80
Ecuador  9 21 4 4 38 0.09 78
El Salvador  4 7 4 5 20 0.05 82
Mexico  170 158 137 170 635 1.51 17
Peru  30 31 29 22 112 0.27 61
Venezuela  18 43 25 16 102 0.24 63
Africa & Middle East
Algeria  21 19 45 50 135 0.32 57
Angola  15 16 18 15 64 0.15 72
Bahrain  24 17 27 49 117 0.28 59
Egypt  40 34 45 51 170 0.41 50
Iran  29 23 10 9 71 0.17 71
Israel  17 17 24 34 92 0.22 65
Jordan  15 11 23 31 80 0.19 70
Kenya  13 15 13 13 54 0.13 74
Kuwait  7 21 10 21 59 0.14 73
Libya  4 7 15 11 37 0.09 79
Morocco  39 37 57 46 179 0.43 49
Nigeria  27 20 38 26 111 0.26 62
Qatar  22 27 24 43 116 0.28 60
Saudi Arabia  31 37 57 97 222 0.53 43
South Africa  61 52 63 74 250 0.60 41
Tunisia  17 9 33 26 85 0.20 68
UAE  146 156 226 282 810 1.93 14
Note. World total refers to all countries.
Source: Locomonitor.
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No. of FDI projects by sector
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-06 total % of total   
Software & IT services  937 1,189 1,197 1,264 4,587 10.93
Financial services  633 641 787 1,094 3,155 7.52
Food & tobacco  571 623 598 623 2,415 5.76
Business services  414 543 559 725 2,241 5.34
Textiles  421 590 410 498 1,919 4.57
Consumer products  396 431 404 585 1,816 4.33
Metals  433 371 540 441 1,785 4.25
Communications  338 361 521 548 1,768 4.21
Industrial machinery, equipment & tools  318 399 422 498 1,637 3.90
Chemicals  438 416 314 370 1,538 3.67
Automotive components  381 404 348 359 1,492 3.56
Real estate  238 229 263 495 1,225 2.92
Automotive OEM  354 337 316 308 1,315 3.13
Electronic components  266 315 353 344 1,278 3.05
Coal, oil & gas  436 257 328 278 1,299 3.10
Transportation  176 264 362 379 1,181 2.82
Hotels & tourism  305 288 265 293 1,151 2.74
Plastics  224 230 233 262 949 2.26
Consumer electronics  250 229 238 194 911 2.17
Semiconductors  218 247 183 222 870 2.07
Pharmaceuticals  208 204 199 192 803 1.91
Leisure & entertainment  212 186 129 173 700 1.67
Building & construction materials  130 145 156 186 617 1.47
Business machines & equipment  129 178 175 146 628 1.50
Warehousing & storage  112 154 152 181 599 1.43
Paper, printing & packaging  133 130 126 116 505 1.20
Beverages  139 157 95 122 513 1.22
Aerospace  89 102 112 139 442 1.05
Alternative/renewable energy  48 41 75 168 332 0.79
Medical devices  82 90 91 127 390 0.93
Wood products  105 96 100 74 375 0.89
Biotechnology  46 68 74 79 267 0.64
Rubber  52 62 74 70 258 0.62
Engines & turbines  53 52 47 70 222 0.53
Non-automotive transport OEM  41 56 49 55 201 0.48
Healthcare  49 47 37 51 184 0.44
Ceramics & glass  38 41 36 32 147 0.35
Minerals  36 27 50 22 135 0.32
Space & defence  18 25 27 31 101 0.24
Overall total 9,467 10,225 10,445 11,814 41,951 100.00
Source: Locomonitor.
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Outline of the model
The business rankings model measures the quality 
or attractiveness of the business environment in 
the 82 countries covered by Country Forecasts using 
a standard analytical framework. It is designed 
to reflect the main criteria used by companies to 
formulate their global business strategies, and is 
based not only on historical conditions but also on 
expectations about conditions prevailing over the 
next five years. This allows the Economist Intelligence 
Unit to use the regularity, depth and detail of its 
forecasting work to generate a unique set of forward-
looking business environment rankings on a regional 
and global basis.
The business rankings model examines ten 
separate criteria or categories, covering the political 
environment, the macroeconomic environment, 
market opportunities, policy towards free enterprise 
and competition, policy towards foreign investment, 
foreign trade and exchange controls, taxes, financing, 
the labour market and infrastructure. Each category 
contains a number of indicators that are assessed by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit for the past five years 
and the next five years. The number of indicators 
in each category varies from five (foreign trade and 
exchange regimes) to 16 (infrastructure), and there 
are 91 indicators in total.
Almost half of the indicators are based on 
quantitative data (for example, GDP growth), and 
are mostly drawn from national and international 
statistical sources (see sources below) for the 
historical period (2002-06). Scores for the forecast 
period (2007-11) are based on Economist Intelligence 
Unit forecasts. The other indicators are qualitative 
in nature (for example, quality of the financial 
regulatory system), and are drawn from a range 
of data sources and business surveys, frequently 
adjusted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, for 2002-
06. All forecasts for the qualitative indicators covering 
2007-11 are based on Economist Intelligence Unit 
assessments.
Calculating the rankings 
The rankings are calculated in several stages. First, 
each of the 91 indicators is scored on a scale from 1 
(very bad for business) to 5 (very good for business). 
The aggregate category scores are derived on the basis 
of simple or weighted averages of the indicator scores 
within a given category. These are then adjusted, on 
the basis of a linear transformation, to produce index 
values on a 1-10 scale. An arithmetic average of the 
ten category index values is then calculated to yield 
the aggregate business environment score for each 
country, again on a 1-10 scale.
The use of equal weights for the categories to 
derive the overall score reflects in part the theoretical 
uncertainty about the relative importance of the 
primary determinants of investment. Surveys of 
foreign direct investors’ intentions yield widely 
differing results on the relative importance of 
different factors. Weighted scores for individual 
categories based on correlation coefficients of recent 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows do not in any 
case produce overall results that differ significantly 
from those derived from a system based on equal 
weights.
For most quantitative indicators the data are 
arrayed in ascending or descending order and split 
into five bands (quintiles). The countries falling in the 
first quintile are assigned scores of 5, those falling 
in the second quintile score 4 and so on. The cut-
off points between bands are based on the average 
of the raw indicator values for the top and bottom 
countries in adjacent quintiles. The 2002-06 ranges 
are then used to derive 2007-11 scores. This allows for 
intertemporal as well as cross-country comparisons of 
the indicator and category scores.
 
Measurement and grading issues 
The indices and rankings attempt to measure the 
average quality of the business environment over 
the entire historical or forecast period, not simply at 
the start or at the end of the period. Therefore in the 
forecast we assign an average grade to elements of 
the business environment over 2007-11, not to the 
likely situation in 2011 only.
The scores based on quantitative data are usually 
calculated on the basis of the numeric average for 
an indicator over the period. In some cases, the 
“average” is represented, as an approximation, by the 
Appendix 4: Business environment rankings methodology
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recorded value at the mid-point of the period (2004 
or 2009). In only a few cases is the relevant variable 
appropriately measured by the value at the start of 
the period (for example, educational attainments). 
For one indicator (the natural resources endowment), 
the score remains constant for both the historical and 
forecast periods.
Sources 
The main sources used for the historical period scores 
include CIA, World Factbook; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Risk Service; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Country Finance; Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Country Commerce; Encyclopaedia Britannica, Annual 
Yearbook; Freedom House, Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties; Heritage Foundation, 
Index of Economic Freedom; IMF, Annual Report 
on Foreign Exchange Restrictions; International 
Institute for Management Development, World 
Competitiveness Yearbook; International Labour 
Organisation, International Labour Statistics Yearbook; 
UN Development Programme, Human Development 
Report; UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; UN, Energy 
Statistics Yearbook; Social Security Administration, 
Social Security Programs Throughout the World; World 
Bank, World Development Report; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators; World Bank, Doing Business; 
World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report.
Weights 
The overall business environment score is derived 
as an unweighted average of the ten category 
scores. Alternative weights based on the correlation 
coefficients of FDI inflows in 2002-06 with the 
individual category scores did not yield markedly 
different results. The use of average business survey 
results (which tend to vary widely) yielded similar 
rankings to the equal-weight method. The use of 
equal weights is in part a reflection of ignorance 
about the relative importance of various determinants 
of business decisions. It may be supported by 
empirical findings on the importance of policy 
complementarities, which suggest that economic 
performance depends on good policies being applied 
across the board, that is, very good polices in one 
area cannot offset poor policies in another. The equal-
weight method is likely to be a closer reflection of the 
latter point than a weighting system that assigned 
above-average significance to some categories.
The weights for deriving category scores from 
individual indicators are in four cases based on 
correlation coefficients between indicators and 
average inflows of FDI in 2002-06 and on business 
survey results. For the remaining six categories, all 
indicators have equal weights in deriving category 
scores.
Market opportunities 
GDP at PPP 0.16
GDP per head at PPP 0.10
GDP growth 0.16
Share of world trade 0.14
Growth of exports 0.08

















Cost of living 0.05
Tax regime 
Corporate tax 0.20
Marginal income tax 0.08
Value-added tax 0.08
Social security contributions 0.12
Investment incentives 0.12
Fairness of tax system 0.20
Tax complexity 0.20
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This questionnaire is composed of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators. The purely quantitative indicators are 
denoted by a single asterisk (*). Indicators with a double 
asterisk (**) are partly based on data. All other indicators 
are based on qualitative assessment.
I Political environment
Ia. Political stability
1. What is the risk of armed conflict (civil or external) during 
the forecast period?
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
2. What is the risk of significant social unrest during the 
forecast period?
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
Consider: large-scale demonstrations and inter-ethnic, 
racial or religious clashes; levels and direction of change 
of income inequality and unemployment; opposition to the 
IMF; serious labour disputes. 
3. How clear, established and accepted are constitutional 
mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one 
government to another?
⑤ Very clear, established and accepted
④ Clear, established and accepted
③ One of the three criteria is absent
② Two of the three criteria are absent
① Not clear, not established, not accepted
To distinguish between 4 and 5, score 5 if mechanisms in 
place prior to 1970, 4 otherwise.
4. Assess the impact on business of the relations between 
the government and opposition
⑤ Relations are smooth and present little risk to business
④ Relations can be fraught, with some moderate risk to 
policy predictability
③ Fraught relations and risks to political stability and policy 
predictability
② Relations are poor and this poses major risks for business 
① Conflict between government and opposition poses risks 
of major political disruptions
Consider: the impact of government-opposition relations on 
the predictability of the business and policy environment; 
the risk of major political disruptions; the extent to which 
governing and opposition forces engage in populist 
rhetoric.
If the country is authoritarian, with latent or suppressed 
opposition, then score according to the risk (5 very low 
to 1 very high) that the government’s efforts to suppress 
opposition could lead to serious disturbances in the policy 
and business environment.
5. Assess the threat of politically motivated violence 
(terrorism) to the conduct of government and business.
⑤ None  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
6. Assess the threat of international disputes and tensions 
to the economy and/or polity during the forecast period.
⑤ None  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
Ib. Political effectiveness
7. Is the present or prospective government likely to 
implement open, liberal and pro-business policies for 
nationals and foreigners?
⑤ Strongly yes  ④ Yes  ③ Inconsistently  
② No  ① Strongly no
8. Assess the effectiveness of the political system in 
formulating and executing policy.
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
Consider: tensions between the legislative and executive 
branches of government; instability in government 
formation; cohesion of the legislature.
9. Assess the quality of the bureaucracy and its ability to 
carry out government policy.
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
Consider: the amount of red tape encountered by business 
and the country’s administrative procedures.
Appendix 5: Business rankings questionnaire
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10. Assess the degree of transparency and fairness of the 
political system (including the judiciary).
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
Consider: the freedom of the press; the separation between 
the state and the ruling party; the consistency of the 
application of the law.
11. Assess the efficiency of legal system
Assess the speed and efficiency of the legal system
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low ① Very low
Consider: length of legal cases and time required to enforce 
contracts through the courts. Historic data from World Bank, 
Doing Business, supplemented by business survey data and 
Economist Intelligence Unit assessments.
12. Assess the pervasiveness of corruption among public 
officials.
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
Consider: how long the regime or government has been in 
power; the number of officials who are appointed rather 
than elected; the frequency of reports or rumours of bribery 
(the perception of degree to which public officials are 
involved in corrupt practices such as the misuse of public 
office for private benefit, accepting bribes, dispensing 
favours and patronage for private gain). 
13. Is crime a problem for government and business? 
⑤ Strongly no  ④ No  ③ Somewhat of a problem
② Yes  ① Strongly yes
Consider: the impact on business of organised crime and 
of violent crimes. Guide (violent crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants). Score 5 if less than 27; score 4 if 27 to 58; 
score 3 if 59 to 89; score 2 if 90 to 179; score 1 if more than 
170. 
Historical scores based on: incidence of violent crime, 
adjusted on the basis of business people’s impressions 
on security of property and persons, and Economist 
Intelligence Unit assessment.
II Macroeconomic environment
*1. Average annual inflation
⑤ If less than 3%
④ If between 3% and 10%
③ If between 10.1% and 20%
② If between 20.1% and 40%
① If more than 40%
*2. Average budget balance/GDP
⑤ If surplus or deficit less than 0.5% of GDP
④ If deficit between 0.5% and 3% of GDP
③ If deficit between 3.1% and 5% of GDP
② If deficit between 5.1% and 7% of GDP
① If more than 7% of GDP
*3. Average government debt/GDP
⑤ If less than 40% of GDP
④ If between 40% and 60% of GDP
③ If deficit between 60.1% and 80% of GDP
② If deficit between 80.1% and 100% of GDP
① If more than 100% of GDP
*4. Exchange-rate volatility; measured by the coefficient of 
variation of annual NCU:SDR rates
⑤ If less than 0.05
④ If between 0.05 and 0.09
③ If between 0.091 and 0.12
② If between 0.121 and 0.3
① If more than 0.3
*5. External stability; measured by current-account 
balance/GDP
⑤ If surplus or deficit of less than 1% of GDP
④ If deficit between 1% and 2.5% of GDP
③ If deficit between 2.6% and 4% of GDP
② If deficit between 4.1% and 5% of GDP
① If deficit more than 5% of GDP
 
 © The Economist Intelligence Unit 239
WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS APPENDIX 5  PART 3
6. Assess the quality of macroeconomic policymaking
⑤ Exemplary record of consistently prudent and successful 
policymaking
④ Macroeconomic policies are solid, but could benefit from 
some reforms
③ Suboptimal fiscal/monetary policy mix; increases 
exposure to external shocks 
② Macroeconomic policies are inconsistent with sustained 
stability
① Very serious deficiencies in policymaking
Consider: the quality of fiscal and monetary policy 
management. Is it prudent, consistent and credible? Is 
the mix appropriate? Does monetary policy need to be 
excessively tight to offset fiscal laxity?
7. Assess the extent and depth of the institutional 
underpinnings for macroeconomic stability
⑤ Long-established and strong; independent central bank
④ Solid institutional underpinnings; central bank formally 
autonomous, but subject to political pressure
③ Moderate institutional underpinnings; central bank 
subject to strong political pressure
② Weak institutional underpinnings, central bank not 
independent 
① Very weak institutional underpinnings; governments 
dictate monetary policy 
Consider: the degree of independence of the central 
bank. How strong are informal pressures on the monetary 
authorities to prioritise short-term growth over stability. 
Consider the track record of successful implementation and 
commitment to IMF programme. If part of a currency union, 
question refers to the common monetary authority.
8. Assess the risk of a steep decline in asset prices (property, 
shares, bonds)
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
III Market opportunities
*1. GDP at PPP, 2000 constant prices, average during the 
period
⑤ If more than US$900bn
④ If between US$281bn and US$900bn
③ If between US$146bn and US$280bn
② If between US$40bn and US$145bn
① If less than US$40bn
*2. GDP per head at PPP, 2000 constant prices, average 
during the period
⑤ If more than US$26,500
④ If between US$17,010 and US$26,500
③ If between US$9,010 and US$17,000
② If between US$4,000 and US$9,000
① If less than US$4,000
*3. Average annual GDP growth
⑤ If more than 6%
④ If between 4.1% and 6%
③ If between 2.1% and 4%
② If between 1.1% and 2%
① If less than 1%
*4. Share of world merchandise trade
⑤ If more than 2%
④ If between 0.81% and 2%
③ If between 0.41% and 0.8%
② If between 0.2% and 0.4%
① If less than 0.2%
*5. Average annual rate of growth of exports of goods and 
non-factor services
⑤ If more than 11%
④ If between 9.1% and 11%
③ If between 5.1% and 9%
② If between 2% and 5%
① If less than 2%
*6. Average annual rate of growth of imports of goods and 
non-factor services
⑤ If more than 11%
④ If between 9.1% and 11%
③ If between 5.1% and 9%
② If between 2% and 5%
① If less than 2%
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*7. The natural resource endowment (based on World Bank 
estimates of monetary value (US$ bn in 1990 prices) of 
countries’ natural resources endowments)
⑤ Very rich: if more than US$1trn
④ Rich: if between US$501bn and US$1trn
③ Fair: if between US$151bn and US$500bn
② Poor: if between US$50bn and US$150bn
① Very poor: if less than US$50bn
8. Profitability (proxied by the inverse of the incremental 
capital output ratio—ICOR; equals average real GDP growth 
over the period divided by the average ratio of fixed 
investment in GDP, in current prices, multiplied by 100)
⑤ If more than 23
④ If between 16.1 and 23
③ If between 7.1 and 16
② If between 4 and 7
① If less than 4
9. The extent of regional integration.
⑤ The country belongs to an economic union. There is 
freedom of movement for goods, people and capital (eg 
the EU). 
④ The country is part of a free trade area (eg NAFTA), and 
there are few sectoral restrictions. Or the country enjoys 
a very high level of preferential access to a major regional 
trade area.
③ The RTA is formally a free trade area, but there are a large 
number of sectoral and other restrictions (eg Mercosur or 
ASEAN). Or the country enjoys considerable preferential 
access to a major regional trade area.
② Formally may be a member of a trade regional grouping, 
but in practice, intra-bloc trade remains significantly 
restricted and any preferential access to major regional 
trade areas is limited.
① Not member of any regional trade grouping.
10. Proximity to major world markets (air distance to US, EU 
or Japan; in km)
⑤ Very close: if less than 1,000 km
④ Close: if between 1,000and 1,600 km
③ Moderately close: if between 1,599 km and 3,400 km
② Far away: if between 3,399 km and 6,000 km
① Very far away: if more than 6,000 km
IV Policy towards private enterprise and competition
1. Degree to which private property rights are guaranteed 
and protected
⑤ Very high: private property guaranteed by state and 
efficient contract enforcement
④ High: private property guaranteed but enforcement 
sometimes imperfect
③ Moderate: property rights recognised but enforcement lax
② Low: inadequate protection
① Very low: protection non-existent or very low, 
predominantly state ownership
2. Level of government regulation (mainly licensing 
procedures) on setting up new private businesses
⑤ Very low: regulations straightforward and applied 
uniformly to all
④ Low: simple licensing procedures, fairly simple 
regulations, applied uniformly most of the time
③ Moderate: haphazard application of regulations, 
complicated licensing, can be significant hindrance
② High: major barriers to opening business, government 
quotas, complex and expensive licensing procedures
① Very high: discouragement of new business, random 
application of regulations
3. Freedom of existing businesses to compete
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
4. Government policy on actively promoting competition 
and curbing unfair business practices
⑤ Very good: unrestricted entry to almost all markets; 
effective enforcement of well-drafted competition policy
④ Good: significant actions to reduce monopoly power and 
promote competitive environment
③ Fair: some actions to curb monopoly power; reduction of 
entry restrictions
② Poor: competition policy and legislation exist; little 
enforcement action
① Very poor: no effective competition institutions or 
legislation
5. Protection of intellectual property
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
Consider: how strict and well-enforced the regulations are. 
How efficient are the courts in dealing with transgressors? 
Can the injured party gain an injunction? Does protection 
extend to patents, trademarks and service marks?
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6. Price controls
⑤ Very few or none
④ In a few areas, usually including energy and some utilities
③ In some areas, including energy, agricultural products 
and some household staples
② In a significant number of industrial sectors as well as 
utilities
① Extensive
7. Distortions in the business environment arising from 
special interest groups’ lobbying of government
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
8. Degree to which state control and ownership of 
enterprises distorts the business environment
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
9. Degree of protection of minority shareholders’ rights
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
Consider: legislation, corporate governance rules and 
commitments, publicised cases of the abuse of minority 
shareholders’ rights
V Policy and attitudes towards foreign investment
1. Government policy towards foreign capital
⑤ Very encouraging: investment encouraged, almost no 
restrictions on activity
④ Encouraging: restrictions on investment in certain areas 
such as natural resources and utilities
③ Fairly encouraging: some restrictions in addition to 
utilities
② Restrictive: extensive restrictions, investments examined 
on a case-by- case basis
① Very restrictive: investment banned or heavily 
discouraged
Consider: restrictions on fields of activity and ownership 
shares, whether effective treatment is fair and equitable, 
the ease and speed of registration procedures.
2. Openness of national culture towards foreign influence
⑤ Very open  ④ Open  ③ Fairly open  ② Fairly closed  
① Closed
3. Risk of expropriation of foreign assets
⑤ Non-existent  ④ Very low  ③ Low  ② Moderate  
① High
Consider: outright nationalisation or creeping expropriation 
in which progressive restrictions or local ownership 
requirements strip foreign investor of control.
4. Availability of investment protection schemes
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
Consider: the extent of country coverage of investment 
protection schemes.
5. Assess the degree to which the authorities favour 
domestic interests over foreign companies.
⑤ No favouritism; level playing
④ Some strictly limited favouritism
③ Moderate degree of favouritism
② High degree of favouritism
① Very high degree of favouritism
Consider: factors such as government’s proclivity to promote 
“national champions”, and anti-foreign collusion between 
government and domestic business groups.
VI Foreign trade and exchange regimes
1. Capital account liberalisation
⑤ Full liberalisation
④ Almost all capital flows free; a few sectors excepted; 
minor administrative procedures
③ Inward and outward investment allowed, but there are 
significant regulatory restrictions to capital mobility
② Special government approval required for any outward 
investment; heavy restrictions on inward flows
① Tightly controlled capital flows
**2. Tariff and non-tariff protection (measured by average 
tariff levels; if non-tariff barriers such as trade quotas, 
licensing and import inspection are significant, score is 
reduced by at least 1 point)
⑤ Very low: if average tariff less than 5%
④ Low: if average tariff between 5% and 10%
③ Moderate: if average tariff between 10.1% and 15%
② High: if average tariff between 15.1% and 20%
① Very high: if average tariff more than 20%
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*3. Openness: actual trade as % of GDP versus “expected” 
trade (“expected” trade based on pooled regression relating 
share of trade in GDP to geographic size, population and 
location relative to potential trading partners)
⑤ Very high: if more than 1.5
④ High: if between 1.17 and 1.5
③ Moderate: if between 0.91 and 1.16
② Low: if between 0.6 and 0.9
① Very low: if less than 0.6
4. Assess the speed and complexity of conducting cross-
border trade
⑤ Few border delays; simple and brief documentation
④ Some border delays and non-trivial documentation 
requirements
③ Considerable delays and extensive documentation 
required
② Lengthy delays and onerous documentation requirements 
① Very long border delays and extremely complex 
bureaucracy
Consider: border delays for exports and imports; complexity 
and extent of required documentation. World Bank Doing 
Business for historic scores.
5. Transactions on the current account
⑤ Full IMF Article VIII convertibility
④ Currency almost fully convertible; minor restrictions still 
in place
③ High degree of formal liberalisation, but significant 
restrictions
② Partial liberalisation; multiple exchange rates
① Very restricted
VII Tax regime
**1. Corporate tax burden
⑤ Very low: if top corporate tax less than 25%
④ Low: if top rate between 25% and 30%
③ Moderate: if top rate between 30.1% and 35%
② High: if top rate between 35.1% and 40%
① Very high: if top rate more than 40%
Consider: how exemptions or the operation of the system 
may affect the scores based on official tax rates. If 
foreign and domestic firms face different tax regimes, 
consider separately for each. Consider special incentives 
and allowances for foreign-owned firms, as well as very 
significant transfer pricing tolerated by governments. Final 
scores for corporate tax burden should be an average of the 
two regimes.
*2. The top marginal personal income tax rate
⑤ Very low: if less than 35%
④ Low: if between 35% and 40%
③ Moderate: if between 41% and 49%
② High: if between 50% and 55%
① Very high: if more than 55%
*3. Value-added tax (VAT)
⑤ Very low: if VAT rate less than 10%
④ Low: if tax rate between 10% and 15%
③ Moderate: if tax rate between 15.1% and 20%
② High: if top rate between 20.1% and 24%
① Very high: if top rate more than 24%
*4. Employers’ compulsory social security contributions
⑤ Very low: if less than 7%
④ Low: if between 7% and 14%
③ Moderate: if between 14.1% and 22%
② High: if between 22.1% and 30%
① Very high: if more than 30%
5. Assess the degree to which the fiscal regime encourages 
new investment
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
6. Assess the consistency and fairness of the tax system
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
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7. Assess the complexity of the tax system
⑤ Very simple  ④ Simple  ③ Moderately complicated 
② Complicated  ① Very complicated
Consider: the number of taxes that have to be paid and the 
time taken to process tax payments. Word Bank, Doing 
Business for historic data and business surveys.
VIII Financing
1. Degree of openness of banking sector
⑤ Very high: very few or no restrictions on foreign banks; 
government controls few commercial banks
④ High: few limits on foreign banks; some limits on 
financial services
③ Moderate: barriers to new bank formation; significant 
government influence
② Low: banks tightly controlled by government
① Very low: financial institutions in chaos
Consider: freedom of foreign banks to operate and to provide 
range of financial services.
*2 Financial depth; stockmarket capitalisation (US$ per head)
⑤ If more than US$12,000
④ If between US$5,001 and US$12,000
③ If between US$501 and US$5,000
② If between US$100 and US$500
① If less than US$100
**3. Degree of distortion in financial markets
⑤ Very low: real interest rates consistently low and positive; 
low differential between deposit and lending rates
④ Low: positive real interest rates, but differential between 
deposit and lending rates is at least 5%
③ Moderate: single-digit negative real interest rates
② High: double-digit negative real rates and large deposit-
lending rate differentials
① Very high: severe disruptions in credit market
Consider: interest-rate controls; negative real interest 
rates; differential between deposit and lending rates; credit 
market disruptions.
4. Quality of the financial regulatory system
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
5. Access of foreigners to local capital market
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
6. Access to medium-term finance for investment
⑤ Very good: easy access to foreign and domestic financial 
markets for the entire range of financial instruments
④ Good: reasonable access, but impaired in at least one 
category, usually equity finance
③ Fair: access to foreign markets mainly for foreign-
owned firms. Can tap domestic bank finance, but limited 
availability of other vehicles
② Poor investment mainly self-financed. Limited bank 
finance
① Very poor: acute shortage of investment finance
IX Labour market and skills
**1. Incidence of strikes; working days lost per 1,000 
population per year
⑤ Very low: if less than 2
④ Low: if between 2 and 10.5
③ Moderate: if between 10.6 and 32
② High: if between 32.1 and 60
① Very high: if more than 60
*2. Labour costs adjusted for productivity (costs measured 
by average hourly dollar earnings in manufacturing; 
productivity proxied by GDP per head at PPP)
⑤ Very low: if index (US=100) less than 30
④ Low: if between 30 and 60
③ Moderate: if between 60.1 and 120
② High: if between 120.1 and 160
① Very high: if more than 160
Sources for wage data: US Department of Labor, 
International Labor Comparisons; UNIDO, Industry and 
Development; International Labour Office, International 
Labour Statistics Yearbook.
*3. Availability of skilled labour; mean years of schooling
⑤ Very good: if more than 11
④ Good: if between 9 and 11
③ Fair: if between 7 and 8.9
② Poor: if between 4 and 6.9
① Very poor: if less than 4
4. Quality of work force (flexibility, adaptability, initiative)
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
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5. Degree of restrictiveness of labour laws on hiring and 
firing practices
⑤ Very low  ④ Low  ③ Moderate  ② High  ① Very high
6. Extent of wage regulation
⑤ Very low: wages determined by supply and demand; no 
wage regulation; no minimum wage law or law not enforced
④ Low: wages determined mainly by supply and demand; 
some minimum wage regulations for specific sectors
③ Moderate: some controls including strict minimum wage 
law
② High: extensive wage controls; government influence 
extensive
① Very high: government determines wage structure
7. The hiring of foreign nationals
⑤ Very easy
④ Easy
③ With some difficulty
② With great difficulty
① Almost impossible
Consider: immigration barriers; rules on employment of local 
nationals; unofficial barriers
*8. Cost of living (mid-1998 base; index New York=100)
⑤ Very low: if lower than 88
④ Low: if between 89 and 93
③ Moderate: if between 94 and 100
② High: if between 101 and 115
① Very high: if more than 115
9. Assess the availability and quality of local managerial 
staff
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
10. Assess the degree to which language skills of the 
workforce meet the needs of business
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
If English is the native language score 5, except if there is 
evidence that poor foreign-language skills of the workforce 
have had an adverse impact on business 
11. The health of the workforce (based on average life 
expectancy)
⑤ Very good: if life expectancy higher than 77
④ Good: if between 75 and 77
③ Moderate: if between 70 and 74.9
② Poor: if between 65 and 69.9
① Very poor: if less than 65
12. The technical skills of the workforce
⑤ Abundant supply, at a reasonable cost, of technically 
skilled professionals; full range of training and 
development programmes
④ Reasonable supply of technically skilled labour; some 
availability of training and development programmes
③ Technically skilled available but at a high price; training 
for fraction of workforce. Older workers resistant to new 
technology
② Widespread shortage of technical skills; few technical 
education opportunities




*1. Fixed-line telephone density: phone lines per 1,000 
population
⑤ Very high: if more than 480
④ High: if between 351 and 480
③ Moderate: if between 121 and 350
② Low: if between 40 and 120
① Very low: if less than 40
**2. Reliability of telecoms network: faults per 100 phone 
lines per year
⑤ Very good: if less than 13
④ Good: if between 13 and 23
③ Fair: if between 24 and 56
② Poor: if between 57 and 200
① Very poor: if more than 200
Historical scores adjusted on the extent to which: network 
meets business needs. Where data on faults unavailable, 
average waiting time for instalment of new lines is used as a 
proxy measure of quality.
*3. The costs of international phone calls (US$ per 3 
minutes to US)
⑤ Very low: if lower 0.7
④ Low: if between 0.7 and 1.75
③ Moderate: if between 1.76 and 2.5
② High: if between 2.51 and 4
① Very high: if more than 4
Based on cost of three-minute call to the US (for US, cost of 
call to Europe).
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*4. Mobile phone penetration, subscribers per 100 
inhabitants
⑤ Very high: if more than 80
④ High: if between 60 and 80
③ Moderate: if between 30 and 59
② Low: if between 10 and 29
① Very low: if less than 10
*5. Number of Internet users, per 100 inhabitants
⑤ Very high: if more than 45
④ High: if between 30 and 44
③ Moderate: if between 15 and 29
② Low: if between 5 and 14
① Very low: if less than 5
*6. Number of broadband subscribers, per 100 inhabitants
⑤ Very high: if more than 9
④ High: if between 5 and 9
③ Moderate: if between 0.5 and 4.9
② Low: if between 0.1 and 0.49
① Very low: if less than 0.1
*7. Stock of personal computers (per 1,000 inhabitants)
⑤ If more than 170
④ If between 80% and 170%
③ If between 20 and 79.9%
② If between 3 and 19.9%
① If less than 3
*8. Technological infrastructure, the share of expenditure 
on research and development (R&D) in GDP
⑤ If more than 1.8%
④ If between 1% and 1.8%
③ If between 0.5% and 99%
② If between 0.1% and 49%
① If less than 0.1%
9. The availability and quality of the local research 
infrastructure
⑤ Very high  ④ High  ③ Moderate  ② Low  ① Very low
Consider: the quality of domestic research institutions; the 
extent of university-industry co-operation; the availability 
of scientists and engineers and the availability of skilled 
researchers
Xb Transport and other infrastructure
**10. Road density: km of paved roads per million 
population
⑤ Very high: if more than 10,000
④ High: if between 5,401 and 10,000
③ Moderate: if between 1,401 and 5,400
② Low: if between 500 and 1,400
① Very low: if less than 500
Historical scores adjusted on the basis of: business surveys on 
the extent to which country’s road network meets business 
requirements.
*11. Annual production of electricity per head; kwh per head
⑤ Very high: if more than 7,000
④ High: if between 4,501 and 7,000
③ Moderate: if between 2,501 and 4,500
② Low: if between 750 and 2,500
① Very low: if less than 750
12. The infrastructure for retail and wholesale distribution
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
Historical scores based on: data on retail outlets per million 
population and Economist Intelligence Unit assessment.
**13. Extent and quality of rail network; rail density: km per 
million population
⑤ Very high: if more than 750
④ High: if between 351 and 750
③ Moderate: if between 161 and 350
② Low: if between 70 and 160
① Very low: if less than 70
14. Assess the quality of the ports infrastructure
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
15. Assess the quality of the air transport infrastructure
⑤ Very good  ④ Good  ③ Fair  ② Poor  ① Very poor
Consider: reputation for efficiency, quality of service to 
passengers, safety record of main carriers. Extent and 
quality of airport infrastructure
*16. Rents of office space (US$ per sq metre per month)
⑤ Very low: if less than US$20
④ Low: if between US$20 and US$28
③ Moderate: if between US$28.1 and US$33
② High: if between US$33.1 and US$50








Tel: (44.20) 7576 8000
Fax: (44.20) 7576 8476
E-mail: london@eiu.com
NEW YORK




Tel: (1.212) 554 0600







Tel: (852) 2585 3888
Fax: (852) 2802 7638
E-mail: hongkong@eiu.com
